THE MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN * BRILL

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Blake R. Beattie

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THE MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN

PEOPLES, ECONOMIES AND CULTURES, 400–1500

VOLUME 67

BRILL

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BY

BLAKE R. BEATTIE

BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2007

On the cover: Orsini's titular church, San Teodoro, Rome
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This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Beattie, Blake R.
Angelus pacis : the legation of Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini, 1326-1334 / by Blake R. Beattie.
p. cm. — (The medieval Mediterranean, ISSN 0928-5520 ; v. 67)
Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.
ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15393-6
ISBN-10: 90-04-15393-4 (hardback : alk. paper)
1. Orsini, Giovanni Gaetano, 14th cent. 2. Papal legates—France. 3. Catholic Church—Cardinals—Biography. 4. Italy—Church history. 5. France—Church history. 6. Catholic Church—Foreign relations—France. 7. France—Foreign relations—Catholic Church. I. Title.

BX1908.B43 2006
282'.450923—dc22

2006049029

ISSN 0928-5520
ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15393 6
ISBN-10: 90 04 15393 4

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

In memoriam matris meæ:
Norma L. (Danner) Beattie,
1929–2004

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A book's faults lie with its author; its strengths reflect the generosity of many kind souls. Dr. Joseph Goering (University of Toronto), Dr. Giulio Silano (University of Toronto) and Dr. Norman Zacour (University of Toronto) provided invaluable assistance in the early stages of this work's research and composition. I am likewise indebted to Dr. Pierre Boglioni (Université de Montréal) and Dr. Paul Fedwick (University of Toronto) for their helpful suggestions. Dr. Kerry Spiers (University of Louisville) was both a congenial sounding board and a wellspring of knowledge regarding the Avignonese court. Dr. Thomas Burman (University of Tennessee—Knoxville) provided moral support and practical guidance concerning the publication process. I owe special thanks to Donald Biddle for his fine maps; to May Drost, copy-editor *par excellence*; and to John Beattie and Bob Whittaker for their exceedingly generous hospitality while I scrambled to finish the book at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.

In the spring of 1991, I spent a lovely day with my wife and a good friend, Charles Hilken, in Anagni, a dusty little town where history ended in the autumn of 1303. There were hardly any tourists there; we had the place to ourselves. Around noon we went to the cathedral, where a friendly custodian took us through the crypt. By the time the tour ended it was nearly one o'clock, and the two custodians were preparing to close up for the afternoon siesta. At that moment, a busload of French tourists arrived and entered the cathedral. The custodians managed to conceal their impatience until one man began taking pictures, within arm's length of a large, multilingual sign prohibiting flash photography. The younger custodian approached him and politely asked him to refrain. The man complied with a smile—then snapped off another half dozen photos and raced out of the *Duomo*, with an infuriating wave to the two custodians. The older man stood, shaking his head in disgust, while the younger proclaimed, in rather too-loud a voice, "*i francesi*—**ANCORA** *i francesi*" ("the French—***AGAIN*** the French"). I owe a special debt to those two anonymous Anagnesi curators for reminding me of the enduring power of cultural and historical memory in the ancient

places of Italy. Above all, I must thank my wife and fellow scholar, Pamela Drost Beattie, for her innumerable contributions and boundless, loving patience.

INTRODUCTION

Of the many troubles that bedeviled the popes of Avignon, perhaps none was more tenacious or seemingly intractable than the problem of Italy. For seven decades, the popes justified their protracted absence from Rome through liberal use of the formula *ubi papa, ibi Roma* ("where the pope is, there is Rome"). In the end, though, they could not deny that their true earthly home was in Rome—not the rhetorical Rome that followed faithfully and compliantly in their train, but the real Rome, forever fixed on the banks of the Tiber River, to which Divine Providence and thirteen centuries of sacred history had bound the successors of Saint Peter with indissoluble ties. But knowing they belonged there was one thing; actually getting there was quite another. For much of the fourteenth century, the Italian peninsula was convulsed by inter-city conflicts and civil unrest. Many northern cities had come under the rule of powerful autocrats who benefited from the pope's absence and were determined to prolong it for as long as possible; many vital papal allies found themselves paralyzed by economic instability and political division. Rome, for its part, was inhospitable to the point of being very nearly uninhabitable. Within the walls of the crumbling and under-populated city, poverty and crime were rampant; beyond them lay malarial marshlands and the rural strongholds of Rome's famously unruly nobles, whose turbulence had increased during the papacy's absence. Whether the popes wanted to return or not—and, despite their protestations to the contrary, at least some of them, along with a goodly portion of their cardinals, clearly preferred the Rhône to the Tiber—was immaterial, so long as conditions in Italy precluded their safe return. In the face of often strident criticism and impassioned exhortations to return home, the popes of Avignon struggled mightily to pacify Italy. Were they to struggle a bit too mightily, they were assailed for a bellicosity that ill became the vicars of Christ on earth; if they gave any ground, they were accused of abandoning the City of Peter and Paul. Damned if they did and damned if they didn't, the Avignon popes expended the better part of seventy years and a veritable fortune on the thankless, immensely difficult, and absolutely essential task of rendering Italy suitable for the papacy's eventual return.

For better and for worse, Avignonese papal policy in Italy owed more to John XXII (1316–34) than to any other pope. Every Avignonese pope after John either consciously rejected John's Italian policy and created a deliberately distinct alternative, like Benedict XII (1334–42) and Clement VI (1342–52), or adopted it, with some modification, like Innocent VI (1352–62), Urban V (1362–70) and Gregory XI (1370–78).[1] John's predecessor, Clement V (1305–14), made the first attempts to manage Italian affairs from afar by means of powerful legates, thereby establishing a vitally important precedent for his successors, but it was John who placed such initiatives at the heart of a coherent policy. Where Clement tried to avoid an overly close cooperation with the Capetian and Angevin crowns, John saw Angevin Naples as the centerpiece of an Italian "Guelf" alliance whose restored primacy he regarded as indispensable to Italian stability and order. It was John, too, who began the systematic transformation of administration in the Papal States, replacing the predominantly Roman and aristocratic rectors of the thirteenth century with a new generation of Gallic administrators schooled principally in the bureaucratic principles and techniques of the fourteenth-century curia. Most importantly, he made the pacification of Italy the highest priority of his eighteen-year pontificate, investing a tremendous amount of human and material resources into the task.

John XXII's Italian policy was exceptionally ambitious. It was also in many respects quite brilliant in its conception. John did not simply resign himself to an indefinite stay in Avignon; there are far too many elements of his pontificate that argue against such a view. On the other hand, his knowledge of Italian affairs probably made him much more willing than his predecessor to countenance the possibility of a protracted absence from Rome. John's Italian policy was grounded in and proceeded from three eminently pragmatic and entirely sensible assumptions: [1] that the pope should do everything in his power to return the papacy to Rome; [2] that the pope should not feel constrained to return before the state of affairs in Italy, and particularly in Rome, made it reasonably safe for him to do so; and

[1] See Andrea Gardi, "Il mutamento di uno ruolo: i legati nell'amministrazione interna della Stato pontificio dal XIV al XVII secolo," in *Offices et papauté (XIV^e–XVII^e siècle). Charges, hommes, destins*, ed. Armand Jamme and Olivier Poncet, Collection de l'École Française de Rome 334 (Rome, 2005), pp. 378–386.

[3] that, given the very real possibility of failure, the pope should provide for the best possible administration of papal holdings in Italy during what could well turn out to be a very long absence. These practical bases underlay virtually everything the pope did or instructed his agents to do with respect to Italy.

The implementation of John's Italian policy was heavily dependent on the activities of French and (especially) Languedocian agents. This should come as no surprise. The fate of Italy was always among the highest priorities of the popes of Avignon; the men they sent to see to it were among their closest and most trusted associates. Of course, all seven popes of Avignon were sons of the Midi—which meant that their closest and most trusted associates were, almost without exception, kinsmen or compatriots from Gascony, Cahors or Limoges. It was to these men that the popes turned for the management of distant Italy; whether they went as legates, nuncios, or administrative officers in the Papal States, the papacy's agents in Italy tended quite naturally to come from the same broadly Gallic social and ecclesiastical circles as the popes who sent them. Cardinals Arnaud de Pellagrue and Bertrand du Poujet were intimate associates of Popes Clement V and John XXII, respectively; the popes who sent them to Italy trusted them implicitly as more capable hands in which to leave the important as the affairs of war-torn Italy. That they were Gallic was neither surprising nor, from the popes' perspective, terribly pertinent.

It did, however, have practical consequences. For one thing, the papacy's reliance on Gallic agents in Italy very quickly proved a costly affair. The administrative overhaul of the Papal States required a considerable outlay of expenditures. Papal officials were frequently unable to collect customary revenues from Italian territories given over to war or insurrection. Thus, the administration of papal territories came to rely on substantial infusions of money from Avignon. What's more, to maintain order in papal Italy, especially in times of conflict, papal agents found it necessary to employ mercenary forces whose services did not come cheaply. Not even the popes' Angevin allies in the kingdom of Naples could be expected to render military aid to the papacy without expecting some kind of remuneration. It was perhaps an inevitable corollary of the papacy's removal from the peninsula, but the administration of papal Italy cost a great deal more from Avignon than it did from Rome: as the governance of the Papal States increasingly passed to a new generation

of Gallic officials, without indigenous support bases or local resources to draw from, the costs increased dramatically.

There was, perhaps, an even more fundamental problem with the papacy's reliance on Gallic officials in Italy: the Italians absolutely detested them. The thirteenth century witnessed a dramatic growth of Italian cultural consciousness. This cultural consciousness is, as such things often are, hard to pin down. It is already discernible in the time of Saint Francis, who thought his native Umbrian a tongue worthy of singing the praises of God; it gathered momentum with the work of the early pre-humanists in Padua, Bologna, and other northern centers, who looked back over the span of centuries and discovered Italy's unique connection to the glories and achievements of ancient Roman civilization. It was doubtless much easier to experience emotionally than it was to articulate in purely intellectual terms. But it was powerful all the same, and it grew stronger with the foreign interventions of the thirteenth century: every Swabian or Angevin or Aragonese army that passed through the peninsula helped to sharpen the distinction between what was Italian and what was not. In the same way, the papacy's retreat to the Venaissin in 1305 was a trauma to the Italian spirit that inevitably intensified this burgeoning sense of *italianità*. In very short order the peoples of Italy conceived an almost universal loathing for the endless parade of Gallic princes, Gallic soldiers, Gallic rectors and Gallic legates that the Gallic popes dispatched from their Gallic resort to protect their interests in Italy. The Italian view is best summed up by a certain Chico of Pesaro, who wrote to Cardinal Napoleone Orsini in 1326: "These Gauls are the worst men in the world. They despise the entire world, except for their own nation. They give no thought to anyone but those who wish to take part in their idiocy."[2] Given the tremendous resentment that the papacy's Gallic officials so often provoked, it is hardly surprising that they had to struggle to maintain even the semblance of order in Italy.

Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini was a rare specimen in the history of the fourteenth-century Church: an Italian who came to

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[2] *Isti Gallici sunt peiores homines de mundo. Et totum mundum habent pro nichilo nisi nationem suam. Nolunt aliquem videre nisi illos, qui sciunt facere stulticias cum ipsis; Acta Aragonensia: Quellen zur deutschen, italienischen, französischen, spanischen Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte aus der diplomatischen Korrespondenz Jaymes II (1291–1327)*, ed. Heinrich Finke, 3 vols. (Berlin/Leipzig, 1908–1922), 1, p. 503, #335.

play a central role in the Avignon papacy's Italian policy. He was dispatched as *legatus a latere* in the spring of 1326 to relieve John XXII's first legate to Italy, Cardinal Bertrand du Poujet, after a series of disastrous setbacks the previous year; thereafter, Orsini's legation took place in what had previously been the southern half of Poujet's legatine territories. The pope made no mention of Orsini's background in the documents authorizing the legation; still, it is very difficult to conclude that his choice of an Italian was merely coincidental. After a long succession of Gallic envoys to Italy and little enough to show for it, the pope himself seemed willing to acknowledge that his Italian program needed some adjustment. The immensely capable and boundlessly energetic Poujet was foundering in a northern Italian theater whose social and political conventions he was never entirely able to apprehend. And he was foundering expensively: Poujet's campaigns, and the large mercenary armies that made them possible, had already cost the papacy a fortune. Orsini's dispatch, then, would seem to signal an important experiment in Avignonese policy in Italy. If Poujet could never aspire to be more than an unpopular foreigner, Orsini was a quintessential "insider"; his exceptionally powerful Roman family had a long history of loyal service to the papacy. There were material benefits as well: the vast resources and extensive connections of the Orsini family could be pressed into the service of Orsini's legation, to the relief of papal coffers already exhausted by Poujet's costly campaigns.

The general mandate of Orsini's legation articulated a goal that was as remarkable in its ambition as it was in its breadth: to do whatever was necessary for the honor of God, the greater good of the territories committed to him, and the restoration of the "peace of the faithful" within these territories[3]—in other words, to bring about the pacification and general reformation of Italy. Of all medieval papal legates, only Poujet and, later, Cardinal Gil de Albornoz were directed to so broad and demanding an objective; indeed, the missions of Poujet, Orsini and Albornoz can be seen as marking the apex of medieval papal legations, drawing on centuries of institutional development to pursue an objective of unprecedented breadth. Yet, while much scholarly ink has been spilled on the missions of

[3] Appendix A, l.62–64: . . . *facias, auctoritate nostra, quecumque ad honorem Dei, prosperum statum partium earundem ac reformationem pacis fidelium uideris expedire.*

Poujet and (especially) Albornoz, Orsini's legation remains little studied. Historians of the Avignon papacy tend to treat it as little more than a footnote to the great events of the period, a mere echo of the far more significant legation of Poujet in the north.

In actual fact, Orsini's legation was much more than that. It constituted a conscious attempt to depart from a predominantly "Gallic" legatine model, defined in large part by the missions of Arnaud de Pellagrue and, in particular, Bertrand du Poujet. These men were of Gallic extraction and enjoyed exceptionally close personal relationships with the popes who dispatched them. They coordinated activities among a variety of different forces, but tended to rely very heavily on expensive mercenaries. They also had to contend with the hard feelings of Italians, enemies and allies alike, whose increasingly fierce resentment for the Gallic papacy in distant Avignon complicated most major papal initiatives in Italy. In the end, legates like the Gascon Pellagrue or the Cahorsin Poujet, however talented and determined they may have been, were not always attuned to Italian sensibilities or social conventions, with sometimes disastrous consequences. Orsini's legation was thus conceived as an Italic alternative to this Gallic model—a model which did not, at the time of Orsini's dispatch in the spring of 1326, appear to be working particularly well. Orsini's mission was intended to be considerably less expensive (which it was), to provide a legate who was far more knowledgeable of Italian affairs (which it did), and ultimately, to be (or at least to feel) more genuinely and organically "Italic" in its character and conduct (which it was). But this was not always a good thing; the mission brought with it a number of distinct problems, unforeseen by John XXII and largely absent from the mission of Poujet—factionalism and familial rivalries; cross-regional antagonism; the legate's own excessively personal investment in the outcome of certain struggles. In the end, these proved ruinous to both the general peace and the papal cause in central Italy.

The ultimate failure of Orsini's legation should not be adduced as an argument against its historical importance or worthiness of scholarly attention. After all, Poujet's mission collapsed in the end, but few scholars would suggest that it was therefore insignificant or unworthy of study. Even Albornoz attained, in the final analysis, a rather more qualified success than either he or the popes who sent him might have liked. Orsini's mission, like Poujet's, was crucial to the development of Avignonese papal policy in Italy; its lessons con-

tributed directly to the ultimately successful legation of Albornoz a generation later. One could even argue that the scholarship of Avignonese papal policy in Italy remains incomplete without adequate consideration of Orsini's important and distinctively Italian mission.

Orsini's legation took place in the context of the distinctive Italian policy which the papacy's relocation to Avignon necessitated. The development of this policy began somewhat tentatively during the pontificate of Clement V and continued much more forcefully and deliberately during the pontificate of John XXII, under whom it came to incorporate a number of different strategies through which the pope sought to maintain a "controlling interest" in the affairs of Italy without actually being there. Beyond a necessary administrative restructuring of the Papal States, these strategies included the continuing cultivation of strategic alliances with traditional papal allies in Italy; the exploitation of local conflicts to the papacy's greatest advantage; the promotion of Angevin political interests throughout the Italian peninsula; and, most importantly, perhaps, an increasingly heavy reliance on powerful envoys—and in particular, *legati a latere*—as executors of papal policy in Italy. The mission of Poujet was especially paradigmatic; it established a model for the Avignon papacy's most ambitious legations in Italy, and thus initiated a new phase in both the development of the legatine office and the continuing evolution of papal policy in Italy.

The reverses of 1325 forced John XXII to modify his Italian policy. With Emperor Ludwig IV now promising an imperial expedition into Italy, the pope conceded that Poujet should concentrate on the war against the Visconti in Lombardy while a second legate attended to the crises mounting in central Italy. Of particular concern were the seemingly inexorable ascendancy of the Lucchese *signore*, Castruccio Castracani, whose territorial ambitions threatened the very independence of Florence, and the parlous state of Rome, whose political instability left the city vulnerable to imperial occupation. Significantly, the man whom the pope selected to undertake this central Italian legation was not "one of the worst men in the world"—that is to say, men of French or Languedocian origin—but a native of the region: Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini.

Orsini had not been especially prominent in the Sacred College prior to his legation; what recommended him to the pope was the enormous power and influence his family wielded in central Italy.

The Orsini were among the most aggressively successful of Rome's aristocratic clans, with influence and territorial connections that reached far beyond Rome and its immediate vicinity. They could also demonstrate a long tradition of faithful (if almost invariably self-interested) service to the papacy. The nomination of an Orsini legate, then, may be taken as evidence of a new experiment in papal policy, wherein the pope sought to depart from his customary reliance on Gallic associates in favor of native agents who possessed both a greater awareness of central Italian problems and a substantial reserve of indigenous political and economic resources with which to tackle them.

As legate, Orsini was able, like Poujet, to draw on centuries of canonical development to exercise a legatine authority without precedent in the history of the Western Church. Poujet, Orsini, and the later fourteenth-century legate, Cardinal Gil de Albornoz, were enjoined with restoring an Italian political that had previously depended on the papacy's physical presence in Rome. No previous legate had been called upon to apply the full range of legatine powers to so ambitious an objective, or to represent the authority of the pope so overtly and comprehensively. The legations of Poujet, Orsini, and Albornoz may thus be seen as the marking the apex of medieval legatine power.

Giovanni Orsini's legation is divisible into three distinct phases. The first took place in Tuscany between 1326 and the end of 1328 or the beginning of 1329. Here Orsini's principal objectives were the defeat of Castruccio Castracani and his allies (most notably Guido Tarlati, the renegade bishop of Arezzo), the restoration of Florence after a difficult period in the city's history, and the defense of Rome against the emperor. The legate's success in these endeavors was at best qualified. The fecklessness of his allies, and the legate's own less than complete commitment to the Tuscan theater, made for a rather dismal showing against the exceptionally talented Castruccio and the tenaciously resilient Guido; only their premature deaths (in 1328 and 1327, respectively) delivered Tuscany from their ambitions. Orsini had no more success in his native Rome, where a pro-imperial revolutionary government not only welcomed the emperor at the beginning of 1328, but celebrated his coronation and witnessed the creation of an imperial antipope, Nicholas V, in the spring of that same year. Orsini's arrival did bolster the spirit of the Florentines, though he soon squandered their good will by issuing a collection of unpopu-

lar (and astonishingly ill-timed) constitutions aimed at reforming the state of the Florentine church.

The emperor's expulsion from Rome in the summer of 1328, and Castruccio's death that autumn, left Orsini free to undertake the restoration of order and functional ecclesiastical authority in the cities and towns of the Patrimony of St Peter. Once again, his success was mixed. While any number of towns submitted to the legate and sought absolution from the Holy See, others—most notably Viterbo and Todi—remained intransigent in defying the authority of the Church. The legate's difficulties were compounded by his increasingly strained relations with papal officials in the region and by the dynamics of old family rivalries: the imperial vicar in Todi, Giovanni di Sciarra Colonna, and the *signore* of Viterbo, Faziolo dei Prefetti di Vico, came from families traditionally hostile to the Orsini. Still, by late 1329 or early 1330, Orsini managed to effect at the very least a fragile peace in the Patrimony, and could turn his attentions at last to his native Rome.

It is hard to say for certain in what capacity John XXII intended his legate to operate in Rome, where the legate's status was problematic. The pope already had a representative agent there in the person of his vicar *in spiritualibus et temporalibus*, Bishop Angelo of Viterbo; municipal government rested, at least nominally, with the agents of Rome's papal senator, King Robert of Naples. But Orsini wasted little time in pushing his rivals aside and establishing himself as *de facto* ruler of the city. In partnership with the Roman commune, he asserted Rome's dominance over the cities and towns of the region; of his own accord, he undertook the aggressive promotion of Orsini interests in Rome and the district. In so doing, he not only earned several unheeded rebukes from the pope, but managed in the end to provoke a bloody clan war with the archrival Colonna family. The outbreak of the vendetta, and the nearly simultaneous collapse of Poujet's legation in the north, brought John XXII's ambitious Italian policy to a disappointing conclusion and occasioned the recall of both legates in the summer of 1334.

Quite aside from his high-profile military and political initiatives, Orsini undertook a number of administrative and ecclesiastical reforms. The execution of these reforms he left for the most part to the members of his legatine entourage or to local officials with whom the legate was somehow associated. These reforms demonstrate a desire to purge the central Italian church of schismatic clerics, to revitalize

local religious foundations that had suffered during the upheavals of the time, and to restore normality to the administration of local churches. Orsini was not uniformly successful in this regard. After all, the efficacy of the legate's reform initiatives was directly contingent on the success or failure of his military activities; he could hardly expect to implement meaningful reforms in communities that remained in a state of rebellion against the papacy. More to the point, perhaps, Orsini's attempts at reform served to underscore just how much the central Italian church had come to depend on the presence of the papacy—not a powerful papal envoy, but the papacy itself, with the full range of curial organs—for its normal operation.

The failure of Orsini's legation is attributable to a variety of factors. Giovanni Orsini was not particularly well suited to the demands of a legation; he was too impatient, too imperious and too distractible. He was also, perhaps, too Roman: he showed too little concern for the fate of Tuscany and far too much for the affairs of Rome and the Patrimony, where his excessive investment in the fortunes of his family eventually brought his legation to ruin. There were problems, too, inherent in the legatine office itself. Legatine authority was by its very nature disruptive; it intruded into established hierarchies and overrode ordinary ecclesiastical jurisdictions. These effects were amplified by the peculiar institutional circumstances of the papacy's Italian possessions, where the legate encountered a network of provincial administrators and other special ecclesiastical authorities with whom to jostle. But even in failure, Orsini's mission provided some useful lessons for the later popes of Avignon and for the great legate, Gil de Albornoz, whose successful legation was instrumental in effecting the papacy's return.

The aims of the present study are modest. It is not intended as the final word, but rather as a first step. Its objective is to present an analytical narrative of a long overlooked legation, with special attention to the mission's place in the development of fourteenth-century papal policy in Italy. It is not intended as in-depth study of Orsini's activities in each of the locales to which he traveled in the course of his legation (though one might hope that it could lead to such studies). It seeks to understand why John XXII chose, in 1326, to send a somewhat obscure Italian cardinal as legate to Italy instead of a close Gallic associate, as he was otherwise wont to do. It seeks furthermore to fathom the tremendous challenge that Orsini's mandate posed, and the vast array of legatine powers he brought to bear

in pursuit of it. It tries to articulate the ways in which Giovanni Orsini's "Italic" legation—dependent on the legate's knowledge of Italian affairs, his ability to draw on family resources in the prosecution of his objectives, and on his extensive connections throughout central Italy—differed from the more traditionally "Gallic" model of Avignonese legation to Italy, as evinced first in the legation of Arnaud de Pellagrue and developed much more thoroughly in the mission of Bertrand du Poujet. Finally, it looks to account for the extent to which the distinct characteristics of the mandate, along with certain problems inherent in the legatine office in papal Italy, contributed to the catastrophic failure of Orsini's mission in 1334. If, in the end, this monograph can add perhaps a few new insights into a critical century in the history of the Church and of the Italian peninsula and peoples, then it will have succeeded; if not, then at least it will have failed no more spectacularly than its subject did in the pursuit of his objectives.

In light of the book's objectives, its principal sources are chronicles and papal letters, rather than archival materials. These sources entail some interpretive problems. The legate's own voice, for example, is strangely and lamentably absent from the record. By the thirteenth century it was not unusual for legates to keep registers, which would have included copies of their letters.[4] If Giovanni Orsini kept such a register, it has not survived. Later medieval legates to France were required to send a copy of their registers to the Parlement of Paris upon completion of their missions;[5] unfortunately, there was no analogous requirement (or recipient authority) in fourteenth-century Italy. The absence of so valuable a resource leaves a gaping chasm in the historical record, especially given the enormous volume of correspondence that legations could reasonably be expected to entail. Cardinal Marcello Cervini produced at least forty-five letters during a legation of just four months in 1540;[6] I have yet to locate even a single letter that Giovanni Orsini wrote in the course

[4] See, for example, Guido Levi, ed. "Registri dei cardinali Ugolino d'Ostia e Ottaviano degli Ubaldini," *Fonti per la Storia d'Italia* 8, Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo (Rome, 1890).

[5] See Bernard Barbiche, "Les registres du cardinal Flavio Orsini, légat *a latere* en France en 1572–1573," *AHP* 31 (1993), p. 266.

[6] See Marc Dykmans, SJ, "Quatres lettres de Marcel Cervini, cardinal-légat auprès de Charles Quint en 1540," *AHP* 29 (1991), p. 119.

of his eight-year mission. (Orsini, it would appear, was not always the most diligent of correspondents. For example, amidst the uncertainties attending the apparently less-than-sincere submission of Todi in the summer of 1331, the pope expressed his frustration at Orsini's failure to respond to the pope's own letters: "We recall having already sent certain proceedings and letters to you, as indicated in the schedule enclosed with the present letters, concerning which we do not know whether they reached your hands . . ."[7] For the communication between the legate and the pope, the scholar is thus entirely dependent on the letters of Pope John XXII, some of which have been published in excellent editions or calendars, associated in particular with the École Française. For those that remain unedited the *Registra Vaticana* are indispensable. In most cases the papal letters give a good indication of the substance, at least, of what the legate relayed to the pope. In other cases, however, they do not. In the summer of 1327, for example, while the legate was preparing for an important campaign in Rome, the pope wrote to inform him that two nuncios, Guigo de Saint-Germain and Guillaume de Veyrato, whom the pope had dispatched to respond to the latest Roman demands that the pope return, would bring the legate further instructions;[8] what those instructions were, and how or even if they related to Orsini's Roman campaign, remains unknown. Toward the very end of his legation, with his mission collapsing into chaos, Orsini received a letter from John XXII, which reads simply,

> We give you license, by the authority of the present letters, to do those things which you have humbly requested through your letters to us at this time.[9]

This particular letter—essentially useless, in the absence of any contextualizing information—underscores one of the biggest problems in any assessment of Orsini's legation: however invaluable the papal letters might be, the legate's silence ultimately leaves the scholar with only half a correspondence to consult.

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[7] *Qvosdam processus et letteras designatos in cedula presentibus inclusa et alios diuersos iam tibi misisse meminimus, de quibus utrum ad manus tuas per-uenerint ignoramus . . .* (RV 116, f. 253rb; 3 August 1331).

[8] RV 114, f. 7ra (30 July 1327).

[9] *Ut ea pro quibus nobis hiis diebus per tuas litteras humiliter supplicasti ualeas adimplere, tibi auctoritate presencium licentiam impartimur* (RV 117, f. 253rb; 27 July 1334).

The narrative sources are in the main municipal chronicles, a great many of which can be found in Muratori's *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*. Both collectively and individually these chronicles provide a wealth of information, though they also present two rather significant problems. First, no single source provides anything like a sustained narrative of Orsini's legation. Because the chronicles focus primarily on the affairs of their own cities, the legate moves in and out of view as activities pertain to or depart from the local concerns of each chronicler. An important exception is Giovanni Villani, whose Florentine chronicle is a good deal less parochial than most contemporary Italian chronicles.[10] Indeed, the chronicles of Giovanni and Matteo Villani (Matteo continued his brother's chronicle after Giovanni perished in the Black Death of 1348) were so influential that many other fourteenth-century chroniclers took material from them and incorporated it, often more or less verbatim, into their own chronicles to relate events taking place in the wider world. Certainly, Villani provides more discussion of Giovanni Orsini's legation than any other narrative source; in fact, his chronicle provides the closest thing available to a sustained narrative of the legation. Even so, the coverage is limited; Orsini's mission was hardly one of Villani's principal subjects.

The admirable and, by the standards of contemporary Italian chronicles, quite exceptional breadth of Villani's coverage can sometimes lead one to forget that, for certain events (and especially those that took place outside of Tuscany), other sources might well be more valuable. To give one example: Villani wrote a detailed account of the battle that broke out when Cardinal Orsini and his Angevin allies attempted to enter Rome through the Leonine City in September 1327.[11] It is a thorough, lively account whose influence is attested by its appearance, in somewhat abbreviated form, in the Sienese chronicle of Agnolo Tura del Grasso.[12] Whatever Villani's eloquence

[10] For Giovanni Villani, see Louis Green, *Chronicle into History. An Essay on the Interpretation of History in Florentine Fourteenth-Century Chronicles* (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 9–43.

[11] Giovanni Villani, "Nuova cronica," in G.E. Sansone/G. Cura Curà, *Giovanni Villani* (Rome, 2002), XI.xxi–xxii (pp. 643–644). For the battle, see below, pp. 101–104.

[12] A. Lisini and A. Iacometti, ed. «Cronaca Senese dell'Agnolo Tura del Grasso», *RIS*^{2} 15 VI–A, p. 456, l.7–29.

or influence might seem to suggest, however, his account of the battle in neither as vivid nor as well-informed as the much less familiar account produced by an anonymous Roman chronicler, who was almost certainly an eyewitness to the events he describes. "I remember," he wrote, "that on that night an armed Roman knight, having ridden to the bridge, heard one of the enemy's trumpets."[13] The Anonimo's account is less widely known and far less influential than Villani's, and most readers would find its *Romanesco* dialect less accessible than Villani's Tuscan; it is, all the same, the better-informed and more reliable of the two accounts.

One must also recognize that almost all of the urban chroniclers were aligned to some degree with either the imperial or the papal cause. Though few are vehemently partisan in tone, most provide at least subtle clues as to their inclinations. The Roman Anonimo, for example, while by no means a virulent opponent of John XXII, was inclined all the same to identify with the leaders of the Roman commune in their struggle against Orsini and his Angevin allies. He betrays his allegiance with his admiring portrait of Sciarra Colonna and his reference to "one of the enemy's trumpets," the enemy here being Cardinal Orsini and the Angevins. By the same token, a chronicler who effectively declines to acknowledge Ludwig IV as *l'imperatore* ("the emperor"), referring to him instead as *il Bavaro* ("the Bavarian") or *il duca di Baviera* ("the duke of Bavaria"), is probably making a show of his Guelf credentials, whether he means to or not. Of the two positions—Guelf and Ghibelline—the former is by far the better represented among the chroniclers, leaving the reader with a perspective predominantly or even overwhelmingly favorable to one side. In some cases, the biases are anything but subtle; the popes and their supporters were particularly successful in depicting the Milanese Visconti as blackguards of diabolical malevolence.[14] One must make a conscious effort not to construct, on the basis of the chronicles (and the papal letters which supplement them so richly),

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[13] *Io me recordo che in quella notte uno cavalieri romano armato, essenno cavalcato a ponte, odìo una trommetta de nimici*; Giuseppe Porta, ed. *Cronica dell'Anonimo Romano* (Milan, 1979), p. 15. For the Anonimo's account of the battle, see cap. iii, pp. 12–19.

[14] See Sharon Dale, "The Avignon Papacy and the Creation of the Visconti Myth," in *La Vie Culturelle, Intellectuelle et Scientifique à la Cour des Papes d'Avignon*, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse. Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales. Textes et Etudes du Moyen Age 28 (Turnhout, 2006), pp. 333–366.

a narrative which divides the Italy of Orsini's legation between heroes and villains. This is particularly true of the first stage of Orsini's mission, where chroniclers like Giovanni Villani tend to portray the conflicts of the day in strongly moral and patriotic terms. Villani saw his Florence much as Livy had seen his Rome, as a city of destiny in whose passage through history a transcendent design was apparent. He was, moreover, very much a successful Florentine man of affairs; if his tone is, for the most part, balanced and fair-minded, his Guelf, mercantile and patriotically Florentine perspective is never far from the surface. He took it for granted that the Guelf cities (and some of them more than others) were faithful sons of the Church and upholders of lofty communal ideals, standing firm on the side of the angels against the schismatic Teuton and his ruthless Ghibelline minions. It would be naive to assume that less celebrated or influential chroniclers were somehow immune to the effects of their own patriotic inclinations.

Ultimately, the scholar is dependent upon a patchwork of different sources, cobbled together to create something of a greater narrative that must remain somewhat less coherent, complete, and even-handed than one might hope. In the latter half of the legation especially, the narrative inevitably takes on an episodic quality that borders at times on the picaresque (though this is not entirely inappropriate, given the nature of Orsini's activities in the final phase of his mission). Nevertheless, in spite of these deficiencies, there are enough materials to permit a reasonable examination of the mission of this least known—and most vigorously Italian—of Avignonese papal legates to Italy.

CHAPTER ONE

ITALY AND AVIGNON, 1305–1325

> On 5 June 1305 Lord Bertrand de Got, archbishop of Bordeaux, was elected supreme pontiff at Perugia, and nuncios were sent to him from Perugia, for he was some thirty days distant from Perugia. And [the cardinals] sent him their [election] decree, which was presented to him at Bordeaux by three upright men, officials of the curia . . . The aforesaid pope, called Clement V after he received the decree, determined to make his residence in the County of Venaissin, and never to cross the mountains, as indeed he never did, although he had promised [to do so].[1]

Thus did the Dominican scholar and bishop Ptolemy of Lucca relate the election of Pope Clement V in his *Ecclesiastical History*. Ptolemy could hardly be numbered among the most strident critics of the fourteenth-century papacy, but his account of Clement's election is among the first clear expressions of what would become almost an article of faith among fourteenth-century Italians: that the papacy's exile on the Rhône was no accident, but the consequence of a deliberate plot, spun by the agents of Philip IV at Anagni and embroidered by calculated Gallic deceit. Villani was instrumental in circulating the rumor that Clement's predecessor, Benedict XI, had succumbed to poison; though he did not implicate Clement directly, he could not refrain from observing that Gascons "are naturally greedy."[2] Dante immortalized the notion of a Gallic conspiracy in *Inferno* XIX, where Pope Nicholas III foretells the pontificate of Clement V, the "lawless shepherd" from the West, who would succeed Boniface VIII and join him after death in the circle of the simoniacs:

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[1] *Anno igitur Domini MCCCV quinta die junii dominus Bertrandus de Gutto, archiepiscopus Burdegalensis, apud Perusium in summum pontificem eligitur, et de Perusio mittuntur nuntii ad ipsum, qui distabat de Perusio per triginta dietas; miseruntque sibi decretum per tres probos viros, officiales videlicet curie, quod sibi Burdegale presentatur . . . Eodem tempore et anno predictus papa post decretum receptum Clemens quintus vocatus deliberat in comitatu Veneysini residentiam facere nec unquam montes transire, sicut nec fecit, quamvis promiserat*; *Secunda vita Clementis V, auctore Ptolomeo Lucensi Ordinis Prædicatorum* (excerpta ex *Historia Ecclesiastica*), Étienne Baluze, *Vitae paparum Avenionensium*, ed. G. Mollat, 4 vols. (Paris, 1914–1922), 1, p. 24.

[2] . . . *che sono naturalmente cupidi*; X.lxxx (p. 443).

A new Jason he will be, of whom we read
In Maccabees; and as his king was pliant to
That one, thus will he who rules France be to this one.[3]

Divine Will had ordained that the papacy should reside in the city of the Caesars; now arrogance, envy, and insatiable ambition impelled these new Gauls, like Brennus two millennia earlier, to storm the walls (if only metaphorically, in this case) and cart off the dearest and most sacred of Roman *spolia*, the throne of Saint Peter. *Vae victis*, indeed.

The real roots of the Avignon papacy, of course, were immeasurably more complex, but the depth and intensity of Italian feeling underscore a crucial fact: if the Avignon papacy was part of a larger "crisis of the later medieval Church," in the familiar parlance of so many undergraduate textbooks, it was also, in the eyes of many Italians, emblematic of a cultural and historical crisis. Rome may have been the spiritual center of Western Christendom, but it was also, needless to say, an Italian city. Indeed, to a considerable extent, it was ***the*** Italian city—*Urbs*: no adjective was necessary; everyone knew which city was meant—the *centrum mundi*, to which all roads led, and the cradle of Italy's languages and cultures, its ruins the enduring reminders of an age when Italians ruled the known world. Long before the advent of nationalism allowed them to conceive of Italy as a politically united nation-state, the peoples of Italy recognized and celebrated their cultural and linguistic descent from Rome.

This "cultural patriotism," for want of a better term, had undergone significant development in the thirteenth century, when rising urban literacy rates sparked a new demand for vernacular literature, and the contending armies of foreign powers heightened the Italian peoples' awareness of their distinctness from other peoples in the West. As part of the process, thirteenth-century Italians came to regard the papacy, that most central and indispensable of medieval

[3] *Inferno* XIX, 79–84:
Che dopo lui verrà di più laida opra,
di ver' ponente, un pastor sanza legge,
Tal che convien che lui e me ricuopra.
Nuovo Iasón sarà, di cui si legge
ne' Maccabei; e come a quel fu molle
suo re, così fia lui chi Francia regge.

institutions, as essentially and necessarily a *cosa italiana*. The papacy's spiritual authority, like the *imperium* of the ancient Caesars, was universal in scope, but immeasurably more perfect insofar as it derived, not *ex senatu populoque Romano* or from imperial law, but from Christ's commission to Saint Peter in the Gospel of Matthew (16:17–19). Moreover, like the *imperium* of the ancient Caesars, it found its rightful seat in Rome. Even the demographics of the high medieval papacy seemed to argue for the papacy's essential *Italianitas*: thirteen of the thirteenth century's eighteen popes—all elected *inspirante Spiritu sancto*—and fully three quarters of its cardinals were born somewhere on the great Italian boot.[4] Let other nations boast their emperors or kings; Christ had chosen Italy as the seat of his earthly vicars.

For a people inclined to think in such terms, the Avignon papacy could hardly appear as anything other than a violation of the divinely sanctioned order. It interrupted a sacred history dating to the time of the apostles and robbed medieval Italians of what they themselves considered their most vital contribution to Christian civilization. What it did not do, however, was undermine the intense pride with which Italians had come to regard the various regional histories and cultures which were all bound together by their common link to Roman antiquity. If anything, it had the opposite effect; one cannot forget that the humanist program was conceived by Petrarch, an Italian exile at Avignon (and, not coincidentally, the man who famously denounced the Avignon papacy as the "Babylonian Captivity of the Church"). The longer the popes stayed away from Rome, the more acutely Italians felt the injury of the papacy's absence, and the more strident their criticisms became. By the time the papacy finally returned during the pontificate of Gregory XI, Italian resentment at its long absence had grown so intense that, in many quarters, Italians had acquired a profound distrust of the very institution whose return they had been demanding for nearly three generations. It may no longer be possible to view Franco-Italian cultural rivalry as the essential cause of the Great Schism (1378–1417),[5] but it is hard to deny that cultural factors helped to widen the political and ecclesiological

[4] See the lists in Konrad Eubel, *Hierarchia catholica Medii Aevi*, 8 vols., *nova editio* (Regensburg, 1913–), 1, pp. 3–13.

[5] See the corrective in Walter Ullmann, *The Origins of the Great Schism. A Study in Fourteenth-Century Ecclesiastical History* (London, 1948), pp. 1–8.

fault lines along which the contending obediences of the Schism fell out.[6]

For Italians, the papacy's removal to Avignon entailed much more than bruised pride and heightened cultural consciousness. It also precipitated a political crisis in Italy, the material effects of which were often intensely destructive. The definitive defeat of the Hohenstaufen in the 1260s ushered in a generation or so of relative peace in Italy. This peace endured in large part through the vigilance of the victorious papacy and its Guelf allies, especially Florence and Angevin Naples. Its erosion began in earnest during the turbulent pontificate of Boniface VIII, whose aggressive policies antagonized many of the pope's Guelf allies and roused the Ghibelline powers from their unaccustomed quiet. By the time of Boniface's ignominious demise in the fall of 1303, factional violence had erupted throughout much of the Italian peninsula. Rome itself was so wracked by clannish feuding that Boniface's successor, Benedict XI, was forced to seek safer quarters in Perugia.

Caught unawares by Benedict's sudden death less than a year later, the deeply divided cardinals squabbled for eleven months before they finally agreed on a successor. As a compromise, they consented to the election of the archbishop of Bordeaux, Bertrand de Got. Bertrand had a long and distinguished ecclesiastical career behind him. He had never been a cardinal, though this was anything but an impediment to his election: it left him refreshingly unaligned with any of the competing factions in the Sacred College and without a personal stake in the continuing furor over the pontificate of Boniface VIII. He enjoyed, moreover, quite favorable relations with both Edward I of England and Philip IV of France—an important consideration in the aftermath of Anagni. To the feuding cardinals who elected him Clement V, Bertrand de Got appeared the perfect compromise candidate.

With all due respect to Ptolemy of Lucca, the bulk of the evidence suggests that Clement had every intention of returning to Rome once the fierce factional conflicts in Italy came to an end.[7] In fact, it was circumstance, rather than some sinister conspiratorial bent on the part of the pope, that led Clement to spend his nine-

[6] See Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Medieval Papacy* (London, 1968), pp. 164–166.
[7] See Sophia Menache, *Clement V* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 23–30.

year pontificate in the Comtat-Venaissin. With little knowledge of Italian affairs, Clement was wholly unequal to the enormous challenges that early fourteenth-century Italy posed for him. Hoping the crisis would end soon enough, Clement sought a temporary haven in the more familiar environs of Languedoc, not all that far from his native Gascony. But the storm he hoped to weather from afar proved far more enduring than he imagined, and Clement would pass his entire pontificate without setting foot in Italy, let alone Rome. And if Italians tended to bewail the pope's protracted delay in Languedoc, there was certainly no shortage of ambitious Italian powers willing to exploit the papacy's absence to their own advantage. With the pope away and the later thirteenth-century Guelf axis in disarray, the great cities of Venice and Milan made the first forays into the regional expansionism that would threaten papal policy in Italy for much of the fourteenth century. Such initiatives only served to intensify the already explosive conflicts of the peninsula and to prolong the papacy's absence.

The difficulties of Clement's situation were further complicated by the pope's increasingly troubled relationship with Philip IV of France. Hoping to press his advantage after Anagni, Philip put almost unrelenting pressure on Clement, seeking papal approval, or at the very least acquiescence, to a wide range of French royal initiatives. Despite oft-made suggestions to the contrary, Clement managed, with considerable effort, to keep some distance between himself and the Capetians; if he was, in the end, perhaps less successful than he might have liked, his final determinations in the matters of the posthumous trial of Boniface VIII and the ultimate disposition of the Templars put paid to the notion that he was merely a puppet of Philip IV.[8] Still, Philip's machinations inevitably distracted Clement from his higher priorities, including the troubled state of Italy. They also inclined him to avoid assigning the French crown too prominent role in Italian affairs; the last thing the pope could afford was to find himself in debt to the Philip or the king's Angevin allies (and kinsmen) in Naples.

Under the circumstances, the imperial election of Count Henry of Luxembourg in 1308 was, for Clement, a godsend. Clement saw

[8] Ibid., pp. 174 ff.

Henry's election as an opportunity to cultivate a powerful ally decidedly outside of the Capetian sphere. Still, when Henry announced his intention to be crowned in Rome, Clement was ambivalent: history suggested that, more often than not, imperial sojourns had anything but a pacific effect on Italy. In the end, Clement was willing to take a chance that the emperor's presence might heal the partisan wounds of the peninsula. The gamble did not pay off. Henry soon set aside all claims to impartiality as he aligned himself, of necessity, with Italy's leading Ghibelline powers. Before long the distant pope found himself in the unfamiliar and decidedly uncomfortable position of having to justify his support for a Holy Roman Emperor against such traditional papal allies as the Guelf communes of Tuscany and King Robert I of Naples, who looked to establish an Angevin hegemony in Italy and found Henry's universalist pretensions little to his liking.[9]

Henry's sudden death in 1313 did nothing to ameliorate the crisis. In the cities, pro- and anti-imperial factions threw themselves at one another with renewed fury. The rival kingdoms of Naples and Sicily went to war in 1312, breaking the fragile, ten-year peace established at Caltabellotta. Throughout central and northern Italy, ambitious Ghibelline lords worked feverishly to erect dynastic *signorie* on the vicariates granted them by the emperor. In 1314 the great Tuscan Ghibelline Uguccione della Faggiuola resurrected the Ghibelline League, which shattered a Guelf coalition at Montecatini the following year. When Clement succumbed to stomach cancer in April 1314, the papacy was no closer to Rome than it had been at the time of his election. More than six decades would pass before another pope set foot in Italy; more than seven before the papacy itself would return.[10]

In responding to the situation in Italy, Clement took recourse to what would become a cornerstone of Avignonese papal policy in Italy: the extensive use of representative agents, and especially powerful

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[9] Martin Thilo, *Das Recht der Entscheidung über Krieg und Frieden im Streite Kaiser Heinrichs VII. mit der römischen Kurie. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Verhältnisses von sacerdotium und imperium und des Wandels vom Weltimperium zum nationalen Konigtum*. Historische Studien 343 (Berlin, 1938), p. 90. For Henry and Clement, see William Bowsky, *Henry VII in Italy. The Conflict of Empire and City-State, 1310–1313* (Lincoln, NE, 1960), *passim*; Menache, pp. 152–165.

[10] For Clement and his Italian policy, see Guillaume Mollat, *Les papes d'Avignon (1305–1375)*, 9th ed. (Paris, 1950), pp. 137–148; Menache, pp. 129–173.

legati a latere.[11] The first of these was Cardinal Napoleone Orsini in 1305. At the time, Clement and the curia were residing in Lyons; four years would pass before the pope finally settled in Avignon. Even so, Napoleone's mission can rightly be seen as the first identifiably "Avignonese" legation to Italy, insofar as it attempted to address problems directly connected to the fallout of Anagni and the papacy's subsequent retreat *ultra montes*. It was not an auspicious beginning. The establishment of radical Black Guelf regimes brought Florence, Prato, Lucca and Bologna to the brink of civil war in the early fourteenth century. When a series of nuncios failed to negotiate a peaceful solution, Clement sent Napoleone as *legatus a latere*. Napoleone had considerable diplomatic experience,[12] though he was otherwise a poor choice for the mission at hand: as a notorious supporter of Ghibellines and White Guelfs, he had little or no credibility with the Blacks. At Florence, he was refused entry to the city; so too at Bologna, where he was showered with abuse as he fumed outside the walls. Neither a contingent of Aretine mercenaries nor harsh ecclesiastical penalties could achieve anything on the legate's behalf, and Napoleone returned to Avignon in June 1309, after more than three years of fruitless activity.[13]

The expedition of Henry VII engendered another flurry of papal diplomacy in Italy, at the heart of which were two legations. The first of these ended almost before it began: in September 1310 Clement sent Cardinal Thomas Jorz to meet the emperor as he crossed into Italy, but Jorz died at Grenoble in December.[14] By the next summer, Henry's expedition was already beginning to unravel in the face of stiff Guelf and Angevin opposition. Clement, hoping to retrieve the situation, sent a delegation of four cardinals, led by a *legatus a latere*, Cardinal Arnaud de Faugères, to meet with the emperor as he laid siege to Brescia. Cardinal Leonardo Patrasso da

[11] For an overview of Clement's legations to Italy, see Gardi, pp. 374–376.

[12] For Napoleone's earlier missions to Orvieto (1295) and Rome (1300), and his term as papal rector of Sabina, see Carl A. Willemsen, *Kardinal Napoleone Orsini (1263–1342)*. Historische Studien 172 (Berlin, 1927; repr. Vaduz, 1965), pp. 6–11.

[13] The mission is reported by Villani, IX.lxxxv (pp. 448–449). See Willemsen, *Kardinal Napoleone Orsini*, pp. 25–52, and, with attention to his failed initiative at Bologna, A. Veronesi, "La legazione del cardinale Napoleone Orsini in Bologna nel 1306," *Atti e memorie della R. deputazione di Storia Patria per le provincie di Romagna*, ser. 3, 28 (1910), pp. 79–133.

[14] Bowsky, *Henry VII*, p. 231, n. 52.

Guercino died at Lucca in December (a bad month for cardinals en route to Italy, it would seem), but Niccolò Albertini of Prato negotiated the emperor's Genoese *signoria* in the fall of 1311, and Luca Fieschi journeyed to Naples on Henry's behalf in May 1312 in an ultimately fruitless attempt to effect a marital alliance between the houses of Naples and Luxembourg. The underachieving legate, by contrast, proved of such little use to the emperor that Henry petitioned Clement for his recall in July 1313. In the end, the cardinals could not prevent Henry's adventure from sliding into chaos, but their mission signifies at the very least Clement's determination to maintain an active role in peninsular affairs.[15]

By far the most ambitious of Clement's Italian legations, and the most important in shaping subsequent Avignonese legations to Italy, was that of Cardinal Arnaud de Pellagrue. The death of the lord of Ferrara, Azzo I d'Este, in January 1308, precipitated a fierce power struggle between Azzo's brothers, Francesco and Aldobrandino, and his illegitimate son, Fresco. Venice, looking to extend her influence into the region, quickly entered the fray and threw her support behind the young and malleable Fresco. Fresco ultimately prevailed, and promptly rewarded his Venetian patrons with sweeping commercial concessions in the city. Ferrara, however, was in Emilia-Romagna, a papal territory, and Clement V viewed Venetian interference, quite correctly, as a violation of the Church's rights. He sent two nuncios, Arnaud de Saint-Astier and Onofrio di Trevi, to persuade the Venetians to withdraw. They failed: when Fresco was expelled in a popular uprising soon afterwards, the Venetians assumed direct control over Ferrara and quickly suppressed the revolt. In a subsequent treaty with the nuncios, signed in December 1309, the Venetians paid lip service to the authority of the Holy See, while in fact maintaining complete control over Ferrara.[16]

The usually mild-mannered Clement was furious. In March 1309 he placed Venice under interdict; when the Venetians failed to relinquish Ferrara, Clement dispatched his nephew, Cardinal Arnaud de

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[15] For Faugères' legation, see Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 311–313, 316, 322–323, 326–327; Bowsky, *Henry VII*, pp. 124, 133, 163, 177, 196, 244–245 n. 91, 254 n. 4, 267 n. 80, 269 n. 97.

[16] «Chronicon Estense cum additamentis usque ad annum 1478», ed. G. Bertoni and E.P. Vicini, *RIS*[2] 15 III, pp. 68, l.21–72, l.39. The «Chronicon Estense» (pp. 68, l.21–78, l.37) provides the principal background for the narrative of Pellagrue's legation. See also Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 141–148.

Pellagrue, as *legatus a latere* to a vast region stretching from Milan and Aquileia to the Papal States, including Corsica and Sardinia, and Venice and its satellites, all the way down the Dalmatian coast to the island of Crete.[17] Pellagrue easily obtained the support of Bologna and preached a crusade against Venice. The response was overwhelming: forces came from the March of Ancona, Tuscany, Romagna, Lombardy and the March of Treviso.[18] By August 1309 Pellagrue's forces had captured the strategically valuable stronghold of Castello Tedaldo and had the Venetians on the run. Crushed in battle and reeling from commercial effects of the interdict, Venice surrendered unconditionally. The government of Ferrara passed to Pellagrue and to Francesco d'Este. Even then, the pope declined to absolve the Venetians until February 1313, after they agreed to pay an enormous indemnity of 50,000 florins.[19]

Ferrara, however, was more easily recovered than governed. To facilitate the restoration of public order, Pellagrue assumed a temporary *signoria*, but left the real administration of the city to his vicar, Guillaume, marquis de Bruniquel, whose misrule provoked a rebellion against the legate and the Estensi in the summer of 1310. Pellagrue, who was in Bologna at the time, sent a Bolognese army to Ferrara just as Onofrio di Trevi and Francesco d'Este were mobilizing against the rebels. With a formidable coalition now ranged against them, the rebels sent eighty delegates to negotiate with Pellagrue and the Estensi in Castello Tedaldo; Pellagrue had them unceremoniously arrested and sent his forces into the streets. A three-day massacre put an end to the rebellion, and the leaders were hanged, at the legate's orders, in the central piazza of Ferrara.[20] But

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[17] *Regestum Clementis papae V ex Vaticanis archetypis*, ed. *ordine sancti Benedicti*, 9 vols. (Rome, 1885–1892), #5024.

[18] «Chronicon Estense», p. 73, l.33–37; see also «Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium II», ed. A. Sorbelli, *RIS*² 18 I-D., p. 308, l.9–16. The «Chronicon Estense» adds that, in response to Pellagrue's preaching, *multi de dictis provinciis equestres et pedestres perrexerunt Ferariam in servitio sancte Ecclesie et pro animabus suis* (l.37–38)—evidence, perhaps, of renewed enthusiasm for crusades against Christian enemies of the Church.

[19] «Chronicon Estense», pp. 73, l.33–75, l.8; see also Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 153–154. For a general narrative of Pellagrue's legation see «Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium II», pp. 305, l.20–310, l.35 (Chron. B).

[20] «Chronicon Estense», p. 78, l.16–36; «Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium II», pp. 313, l.13–316, l.4 (Chron. B).

Pellagrue never fully regained control of the city. The rectors of Robert of Naples, named papal vicar of Ferrara in August 1309, proved scarcely more popular than Bruniquel, and the Estensi were lost to the papal cause after the assassination in 1312 of Francesco d'Este by Pellagrue's brutal Majorcan captain, Dalmasio de Banyuls. In August 1317 a second revolt drove out Robert's vicars and restored the Estensi to power, where they remained stalwarts of the Ghibelline alliance until their defection to the cause of the Church in 1329.[21]

In many respects, Pellagrue's legation anticipated the distinctive Italian legations of later Avignon popes. The territories placed under Pellagrue's jurisdiction were vast; his *signoria* in Ferrara prefigured those of Bertrand du Poujet in Bologna, Giovanni Orsini in Rome, Gil de Albornoz in Bologna and a number of other cities, and Cardinal Guillaume de Noëllet, also in Bologna; the legation relied very heavily on military operations, over which the legate himself exercised executive oversight. The unusually extensive legatine powers with which Pellagrue was dispatched prefigure the great agglomeration of powers with which later Avignonese legates would march into Italy: no fewer than thirty graces, indulgences and special mandates accompanied and expanded the general mandate of Pellagrue's legation.[22]

Ultimately, however, Pellagrue's legation was as much a product of the thirteenth century as it was of the fourteenth. Unlike later Avignonese legates, Pellagrue did not have to coordinate extensive actions in response to diverse issues and problems or in several different theaters of operation simultaneously. The focus of his legation was concrete and specific. Unlike Poujet, Orsini, or Albornoz, whose campaigns ranged over vast stretches of territory, Pellagrue was able to accomplish his objective with a single campaign in the immediate vicinity of Ferrara. Pellagrue's most important legacy may well have been his initial military success: the startling effectiveness of his crusade against the Venetians suggested to Clement's successors that, under the right leadership, ambitious—and decidedly martial—legations might well be the key to the successful prosecution of papal policy in Italy, however distant the popes themselves might be.[23]

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[21] For the Estensi defection, see Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 180–181.

[22] *Regestum Clementis papae V*, #5024–5054.

[23] Norman Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305–1378* (Oxford, 1986), p. 75.

Clement's pontificate, then, witnessed the emergence of what were to become the Avignon papacy's biggest and most enduring challenges in Italy: widespread Italian suspicion of and alienation from the "Gallic" papacy and its "foreign" agents; intractable factional violence; the emergence of aggressive dynastic *signorie*, at least nominally aligned with the emperor; the expansionist ambitions of major regional powers; the potentially seismic effects of imperial involvement in Italian affairs. Likewise, Clement's pontificate first suggested that powerful papal envoys would have a vital role to play in Avignonese papal policy in Italy. It fell to Clement's successor to determine more precisely and coherently what exactly that role should be, as both the crisis in Italy and the papacy's response to it began to take clearer shape in the second quarter of the fourteenth century.

Clement's death led to another hotly contested conclave, this time pitting the "Gascon" majority created by Clement against a vocal and powerful Italian minority. In August 1316, after more than two years, the hopelessly deadlocked cardinals consented to the election of a caretaker, a feeble, elderly figurehead who would sit on the papal throne, if nothing else, for a short time while the cardinals worked to resolve their disputes. The man they chose was the oldest cardinal in the Sacred College, Jacques Duèse—a tiny, frail-looking Cahorsin nearly seventy years of age. Styling himself John XXII, the new pope quickly confounded his electors with his firm, decisive leadership and his stubborn refusal to die within the expected few months. Indeed, given the expectations of his electors, John XXII might well have been the worst caretaker pope in history: a determined, energetic and sometimes cantankerous authoritarian from the beginning to the end of his eighteen-year pontificate, he outlived more than three quarters of the men who elected him.[24] Arguably the most important of the Avignon popes, John accomplished many things during his long pontificate, and very few of them quietly: from his bitter row with the Franciscan Spirituals and his contest with Emperor Ludwig IV, to his massive overhaul of the curial bureaucracy and his controversial declaration on the Beatific Vision, John left an indelible imprint on the fourteenth-century papacy.[25]

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[24] Of the twenty-three cardinals who elected John XXII in 1316, only Luca Fieschi (d. 1336), Guillaume de Pierre Godin (d. 1336), Jacopo Stefaneschi (d. 1341), Napoleone Orsini (d. 1342) and Raymond des Farges (d. 1346) were alive to attend his funeral obsequies in December 1334.

[25] See Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 38–59.

As chancellor to Kings Charles II and Robert of Naples from 1308 to 1310, John had acquired a far greater knowledge of Italian affairs than Clement ever had. This, and the failure of Clement's own Italian initiatives, led John to develop an Italian policy much more dependent than Clement's on the traditional thirteenth-century Guelf axis of the papacy, Florence and the Neapolitan crown, but with an expanded role for the Angevins, whose influence certain thirteenth-century popes, most notably Gregory X and Nicholas III, had sought to circumscribe.[26] John's policy incorporated a number of distinct though interconnected objectives: the pacification of Italy through the conjoint application of legatine and Angevin arms; the destruction of the resurgent Ghibelline alliance; the restoration of Guelf primacy in the peninsula; and the transfer of some or even all imperial rights in Italy to the crowns of France and Naples. Whether it included the all-important matter of the papacy's return to Rome remains a subject of considerable scholarly debate. John XXII's public declarations and many of his actions—his commitment to maintaining but a temporary residence in the episcopal palace at Avignon, for example, or his apparently sincere intention to settle provisionally in Bologna in 1332—suggest that he did intend to bring the papacy back to Rome. On the other hand, his administrative reforms, which established Avignon as the operational center of the international Church and the seat of a greatly expanded curia, and his rejection of all Roman entreaties to return, might seem to suggest otherwise. In any case, he made it clear from the outset that he had no intention of returning to an Italy wracked by warfare and disorder, or to a Rome that kept up its dangerous flirtation with the emperor and his turbulent allies. It may never be possible to say for certain whether or not John truly believed that the papacy would return to Rome in his lifetime, but it is hard to

[26] The best study of John XXII's policy remains Giovanni Tabacco's *La casa di Francia nell'azione politica di papa Giovanni XXII* (Rome, 1953). For the changing dynamics of the papal alliance in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries see Norman Housley, *The Italian Crusades. The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Power, 1254–1343* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 15–34. See also Tabacco, "Programmi di politica italiana in età avignonese," *ACSI*, pp. 49–75. An older but still useful study, if largely confined to the Lombard theater, is H. Otto, "Zur Italienischen Politik Johanns XXII.," *Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven and Bibliotheken* 14 (1911), pp. 140–265.

deny that he committed himself and his resources to the affairs of Italy as if he did.[27]

John's Italian policy was a complex affair. It operated on a number of different levels, the connections between which are not always entirely clear. On one level, John tended to view Italy as the principal battleground in a larger struggle within Western Christendom between two broadly defined coalitions of pro-papal and pro-imperial powers. The resolution of this struggle required nothing less than a profound restructuring of the political order of Western Christendom. In John's eyes, the Empire's long history of opposition to the papacy—and, after 1322, its current emperor, Ludwig IV—rendered forfeit the Empire's historical claim to secular headship in the West. For John, any meaningful reform of the Western Church and society had to start with the containment of the emperor and the transfer of secular headship in the West to Capetian France, with Angevin Naples as the principal custodian of the rightful ordering of Italy. Everything else depended on this fundamental restructuring; a universal Crusade under the direction of the French crown, for example, was hardly feasible so long as the "enemies of God" ruled Italy on behalf of an Empire which set itself in direct opposition to the successors of Saint Peter.[28]

In Italy the pope John kept a close eye on regional and local power struggles. He saw these struggles as emanations of the larger contest between the papacy and the Empire and was adept at turning them to his advantage. In northern Italy, for example, where Milan posed the greatest threat to peace and the papacy's objectives, John made much of the bitter rivalry between the Visconti

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[27] See Eugenio Dupré Theseider, *Problemi del papato avignonese* (Bologna, 1961), pp. 114–118. While skeptical of John's commitment to a prompt return, and rejecting outright the notion that he had sworn an oath to do so at the time of his election, Dupré Theseider acknowledges John's hopes for eventual return and recognizes that Poujet's construction of *La Galliera* reflected the pope's desire to return to Italy at least temporarily (pp. 197–198). For the broader issue of the vital "return question" in the early stages of the Avignonese papacy see Dupré Theseider, *I papi di Avignone e la questione romana* (Florence, 1939), and Elisabeth Kraack, *Rom oder Avignon? Die römische Frage unter den Päpsten Clemens V und Johann XXII.* Marburger Studien zur älteren deutschen Geschichte, ed. Edmund E. Stengel, 2.2 (Marburg, 1929); for the state of the "return question" in the time of Urban V (who did return briefly from 1367–70) see Ludwig Vones, *Urban V. (1362–1370). Kirchenreform zwischen Kardinalkollegium, Kurie und Klientel.* Päpste und Papstum 28 (Stuttgart, 1998), pp. 446–457.

[28] Tabacco, *La casa di Francia*, pp. 267–280; idem, "Programmi di politica italiana," especially pp. 54–55, 63–64.

and the powerful della Torre family, who had led the Milanese Guelfs for much of the thirteenth century. After their defeat and definitive expulsion by the Visconti in 1311, the Torriani established themselves in Aquileia, where they resumed their now hereditary enmity with the Visconti. When the patriarchate of Aquileia became vacant in 1316, John utilized the newly implemented principles of general reservation in Italy to secure the provision of Gastone della Torre to the see;[29] when Gastone died two years later, the pope provided Pagano della Torre to succeed him.[30] John hoped that a firmly established Torriani presence might transform the vast, sprawling patriarchate into a bulwark against continued Visconti expansion in northern Italy; given the papacy's recent experience in Ferrara, he may also have intended it as a check to any future Venetian aggression. In the end, John's instincts served him well: during Poujet's early campaigns against the Visconti, Pagano was one of the legate's most dependable allies.

In Arezzo, stronghold of the renegade Bishop Guido Tarlati, John exploited the long rivalry between the Tarlati and Ubertini families. On 19 June 1325 he raised the town of Cortona, an Aretine possession since 1258,[31] to diocesan status and made Rinieri degli Ubertini its first bishop.[32] A month later John announced the formal deposition of Guido Tarlati and the provision of Rinieri's brother, Boso degli Ubertini, to the Aretine see.[33] Unlike the Torriani, the Ubertini were anything but Guelf stalwarts: they had vied unsuccessfully with the Tarlati for leadership of Arezzo's Ghibellines earlier in the fourteenth century. But John understood well enough that, in this case at least, the enemies of his enemies were his friends; as inveterate opponents of Guido Tarlati, the Ubertini were valuable to him, even if he knew better than to believe that Boso had much chance of wresting effective control of the see from Guido or that Rinieri could

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[29] For the provision of Gastone, against the election of the archdeacon Gilone by the local chapter (10 January 1317), see *Lettres communes, analysées d'après les registres dits d'Avignon et du Vatican*, ed. G. Mollat, 16 vols. (Paris, 1904–1947), #2445. For the Visconti triumph in Milan see Tabacco, *The Struggle for Power in Medieval Italy. Structures of Political Rule*, trans. R. Brown Jensen (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 288–291.

[30] For Pagano's provision (23 March 1319), see *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #9124.

[31] Ubaldo Pasqui, ed. *Documenti per la storia della città di Arezzo nel medio evo*, 2 (Florence, 1916), 2, pp. 334–339, #607–609.

[32] Ibid., pp. 388–391, #732; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #22609, #22886.

[33] 20 July 1325. See Villani, XI.xii (V, p. 639); Pasqui 2, pp. 592–593, #735.

establish himself in Cortona. Even an unsuccessful challenge from the Ubertini brothers might be enough to distract Guido from his mischief-making in the eastern Papal States and to undercut his ability to threaten Florence. Here again, John's instincts were vindicated: after Altopascio, the revolt of the Ubertini kept Guido from providing assistance to Castruccio at a critical time in Castruccio's campaign against Florence[34]—to the detriment of the previously strong alliance between the two men.[35]

No theater of conflict was too small, nor service to the papacy too minor, to warrant John's attention. He knew who his friends were and took care to ensure that they knew it, too. In 1331 a lay knight of Chiusi, Pono fu Guasta da Radicofani, informed John that he had given certain properties to the Cistercian convent of San Salvatore di Monteamiato, near Radicofani, in exchange for a grange, La Rocchetta. Pono wanted the castle that dominated La Rocchetta and was anxious to ensure that the transaction be conducted legally. Thus, on 23 June 1331 the pope ordered his legate, Giovanni Orsini, to investigate the matter and to provide him with all of the necessary information pertaining to the exchange and to its prompt, efficient execution.[36] On the very same day, John provided two of Pono's brothers, Carlo and Angelo, to lucrative canonries, expectant of prebends, in Orvieto and Siena, respectively.[37] Pono, for his part, ultimately received a good deal more than just La Rocchetta: by the time of his murder in 1341 at the hands of his cotenant, Giovanni Monaldi, he had acquired half of the dominion of the papal *castrum* of Radicofani.[38] Radicofani was anything but a major strategic center, and Pono and his brothers were at best very minor players in the affairs of fourteenth-century Italy, but John XXII was eager to demonstrate his gratitude with a show of generosity to the family: their recently deceased father, a simple knight, had rendered loyal

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[34] «Historiarum Florentini populi libri XII Leonardi Aretini Bruni», ed. E. Santini and C. di Piero, *RIS*² 19 III, p. 127, l.24–37; p. 128, l.4–14.

[35] See below, p. 105.

[36] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #54077.

[37] Ibid., #54075, 54076.

[38] Pope Benedict XII, *Lettres closes, patentes et curiales intéressant les pays autres que la France*, ed. J.-M. Vidal and G. Mollat, 4 fascicles (Paris, 1913–1950), fasc. 4, col. 205–206, #3234 (23 November 1341). The letter orders the rector of the Patrimony, Bernard du Lac, to recover the *castrum* from Giovanni (who also murdered an unnamed brother of Pono) for the papacy.

service to Poujet in his war against the rebellious Counts of Panico in Emilia-Romagna.[39]

For all of his keen attention to detail, John XXII was at times inclined to exaggerate the extent to which local and regional conflicts related to the larger struggle between the papacy and its allies on the one hand and the Empire and its adherents on the other. John's rather liberal application of the terms "Guelf" and "Ghibelline," for example, obscured political realities and implied a breadth of ideological polity that did not, in fact, exist, or at least not nearly to the extent that he assumed it did. By the early fourteenth century, the Guelf and Ghibelline parties had undergone a substantial transformation since their origins in the contest between Frederick I and the papacy. In those days, the Guelfs, who generally came from the upwardly-mobile commercial classes, fought for the cause of the papacy and communal government, while the Ghibellines, whose origins were typically more aristocratic, fought for their imperial overlord and his traditional rights in Italy.

By John's time, the parties had undergone more than a century and a half of historical development, and the terms "Guelf" and "Ghibelline" had come to signify at once much more and much less than they had in the time of Frederick II and Gregory IX. While it is true that the Guelfs generally continued to present themselves as the papal party, they might better be seen as the champions of communalism, in an age when it could hardly be taken for granted that the objectives of the Italian communes and those of the papacy, or even of one commune and another, necessarily coincided. The Ghibellines, for their part, remained more aristocratic in background and retained their allegiance to the Empire, though only to a degree. The Ghibelline *signori* of Lombardy and Tuscany, for instance, were as likely as not to trumpet (rather cynically, perhaps) the populist foundations of their regimes, and their support for the Empire was anything but unqualified. For them, the ideal emperor was a distant and rather indifferent overlord who cheerfully passed out imperial vicariates and otherwise kept to the far side of the Alps; their principal devotion, as Henry VII and Ludwig IV would discover the hard way, was to the strength and independence of their own regimes.

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[39] Lisetta Ciaccio, *Il cardinal legato Bertrando del Poggetto in Bologna (1327–1334)*. Atti e memorie della r. Deputazione di Storia Patria per la Romagna, ser. 3, 23 (1904–1905), p. 36.

Guelf and Ghibelline, moreover, could mean very different things in different places and at different times. While the two terms did signify reasonably concrete and coherent polities in the cities of Tuscany, Lombardy, and, perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent, Emilia-Romagna, they did not necessarily do so elsewhere. Rome, for example, had no genuine party-structures analogous to those of the Tuscan cities.[40] Here, when they were used at all, the terms Guelf and Ghibelline more commonly denoted allegiance to (respectively) the Orsini or the Colonna families, both of whom maintained close ties to "real" Guelfs and Ghibellines farther afield. This may well speak to what was arguably the most important dimension of the Guelf and Ghibelline labels in the early fourteenth century: their instrumental value in maintaining important intra-urban alliances and in pursuing local and regional hegemonic strategies.[41]

Both "parties," moreover, were subject to often intense internal divisions. In the opening years of the fourteenth century, the Guelfs in Pistoia, Florence, and Bologna broke into the Black and White factions whose discords so confounded Cardinal Napoleone Orsini in the first of Clement V's legations to Italy. The Blacks are often cast as hard-line advocates of traditional Guelfism, the Whites as occupying a more "moderate" position, midway between Guelfism and Ghibellinism. In fact, the causes of the schism are much more complex, involving rivalries for Guelf leadership (as between two branches of the Cancellieri family in Pistoia, or the Donati and Cerchi families in Florence), socio-economic tensions within the commercial classes, and competing visions of communal government, among other things. Thus, if the Blacks or Whites of one city tended to maintain ties with their counterparts in another, the precise meanings of "Black" and "White" nevertheless remained wholly dependent on specific local circumstances.[42] The same can be said of

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[40] See Eugenio Dupré Theseider, *Roma dal comune di popolo alla signoria pontificia (1252–1377)*, Storia di Roma 9 (Bologna, 1952), p. 459

[41] For the variegated meanings of Guelfism and Ghibellinism in early fourteenth-century Italy, and the extent to which the two "parties" did or did not subscribe to established political principles, see Menache, pp. 129–132.

[42] See Charles Poulet, OSB, *Guelfes et Gibelins*, 2 vols. (Brussels/Paris, 1922), 2: *La diplomatie pontificale à l'époque de la domination française (1266–1378)*, pp. 84–89. For a history of the parties from their inception to 1326, with special attention to Bologna, see Giuliano Milani, *L'esclusione dal commune. Conflitti e bandi politici a Bologna e in altre città italiane tra XII e XIV secolo*. Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medo Evo. Nuovi studi storici 63 (Rome, 2003).

divisions among the Ghibellines. In Arezzo, for example, the Ghibellines were divided into "Green" (*Verdi*) and "Dry" (*Secchi*) factions, whose animosity derived less from any substantial ideological differences than from the rivalry between the Faggiuola and Tarlati families, around whom the two factions grew up in the early fourteenth century.[43]

In fairness, it must be added that John XXII was far from alone in exaggerating the importance and extent of the Guelf/Ghibelline divide in fourteenth-century Italian affairs. The Italian expedition of Henry VII had suggested to many that the Empire still had an important role to play in the affairs of Italy. Many influential thinkers, including Dante, saw the salvation of war-torn Italy in the chivalrous Henry of Luxembourg; to others, Henry seemed to pose as dire a threat as Frederick II and his viper's brood two generations earlier. The excitement and anxiety that Henry brought with him to Italy endured there long after his death in 1313. John XXII was forever mindful that many of his ablest and most resilient opponents in Italy—Matteo Visconti in Milan, Can Grande della Scala in Verona, Passerino Bonacolsi in Mantua—had founded their *signorie* on imperial vicariates granted by Henry VII. The memory of the noble and high-minded Henry, overestimated by friends and foes alike, allowed for a comparable excitement over a decade later, when Ludwig of Bavaria undertook his own Italian campaign.[44] Ludwig himself helped to create a somewhat distorted perception of his place in the struggles of the age. Protector of heretical *fraticelli* and Ghibelline political theorists; ally of Lombard tyrants and the Aragonese usurpers in Sicily; creator of the first imperial antipope in 150 years: to contemporary observers, Ludwig certainly appeared to be the political and ideological hub around which the papacy's collective enemies revolved. If John XXII misjudged the extent to which the affairs of Italy revolved around the Empire, he did so with good cause and in good company.

For Italians, the most controversial aspect of John's Italy policy was the central role it assigned to Gallic agents. If its aims did not

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[43] Blake Beattie, "Local Reality and Papal Policy: Papal Provision and the Church of Arezzo, 1248–1327," *Mediaeval Studies* 57 (1995), pp. 138–139.

[44] See Bowsky, *Henry VII*; an excellent discussion of Henry's impact on contemporary political theories is found in Peter Armour, *Dante's Griffin and the History of the World. A Study of the Earthly Paradise* (Purgatorio, *cantos xxix–xxxiii*) (Oxford, 1989), especially pp. 112–148.

depart radically from those of many popes of the later thirteenth century, the way it sought to accomplish those aims often did. John's thirteenth-century predecessors were, for the most part, Italians, working through a curia situated in Rome. They sought to preserve order in the Italian peninsula "from within," as it were, by manipulating Italian alliances and networks with which they were intimately familiar. The papacy itself, as an Italian power rather than the spiritual head of Western Christendom, was an integral part of the balance of power they worked to maintain. John XXII, by contrast, and all of his Avignonese successors, looked essentially to impose order "from without." John's Italian policy depended in the main on Angevin leadership and arms; the overwhelming majority of John's principal agents in Italy were curialists of Gallic origin whose organizational and administrative model for the governance of papal territories in Italy was conceived at the Avignonese curia.[45] John's policy by no means precluded an important contribution from the Italian powers;[46] it did, however, subordinate Italian participation to the more central activities of the pope's Angevin allies and Gallic officials.

Much of John's Italian policy hinged on his complex relationship with the Angevin king of Naples, Robert "the Wise" (1309–43). Robert was, by any reckoning, the most powerful Italian prince of his time; he was also, as count of Provence, the temporal overlord of Avignon and John's single most important ally in Italy. He was an enigmatic man whose reign is sometimes difficult to assess. He lived the first twenty years of life without ever expecting to succeed his father or demonstrating much desire to do so. Then, suddenly, in 1295, his eldest brother, Charles Martel, died of cholera while traveling in Tuscany; soon afterwards, his elder brother Louis renounced his inheritance for a Franciscan vocation before expiring, in a golden aura of sanctity, in 1297. Now thrust into the succession, Robert never completely threw off the idiosyncrasies instilled by a privileged, if somewhat aimless youth. Devout and cerebral, Robert was always more at home in the chapel or the library than on the battlefield. His devotion to justice earned him the admiration of his subjects; his liberal patronage of scholars won him the praises of Petrarch

[45] For a more thorough discussion of the differences between "Italic" and "Gallic" approaches to ecclesiastical administration in Italy, see below, pp. 190–192.

[46] See above, pp. 13–16.

and Boccaccio; his enthusiastic and prolific lay preaching led Dante to characterize him, somewhat unkindly, as a "sermon-king" (*re da sermone*).[47]

For all his considerable gifts and wide-ranging interests, Robert was always something of a disappointment to John XXII. John longed for an Italian ally more like Robert's grandfather and father, Charles I and Charles II: tough, canny, low-slung men who prosecuted their dynastic war against their Aragonese rivals in Sicily with unflagging energy and very few scruples. But Robert was cut from different cloth. He did not lack in martial ability, and he was certainly no coward, but he was a far less energetic campaigner than his father and grandfather had been. He exercised vicariates and *signorie* throughout central Italy, though often a good deal less assertively than John would have liked. John was often exasperated by Robert's cautious and deliberate temperament, and not always without justification; with Robert, it was sometimes hard to tell where the virtue of prudence left off and the vice of lethargy began. The premature deaths of his elder brothers made him almost obsessively protective of his heir and principal agent in Italy, Duke Charles of Calabria, often to the detriment of his political and military objectives beyond the borders of his kingdom. In a less turbulent time and place, Robert's benevolence and generosity might well have secured for him the reputation of greatness; in the hard arena of early fourteenth-century Italy, they too often had the effect of making him appear weak and indecisive.

More significantly, perhaps, Robert's priorities were not always as consistent with John's as the pope was inclined to believe. Robert's personal and political loyalties to the pope ran deep, but they were by no means unqualified. Robert was an altogether more principled man than his father and grandfather, though he too did not hesitate to set scruples aside when they stood in the way of his practical objectives. He had his own ambitions in Italy and was perfectly willing to use his alliance with the Church to his own greatest advantage. Broadly speaking, pope and king had similar goals: the defeat of the Ghibellines and revival of the Guelfs in northern and central Italy; the establishment of a strong Angevin presence in Rome and the Papal States; the creation of an Angevin hegemony in the

[47] *Paradiso*, VIII, 147.

peninsula. For Robert, however, these objectives were quite naturally and inevitably connected to his larger (and ultimately more important) dynastic strategy in the South. One can reject the claim, sometimes found in older histories, that Robert sought to rule all of Italy as king;[48] if he did harbor hegemonic aspirations—which is likely—he did so very much as a Neapolitan king. Vicariates in Rome and *signorie* in Tuscany were attractive and often quite useful to him, but they were rarely if ever his highest priority. Over-investment in the affairs of the North necessarily diverted resources and attention away from Robert's more immediate objectives in the South. If Robert was genuinely concerned about, say, the expansion of Visconti power in Lombardy or the activities of Castruccio Castracani in Tuscany, he can hardly be faulted for caring a good deal more about the designs of his Aragonese rivals in Sicily. John XXII knew Robert very well, and harbored no illusions about Robert's ambitions; at the same time, he was an imperious and impatient man who had a tendency to forget, at times, that friends were not always subordinates. The king of Naples was an ally, not an agent of the pope. It was a lesson John would learn all too painfully in the 1330s, when the campaigns of John of Bohemia set Robert in direct opposition to the pope.[49]

In the final analysis, John's dependency on Capetian and Angevin participation was nothing more or less than a logical consequence of his own experience. He had close personal ties to both royal houses. He was fully aware of the extent of Capetian ambitions in the West and Angevin ambitions in Italy, and had his suspicions about both. On the other hand, he trusted the French and Neapolitan crowns far more than he could ever trust the Empire, and he understood implicitly that the dynastic axis between the houses of France and Naples had come to constitute the single most powerful, dynamic and effective political force in Western Christendom. Nor is it any wonder that John made extensive use of Gallic agents and officials,

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[48] See, e.g., Barraclough, *The Medieval Papacy*, p. 145.

[49] See below, pp. 151–152. For Robert—a complex man regarding whom scholars have advanced a variety of different opinions—see Romolo Caggese, *Roberto d'Angiò e i suoi tempi*, 2 vols. (Florence, 1922–30); Walter Goetz, *König Robert von Neapel (1309–1343), seine Persönlichkeit und sein Verhältnis zum Humanismus* (Tübingen, 1910); Samantha Kelly, *The New Solomon: Robert of Naples (1309–1343) and Fourteenth-Century Kingship* (Leiden, 2003); É.G. Léonard, *Les Angevins de Naples* (Paris, 1954), esp. pp. 270–294.

both in Italy and elsewhere. Several conspiracies against the pope in the opening years of his pontificate inclined John to place his trust only in kinsmen and close associates, almost all of whom, *mirabile dictu*, were French or Languedocian.[50]

To the peoples of Italy, however, the practical foundations of John's policy meant little. John was far too astute a man to be unaware of how Italians reacted to his policy, or how those reactions affected its outcome. His problem was not that he failed to recognize how much the "Gallicization" of the fourteenth-century papacy antagonized Italians, but rather that he too seldom acted in accordance with that recognition. In the fall of 1331, Queen Jeanne of France petitioned the pope for the creation of more French cardinals. John responded with a respectful but firm rejection, on the grounds that there were already too many "Gauls" in the Sacred College.[51] The pope's tactful response evinces his sensitivity to Italian concerns about the increasing decline of Italian representation in the Sacred College; he often spoke of the need to preserve a Sacred College that was truly "universal" in its character and composition.[52] Yet three months later, in his sole creation of December 1331, he raised Pierre Bertrand, a royal counselor from Annonay, to the cardinalate. It was typical, perhaps, of John's rather curious position with respect to the Italians. He knew more about Italy and Italian affairs than any other Avignon pope, but seems never to have placed much trust in the Italians themselves. And if he recognized and even appreciated the bases of Italian complaints about papal policy, he too often failed to address them. The legation of Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini stands as an important exception, though it only became possible when the pope was forced to recognize the limitations of his "Gallo-centric" policy after the catastrophic events of 1325.

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[50] Mollat, *Les papes*, p. 58.

[51] See John XXII, *Lettres secrètes et curiales*, ed. A. Coulon and S. Clémencet, 4 vols. (Paris, 1960–65), #3692 (26 September 1331).

[52] See John F. Broderick, SJ, "The Sacred College of Cardinals: Size and Geographical Composition (1099–1986)," *AHP* 25 (1987), p. 21 n. 38.

CHAPTER TWO

MCCXXV

On Monday morning, 23 September 1325, the captain-general of Florence, Ramón de Cardona, led a weary Guelf army down a dusty Tuscan road to the town of Altopascio, some fifteen kilometers to the southeast of Lucca. His ultimate objective was the city of Lucca and its powerful *signore*, Castruccio di Gerio Castracani degli Antelminell, arguably the most dangerous of the many enemies who had menaced Florence in the past two generations. Since assuming the *signoria* in 1316, Castruccio had devoted himself to making Lucca the dominant city-state in Tuscany. Ten years of vigorous and uniformly brilliant campaigning had brought much of northwestern Tuscany under his control. More recently he had turned his attentions east toward Florence, in whose shadow Lucca had stood too long and whose definitive defeat would leave Castruccio uncontested master of Tuscany. The capture of Pistoia in May 1325 extended Castruccio's dominion to the northwestern edge of the Florentine *contado* and gave him a potential staging ground for an assault on Florence itself. Pisa, too, was in his sights; its acquisition would give him the means to launch a great invasion of Florence from the west. Cardona's campaign was more than just another episode in the ceaseless contending of the Tuscan communes. Its conclusion might very well determine the fate of Florence.[1]

Cardona's arrival in Florence in May 1325 was, for the Florentines, a godsend.[2] Cardona was a tough, shrewd, battle-hardened Catalan who had previously served under the papal legate, Cardinal Bertrand du Poujet, as captain-general of the Church's forces in Lombardy. He was also quite possibly the only commander in Italy who could match Castruccio in audacity and skill. Cardona worked from the

[1] For the Altopascio campaign, see Louis Green, *Castruccio Castracani. A Study on the Origins and Character of a Fourteenth-Century Italian Despotism* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 161–182.

[2] Villani, X.ccxv (p. 598).

outset to throw off the feckless defensiveness which had characterized Florentine policy toward Castruccio throughout the 1320s. The Florentines, he believed, could not afford to let Castruccio deliver the first blow. Cardona quickly assembled an army and took to the field. Rather than risking a decisive engagement with Castruccio himself, Cardona left Castruccio unmolested at Pistoia and led his forces against key Lucchese targets. His initial successes raised the hopes of Florentine allies farther afield; contingents from Siena, Bologna, Perugia and elsewhere swelled his ranks to 15,000 infantrymen and 2,400 horses, including 500 French knights. By mid-July his Guelf army had taken Montefalcone and began the march to Lucca.

Cardona's bold strategy had the desired effect. Suddenly, Castruccio found himself thrown onto the defensive—a position to which he was decidedly unaccustomed. He had no choice but to withdraw from Pistoia and move to the defense of Lucca itself. Leaving a small garrison to hold Pistoia, he hastened west with the bulk of his force to secure the high plain above Altopascio. But he was too late to stop Cardona from capturing the town on 25 August. From Altopascio, Cardona made ready to advance on the abbey-village of Pozzeveri, one of the last stops on the road to Lucca.

Still, Cardona knew that his success was anything but assured. Castruccio was an audacious tactician and a masterful strategist; the urgency of his situation had doubtless rendered him more dangerous than ever. Cardona's progress, moreover, had been slowed in recent weeks by a troubling agglomeration of problems. Since the campaign against Montefalcone in July, his forces had been ravaged by epidemic. As sickness spread through the ranks, troops who had campaigned with great enthusiasm against minor Lucchese holdings began to lose heart as they neared Lucca—and the promise of a decisive engagement with a commander whom many regarded as invincible. Throughout the summer, desertion further depleted ranks already thinned by sickness and death. While Cardona remained unbowed in his determination to carry the war to Lucca, some of his anxious Florentine subordinates began to press for the less ambitious goal of keeping Castruccio contained. The army's advance from Altopascio slowed to a crawl as Cardona squabbled with his captains and the morale of his soldiers plummeted.

Castruccio, meanwhile, had thrown himself into the defense of his city with demonic energy, shoring up his forces and issuing a series of desperate appeals to his Ghibelline allies. On 21 September he

defeated a Florentine expeditionary force as it ventured from Pozzeveri; it was by no means a disastrous setback for Cardona's army, but the defeat further enervated a Guelf force that was already badly demoralized. With the arrival of a mercenary force from Milan the following day—and after a good deal of haggling over the terms of their remuneration—the tide turned decisively in Castruccio's favor. Exasperated but determined to hold to his original plan, Cardona looked to regroup in the more secure environs of Altopascio, and ordered his men to begin the four-kilometer retreat from Pozzeveri back to the town. Castruccio followed, racing with his cavalry along the spine of the Cerbaian hills and looking to intercept Cardona's forces before they could establish a strong defensive position in the town.

As the sun rose on 23 September, Castruccio led 1,500 knights in a spectacular charge down from the hills into the heart of the Guelf camp. Though badly outnumbered, Castruccio kept his exhausted and disoriented opponents pinned down until mid-morning, when Azzo Visconti rode onto the battle plain at the head of 800 Milanese horsemen. By day's end Cardona's army was completely destroyed. Perhaps 3,000 Guelfs lay dead on the battlefield; among the 2,000 or so taken captive were Cardona and many of the French knights who had come to his assistance.[3] To compound the disaster, just two months later, a Ghibelline host under the *signore* of Mantua, Rinaldo "Passerino" Bonacolsi, fell upon a Bolognese army at Zapolino, just north of Bologna. When the dust cleared a thousand Bolognese lay dead, with a thousand more led off in chains. In two strokes in the autumn of 1325, Tuscany and Emilia were thrown open to the depredations of Italy's Ghibelline strongmen.[4]

The twin disasters at Altopascio and Zapolino signaled a turning-point in the papacy's twenty-year struggle to restore order to the Italian peninsula. From early in his pontificate, John XXII determined to do whatever was necessary to pacify Italy. With factional conflicts intensifying and Uguccione's Ghibelline alliance increasing its strength, the pope sent a series of nuncios to look into the Italian

[3] See the detailed narrative in Villani, X.cciii–ccvi (pp. 603–607).

[4] For Zapolino (25 November 1325) see «Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium II», p. 366, 1.12–367, 1.9 (Chron. A). Passerino was supported by a Milanese force under Azzo Visconti and by contingents from Ferrara under the *marchesi* d'Este.

situation and to do what they could to improve it. The most important of these nuncios, Bernard Gui and Bertrand de la Tour, conducted an exceptionally thorough investigation and concluded that the crisis in Lombardy was far beyond any remedy that the limited authority of a nuncio might provide.[5] The reports of Bernard Gui and Bertrand de la Tour helped to convince John that nothing less than the dispatch of a *legatus a latere*, invested with the full range of legatine powers, could effectively rein in the Lombard and Tuscan tyrants whose aggressions destabilized Italy and precluded the pope's return. Thus, on 23 July 1319, John appointed a fellow Cahorsin and close associate, Cardinal Bertrand du Poujet, as legate to Italy.[6]

A full year of preparations passed before Poujet finally left the curia, but once in Italy he proved himself an able and energetic commander whose abilities seemed at the very least equal to the enormous challenge before him. His first priority was the defeat of the mighty Visconti family, under whom Milan had emerged as the linchpin of the anti-papal alliance. It was rumored abroad that the Milanese *signore* Matteo Visconti had suborned sorcerers to assist him in his struggle against the pope and Poujet. John, who had already endured one attempt on his life involving the black arts,[7] added sorcery to the growing list of charges against the Visconti and instructed Poujet to preach a crusade against them. After some initial setbacks, Poujet's crusade gained momentum and put sufficient pressure on Milan so that the aging Matteo Visconti abdicated in favor of his son, Galeazzo, in the spring of 1322. Galeazzo, however, remained defiant, and Poujet assembled a great force, comprised chiefly of Florentines and troops supplied by the patriarch of Aquileia, Pagano

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[5] See Bernard Guenée, *Entre l'église et l'état. Quatre vies de prélats français à la fin du Moyen Âge (XIIIe–XVIe siècle)* (Paris, 1987), pp. 69–70, and Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 149–152. The findings of Gui and Tour as related to the pope (1317) are found in Sigmund von Riezler, ed. *Vatikanische Akten zur deutschen Geschichte in der Zeit Kaiser Ludwigs des Bayern* (Innsbruck, 1891), pp. 22–39, #50 I–V.

[6] See *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #12112. For Poujet's legation see Ciaccio, *Il cardinal legato Bertrando del Poggetto*, and Carol Marcus, *The Mission of Bertrand du Poujet, the Legate of Lombardy (1320–1334): The First Seven Years* (unpublished dissertation; Toronto, 1977).

[7] See Robert Michel, "Le procès de Matteo et de Galeazzo Visconti. L'accusation de sorcellerie et d'hérésie. Dante et l'affaire de l'envoûtement (1320), *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire* 29 (1909), pp. 269–327, and Franciscus A. van Liere, "Witchcraft as Political Tool? John XXII, Hugues Géraud, and Matteo Visconti," *Medieval Perspectives* 16 (2001), pp. 165–173.

della Torre. Poujet turned Ramón de Cardona loose against the principal Visconti strongholds; Pavia, Carrara, Tortona, Monza and Alessandria fell in rapid succession to Cardona's forces. As Poujet tightened the noose around Milan, Galeazzo's allies scrambled to ensure their own political survival. In May 1323 Passerino Bonacolsi and the powerful *signore* of Verona, Can Grande della Scala, announced their intention to make formal submissions to the Church; in June the legate laid siege to Milan. After three years of costly and hard-fought campaigning, Poujet had pushed the pope's Ghibelline enemies to the brink of destruction.[8]

Beyond the Alps, however, events augured ill for the papal cause in Italy. After the death of Henry VII in 1313, the divided electors of the Empire had chosen two rival candidates for the imperial throne: the duke of Bavaria, Ludwig von Wittelsbach, and the duke of Austria, Frederick "the Handsome" of Habsburg. The double election of 1314 left John XXII free to pursue his goals in Italy without fear of imperial intervention; if he was inclined to prefer Frederick, he was also inclined, like Innocent III more than a century earlier, to do everything in his power to prolong what was, from the standpoint of the pope, an entirely opportune contest for the imperial throne. But on 9 September 1322, after eight long years of fighting, Ludwig inflicted a decisive defeat on his rival at Mühldorf. Frederick surrendered all claims to the throne in the accord that followed, and Ludwig moved to consolidate his authority in the Empire.

By early 1323 Ludwig IV was finally in a position to answer to the desperate pleas of his beleaguered Ghibelline vicars in Italy. As Poujet intensified the siege of Milan, the emperor's envoys flew south to rally the adherents of the Empire. An impassioned plea from Count Berthold von Neiffen jolted Passerino and Can Grande from their momentary penitence; they rode to Milan and forced Poujet to break his siege, even as victory seemed imminent. In the massive counter-offensive that followed, the Visconti recovered all of their subject cities; by the end of 1325 they had all but driven Poujet from Lombardy. The legate's own allies were powerless to help him. At Altopascio, Cardona's remarkable campaign against Castruccio came to a catastrophic conclusion; the Bolognese were broken at Zapolino. The galleys of Frederick III of Sicily prowled the Tyrrhenian

[8] For a concise overview see Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 158–172.

Sea unchallenged. And across the Alps, the excommunicate emperor, spurred on by the heretic theorists and *fraticelli* of his court, began gathering his forces for the great imperial descent into Italy. For the champions of the papal cause in Italy, the winter of 1325 was cold, dark and bleak.[9]

As the new year dawned, John realized with a heavy heart that Poujet could not attain victory for the Church unassisted. Henceforth, Poujet would have to concentrate all of his efforts on the war against the Lombard Ghibellines and on confronting the emperor as he crossed into Italy. In fact, Poujet's activities had always been confined in large part to the Lombard theater, despite his appointment as legate to *Italia*, the entire region stretching from the Po Valley to the northern borders of the Angevin *Regno*.[10] It was, the pope now conceded, too large a territory for a single legate to manage. While Poujet struggled to regain the upper hand in Lombardy, a second legate would have to tackle the innumerable problems that plagued the central Italian theater of Tuscany and the Papal States.

These problems were considerable, and largely distinct from those that obtained in Lombardy. The cities and towns of Tuscany were more actively involved in the conflicts that raged to the north than were those in other parts of central Italy. The Florentines, for example, had contributed both financially and militarily to Poujet's campaigns against the Lombard despots, and Castruccio Castracani maintained close ties to his Lombard counterparts, in particular the Visconti and Can Grande della Scala. For the most part, however, this involvement derived from long-standing political affiliations and alliances rather than a strong sense of investment in affairs. The Tuscan cities were less concerned with the threat of Visconti expansion to the north than they were with their own internal discords and the economic fluctuations that threatened their commercial lifeblood. If there were fewer grand *signori* in Tuscany than in Lombardy, there was certainly no shortage of petty tyrants, whose allegiances could be harder to pin down than those of their greater Lombard counterparts: between 1312 and 1334 the little city of Grosseto, in the Maremma, lay under the rule of Bino degli Abati del Malia and his sons, Malia and Abbatino, whose valiant defense

[9] Ibid., pp. 172–178.
[10] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #12112, and Riezler, p. 74, #121.

of the city against Ludwig IV in 1328 did not preclude their sporadically harassing the bishops of Grosseto.[11]

The papacy's principal opponent in Tuscany was Castruccio Castracani, a larger-than-life and supremely gifted man who had risen from early exile and political ruin to become one of the greatest princes of early fourteenth-century Italy. Giovanni Villani, a Florentine with little love for his city's greatest adversary, could not help but portray Castruccio as a handsome, charismatic, golden-haired conqueror who towered above his contemporaries.[12] Castruccio's remarkable life story and exceptional achievements fascinated both Renaissance humanists and the early nineteenth-century Romantics: Machiavelli—another Florentine—wrote an admiring biography of him, and Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley made him the vaguely Byronic hero of her highly romanticized *Valperga*. Nor were Castruccio's talents unequal to his reputation. Since wresting power from Uguccione della Faggiuola in 1316, he had brought Lucca out from under the shadows of Florence and Pisa and transformed it into one of Italy's most dynamic and formidable states. His designs and ambitions extended throughout Tuscany and beyond; his military prowess had no peer anywhere in Italy. So long as Castruccio remained in power, Florence was at risk.[13]

For Florence, Castruccio's ascendancy could hardly have come at a worse time. The city's meteoric growth in the second half of the thirteenth century not only established it as one of Europe's greatest commercial centers, but in the process earned it the resentment and envy of virtually every major city in Tuscany. Florence had established its regional supremacy with major victories over Siena (1269) and Arezzo (1289), the bitter memories of which remained alive and well in the fourteenth century. Economic instability and the intense factional divisions between the White and Black Guelfs weakened the city in the early fourteenth century but did nothing to diminish her long list of enemies. The commune's struggles with

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[11] See A. Cappelli, "La signoria degli Abati-Del Malia e la repubblica Senese in Grosseto," *Maremma* 5 (1930), 6 (1931). For the effects of the Malia regime on the pontificate of the papal *provisus* Angelo Cerretani (1334–49), see Giotto Minucci, *La città di Grosseto e i suoi vescovi. Già di Roselle. A.D. 498–1988*, (Florence, 1988), 2, pp. 232–233.

[12] Villani, XI.lxxxvii (pp. 684–686).

[13] For Castruccio see Green's *Castruccio Castracani* and the classic study by Friedrich Winkler, *Castruccio Castracani, Herzog von Lucca*, Historische Studien 9 (Berlin, 1897; repr. Vaduz, 1965).

powerful and determined opponents had strained its political and financial resources to the limit; the Florence that confronted Castruccio was weaker and more vulnerable than the one that had staved off the challenges of Henry VII and Uguccione della Faggiuola. The collapse of the Amieri, Pilestri, and Scali banking houses in 1326 was but an emblem of the city's mounting financial crisis and a herald of the greater financial disasters to come in the 1340s. By 1326 the beleaguered Florentines had been forced to overcome their ancient revulsion for *signorile* government three times in a single generation. In November 1301 Pope Boniface VIII, the exiled Florentine nobles, and the great magnates who dominated the Black Guelf faction had helped to secure the *signoria* for Charles of Valois, the brother of King Philip IV of France; in 1313 King Robert of Naples had obtained a five-year *signoria,* extended later to 1322; and on 24 December 1325, after the debacle at Altopascio, Robert's son and heir, Duke Charles of Calabria, had been elected *signore* to protect the republic from the aggressions of Castruccio.[14] The fact that, on each occasion, the *signore* was a French or Angevin prince attests the rise of Franco-Angevin power in Italy at the expense of the increasingly vulnerable Florentine state.[15]

Pisa, too, found itself in a precarious position. Overtaken by Florence as the leading Tuscan commercial center in the later thirteenth century, Pisa had lost power at sea to the Genoese, who crushed the Pisans at Meloria in 1284 and wrested Corsica from Pisan control the following year. Between 1314 and 1316 the *signoria* of Uguccione della Faggiuola helped to establish the city as a leading center of Ghibelline political activity, but after Uguccione's fall from grace, Pisa resumed its slow and steady decline. In 1317 the city came under the domination of the starkly pragmatic Gherardesca Counts of Donoratico, who pursued a defensive, almost isolationist policy in hopes of preserving the city's independence.

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[14] For a fuller treatment of Florentine subordination to papally-sponsored Franco-Angevin leadership in the period see Peter Partner, "Florence and the Papacy, 1300–1375," in *Europe in the Late Middle Ages*, ed. J.R. Hale *et al.* (London, 1965), pp. 76–121, especially pp. 76–84. Fine surveys are available in Robert Davidsohn, *Storia di Firenze*, trans. Giovanni Battista Klein, 8 vols. (Florence, 1956–68), 4, *passim*, and, for the financial problems of the period, Marvin Becker, *Florence in Transition*, 2 vols. (Baltimore, 1967–68), 1, pp. 65–88. For the roots of the papacy's problems in Florence, and in Tuscany generally, see Dupré Theseider, *Problemi*, pp. 34–39.

[15] See William Bowsky, *A Medieval Commune. Siena under the Nine, 1287–1355* (Berkeley, 1981), pp. 176–178.

Fearful of Castruccio's grand designs, the Pisans struggled to distance themselves from the Ghibelline cause while simultaneously striving to avoid too close an association with the old enemy, Florence. By 1326 the mighty sea-power of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had become a timorous, vacillating port town hoping desperately to remain free from the influence of her more aggressive neighbors.[16]

If other cities fared rather better, they were by no means free from troubles. Siena, for example, passed under Guelf rule after her humiliating defeat by the Florentines at Colle Val d'Elsa in 1269 and went on to establish a communal government that was in many respects more stable than that of Florence. After some experimentation, the city instituted a governing council of nine *Priori e Defensori* (1291), whose rule continued without significant interruption until 1355. The Sienese economy remained strong as well; if Sienese commerce and banking were less spectacularly lucrative than those of Florence, they also suffered much less acutely from the financial upheavals of the early fourteenth century. The peace and prosperity that prevailed, however, were fragile. The feuding of the powerful Tolomei and Salimbeni families was so destructive that they were banished by the Nine in 1329. Nor could Siena remain immune to the effects of Florence's growing vulnerability. A strong Florence was essential to stability in Tuscany—whether her neighbors cared to admit it or not. Before long, the lesser Tuscan communes found it necessary to submit to the same Angevin protectorate under which Florence had come. Siena, for example, extended the *signoria* to Charles of Calabria in 1326.[17]

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[16] The most thorough treatment of Pisa during this period remains Giuseppe Rossi-Sabatini's *Pisa al tempo dei Donoratico (1316–1347). Studio sulla crisi costituzionale del comune* (Florence, 1938). For Pisa's vacillation between Guelf and Ghibelline allies after the death of the emperor Henry VII see Emilio Cristiani, "Il trattato del 27 Febbraio 1314 tra Roberto d'Angiò, Pisa a la lega guelfa toscana alla luce di nuovi documenti," *BIST* 68 (1956), pp. 259–280. For the roots of the problems of the papacy's relations with Pisa see Dupré Theseider, *Problemi*, pp. 39–40. For the idiosyncrasies attending Pisa's political and economic associations (particularly as concerned the Pisan Gaetani family) see Emilio Cristiani, "The Political and Economic Relations of Pisa and the Guelf League in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries," in *The "Other Tuscany". Essays in the History of Lucca, Pisa and Siena during the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, ed. Thomas W. Blomquist and Maureen F. Mazzaoui (Kalamazoo, MI, 1994), pp. 153–162.

[17] For Siena during the period, see Bowsky, *A Medieval Commune*.

The dominant figure in eastern Tuscany was the renegade bishop of Arezzo, Guido Tarlati da Pietramala. After the effective destruction of the Aretine *popolo* in the civil wars of the early fourteenth century,[18] Guido had erected a remarkable episcopal *signoria*, founded on the strength and stability of Arezzo's ancient diocesan administration, assured by the victory of the *Secchi* faction to which his staunchly Ghibelline family was attached, and sanctioned by the last remnants of the politically devastated commune. Guido was unanimously elected *signore* by the Council of Four-Hundred, Arezzo's principal communal assembly, on 14 April 1321; his term was extended to life on 6 July.[19] The election was a mere formality; as early as 1315, Guido is named as *signore* in Aretine documents.[20] Vigorous, young—he was barely thirty at the time of his episcopal election in 1312[21]—and immensely popular in Arezzo, Guido labored ceaselessly to restore the faded glory of an ancient and proudly Ghibelline town that had languished too long in the shadow of Florence. Taking his cue from Guglielmino degli Ubertini, the celebrated Aretine warrior-bishop who fell in battle against the hated Florentines at Campaldino in 1289, Guido threw his energies into the creation of an extended Aretine state that came to include Fronzola, Faggiuola, Rondine, and, in 1323, the important town of Città di Castello. His implacable hatred for Florence made him one of Castruccio's most dependable allies,[22] and his own territorial designs posed a constant menace to the stability of the central and eastern Papal States.[23] With his neighbor and ally, Federico II da Montefeltro, Count of Urbino, Guido promoted and subsidized rebellions against the papal rectors in Osimo, Recanati, Fermo and Fabriano as a newfound spirit of independence swept through the March of Ancona in the second

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[18] «Annales Arretinorum maiores et minores», ed. A. Bini and G. Grazzini, *RIS*[2] 24 I, p. 13, l.12–22.

[19] Ibid., p. 16, l.17–21; cf p. 43, l.11–13, where the date of the extension is given as 6 August.

[20] See the text of a document from the Archivio Capitolare Aretino of Santa Maria in Gradi, ibid., pp. 16–17. Already by 1319 Guido appears in the Annales minores as *episcop*[*us*] *et generalis domin*[*us*] *Arretinorum* (ibid., p. 43, l.7–8).

[21] Massimiliano Falciai, *Storia di Arezzo dalle origini alla fine del Granducato Lorenese* (Arezzo, 1928), p. 159.

[22] Leonardi Bruni attests twice to Guido's hatred of the Florentines («Historiarum Florentini populi libri XII Leonardi Aretini Bruni», pp. 116, l.5–8; 117, l.46–48).

[23] For Guido, see Beattie, "Local Reality and Papal Policy," pp. 131–153.

decade of the fourteenth century. By 1326 effective papal administration and collection of revenues had all but collapsed in the *Marche*.[24]

The state of the *Marche* underscores the difficulties that the popes of Avignon faced in the governance of their Italian territorial possessions. The Papal States had never been easy to govern, especially along the peripheries. Even in the thirteenth century, papal rule was often contested by restive subjects whose desire for autonomy militated against the centralizing tendencies of their papal sovereigns. The relative frequency with which the throne of Saint Peter was vacated and re-occupied by popes made it difficult to maintain much continuity with respect to governing strategies or the personnel on whom the administration of the Papal States depended. During the fourteenth century, these problems were compounded by the absence of the popes as well as the many hardships—epidemics, food shortages, natural disasters, financial instability—for which the century is famous.[25] In Umbria and the Patrimony of St Peter, a number of towns repudiated their allegiance to the pope and attached or would attach themselves to the emperor as the imperial cause gained strength in the later 1320s. Their motives were complicated and, perhaps, not always wholly consistent. Some had come under the rule of petty *signori* who aspired to imperial vicariates and trimmed their sails accordingly; others were frustrated by the long absence of their papal overlords; still others were eager to free themselves from papal domination or, more immediately, as in the case of Viterbo, the heavy yoke imposed by the city of Rome—in many cases, it was probably difficult to determine where the one rationale ended and the other began. Viterbo, Narni, Todi, and Amelia, to name but a few of the more important towns, hovered on the brink of revolution throughout the early fourteenth century and would openly declare for Ludwig

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[24] See Friedrich Bock "Processi di Giovanni XXII contro i Ghibellini delle Marche," *BIST 57* (1941), pp. 19–70. For rebellion not only in the March but throughout the Papal States, see G. Ermini, "La libertà comunale nello stato della chiesa," *ASRSP* 49 (1926), pp. 5–126. For the role of Tarlati and Montefeltro, see Bock, pp. 34–36; for the leaders of these rebellions, all condemned in the proceedings of 1318, ibid., pp. 25–26.

[25] See Augusto Vasina, "Il papato avignonese e il governo dell Stato della Chiesa," in *Le fonctionnement administratif de la papauté d'Avignon. Actes de la table ronde organisée par l'École Française de Rome avec le concours de CNRS, du Conseil general de Vaucluse et de l'Université d'Avignon (Avignon, 23–24 janvier 1988)*. Collection de l'École Française de Rome 138 (Rome, 1990), pp. 135–150.

of Bavaria when he entered Italy. There were important exceptions. In the northern Patrimony, Orvieto remained loyal to the pope, as did Perugia, the dominant city in Umbria. But territorial disputes between the cities precluded solidarity between them and undercut their potential effectiveness as papal allies in the face of rebellion and imperial invasion.[26]

Finally there was Rome, whose problems were among the most complex and pervasive of any place in Italy.[27] Municipal government relied heavily on the presence of the popes. The office of the prefect, once Rome's chief law enforcement officer, had been reduced in the thirteenth century to a hereditary and honorific title of the di Vico family; the ill-defined senate, whose great flexibility had allowed for oddly effective administration against a backdrop of strong papal government, had become a platform for the competing ambitions of the mighty noble clans.[28] Commercially underdeveloped in comparison with the Tuscan cities, Rome was economically dependent on the hordes of pilgrims who flocked to the shrines of the martyrs and on the substantial local market which sustained the curia and its numerous dependents. Looming over this eccentric civic gov-

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[26] For the Papal State generally in the early fourteenth century see Vasina, "Il papato avignonese," and Peter Partner, *The Lands of St. Peter. The Papal State in the Middle Ages and the Early Renaissance* (London, 1972), pp. 296–318. Several older studies by Mercurio Antonelli still shed the most valuable light on the state of the Patrimony during this period; see "Vicende della dominazione pontificia nel patrimonio di s. Pietro in Tuscia dalla traslazione della sede alla restaurazione dell'Albornoz," *ASRSP* 25 (1902), pp. 355–395; 26 (1903), pp. 249–341, and "Nuove ricerche per la storia del patrimonio dal MCCCXXI al MCCCXLI," *ASRSP* 58 (1934), pp. 119–151; also, "Una relazione del vicario del patrimonio a Giovanni XXII in Avignone," *ASRSP* 18 (1897), pp. 447–467; "I registri del tesoriere del patrimonio Pietro d'Artois (1326–1331)," *ASRSP* 46 (1922), pp. 373–388; "Di Angiolo Tignosi vescovo di Viterbo a di una sua relazione al pontifice in Avignone," *ASRSP* 51 (1928), pp. 1–14. For the state of the lands directly adjacent to Rome itself, where Roman aggression was most acutely felt, see Giorgio Falco, "I comuni della Campagna e della Marittima nel medio evo," *ASRSP* 48 (1925), pp. 5–94; 49 (1926), pp. 127–302, especially pp. 149–175.

[27] For the legate's problematic status with respect to Rome see below, pp. 133–134.

[28] For the senate see Robert Brentano, *Rome before Avignon. A Social History of Thirteenth-Century Rome* (New York, 1974), pp. 95–101, 117–118; L. Halphen, *Études sur l'administration de Rome au Moyen Age (751–1252)* (Paris, 1907), pp. 66–76; Franco Bartoloni, "Per la storia del senato romano nei secoli XII e XIII," *BIST* 60 (1946), pp. 1–108; and Alain de Boüard, *La régime politique et les institutions de Rome au Moyen-Age, 1252–1347*. Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome 118 (Paris, 1920), pp. 134–142. For the prefects, see Halphen, pp. 16–27, and Boüard, pp. 133–134.

ernment and idiosyncratic economy were the rivalries of the great noble clans: Annibaldi, Savelli, Conti; the declining Frangipani and Pierleoni; but above all the Colonna and the Orsini, whose rapid rise in the thirteenth century had thrust them to pre-eminence in the volatile Roman political arena. Abandoned by the papacy that ensured its greatness and imposed at least a measure of restraint on the warring clans, the most storied city in the West found itself reduced to squalid poverty and wracked by explosions of factional feuding. After the death of Emperor Henry VII in 1313, the twelve-year senatorate of King Robert of Naples helped to preserve an uneasy peace, but even in the absence of actual conflict, Rome remained devoid of pilgrims and economically ruined. Without the papacy, it was bereft of much more than its livelihood and source of order; it was a city stripped of its very identity.[29]

To address the problems that pervaded this central Italian theater, John XXII turned to Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini. Though he never stated explicitly that he wanted his second legate to be an Italian, there is no denying that he overlooked a large and talented pool of Gallic candidates for the mission, including a number of close personal associates. John's rejection of an obvious and experienced candidate in Cardinal Arnaud de Pellagrue was perhaps more to be expected than not: as leader of the generally antagonistic "Gascon" faction in the Sacred College, Pellagrue was not on the best of terms with John.[30] Still, though there was no shortage of able Cahorsins in the College, the pope by-passed all of them in favor of a relatively obscure and inexperienced Italian. Two considerations

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[29] See Ferdinand Gregorovius' *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter vom V. bis XVI. Jahrhundert*, ed. W. Kampf, 3 vols. (Basel, 1953–1957), especially 11, 1–3.2 (vol. 2, pp. 583–638); see also Boüard. An updated study of later medieval Rome is found in Dupré Theseider's *Roma dal comune di popolo alla signoria pontificia*, a fine, if frustratingly undocumented, history of a period of important change for the commune of Rome. See also Friedrich Bock, "Roma al tempo di Roberto d' Angiò," *ASRSP* 65 (1942), pp. 162–176. For an interesting discussion of the "myth" of Rome during the "Babylonian Captivity" see Massimo Miglio, "«Et rerum facta est pulcherrima Roma»: Attualità della tradizione e proposte di innovazioni," *ACSI*, pp. 310–369. For the Roman commune during the period, see Boüard, pp. 96–113. The effects of the papacy's absence on Rome are treated in Paolo Brezzi, *Roma, Firenze dal secolo XII al XIV* (Rome, 1976), pp. 111–122. The liveliest account of later medieval Roman life is Brentano's Rome before Avignon, a vivid portrait of the intricate connection amongst *populus*, great clans and the papacy.

[30] Bernard Guillemain, *La cour pontificale d'Avignon 1309–1376. Étude d'une société* (Paris, 1966), p. 213.

in particular may have guided John's decision: a lingering suspicion that even the highly capable Poujet had been caught off guard by an Italian political and diplomatic dynamic whose intricacies he had yet to master fully; and the quite pragmatic realization that an Italian legate with the right family background might have resources and connections for his mission without necessitating regular transfers of money from Avignon. The latter in particular would have been an important consideration in the light of the tremendous expense which Poujet's mission had incurred thus far.[31]

Identifying the right Italian candidate for the mission was probably a relatively easy task. At the end of John's *annus horribilis*, 1325, there were only five Italians in the Sacred College, one of whom, Pietro Colonna, died early in the new year. It is hard to imagine, however, that John had ever given Pietro any serious consideration as a candidate for the mission: his family's infamous conflict with Boniface VIII in 1297 and Pietro's own antagonism to John's policies would have kept him out of the running in any event. Of the three senior Italian cardinals who remained, Jacopo Stefaneschi and Napoleone Orsini were in their early or mid-sixties, and Luca Fieschi was in his late fifties—too old for the rigor and perils of a martial legation, even from the standpoint of a vigorous septuagenarian pope like John. Most Avignonese legates were in their late thirties or early forties at the time of their appointment. Napoleone Orsini, for instance, was forty-three when he arrived in Bologna in 1306, and Poujet was probably thirty-seven or thirty-eight at the time of his appointment in 1319; Pellagrue was younger still. Albornoz, who was in his sixties, is a noteworthy exception (though he was exceptional in many other ways, as well); for the most part the popes regarded "advanced age" as legitimate grounds for declining a legatine assignment. In 1346, when Clement VI appointed Poujet and Cardinal Pierre Bertrand, both in their mid-sixties, as legates to Sicily, Queen Jeanne of France, an old friend of Pierre Bertrand, implored the pope not to expose a man of such advanced years to the perils of the voyage; Clement relented, and Pierre was replaced by the thirty-three year-old Cardinal Gui de Boulogne.[32]

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[31] See below, pp. 83–84.

[32] Pope Clement VI, *Lettres closes, patentes et curiales se rapportant à la France*, ed. E. DéPrez, 3 vols. (Paris, 1901–1925), #2213.

Age aside, John XXII had other reasons for overlooking Luca Fieschi, Jacopo Stefaneschi and Napoleone Orsini. Luca came from a wealthy and powerful Genoese magnate family that produced two popes in the thirteenth century, but was not especially well-connected in Tuscany and the Papal States. Jacopo Stefaneschi and Napoleone Orsini came from the Roman aristocracy, but only Napoleone had much diplomatic experience, and he could be rejected out of hand for his close association with the Ghibellines and his implacable opposition to the pope's Italian policy.[33] Furthermore, all three had been intimately involved in the controversies surrounding the pontificate of Boniface VIII—controversies that remained potentially explosive almost a generation after Boniface's death.

In the final analysis, there was really only one truly viable candidate for the mission: Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini. At about forty, he possessed both maturity and the vigor of a youth whose bloom was not yet wholly faded. More importantly, perhaps, he was also John's own creation and the first Italian raised to the purple at Avignon; unlike his older Italian colleagues, Giovanni Orsini had spent virtually his entire ecclesiastical career at the Avignonese curia. Though he had not been especially prominent in the first decade of his cardinalate, his abilities were sufficient to inspire the confidence of the pope, and he maintained close ties to some of the pope's most important Italian allies. He had a long association with Pagano della Torre,[34] the patriarch of Aquileia and one of Poujet's key allies in the Lombard theater, and he was on excellent terms with Robert of Naples—an essential criterion for a legate who would be coordinating extensive actions with the Angevins during his mission.[35] Finally, as a member of one of the leading noble clans of Rome—indeed, one of the most powerful families in all of Italy—he had recourse to a network of kinsmen and powerful associates stretching from the Angevin *Regno* into Tuscany, as well as a personal familiarity with Italian politics and diplomacy that no "Gaul" could hope to match.

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[33] For the turbulent relationship between Napoleone and John XXII, see Willemsen, pp. 80–129. Napoleone conspired almost routinely with the pope's enemies (see Mollat, *Les papes*, p. 349); he exploited John's controversial pronouncement on the Beatific Vision (1331) to conspire with the Franciscan Spirituals and Ludwig of Bavaria to have John deposed by a General Council (ibid., pp. 55–56).

[34] See below, pp. 42–43.

[35] Tabacco, *La casa di Francia*, p. 286. For Orsini's friendship with Robert see Finke, *Acta Aragonensia* 3, p. 408, #188.

Thus, on 17 April 1326, in full consistory, at the request of the Florentines and King Robert of Naples and with the consent of the cardinals, John XXII named Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini as *angelus pacis*—"to tear out and to destroy, to scatter and to despoil, to build up and to sow"[36]—to Tuscany, the Patrimony, the Duchy of Spoleto, Campagna-Marittima and the March of Ancona.[37] The opening lines of Orsini's general mandate bear testimony to the hard lessons that John had learned about his policy thus far in Italy

> Because sometimes what conjecture suggests will be sufficient is proven otherwise by experience, the schoolmistress of all things, we deem it opportune and appropriate to make up for such insufficiency accordingly.[38]

Orsini's legation, while clearly conceived as a complement to Poujet's mission, was never intended as anything other than an entirely independent operation. Orsini's office was in no way subordinate to or dependent on Poujet's; nor did it diminish Poujet's own legatine authority, except insofar as it was to take place in territories initially

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[36] Appendix A, l.61–62; cf. Jer. 1:10. The juxtaposition of this bellicose phrase with the term *angelus pacis* (Appendix A, l. 50) grows out of the evolution of the legatine office during the central Middle Ages. Since the time of Gregory VII, the phrase *vt euellas et destruas, dissipes et desperdas, edificies et plantes* . . . signified the conferral of the office of *legatus a latere* and all of its incumbent powers; Richard A. Schmutz, "Medieval Papal Representatives: Legates, Nuncios, and Judges-Delegate," *Studia Gratiana* 15 (1972), p. 451. The phrase *angelus pacis* became current with Innocent III's legations against the Cathars of the Midi; Pierre Blet, SJ, *Histoire de la représentation diplomatique du Saint-Siège des origines à l'aube du XIX^e siècle* (Vatican City, 1982), pp. 135–136. It remained in regular use until 1625; see Bernard Barbiche, "Les «diplomates» pontificaux du moyen âge tardif à la première modernité. Office et charge pastorale," in *Offices et papauté*, pp. 367–368. The same language appears in the general mandates of Pellagrue (*Regestum Clementis papae V*, #5024), Poujet (Riezler, p. 74, #121; cf. *Annales ecclesiastici Caesaris Baronii, cura Oderici Raynaldi et Jacobi Laderchii, et ad nostra usque tempora perducti ab Augustino Theiner*, 37 vols. [Rome, 1864–1883], 24, pp. 120–121) and Albornoz (Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes et curiales publiées ou analysées d'après les registres des Archives Vaticanes*, ed. Pierre Gasnault, M.-H. Laurent, 3 vols. [incomplete; Paris, 1959], #352).

[37] See Villani, X.cccxlvi (p. 625) and «Cronaca Senese di Agnolo Tura del Grasso», p. 435, l.14–22. The legation covered Tuscany and the Papal States, with the exception of Romagna and Bologna, which remained under Poujet's control, and Benevento, which was under Angevin protection; thus it covered all territories north of the Angevin *Regno* and south of a line passing through the districts of Pisa, Città di Castello, Perugia, Urbino and Ancona (Mollat, *Les papes*, p. 178).

[38] *Quia nonnumquam quod coniectura fore sufficiens persuasit, contingit docente magistra rerum experientia insufficiens declarari, oportunum reputamus et congruum ut talis insufficientia proinde suppleatur*; see Appendix A, l.3–6.

placed under Poujet's jurisdiction. While Poujet strove to regain the initiative against the Visconti and their allies, Orsini would pursue a distinct set of objectives in central Italy: the war against Castruccio Castracani and Guido Tarlati in Tuscany; the defense of Rome against the emperor's long-threatened *Romzug*; the restoration of order and effective administration in the troubled Papal States. The general mandate of Orsini's legation enabled him to exercise wide-ranging legatine powers in the territories committed to him. He was given the power of summary excommunication and interdict over all rebels, regardless of status or special privileges, with all rights of appeal postponed until after Orsini's legation had ended.[39] So long as Orsini held office, the pope would honor his sentences; neither Poujet nor any other representative agent would exercise any jurisdiction in Orsini's territories.[40]

Orsini's general mandate was expanded and refined by the forty-one concessions, faculties, and special indulgences that accompanied it. Orsini was given a wider range of subsidiary powers than Pellagrue or even Poujet; indeed, no envoy to Italy would enjoy such extraordinary powers for a generation.[41] His authority was unchallengeable; violations of his orders, or attacks on him or his *familia*, were punishable by ecclesiastical censure.[42] He was to function as apostolic judge-delegate, with appeals to the Holy See from within his legation coming to his own court.[43] The religious orders, particularly the mendicants, were placed at Orsini's disposal.[44] He was given unusual powers to raise monies for the maintenance of his entourage, and those who refused to comply or interfered with the collection of these revenues were subject to ecclesiastical penalties.[45]

Orsini could leave his territories without surrendering his legatine authority, most likely to permit any necessary travel to the Angevin *Regno*, where Orsini exercised no jurisdiction.[46] He was given permission to negotiate with excommunicates and to attend private

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[39] Appendix A, l.64–74.

[40] Appendix A, l.84–88. By the end of the legation, John XXII was apparently thinking otherwise; see below, pp. 146, 149.

[41] For the character of these extraordinary faculties see below, pp. 70–71.

[42] See Appendix B, #1–6, 8, 10, 15, 16, 40.

[43] Appendix B, #37.

[44] Appendix B, #7, 13.

[45] Appendix B, #9, 12. For *procurationes* and *evectiones* see below, pp. 86–87.

[46] Appendix B, #11. John XXII raised the possibility of a journey to Naples in two letters of 3 January 1329 (RV 115, f. 33va–vb).

Masses in interdicted territories; to all intents and purposes, Giovanni Orsini was an island of immunity in a sea of interdicts.[47] He was also given the power to dispense or absolve penitents from irregularities and ecclesiastical penalties incurred for various reasons within the boundaries of his legation,[48] to dispense petitioners from impediments to clerical office or marriage, to offer a wide range of indulgences, and to grant papal notariates (*tabellionatus*).[49] The traditional restrictions on legatine provisions in cathedrals and collegiate or regular churches were loosened,[50] and Orsini was authorized to receive resignations and confer benefices in cases of exchange.[51]

Invested with this constellation of powers, Giovanni Orsini set sail for Italy in the spring of 1326, once the winter storms had ended and the Mediterranean Sea was suitable for passage again. His dispatch inaugurated the most ambitious papal intervention in Italy prior to—and, arguably, including—the mission of Albornoz, as two powerful cardinal legates traversed the troubled lands of northern and central Italy. If at least some of John's Italian opponents hoped that the disasters of 1325 had broken the pope's determination to continue the fight, they had badly misjudged him. The next great stage of papal activity in Italy had begun.

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[47] Appendix B, #14, 30, 31; he was also given the faculty to relax or suspend interdicts (#18), and, for his own purposes, he could be absolved once *in articulo mortis* from all sins (#32).

[48] Appendix B, #20–22, 24, 27, 36, 41.

[49] Appendix B, #19, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 33, 34, 39.

[50] Appendix B, #17, 35. For these restrictions, see below, p. 70.

[51] Appendix B, #36.

CHAPTER THREE

CARDINAL GIOVANNI GAETANO ORSINI AND HIS FAMILY

The man who would lead John XXII's second great legation to Italy was born into one of medieval Rome's most powerful families. His paternal grandfather was the illustrious Matteo Rosso Orsini who, as senator, exercised a virtual dictatorship over Rome in the dark years of the early 1240s, when the armies of Frederick II encircled the city and the cardinals squabbled over who should succeed Gregory IX in the papacy's hour of crisis.[1] Matteo Rosso sired an enormous brood, of which Cardinal Giovanni's father, Matteo Rosso II, was the youngest son. The younger Matteo Rosso was prominent, if less spectacularly than his father, in the public life of later thirteenth-century Rome, especially after the election of his older brother, Giovanni Gaetano, as Pope Nicholas III (1277–80). Though separated in age by perhaps some twenty years, the two brothers were quite close, and Matteo Rosso became one of Nicholas III's most trusted and reliable agents in the governance of Rome and its *contado*.[2] Giovanni's mother, whose name remains unknown, was Matteo Rosso's second or third wife. She was not a member of the Gaetani family, as is often alleged, but, it would appear, of the Romangia family, a baronial clan of the Roman *contado*. In a letter (12 December 1335) to Alfonso, *infante* of Aragon, Cardinal Napoleone Orsini—Giovanni's first cousin, and thus a reliable source regarding the family's bloodlines—refers to Napoleone of Romangia, *electus* of Monreale,

[1] For Matteo Rosso I, see Matthias Thumser, *Rom und der römische Adel in der späten Stauferzeit*. Bibliothek des deutschen historischen Instituts 81 (Tübingen, 1995), pp. 143–152.

[2] Matteo Rosso was born around 1246 and died before 1300. For Matteo Rosso II see F. Savio, "Le tre famiglie Orsini di Monterotondo, di Marino e di Manopello," *BSUSP* 2 (1896), pp. 89–112, esp. 92–94; Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 124, 148, 154–155, 178, 207, 216, 263, 356–357. For his family see Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, *Cardinali di curia e 'familiae' cardinalizie dal 1227 al 1254*, 2 vols. (Padua, 1972), 1, pp. 314–316.

as maternal uncle (*avunculus*) of Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini of San Teodoro.[3]

Giovanni Gaetano di Matteo Rosso II Orsini was born in or near Rome in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. The exact date is uncertain, though it was probably some time around 1285. Giovanni began his university education in 1308, when he was most likely in his early twenties; when he was provided to the archdeaconry of Bibiesca, Burgos, in September 1316, he was at least twenty-five, as he was not dispensed *super defectu aetatis*.[4] He had at least four half-brothers, all of whom were apparently a good deal older than he was. One of these, Orso, seems to have died as a young man. Francesco and Napoleone ("Poncello") were, like their father, active in the political life of Rome. Francesco was senator in 1301 and led the opposition to Henry VII in 1312; he died before 1337. Poncello served as vicar to the papal senator, King Robert of Naples, in 1314, and died before 1328; his sons seem to have had an especially close relationship with Cardinal Giovanni. A fourth brother, Jacopo (d. 1323), pursued a career in the Church.[5] A number of dispensations *super consanguinitate*, which Giovanni obtained as cardinal for various nieces and nephews, suggest that he had four or five sisters or half-sisters, all of whom married into prominent and distinguished Roman houses.[6]

It is hard to say for certain when Giovanni began his ecclesiastical career. His first benefice was a canonry in Rheims, which he acquired sometime before 1308.[7] Between 1308 and 1310 he was at the University of Padua,[8] where he became something of a fixture

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[3] See Marc Dykmans, SJ, *Le cérémonial papal de la fin du Moyen Age à la Renaissance*, 3 vols. (Brussels/Rome, 1977–1983), 2, "De Rome en Avignon ou le cérémonial de Jacques Stefaneschi," p. 29; also Finke, *Acta Aragonensia* 2, p. 739, #456. Guillemain too mistakenly identified Giovanni Orsini as a Gaetani (*Le cour pontificale*, p. 190). For the scholarly debate over Cardinal Giovanni Orsini's connections to the Gaetani family, see Angelo Mercati, *Nell'Urbe dalla fine di Settembre 1337 al 21 Gennaio 1338* (Rome, 1945), pp. 8–9, n. 11.

[4] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #881.

[5] For Giovanni's half-brothers see Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 263, 359, 400, 409–410, 423, 430, Tavola III; Savio, pp. 90, 99–100. See also Franca Allegrezza, *Organizzazione del potere e dinamiche familiari. Gli Orsini dal Duecento agli inizi del Quattrocento*. Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo. Nuovi studi storici 44 (Rome, 1998), Tavola V.

[6] See for example *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #5525, #5525bis, #15060, #24517.

[7] *Regestum Clementis papae V*, #2653.

[8] Ibid., #2653 (8 March 1308), an indulgence, secured by the intercession of Cardinals Jacopo Stefaneschi and Francesco Gaetani, by which Giovanni was allowed

at the court of the then-bishop of Padua, Pagano della Torre.[9] He studied letters, a classical curriculum increasingly associated in the later thirteenth century with the study of rhetoric and, by extension, legal studies.[10] Though there is no evidence that Giovanni ever engaged in the formal study of the law, he possessed a considerable knowledge of the field and retained an active interest in it: the jurists Alberico da Rosate and Oldradus de Ponte both referred to him as *jurisperitus*, and during his legation he commissioned the *De potestate ecclesie* of the Franciscan Francesco Toti of Perugia.[11] Giovanni's knowledge of theology, by contrast, was minimal: he declined to take part in the discussions which led up to the issue of the bull *Cum inter nonnullos* in 1323, citing his own incompetence in theological matters.[12]

By 1316 Giovanni was resident at Avignon as a *familiaris* of his first cousin, Cardinal Napoleone Orsini.[13] Napoleone's support for the imperial cause was unusual among the Orsini, though by no means unprecedented,[14] and did not preclude an apparently warm relationship between the two cousins. Under Napoleone's patronage, Giovanni amassed an impressive collection of benefices.[15] Giovanni seems to have taken a minor part in the routine business of the curia: in the brief period between 7 September and 11 November

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to receive the fruits of his prebend in Rheims while away at *studium litterarum*; a copy was sent to the bishop of Padua, Pagano della Torre. See also Andrea Gloria, ed. *Monumenti della Università di Padova (1222–1318)* (Bologna, 1884), p. 401, where Giovanni is listed among the *scolares* in 1310.

[9] A number of entries from protocols of the notary Gabriel quondam Henrigini de Cremona attest to Giovanni's presence at Pagano's court: Udine, Biblioteca Civica, MS 1475 (1), f. 41v (16 October 1308); f. 67v (29 September 1309); f. 73v (17 February 1310). See also Piero Posenato, "Chierici ordinati a Padova agli inizi del Trecento," *Fonti e ricerche di storia ecclesiastica padovana* 5 (Padua, 1972): pp. 35–68, 62–63, #73, #74 (1 December and 8 December 1310), and Gloria, p. 65, #628 (25 May 1308).

[10] See Nancy Siraisi, *Arts and Sciences at Padua: The* Studium *of Padua before 1350* (Toronto, 1973), pp. 33–65; see also Helene Wieruszowski, "Rhetoric and Classics in Italian Education of the Thirteenth Century," *Studia Gratiana* 16 (1967), pp. 169–207; for Padua, pp. 201–202.

[11] Baluze-Mollat 2, pp. 231–232.

[12] Louis Duval-Arnold, "Élaboration d'un document pontifical: Les travaux préparatoires à la constitution *Cum inter nonnullos* (12 novembre 1323)," in *Le fonctionnement administratif de la papauté d'Avignon*, pp. 400–401.

[13] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #713.

[14] See Thumser, pp. 332–333. For the practical bases of Napoleone's "Ghibellinism," see Allegrezza, pp. 79–88.

[15] For Giovanni's benefices see Appendix D.

1316 he served as executor in the provisions of at least five benefices.[16] His career, in other words, was by no means extraordinary for a man of his station. His promotion to the cardinalate at the end of 1316 was predicated entirely on political and diplomatic considerations. Thirteen years had passed since the creation of the last Italian cardinal, and John XXII knew better than to overlook the Italians any longer.[17] More importantly, perhaps, the pope wished to renew the traditionally strong ties between the papacy and the Orsini, some of whom had thrown their support behind Henry VII when the emperor came to Rome for his coronation in the summer of 1312.[18] Thus, on 17 December 1316, in his first promotion of cardinals, John XXII named Giovanni Gaetano Orsini cardinal deacon of San Teodoro.

The first decade of Giovanni Orsini's cardinalate was, like his earlier career, uneventful. He was neither part of the pope's inner circle, comprised chiefly of Cahorsins, nor prominent among the pope's opponents, of whom Cardinal Napoleone Orsini was among the most vociferous. As a cardinal-deacon, he had a hand in the ceremonial activities of the curia: in May 1318 he, Napoleone, and Jacopo Stefaneschi presented the *pallium* to Berengar, *electus* of Compostela,[19] and in August 1324 he was among the six cardinal-deacons who presented the *pallium* to Bishop Henry of Bamberg.[20] Otherwise, he remained in the background, collecting benefices, advancing the careers of his *familiares*,[21] and undertaking routine administrative duties, though not, it would seem, with any great frequency.[22]

Giovanni's elevation to the cardinalate established him as one of his family's most powerful agents and benefactors at the papal curia. With two cardinals (three, after the elevation of Matteo Orsini in 1327) and innumerable curial clerics, the Orsini were better repre-

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[16] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #217, #222, #441, #1819, #1822.
[17] Guillemain, p. 185.
[18] See Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 410–418.
[19] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #7116.
[20] See Riezler, pp. 184–185, #379.
[21] For the known members of Orsini's *familia* see Appendix C.
[22] The letters of John XXII show Giovanni considering benefices or graces for clerics outside of his family or household fourteen times between 17 March 1317 and 1 March 1326. He also helped Gayta Johannis Jacobi obtain entry into the Benedictine convent of Sant'Agnesa, Rome (1 December 1324; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #21128) and was one of the clerical executors of a papal grant to the Hospitallers over the payment of outstanding debts (19 April 1325; ibid., #22050).

sented at Avignon during the pontificate of John XXII than any other Italian family. They lived in a sort of Orsini enclave just south of city, centered on the adjacent *librate* (residential compounds) of the Orsini cardinals: Giovanni's *librata* was slightly to the southwest of Napoleone's and southeast of the one later inhabited by Matteo.[23] If the different branches of the Orsini family often found themselves at odds, they generally liked to present a united front to the world outside. This was certainly the case at Avignon. Orsini cardinals maintained kinsmen in their *familiae*,[24] obtained benefices for them[25] and secured dispensations for nieces and nephews looking to marry within canonically forbidden degrees;[26] Orsini clerics looked after one another's beneficial holdings and served as executors in beneficial appointments of kinsmen.[27] Just as the family's secular agents looked to ensure that Orsini properties stayed within the extended family, Orsini clerics at Avignon did what they could to keep important benefices in Orsini hands. When Giovanni's brother, Jacopo, died in February 1323, Giovanni saw to it that Jacopo's benefices were redistributed to Orsini nephews:[28] a canonry and prebend in Padua went to Giordano di Poncello Orsini;[29] canonries and prebends in Beauvais and Chartres went to Giordano's brother, Giovanni;[30] a canonry and prebend in St Peter's went to Orso di Francesco

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[23] See Stefano Forte, OP, "Il card. Matteo Orsini OP e il suo testamento," *Archivium fratrum praedicatorum* 37 (1967), pp. 190–191.

[24] See Appendix C.

[25] Two nephews in particular, Giordano and Giovanni di Poncello Orsini, enjoyed Giovanni's favor; see *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #14906, #16939, #16940, #17549, #17550, #17567, #17568. Orsini continued to act as suppliant for benefices for these two nephews throughout his legation.

[26] See *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #3964, #5525 and 5525bis, #15060, #21620, #24517.

[27] In 1318, for example, two of the conservators who administered Giovanni's benefices and properties were nephews (Napoleone Orsini and Francesco Gaetani; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #8621); Napoleone was reappointed in 1322 (ibid., #15466). In 1323, Bertoldo Orsini, *electus* of Naples, and Rinaldo Orsini, papal notary and future cardinal, served in this same capacity (ibid., #18377).

[28] See Andreas Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht im römischen Trecento. Die Colonna, und ihre Klientel auf dem kurialen Pfründenmarkt (1278–1378)*. Bibliothek des deutschen historischen Instituts in Rom 88 (Tübingen, 1999), p. 262, n. 115.

[29] Ibid., #16939. The benefice had previously been reserved for Giordano, apparently at Cardinal Giovanni's request.

[30] Ibid., #16940, #16941. The benefices had previously been reserved for Giovanni, apparently at Cardinal Giovanni's request; in both cases, the future cardinal Rinaldo Orsini served as one of the clerical executors of the appointment.

dell'Anguillara.[31] And, of course, the Orsini cardinals knew how to look after themselves as well: Giovanni obtained for himself rights to the papal fief of Orvieto (1321),[32] where his vicar, Poncello Orsini kept the town firmly loyal to the papal cause; he also obtained rights to the towns of Bitteto and Brindisi (1323), in Puglia.[33]

If the sources permit at least a reasonable reconstruction of Giovanni Orsini's career, they reveal very little of the man himself. Giovanni Orsini was not among the more prominent or colorful personalities of the fourteenth-century curia. Certainly, he lacked the eccentric and sometimes charming audacity of his cousin, Cardinal Napoleone. In his sixteenth-century history of the Orsini family, Francesco Sansovino described Cardinal Giovanni in glowing terms, though his panegyric was commissioned by an Orsini prince and must be taken with a grain of salt.[34] More recent historians have been anything but flattering. Robert Davidsohn, for example, in his monumental *History of Florence*, described Orsini as a "cardinal of few scruples";[35] the historian of Viterbo, Cesare Pinzi, dismissed him as "a wrathful and overbearing baron in the guise of a prelate."[36] In both cases, the authors' love for the cities about which they wrote shaped their opinions of a legate who was kind to neither Florence nor (especially) Viterbo. Even so, Orsini's actions during the course of his legation suggest that Davidsohn and Pinzi come a good deal closer to the mark than Sansovino did.

More contemporary evidence is limited. Some of it suggests a character well-suited to the legatine office. In April 1323, John XXII solicited *consilia* from the cardinals regarding a crusading proposal from King Charles IV. In a thoughtful and informative opinion,

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[31] Ibid., #16942. The benefice had previously been reserved for Orso, apparently at Cardinal Giovanni's request.

[32] Ibid., #13317 (2 November 1321). For the vicariate of Poncello see «Estratti dalla "Historia" di Cipriano Manenti», in *Ephemerides Urbevetanae II*, ed. L. Fumi, *RIS*^{2} 15 V, p. 426, l.21–24. For the long Orsini association with Orvieto, which enjoyed considerable glory under from 1315–1322 under its flamboyant War-Captain Poncello Orsini (not the brother of Cardinal Orsini), see Daniel Waley, *Medieval Orvieto. The Political History of an Italian City-State, 1157–1334* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 99–111.

[33] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #18236.

[34] See Sansovino's *L'Historia di casa Orsini* (Venice, 1565), part I, p. 49, f. 1.

[35] *Storia di Firenze* 4, p. 42.

[36] *. . . un iroso e prepotente barone camuffato da prelato*; *Storia della città di Viterbo*, 4 vols. (Viterbo, 1887–1913), 3 (1899), p. 183.

Orsini rejected the proposal on several practical bases. For one thing, he argued, the French crown offered to provide twenty galleys, two smaller ships and four *galioti*, at a cost of 200,000 *libri Turonenses*; the Gallic prelates and barons, Orsini observed, could guarantee payment of only 20,000 *libri*. The time-frame, moreover, calling for an imminent departure, was, to Orsini's mind, unrealistically short. He was more favorable to proposals for subsequent passages, for which the crown had offered 300,000 *lib. Tur.*, provided that the project receive adequate planning and mobilization of resources. He was skeptical, however, that the French people and church would be willing or able to remit the necessary taxes, and was critical of the proposal's failure to provide concrete figures for the requisite manpower. He suggested to the pope that nuncios be sent to the king to explain the flaws in the proposal for the first passage and to demand guarantees of the crown's commitment to the development and prosecution of subsequent passages. The *consilium* reveals a careful and practical mind, highly attentive to logistics and organizational details—provided, of course, that Orsini, and not one of his *familiares*, actually researched and prepared the *consilium* himself.[37] On the other hand, Giovanni Orsini was anything but a diplomat; during his legation, he was often abrasive, impatient and impulsive, to the detriment of his mission. Intensely loyal to his family and friends, ruthless to his enemies, he was above all else an Orsini, cut from the cloth of a mighty Roman clan whose power and wealth John XXII hoped to apply to the prosecution of his objectives in central Italy.

The Orsini were not a particularly old family, though distinction of lineage, in medieval Rome, did not require a long or venerable pedigree. Certainly, long-established bloodlines added luster to a house, and some prominent Roman families laid claim to preposterously ancient origins. The Savelli, for example, took their name as evidence of descent from the Oscan-speaking peoples (whom the Romans called *Sabelli*) of distant antiquity; by a similar etymological sleight-of-hand, the Annibaldi identified themselves as the eponymous descendants of the great Carthaginian general, Hannibal.[38] For these two families at least, homonymic temptations proved impossible to

[37] *Lettres secrètes et curiales de Jean XXII*, #1707; April 1323.

[38] See Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 1909–1914 edition (repr. 1974), 7, p. 263; Brentano, *Rome before Avignon*, p. 14.

resist. Most others, however, did not bother to fashion spurious genealogies; in fact, very few of the leading Roman families of the fourteenth century could trace their origins much farther back than the middle of the twelfth century, or found themselves much troubled by the fact. The Colonna, perhaps, were exceptional; they could trace their descent to the Counts of Tusculum, who dominated Rome's political life in the tenth and eleventh centuries, though the Colonna themselves made little enough of the fact. In Rome, familial distinction was linked much more to the tangible realities—acquisition of property; continued access to municipal offices; prominent representation in the Church—than to the venerable antiquity of the bloodline.

Perhaps no family exemplified these truths more than the Orsini did. The Orsini belonged to the "new" Roman aristocracy that came to prominence during the transformation of papal government in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The proximity of the Norman *Regno*, the emergence of a Roman communal movement in the 1140s, and the imperial challenge of Frederick I and Henry VI had all prompted significant changes in the mechanics of papal government in the second half of the twelfth century. The process reached its apex under Innocent III (1198–1216), whose pontificate established the essential parameters of thirteenth-century papal government. Papal administration was overhauled, with a more genuinely bureaucratic curia growing up in place of the old *palatium lateranense*. For security, the popes acquired fortified *castra specialia* in and around Latium; to maintain general order, they promoted the emergence of semi-autonomous but clearly subordinate local governments in the region. Most importantly, perhaps, they came to rely increasingly on feudal grants as a means of managing extended rural territories and securing the fealty of the region's leading families.[39]

All of these developments demanded a substantial pool of appropriately prominent local personnel. They also afforded opportunities for spectacular advancement to families which could provide for the papacy's changing needs. Many of the older baronial families that had come to prominence in the tenth and eleventh centuries proved unable, for a variety of reasons, to adapt to the changing circum-

[39] Sandro Carocci, *Baroni di Roma. Dominazioni signorili e lignaggi aristocratici nel Duecento e nel primo Trecento*. Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo. Nuovi studi storici 23 (Rome, 1993), p. 17.

stances, and a new baronial aristocracy gradually arose to take their place. As they ascended to prominence these new families developed strategies and power structures which responded organically to the new political reality. By the beginning of the thirteenth century the sun was setting on the Tuscolani, the Pierleoni, the Frangipani, the Boboni and the Corsi, whose power and, increasingly, territorial possessions passed to a new generation: the Savelli, the Conti di Segni, the Gaetani, and above all, the Colonna and the Orsini.[40]

The Roman baronial noble family (*casato*) of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was a uniquely Roman phenomenon; no other aristocracy in Western Christendom was entirely like it.[41] It radiated outward from the nuclear family into a *consorteria* that might include more distant relatives or even, in its broadest sense, those not related by blood. In some ways it resembled the *clientela* system of ancient Rome, with a symbiosis between one powerful family and the lesser, associated families which it protected and which in turn supported its ambitions.[42] The wealth of the Roman *casati* derived not from commerce and banking, as elsewhere in Italy, but from the sale or lease of properties and from agricultural activities such as sheep and cattle farming. Observers from other Italian cities regarded farming and ranching as peculiarly Roman sources of aristocratic wealth, as the fifteenth-century Florentine humanist Poggio Bracciolini remarked in his *De nobilitate*.[43] Indeed, such activities were far more important in Rome than in many other Italian cities; along with the cloth-merchants, Rome's most important professional association was probably that of the *bovacterii*, or cattle merchants.[44]

Like urban aristocracies elsewhere in medieval Italy, the clans possessed both urban and rural bases, with the clans themselves serving as vital link between the city and its *contado*.[45] In Rome, their power lay in the great palaces that dominated sprawling, often unconnected series of neighborhoods, and in the brooding towers from

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[40] For the origins and development of the new baronial aristocracy see Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, pp. 17–66.

[41] For the characteristics of the Roman *casati*, see Boüard, pp. 82–95.

[42] See Sandro Carocci, "Aspetti delle strutture familiari nel Lazio tardomedievale," *ASRSP* 110 (1987), pp. 151–176.

[43] See Claudio Donati, *L'idea di nobiltà in Italia, secoli xiv–xviii* (Bari: 1988), p. 1.

[44] Brentano, *Rome before Avignon*, p. 52. For the *bovacterii*, see Isa Lori Sanfilippo, *La Roma dei romani. Arti, mestieri e professioni nella Roma del Trecento*. Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo. Nuovi studi storici 57 (Rome, 2001), pp. 95–122.

[45] Gene Brucker, *Renaissance Florence* (Berkeley, 1969), pp. 4–5.

which the clans conducted their frequent feuds.[46] Their principal rural bases were located in the larger towns of the region, though they also maintained numerous *castelli* and fortified villages (*castra*) throughout the countryside.[47] Many of these rural properties were papal fiefs, though others were held in pledge or in fief from the numerous ecclesiastical foundations of Rome and Lazio.[48] In addition, the clans possessed substantial allodial lands, which they acquired by various means: some were purchased outright; some were acquired in judicial proceedings; others were taken by force.[49] Taken together, these urban and rural bases provided each clan with the subordinate or dependent populations that came to comprise the clan's faction.[50]

The baronial clans sought to maintain open lines of communication between their rural and urban holdings by controlling the different roads leading in and out of Rome. Their *castelli* were typically built on or near important thoroughfares, and fortified farmhouses (*casali*) were used as way stations for persons or goods in transit. The proliferation of other families and the existence of independent communes generally ensured that no one clan could hope to obtain complete control of the thoroughfares between its urban bases and

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[46] For the nature and dynamics of the clans' urban holdings, as distinct from their rural holdings, see Sandro Carocci, "Baroni in città. Considerazioni sull'insediamento e i diritti urbani della grande nobiltà," in *Roma nei secoli XIII e XIV. Cinque saggi*, ed. E. Hubert (Rome, 1993) pp. 137–173.

[47] Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, p. 79.

[48] Ibid., pp. 69–72.

[49] Ibid., pp. 105–154.

[50] Despite the recent boom in prosopographical studies on medieval Europe, the Roman noble families have yet to receive quite the same attention as their counterparts in Lombardy or Tuscany. The most important work on the Roman clans is Carocci's *Baroni di Roma*, which acknowledges throughout an unfortunate dearth of documentation and insufficient scholarly attention. For the structures of the medieval clan generally, with particularly attention to Italy and some discussion of Rome, see Jacques Heers, *Le clan familial au Moyen Age. Étude sur les structures politiques et sociales des milieux urbains* (Paris, 1974). For the aggrandizing strategies of the Roman clans, particularly with respect to ecclesiastical policies, see two excellent studies by Andreas Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, and *Die Kanoniker von S. Giovanni in Laterano und S. Maria Maggiore im 14. Jahrhundert. Eine Prosopographie*. Bibliothek des deutschen historischen Instituts in Rom 89 (Tübingen, 1999). For a general treatment of the Roman clan as it existed in the thirteenth century see Brentano, *Rome before Avignon*, pp. 171–209. For the military and factional power of the clan in the city see Heers, pp. 181–202; for urban towers and tower warfare, pp. 190–191, 201–215; for the urban aristocratic court as a means of controlling neighborhoods, p. 155.

its principal rural holdings, but this does not appear to have precluded relatively free movement; an unspoken agreement allowed the dependents or armed retainers of one clan to pass through the territories of other clans or free communes, without fear of molestation or remission of tolls.[51]

Within a few generations, most clans split into a series of agnatic lines, designated by the centers of their principal holdings. Given the fecundity of the baronial clans, this was all but inevitable, though it almost always signalled a significant reduction in the power of the clan. Some branches managed to acquire considerable influence and territory, though rarely if ever on par with those of the original nuclear clan from which they emerged.[52] Perhaps to compensate, the various branches often banded together in times of conflict with a common enemy. This, however, was far from a universal rule, and in the absence of a common foe, the different lines of one *casato* were as likely to be at odds with one another as they were with rival clans.

The baronial *casati* maintained and expressed their power in a number of ways. They routinely competed for representation in the offices of Rome's municipal government. The most coveted prize was the senatorate, an office as important as it is difficult to characterize. Though the name implies a connection to the Senate of Republican antiquity, the medieval senate traces its origins to 1143, when Arnold of Brescia attempted to reconfigure Rome's government as part of the nascent Roman commune's bid to end papal government in the city. Without a clear constitutional definition or mandate, however, the character of the senate was subject to enormous variation. It moved in fits and starts from a genuine assembly of some fifty members in the mid-twelfth century to an aristocratic office of one (after about 1205) or two members (after 1238) in the thirteenth, by which time it was as likely to be an instrument of papal government as it was an organ of the ethereal but tenacious "Roman Republic."

This flexibility might appear at first glance to be an institutional weakness; in fact, the ability to change in accordance with immediate needs and fluctuations in the political climate made the senatorate

[51] Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, pp. 76–78.
[52] Ibid., p. 80.

invaluable to municipal government. If need be, it could provide vigorous leadership; as sole senator during the crisis of the early 1240s, Matteo Rosso I Orsini exercised a virtual dictatorship, rallying the papacy's supporters to keep the forces of Frederick II at bay and taking extreme measures to end the deadlock that paralyzed the College of Cardinals after the death of Gregory IX.[53] At other times, the senator might be little more than an elegant and largely symbolic figurehead from a distinguished but diminished house; a decade after the heavy hand of Matteo Rosso Orsini, the unremarkable term of Jacopo Frangipani allowed the city to catch its collective breath during a brief hiatus in the conflicts surrounding the Hohenstaufen presence in Italy.[54] While the senatorate was usually the province of the local nobility, it passed at times to foreigners or non-nobles, and sometimes disappeared altogether. Strong thirteenth-century popes, and in particular those who came themselves from Roman noble clans, tended to favor a rather nepotistic arrangement in which senators functioned as papal agents of local government. In the 1250s the communal experiment of Brancaleone degli Andalò produced a senatorate more akin to a *podesteria* in its republican orientation and reliance on foreign-born senators. The defeat of the Hohenstaufen and expulsion of Brancaleone established a senatorate which reflected the alliance between the popes and the Angevin crown of Naples; though abandoned by Nicholas III, the Angevin senatorate, with its delegated vicars and sub-senators, would make a triumphant return under King Robert of Naples, the designated senator of the distant Avignonese popes.

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the senate chancery developed a series of reasonably coherent and consistently applied administrative practices and protocols;[55] otherwise, the senatorate itself remained as protean as ever. By the middle of the thirteenth century, however, one thing had become abundantly clear: regardless of what form the Roman senatorate might take, the leading clans had acquired a virtual monopoly on the office. Between 1230 and 1347 there were some 185 senators or senatorial vicars in Rome,

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[53] For the senatorate of Matteo Rosso see Gregorovius, 9,5.3 (2, pp. 384–385), Thumser, pp. 308–318.

[54] See Thumser, p. 326.

[55] See Franco Bartoloni, "Per la storia del senato romano dei secoli XII e XIII," pp. 1–108.

no fewer than 168 of whom were Roman barons. The Orsini led the way with fifty, followed by the Annibaldi (28), Colonna (24), Conti di Segni (17), Savelli (15), Stefaneschi (8), and Conti dell'Anguillara (5).[56] Though the office was always important, the changing nature of the senate makes it difficult to distinguish between men elected for their ability to provide strong government and men elected for the prestige of their houses—qualities generally but by no means always interchangeable in medieval Rome.[57]

If the clans vied for representation in the Roman senate, they contended no less strenuously for regular membership in the Sacred College—in many respects, a more essential instrument of clannish aggrandizement than any civic office. By the thirteenth century Peter Damian's "spiritual senate of the universal Church" had given way to an inordinate Roman presence: of the 136 cardinals created between 1198 and 1302, thirty-five—more than a quarter—came from Roman noble houses.[58] The men who rose to the purple, and the dates at which they did, attest the power of the individual Roman clans whose goodwill and cooperation had for centuries been requisite to effective papal government. The Roman *casati* of the thirteenth century were quick to identify and exploit the value of the cardinalate in familial advancement;[59] Giovanni Colonna, Cardinal-Priest of Santa Prassede (1212–44), gave considerable momentum to the meteoric rise of the Colonna in the thirteenth century; Cardinals Guido (1190–1221) and Romano di Bonaventura (1216–43) used their office to obtain great advantage for their family, the Papareschi,[60] as Cardinal Riccardo Annibaldi (1238–76) did for the Annibaldi.[61]

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[56] Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, pp. 35–36.

[57] For the development of the senatorate between the mid-twelfth and thirteenth centuries see Halphen, pp. 66–76, and Brentano, *Rome before Avignon*, pp. 95–100. For the senatorate, reminiscent of a *podesteria*, created by Brancaleone, see Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 13–21; for the competing visions of the Angevin senatorate and the more "Roman" model of Nicholas III, ibid., pp. 210–217, and Tabacco, *La casa di Francia*, pp. 15–16. For the constitution by which Nicholas III allowed only Roman nobles to hold the senatorate, see A. Theiner, *Codex diplomaticus dominii temporalis s. Sedis*, 3 vols. (Rome, 1861–1862), 1, pp. 216–218, #CCCLXXI. For the complex relationship between the senate and the Roman clans, see Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, pp. 17–21.

[58] See Sandro Carocci, *Il nepotismo nel medioevo. Papi, cardinali e famiglie nobili.* La corte dei papi, 4 (Rome, 1999), pp. 74–83; see also the lists provided in Eubel, *Hierarchia* 1, pp. 3–13.

[59] Carocci, *Il nepotismo*, pp. 95–102.

[60] Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, pp. 29–30.

[61] Carocci, *Il nepotismo*, pp. 76–78.

Families whose power mattered, or whose advancement the popes deemed beneficial, were courted with cardinalates; those in decline were not. By the second half of the thirteenth century, the maintenance of strong curial connections had become all but essential to clannish ascendancy in Rome; the spectacular success of the Orsini during the period owes much to the efforts of powerful (and often long-serving) cardinals like Giovanni Gaetano I (1244–77), Giordano (1278–87), Matteo Rosso (1263–1302), and Napoleone (1288–1342) Orsini.[62] The nepotism of certain popes—Innocent III, Nicholas III, Boniface VIII—should not be seen as "skewing" the figures in favor of Conti, Orsini or Gaetani; the very presence of nepotist popes on Saint Peter's throne attests more than anything the triumph of the clans who produced them. As Robert Brentano so aptly put it, "'My uncle is a cardinal' is the device of strength in thirteenth-century Rome; 'My uncle is the pope' is the device of victory."[63]

In general, it would appear that, for the Roman clans of the thirteenth century, one "family" pope was good for three "family" cardinals. The three Conti popes raised six kinsmen to the cardinalate, all in the pontificates of Innocent III (1198–1216) and Gregory IX (1227–41). Alexander IV (1254–61) did not create any cardinals, relatives or otherwise. The Orsini pope Nicholas III (1277–80) raised three relatives, including a Colonna, to the cardinalate. Even the aggressively nepotistic Gaetani pope Boniface VIII (1294–1303) drew the line at four kinsmen.[64] Strong families were assured of cardinalates even from popes to whom they were not directly related; of the six patrilineal Orsini cardinals of the thirteenth century, only one—the pope's brother, Giordano Orsini (d. 1287)—owed his position to Nicholas III, and the Annibaldi and Capocci were important enough to secure cardinalates without any family popes. More marginal or declining families were less fortunate. Without either family popes or a great deal of clout, the Normanni, Ceccano, Bonaventura, Malabranca, Crescenzi and Pierleoni families each produced but a single cardinal during the thirteenth century; the Frangipani failed to produce any.

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[62] Allegrezza, pp. 19–25, 40–43.

[63] *Rome before Avignon*, p. 185. For an excellent study on papal and cardinalatial nepotism, see Carocci's *Il nepotismo*.

[64] For the fundamentally "Roman" character of Boniface's pontificate, see Brezzi, pp. 80–85.

Two families may be seen as exceptions to an otherwise fairly well-established rule: the Savelli and the Colonna, both of whom enjoyed considerably greater success than their relatively few cardinals would suggest. The Savelli produced one pope in the thirteenth century, but just two cardinals, only one of whom was a patrilineal Savelli: Jacopo Savelli, raised to the cardinalate in the pontificate of Urban IV. As Honorius IV, Jacopo reigned long enough only to create a single cardinal, his sister's son, Giovanni Boccamazzi.[65] The Colonna, for their part, did not produce any popes during the thirteenth century, although Nicholas IV (1288–92) was a devoted Colonna client who raised Pietro Colonna to the cardinalate. The Colonna may well have been victims of their own reputation. The three Colonna cardinals of the thirteenth century were, for want of a better word, "trouble-makers" whose long, turbulent cardinalates did not inspire subsequent popes to raise other Colonna to the purple: Giovanni Colonna proved a long-lived bugbear to Gregory IX and Innocent IV with his ardent support of Frederick II;[66] Jacopo (1278–1318) and his nephew Pietro (1288–1326) were central figures in the Colonna rebellion against Boniface VIII in 1297, for which they were deprived of their cardinalates and restored only under Clement V. In general, however, if the value of the cardinalate as an emblem of clannish power is considerable for the "Roman" thirteenth century, it is even greater for the fourteenth century, when a huge influx of French and Languedocians into the Sacred College put cardinalates for Italians at a premium. Only those Roman families whose power could not be ignored—Colonna, Orsini, Gaetani—continued their representation in the Sacred College.[67]

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[65] For the pontificate of Honorius IV (1285–87) see Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 256–259.

[66] See Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, pp. 39–40.

[67] See Edith Pàsztor, "Funzione politico-culturale di una struttura della Chiesa: il cardinalato," *ACSI*, pp. 210–212, and Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, pp. 29–34. The Avignonese popes elevated four Orsini (Giovanni Gaetano, 1316–1335; Matteo, 1327–1340; Rinaldo, 1350–1374; Jacopo, 1371–1379), two Colonna (Giovanni, 1327–1348; Niccolò Capocci, nephew of Pietro Colonna and a firm Colonna supporter, 1350–1368), a Gaetani relative (Annibaldo di Ceccano, 1327–1350) and, in an appointment clearly aimed at winning support from the Romans on the eve of Urban V's return to Rome, a member of the relatively unimportant Tebaldeschi (Francesco, 1367–1378). Thus, of the twenty non-Gallic cardinals created under the Avignonese popes (thirteen Italians, four Spaniards, two Englishmen and one Savoyard), eight were Roman nobles, of whom seven were connected with the leading families of Colonna, Orsini and Gaetani.

The *casati* competed fiercely for land, both urban and rural, and for offices, both secular and ecclesiastical, on which clannish power was predicated. This competition was exacerbated, and to some extent justified, by political differences between those clans that aligned themselves with the papacy and those that supported the imperial cause. Gibbon characterized these affiliations, somewhat unfairly, as no more than "a specious badge of distinction."[68] Certainly, they were more than that, though there is no denying that the clans derived enormous benefits from their service to papacy or Empire, or that some families—most notoriously the Frangipani—might charitably be described as "adaptable" in their political leanings. Roman political attachments were less clearly defined than those that obtained among the Guelf and Ghibelline parties of Tuscany and Lombardy. During a consistory in February 1323, John XXII angrily accused Cardinal Napoleone Orsini of being a Ghibelline for his enmity to Robert of Naples and his friendship to the crown of Aragon. Napoleone denied it, going so far as to claim that he did not understand the meaning of the words Guelf and Ghibelline. "Truly," he added, "Romans have many rivalries and friendships, and they help their friends, whether they be Guelfs or Ghibellines. Indeed, they help and love their friends, whoever they may be, but you will never find any true Roman who is either Guelf or Ghibelline."[69] Napoleone's response, of course, was disingenuous, and a good example of why John XXII found him so perennially exasperating. Napoleone knew perfectly well what Guelf and Ghibelline meant, and Romans did use the terms, whether Napoleone cared to admit it or not: the anonymous Roman author of a fourteenth-century chronicle described Bertoldo Orsini as "leader of the Guelf party" (*canfione della parte guelfa*).[70] In any case, there is no denying that the challenge of the popular commune in the 1250s and 1260s served to polarize the Roman nobility into contending factions which at the very least bore a striking resemblance to the Guelfs and Ghibellines of the Tuscan and Lombard cities.[71] Even so, Napoleone's claim underscores the extent to which partisan affiliation was subsumed by ties of friendship and blood in medieval Rome. If it is possible to speak of Guelfs

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[68] *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* 7, p. 263.
[69] Finke, *Acta Aragonensia* 2, pp. 615–616, #393.
[70] *Cronica dell'Anonimo Romano*, p. 13.
[71] See Thumser, pp. 327–337.

and Ghibellines in medieval Rome, it is probably better and a good deal more accurate to speak of broadly and loosely pro-papal and pro-imperial factions.[72]

Of all the Roman clans, the Orsini were undisputed leaders in championing the cause of the papacy. That their allegiance to the papacy was based on considerations of self-aggrandizement has been long maintained and is undeniable. It is also, perhaps, immaterial: their fidelity to the papal cause is historically demonstrable and cannot be called into question. In the conflict between Boniface VIII and the Colonna, the Orsini, much more than the Gaetani, stood at the forefront of the papal forces, leading their allies in repeated assaults against the principal Colonna fortresses.[73] Doubtless they hoped to profit from the defeat of their archrivals, as indeed they did: on 10 September 1300, for example, Giovanni's older brother Francesco, along with other brothers unnamed, was enfiefed by Boniface VIII with the *castra* of Communantia and Podii de Corresio, both confiscated from the vanquished Colonna.[74] But this alone does not explain why the Orsini remained loyal to Boniface even after his defeat by the abusive agents of Philip IV and the Colonna at Anagni, nor why the Orsini were willing to provide the disgraced and apoplectic pope, clearly no longer able to reward his allies, with safe conduct to Rome.[75] In assessing the political loyalties of the Roman clans, one cannot distinguish between genuine commitment and cynical opportunism. It is not a matter of *either/or*, but of *both/and*.

By the fourteenth century the principal contest for pre-eminence in Rome lay between the Orsini and the Colonna. Other families remained important, particularly the Savelli and the Gaetani, who could not be ignored after their meteoric rise under Boniface VIII, but by the end of the thirteenth century the wealth, property and resiliency of the Colonna and the Orsini were already clearly exceptional. Both families had experienced dramatic growth during the thirteenth century, the Orsini as stalwarts of the papacy and the

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[72] For the inadequacy of the labels "Guelf" and "Ghibelline" in medieval Rome see Isa Lori Sanfilippo, "Roma nel XIV secolo. Riflessioni in margine alla lettura di due saggi usciti nella *Storia dell'arte italiana Einaudi*," *BIST* 91 (1984), pp. 281–316, esp. 290–291.

[73] Two of Boniface's principal commanders in this conflict were Bertoldo and Orso Orsini; T.S.R. Boase, *Boniface VIII* (London, 1933), p. 178.

[74] Pope Boniface VIII, *Les registres*, ed. G. Digard *et al.*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1884–1939), #3915.

[75] Boase, p. 350.

Colonna as champions of the imperial cause. The Orsini were essentially the creation of Celestine III (1191–98), himself a member of the Roman Boboni family. Celestine was an ardent patron of his nephew, Orso Boboni, whose descendents became known for him as the *filii Ursi* or Orsini. Partly on his own initiative but mainly through the generosity of his papal uncle, Orso assembled an impressive collection of territories to the northeast of Rome, near Tivoli. These territories formed the core of the substantial body of possessions that enabled the Orsini to surpass their Boboni kinsmen in wealth and prominence within a generation.[76] Three generations later, the lavish nepotism of another "family" pope, Nicholas III, ensured a place for the Orsini in the highest rank of Roman clans.

Remarkable fecundity and a talent for effecting strategic divisions of property among brothers, sons and nephews quickly led to the establishment of various branches of the clan, based mainly but not exclusively in the regions to the north and northeast of Rome. Within the city, too, the Orsini divided and subdivided family possessions, though always with an eye to the family's advantage. A document of 21 October 1286 records how Cardinal Giovanni's father, Matteo Rosso II, presided over a family conference of sorts on Montegiordano and oversaw the sale of family tenements to four of his nephews. The scene, as Robert Brentano noted, is simultaneously "an example of family solidarity and of family fragmentation"; even in division and alienation, properties were to be kept within the extended family whenever possible.[77]

By the late thirteenth century the various branches of the Orsini controlled much of northwestern Rome, from Castel Sant'Angelo along the Via Sacra as far as Santa Maria sopra Minerva and Santa Maria in Monticelli, with significant centers at Campo dei Fiori and Piazza Navona.[78] Powerful family patrons like Pope Nicholas III and Cardinal Napoleone Orsini worked tirelessly to facilitate and accelerate the acquisition of new holdings farther afield.[79] To the north and northeast of the city the Orsini controlled an enormous collec-

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[76] Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, pp. 387–389. For the ascendancy of the family and its territorial acquisitions, see Allegrezza, pp. 3–34; for an overview of the family in the thirteenth century, see Thumser, pp. 140–187. See also D. Benucci, "Ancora gli Orsini," *BSUSP* 2 (1896), pp. 547–551.

[77] Brentano, *Rome before Avignon*, p. 185.

[78] See the map in Brentano, *Rome before Avignon*, p. 2.

[79] See Allegrezza, pp. 70–79.

tion of territories so completely that no other clan of the region came close to matching the extent or security of their holdings. The region of the Patrimony south of Lake Bracciano, and virtually the whole of Sabina along the east bank of the Tiber from Orte to Monterotondo and north-eastward to Rieti and beyond, were firmly Orsini, with the exception of a Colonna pocket stretching south from Nepi. At the same time, the Orsini had begun to expand into the much more competitive arena to the south of Rome, in Campagna-Marittima. Here the Colonna jostled for territory with the Gaetani, Conti and Annibaldi, but had already begun the program of acquisition that would, by the fifteenth century, place them in control of the lands from Tivoli to Sulmona and south almost as far as Terracina. Even so, the insatiable Orsini managed to establish a stronghold at Marino, on the northwest shore of Lake Albano, as the family began establishing claims farther afield in Tuscany and the Angevin *Regno*.[80]

Exogamous marriage was a valuable instrument for acquiring properties beyond the Roman contado, and the egregiously fecund Orsini made the most of it. They were also quite vigorous in protecting even their more distant acquisitions. In April 1330, for example, Bandino and Tebaldo Orsini, sons of Cardinal Giovanni's cousin Francesco, petitioned the pope for the restoration of a series of Romagnol *castra* (Belelari, Gattarie, Montisveteris, Montis Romani and Pepulani), which they had inherited through their mother, a Romagnol noblewoman, but which had subsequently been seized by the city of Faenza; at their repeated insistence, John XXII ordered the legate Bertrand du Poujet to compel the Faventini to restore the *castra*—over two hundred kilometers from the Orsini estates in the Patrimony—to the Orsini brothers.[81] It was not for nothing that the Orsini family's holdings were, by the fourteenth century, by far the most extensive of any of the great Roman clans.

Cardinal Giovanni Orsini's family, the Orsini di Monterotondo or Orsini *del Monte*, was one of the younger and less spectacularly

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[80] For the extent of the Orsini holdings see Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, pp. 387–400. See also Daniel Waley, *The Papal State in the Thirteenth Century* (London, 1961), pp. 83–84, and Giuseppe Marchetti-Longhi, *I Boveschi e gli Orsini* (Rome, 1960), p. 115; for the important territorial expansion of the later thirteenth century, see Allegrezza, pp. 35–47, and, with special reference to the pontificate of Nicholas III, Partner, *Lands of St. Peter*, pp. 273–274.

[81] Theiner 1, p. 574, #DCCXLVIII.

successful branches of the family. It was established in 1286 by a division of family properties wherein Giovanni's father, Matteo Rosso II, acquired the castles of Monterotondo, Galeria, Formello, and Mugnano, to the north of Rome. Matteo Rosso's political prominence enable him to make the most of his inheritance, and the Monterotondo holdings increased somewhat during the fourteenth century; however, the branch never came close to matching the territorial possessions of the Campo dei Fiori, Marino or Nola branches of the family.[82]

Given the extent of their holdings and their historical commitment to the papal cause, it is not surprising that the Orsini were first among the Roman clans whose favor John XXII courted. Indeed, no single family in Italy played a larger or more important part in the pope's Italian policy than the Orsini did. In Rome they worked closely with the papal senator, Robert of Naples: between 1314 and 1326, Robert appointed a succession of thirty-one royal vicars, eleven of whom—more than a third—were either Orsini or Orsini relatives.[83] With their unparalleled prominence in the local Roman church, the Orsini were also uniquely well-positioned to rally the powerful Roman churches to the papal cause. Between 1276 and 1342, the chapter of St Peter's was so thoroughly dominated by the Orsini that one scholar has described the Basilica as "the family church of the Orsini for nearly a hundred years."[84] Of the fifty-three men who held stalls in St Peter's during Cardinal Napoleone's tenure as archpriest (1305–1342), nine were members of the Orsini family,[85] seven

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[82] Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, pp. 399–400.

[83] Poncello Orsini (1314); Tebaldo Orsini (1316); Giovanni d'Alcheruccio Boboni (1319); Giordano Orsini (1320); Riccardo Orsini (1321); Bertoldo Orsini (1323); Buccio di Processo Capocci (1324); Orsino Orsini (1324); Francesco Bonaventura (1324); Romano Orsini (1326); Count Francesco dell'Anguillara (1326). The Orsini were a cadet branch of the Boboni; the Conti dell'Anguillara were a distaff branch of the Orsini, and the Capocci and Bonaventura families were families of the second tier, bound to the Orsini by marriage. The list of vicars is found in A. Cappelli, *Cronologia, cronografia e calendario perpetua*, 5th ed. (Milan, 1983), p. 431.

[84] "So wurde St. Peter zur Familienkirche der Orsini für fast 100 Jahre"; Albert Huyskens, "Das Kapitel von St. Peter in Rom unter dem Einflusse der Orsini (1276–1342)," *Historisches Jahrbuch* 27 (1906), p. 267. The Orsini infiltration began as part of the nepotistic program of Nicholas III, who had himself been archpriest of the Basilica (ibid., pp. 266–271).

[85] Cardinal Giovanni and his brother, Jacopo; Latino di Gentile, Rinaldo di Jacopo di Napoleone; the brothers Bertoldo and Jacopo d'Orso; Napoleone; Giovanni di Poncello; and Matteo di Francesco. See the table in Huyskens, pp. 283–287.

were relatives,[86] and three were *familiares* of Orsini cardinals.[87] Even the Lateran, a Colonna "family church" (though less so than St Peter's was Orsini) under its archpriest, Cardinal Pietro Colonna,[88] yielded stalls to Orsini clerics. Throughout the long tenure of Pietro Colonna, the canons of the Lateran included a substantial number of Colonna and Colonna associates.[89] Yet one also finds among the canons of the Lateran Benedetto d'Andrea Orsini;[90] significantly, perhaps, the sons of Processo Capocci were as closely connected (and related) to the Orsini as they were to the Colonna. During the long archpriesthood of Cardinal Napoleone Orsini, by contrast, only a single Colonna—Giovanni di Landolfo[91]—sat on the chapter of St Peter's.[92]

The far-flung possessions of the Orsini meant that they could also provide the pope with substantial support outside of Rome and the western Patrimony. They came to play an important role in the pope's beneficial policy in the south. Here, where the Angevins struggled to regain control of Sicily from the Aragonese, John XXII routinely provided Orsini candidates to important episcopal sees and archdioceses. During Giovanni Orsini's legation, both pope and legate

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[86] Ibid.; Paolo and Pietro di Giovanni Conti; Bobo, Alcheruccio and Giovanni Boboni; Orso dell'Anguillara; and Egidio di Roffredo.

[87] Ibid.; Giovanni and Cinzio Arlotti, *familiares* of Cardinal Napoleone, and Francesco di Pietro Ranucceti, *familiaris* of Cardinal Giovanni.

[88] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #7922. See also Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, p. 63. For thorough studies of the Lateran and its personnel during the period, see Rehberg, *Die Kanoniker*, and Robert Montel, "Les chanoines de la Basilique Saint-Pierre de Rome des statuts capitulaires de 1277–1279 à la fin de la papauté d'Avignon. Étude prosopographique," *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia* 42 (1988), pp. 365–450; 43 (1989), pp. 1–49; 413–479.

[89] The canons of the Lateran included Pietro's nephew and successor as Cardinal-Deacon of Sant'Angelo in Pescheria, Giovanni di Stefano Colonna (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #17711), Francesco d'Oddone Colonna (#6661; Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, p. 413, C6.; *Die Kanoniker*, p. 237, L27.), the Colonna relatives Pietro (#12070; Rehberg, *Die Kanoniker*, pp. 234–235, L23., L24.), Giovanni (#22760; Rehberg, *Die Kanoniker*, pp. 229–232, L18.) and Lorenzo di Processo Capocci (#16323), Omodeo dei Pappazuri, a *familiaris* of Cardinals Pietro and Giovanni Colonna (#17922; Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, p. 461, P 31., pp. 490–491, G 39; *Die Kanoniker*, p. 269, L78.), and Cardinal Pietro's wild nephew, Giovanni di Sciarra Colonna (#17953; Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, pp. 417–418, C16.; *Die Kanoniker*, p. 237, L30.).

[90] Ibid., #20730; Rehberg, *Die Kanoniker*, pp. 246–247, L50.

[91] Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, p. 419, C20.

[92] A complete list would be impossibly long for this work, but the common letters of John XXII reveal that Orsini clerics held benefices of distinction in every major church in Rome.

worked hard to secure possession of Monreale for Giovanni's uncle, Napoleone da Romangia, whom John XXII provided to the see in 1325. Not surprisingly, the provision was met with strenuous opposition from King Frederick III of Sicily, at whose request the antipope Nicholas V provided Jacopo Alberti to the "vacant" see in May 1328. Giovanni Orsini secured a number of indulgences allowing Napoleone to forgo priestly ordination and archiepiscopal consecration until such time as he could take possession of the see.[93] Napoleone died in 1337 without ever having set foot in Monreale, though not for want of trying. The Dominican Matteo Orsini was bishop of Agrigento (1326–1327) and, briefly, archbishop of Siponto before his elevation to the cardinalate in 1327; another Giovanni Orsini was archbishop of Palermo from 1320 to 1333. Two of Cardinal Giovanni's nephews—Bertoldo and yet another of the family's apparently innumerable Giovannis—were archbishops of Naples, from 1323 to 1325 and 1327 to 1358, respectively. Through the provision of Orsini bishops on the mainland, John XXII hoped perhaps to strengthen the sometimes strained relations between the Orsini and the Angevin crown, two invaluable papal allies whose close cooperation he deemed essential to the success of his objectives in Italy. Orsini *provisi* in Sicily, meanwhile, could be expected to rally the might of their family to acquiring physical possession of sees from which they were barred by Frederick III, in the process making common cause with the royal house of Naples.[94]

Thus, for John XXII, the legatine appointment of Giovanni Gaetano Orsini had at least as much to do with Orsini's family as it had with Orsini's own character and abilities. In the extent of their territorial holdings the Orsini were without peer; of all the Roman *casati*, only the Colonna could match them in power, prestige and influence. The Orsini attachment to the cause of the papacy, if undeniably motivated at least in part by self-interest, had evinced a generally solid reliability across five generations; the Orsini never pursued

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[93] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #23780, #25338, #40523; Pope Benedict XII, *Lettres communes, analysées d'àpres les registres dits d'Avignon et du Vatican*, ed. J.-M. Vidal, 3 vols. (Paris, 1903–1911), #2264.

[94] For papal provision as a means of reclaiming church rights in Sicily see C.R. Backman, "The Papacy, the Sicilian Church, and King Frederick III (1302–1321)," *Viator* 22 (1991), pp. 229–249, esp. pp. 233–244. For Napoleone da Romangia see Eubel, *Hierarchia* 1, pp. 348–349; Backman (p. 237) notes that the chapter acquiesced to Napoleone's provision in 1331 but confuses him with Cardinal Napoleone Orsini.

their interests and objectives with anything less than a relentless, almost inexorable determination. By raising up his second legate from the ranks of the Orsini, John XXII placed at his disposal the resources of one of medieval Italy's most powerful, aggressive and extensively connected families.

CHAPTER FOUR

LEGATUS A LATERE

Around 1318 Cardinal Guillaume de Pierre Godin wrote that the office of *legatus a latere*, invested from the very start with *plenissimam potestatem*, began with the first pope, Saint Peter, in full accordance with the will of God.[1] Godin's sense of history may be questionable, but his bold claim sheds light on the exalted position of the most powerful of medieval papal representatives, the *legatus a latere*. During the fourteenth century the *legatus a latere*, buttressed by the vast array of powers that had accrued to the office over the centuries, became an indispensable instrument of Avignonese papal policy in Italy. The papacy's absence from Italy created unprecedented problems that threatened the political stability of the Italian peninsula and the territorial rights of the Holy See there. To provide a quasi-papal presence capable of addressing these problems, the popes of Avignon sent a long line of representatives and envoys to Italy, including twelve *legati a latere*.[2] The missions of three legates in particular—Bertrand du Poujet, Giovanni Orsini and above all Gil Albornoz—stand out as arguably the most ambitious of all medieval papal legations.

The development of legatine power, especially in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, is inseparable from the development of papal

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[1] William D. McCready, *The Theory of Papal Monarchy in the Fourteenth Century. Guillaume de Pierre Godin, Tractatus de causa immediata ecclesiastice potestatis*, Studies and Texts 56 (Toronto, 1982), p. 282, l.946–949. John XXII, in his decretal «De consuetudine» (*Extrav. com.* 1, 1), confirmed the divine origin of the office: legates . . . *huiusmodi officium et potestatem ipsius Romani Pontificis . . . non ab homine, sed a Deo recepit* . . . William Durantis the Elder traced the office even farther back, to the time of Moses, who established "God-fearing men as tribunes and centurions to exercise judgment over the people" (Ex. 18:21–22); Guillelmus Durantis, *Speculum iuris*, 2 vols. (Venice, 1537), «De legato» 1, 7, pp. 30–31. For the most important of independent medieval discussions on legatine power, the *Speculum legatorum* of Durantis (best known as «De legato» from his *Speculum iuris*, but also circulated as an independent text), see Clifford Ian Kyer, *The Papal Legate and the 'Solemn' Papal Nuncio, 1243–1378: The Changing Pattern of Papal Representation* (unpublished PhD dissertation; Toronto, 1979), Appendix I, pp. 183–193.

[2] See Kyer, *The Papal Legate*, Appendix IV.

power.[3] By the central Middle Ages, the notion that a legate possessed the *vicis* of the pope was so firmly fixed that the popes of the twelfth century routinely described their most important legates as *vicarii*.[4] A legate's general mandate allowed him to function essentially as pope in pursuit of the papacy's objectives in a given time and place. Thus the legates of the later eleventh and twelfth centuries, with whom a genuinely medieval vision of legation was conceived, were concerned chiefly with the implementation of reform programs throughout Christendom.[5] Most thirteenth-century legations sought to disseminate and implement the principles of Lateran IV and the Crusade, or to address related issues such as the suppression of heresy in the West and the defeat of the Hohenstaufen.[6] As the concept of papal *plenitudo potestatis* was elaborated throughout the thirteenth century, papal legates enjoyed a corresponding growth in the power they exercised. By the fourteenth century, the *legatus a latere* could do whatever the pope wished him to do, in order to achieve whatever goal enjoined him to pursue.

Fourteenth-century legates were the product of three principal phases of development. The diplomatic role of the *legatus a latere* was almost as old as the papacy itself, dating from the first centuries of Christian antiquity, when the bishops of Rome used legates to keep in touch with other churches. As the Roman bishops gradually assumed more exalted authority, their envoys became agents through whom nascent Roman primacy was expressed across Christendom. Already by the Council of Sardica (*ca.* 343) legates appear as well-developed proctorial agents of the bishops of Rome. Legatine envoys represented the popes at a number of important councils in the East. Many of the more important representational aspects of later legates were in fact developed in the *apocrisiarii*, the papal ambassadors who maintained a regular presence at the imperial court at Constantinople

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[3] John W. Perrin, "Legatus, the Lawyers and the Terminology of Power," *Studia Gratiana* 11 (1967), p. 466.

[4] I.S. Robinson, *The Papacy, 1073–1198. Continuity and Innovation* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 148, 156, 164.

[5] Schmutz, p. 450. Schmutz's classification of envoys is criticized by Robert Figueira, "The Classification of Medieval Papal Legates in the *Liber Extra*," *AHP* 21 (1983), pp. 211–228, and Clifford Ian Kyer, "*Legatus* and *Nuntius* as Used to Denote Papal Envoys: 1245–1378," *Medieval Studies* 40 (1978), pp. 473–477.

[6] For an overview of the legations of these periods see Blet, chap. 5, 6, pp. 91–140.

until about 600.[7] After 800, diplomatic activities shifted more to western legates, who came to play a role analogous to that of the *apocrisiarii* in maintaining contact between Rome and the Carolingians. Even in the later ninth and early tenth centuries, during the relatively uninspiring pontificates of the "Century of Iron," legates continued to function effectively, presiding over councils, settling election disputes, and defending royal rights from the encroachment of overly ambitious vassals.[8]

The papal reforms of the eleventh century inaugurated a second major phase of legatine development. Episcopal resistance to papally sponsored reforms, particularly in France and the Empire, led Gregory VII and his successors to exalt their legates over bishops, developing in the process a concrete theory of legatine jurisdiction. Gregory, himself a veteran of several important legations, placed the power of legates, even those of lesser liturgical grade, over bishops in his *Dictatus papae*.[9] Thus armed with supra-episcopal jurisdictional prerogatives, the legates of the period appear as powerful agents of papal reform. As a result, the popes of the later twelfth and (especially) thirteenth centuries would find legates essential to the development of the high medieval "papal monarchy."[10]

The general success of the Gregorian reform led to a more modest application of legatine powers within Christendom after 1150. Most legates in the later twelfth century grappled with the problems engendered by the imperial schisms of Frederick Barbarossa. Though

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[7] For an overview of the period until the pontificate of Gregory I, see Blet, chapters 1–3, pp. 1–65.

[8] Ibid., chapters 3–4, pp. 66–90.

[9] Walter Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages*, 3rd ed. (London, 1970), p. 292.

[10] Blet, chap. 5, pp. 91–116. For continuity and change between pre-Gregorian and Gregorian legations, see Stefan Weiss, *Die Urkunden der päpstlichen Legaten von Leo IX. bis Coelestin III. (1049–1198)*. Forschungen zur Kaiser- und Papstgeschichte des Mittelalters 13 (Cologne, 1995), and Theodor Schieffer, *Die päpstlichen Legaten in Frankreich vom Vertrage von Meersen (870) bis zum Schisma von 1130*. Historische Studien 263 (Berlin, 1935), which chronicles fifty legations during this period. For the increasing use of reform-legates as agents of the emerging papal monarchy of the twelfth century, see Wilhelm Janssen, *Die päpstlichen Legaten in Frankreich vom Schisma Anaklets II. bis zum Tode Coelestins III. (1130–1198)* (Cologne, 1961); unfortunately, Janssen's distinctions between legates and nuncios are quite lax. A more dynamic overview is found in Robinson, pp. 146–178. For Alexander III's importance in foreshadowing the move to papal *plenitudo potestatis* in the thirteenth century and the role of legates in this movement, see Werner Ohnsorge, *Die Legaten Alexanders III. in ersten Jahrzehnt seines Pontifikats (1159–1169)*. Historische Studien 175 (Berlin, 1928).

undeniably challenging, these missions simply did not require the same range of powers that Gregorian legations had.[11] *Outre-mer*, however, the Crusade provided new opportunities for the development of legatine power. Beginning with Adhémar of LePuy in 1096, legates routinely accompanied crusading armies to the East as representatives of the popes.[12] Legates served not only as counsellors and, at times, commanders-in-chief, but also as architects of the Latin Church established in the crusading kingdoms of the Middle East.[13] They also played a crucial role in organizing and preaching crusades at home, especially after Bernard of Clairvaux's ambitious preaching of the Second Crusade in France.[14] Inevitably, perhaps, legates later came to play a central role in crusades against heretics in the West and during the papacy's extensive struggle against the Hohenstaufen.[15]

By the mid-thirteenth century, then, *legati a latere* were at once papal envoys *par excellence*, *de facto* ordinaries subject only to the pope, and crusading commanders-in-chief.[16] But the exalted status of the *legatus a latere* had been hard won after over a century of debate amongst canonists, particularly over the vexing issue of jurisdiction. In spite of the Gregorian determination that legatine authority overrode episcopal jurisdiction, Huguccio, Alanus Anglicus, Johannes Teutonicus, and other early thirteenth-century glossators interpreted canon law texts as leaving bishops and other local ordinaries independent of legatine authority. The *Decretales* of Gregory IX and the constitutions of Innocent IV, however, helped to clarify the principles of papal *plenitudo potestatis* sufficiently that a later generation of thirteenth-century canonists—Vincentius Hispanus, Jacopo de Albenga, Tancred, Hostiensis—argued in support of the papal position. Through a literal application of the ancient term *a latere* (Hostiensis reiterated

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[11] Robinson, pp. 177–178.

[12] Karl Reuss, *Die rechtliche Stellung der päpstlichen Legaten bis Bonifaz VIII.* (Paderborn, 1912), p. 80.

[13] See Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades. A Short History* (New Haven, 1987), pp. 46–51.

[14] Janssen, p. 51. A thorough treatment of crusade preaching is found in Penny Cole, *The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095–1270* (Cambridge, MA, 1991); the nature of Bernard's papal commission to preach the Second Crusade can be found pp. 42–49.

[15] Reuss, p. 82. A thorough, independent study of crusading legates remains to be written; for the legates of the Albigensian crusade, see Blet, pp. 129–136.

[16] For a concise overview of the development of the legatine office to the thirteenth century, see Gardi, pp. 371–373.

the Gregorian description of the *legatus a latere* as *pars corporis papae*),[17] the champions of exalted legatine power argued that legates, as veritable appendages of the papal body, carried the full weight of apostolic authority and were thus superior to, and not simply apart from, episcopal jurisdiction. Episcopal resentment may have continued past I Lyons (1245), but effective opposition did not. The office of the *legatus a latere* had emerged as a striking instrument of papal power, inextricably linked to the "papal monarchy" of the High Middle Ages.[18]

By about 1250, certain general rules applied to the nature and power of the *legatus a latere*. By a canon of I Lyons, the office of *legatus a latere* was restricted to members of the Sacred College.[19] Through the general mandate of his commission, the legate enjoyed *de facto* and *de iure* a wide range of powers.[20] His office and jurisdiction expired only with his recall. Legates who bore their office in several different regions could exercise jurisdiction simultaneously in all of them, and decisions or sentences made in one region were deemed binding in all others.[21] The jurisdiction of a *legatus a latere* superseded

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[17] *Summa domini Henrici cardinalis Hostiensis* (Lyons, 1537), Lib. I, «De officio legati», 2 (f. 52va); Durantis («De legato», 3, 1) reiterated the claim (p. 32), which originated with Gregory VII (see below, p. 71). See also Barbiche, "Les «diplomates» pontificaux," p. 358.

[18] See Kenneth Pennington, "Johannes Teutonicus and Papal Legates," *AHP* 21 (1983), pp. 183–194. The canonists disagreed over many of the details of papal reserved powers, which naturally affected their positions on whether or not such powers were conferred to a legate through the general mandate; see Robert Figueira, "Papal Reserved Powers and the Limitations on Legatine Authority," in *Popes, Teachers and Canon Lawyers in the Middle Ages*, ed. J.R. Sweeney and Stanley Chodorow (Ithaca, NY, 1989), Appendix 2, pp. 206–211, containing the differing views of the principal canonists over 112 papal reserved powers. The essential powers of the *legatus a latere*, however, were defined quite clearly.

[19] Robinson, p. 157; for the incumbent rise in the prestige of the legatine office in the thirteenth century, see Schmutz, pp. 453–454. The text which restricted the office to cardinals (I Lyons, can. 7) was codified in *Liber Sextus* I, xv, c.1. For the rise of cardinal legates in the thirteenth century, and the associated developments in the legatine office, see Heinrich Zimmermann, *Die päpstliche Legation in der ersten Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts vom Regierungsantritt Innocenz III. bis zum Tode Gregors IX. (1198–1241)* (Paderborn, 1913), pp. 104–115, 248–250, 267–280.

[20] The general mandate was a generic text; see the model in Durantis, «De legato» 4, 2, p. 31. For these powers as interpreted by the most important of later medieval canonists, see Hostiensis, «De officio legati» 3, pp. 52vb–54ra, Durantis «De legato» 4, pp. 32–41), and the glosses of Joannes Andreae, found in his *Novella in sextum* (Venice, 1499; repr. Graz, 1963), Lib. I, «De legato», pp. 93–96, and his *In quinque decretalium libros novella commentaria*, 5 vols. in 4 (Venice, 1581; repr. Turin, 1963), 1, «De officio legati» cap. I–IX, pp. 238a–242.

[21] *Liber Sextus* I, xv, c.2, 3; *Decretales Gregorii IX*, I, xxx, c.7.

that of all local ordinaries or even lesser legates (such as non-cardinal *legati missi* or *legati nati*, prelates such as the archbishop of Canterbury, who exercised legatine authority *ex officio*),[22] except in cases specifically delegated to another by the pope.[23] Only *legati a latere* had the power to absolve those excommunicated for attacks on clerics. They could confer benefices, even those that pertained to the presentation of another cleric.[24] Their statutes had perpetual force, enduring after the cessation of the legatine office, and a legate's sentence was deemed binding pending papal confirmation or rejection.[25]

Legatine power also had its limitations. Not even *legati a latere* could transfer bishops, subject one archdiocese to another, or unite or divide sees.[26] They could not reserve or confer cathedrals or regular or collegial churches, nor could they accept beneficial resignations or confer resigned benefices.[27] Reservations of benefices by a legate which were not yet collated at the end of the legation became null, and collations made without mention of the recipient's other benefices were invalid.[28] These restrictions, however, could be and often were removed through exemptions issued at the time of the general mandate, or through special mandates, which included the grant of all exceptional powers and which overrode the limitations implicit in general commissions.[29]

The character of these special faculties, exemptions and privileges varied according to the particular needs and focus of each mission; they did not reflect a growing canon of powers. Cardinal Annibaldo di Ceccano, legate to Rome for the Jubilee of 1350, had eighty such faculties accompanying his general mandate, although his mission was far less comprehensive in scope than those of Poujet, Orsini and

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[22] *Decretales Gregorii IX*, I, xxx, c.7. The legatine hierarchy was established by the jurists of the thirteenth century; see Barbiche, "Les «diplomates» pontificaux," p. 359. For *legati nati* and the changes and diminution in their power from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, see Robinson, pp. 152–161.

[23] *Decretales Gregorii IX*, I, xxx, c.1, 2.

[24] *Liber Sextus* I, xv, c.1; *Decretales Gregorii IX*, I, xxx, c.6.

[25] *Decretales Gregorii IX*, I, xxx, c.10; see Schmutz, p. 450.

[26] *Decretales Gregorii IX*, I, xxx, c.3, 4.

[27] *Liber Sextus* I, xv, c.4.

[28] *Liber Sextus* I, xv, c.3, 5.

[29] For Orsini's general mandate and special powers, see Appendices A and B. For a general discussion of the restrictions imposed on legatine power, see Figueira, "Papal Reserved Powers," pp. 192–194.

Albornoz.[30] Furthermore, some faculties conveyed considerably more power than others: Cardinal Gui de Boulogne, dispatched as Annibaldo's counterpart to Hungary and Salzburg, had his mandate expanded by only thirty-three faculties and privileges—the last of which was in fact a blanket concession of forty-six distinct faculties.[31] In general, however, fourteenth-century legates accumulated more and more special faculties and privileges as the century progressed and the scope of their missions grew more extensive.

The powers accorded to *legati a latere* reveal the inextricable link between legates and papal *plenitudo potestatis*. The legate was a functionary of papal power and jurisdiction, and, in this, by virtue of the enormous powers he acquired over the centuries, he emerged by the fourteenth century as a virtual pope himself; Durantis suggested that, as delegates of the vicar of the apostles, legates were in a sense literally vicars of the apostles.[32] To Gregory VII, the *legatus a latere* was literally an extension of the pope's body, a *pars corporis papae*.[33] Upon leaving the territory of the city in which the pope resided, a legate acquired the right to don full papal regalia, though he probably only did so at crucial points in the mission, when the symbolism seemed especially appropriate.[34] Giovanni Orsini put on papal garb for his triumphal entries into the cities of his legation—spectacles accompanied by civic gifts of gold coins in cups, perhaps as a sort of symbolic tribute.[35]

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[30] Clément VI, *Lettres closes, patentes et curiales intéressant les pays autres que la France, publiées ou analysées d'après les registres du Vatican*, ed. E. DéPrez and G. Mollat (Paris, 1960), #1759–1838; dated 30 November 1348.

[31] Ibid., #1840–1872; also dated 30 November.

[32] «De legato» 4, 6: *Et Apostolus, cuius loco legatus est, dicit: omnia mihi licent* (1 Cor. 6:12; 10:22–23), p. 34.

[33] Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government*, p. 292; the claim was later reiterated by Hostiensis (see above, pp. 68–69).

[34] Schmutz, p. 455. Upon returning to the territory in which the pope resided, a legate had to remove all papal regalia (*Ordo Romanus XIV*, *PL* 78, col. 1272–1273), since, once the garb was assumed, the legate was, quite literally, pope, and two popes could not occupy the same territory. Legates could not have crosses carried before them (ibid., col. 1273); patriarchs could not bear crosses in the presence of a legate *utens insigniis apostolice dignitatis* (Lat. IV, const. 4; J. Alberigo *et al.*, eds. *Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta*, 3rd ed. [Bologna, 1973], p. 236, l.21–22). Joannes Andreae, in his gloss to Durantis' *Speculum iuris*, described these *insignia* as scarlet vestments and a palfrey, at one time decked with gilded bridle and spurs ([*cardinales*] *transeuntes mare vtuntur vestibus rubeis, palafredo, aliàs fraeno et calcaribus deaureatis*, «De leg.» 3, 5, p. 32).

[35] Villani suggests that Orsini entered Florence in papal regalia when he notes

At Avignon, the appointment of a cardinal legate or nuncio was a solemn affair, subject to elaborate protocols and rituals which reflected the gravity of the occasion. These protocols are related in the lengthy ceremonial of Cardinal Jacopo Stefaneschi (d. 1341), who chronicled the ritual life of the Avignonese curia during the pontificates of Clement V, John XXII, Benedict XII and Clement VI. Stefaneschi's ceremonial was not prescriptive; some of the "rules" he laid out concerning liturgical preaching *in vice pape*, for example, were relaxed routinely when it suited the pope.[36] Nevertheless, Stefaneschi's discussion of the rituals surrounding the selection of legates gives a clear sense of the weight which the fourteenth-century curia attached to the dispatch of a legate.

Legates were "created," in much the same way that cardinals were;[37] preparations for the creation of a legate were not unlike those that attended the creation of a cardinal. Ordinarily, the dispatch of a cardinal legate required consultation with the cardinals in a public consistory. Here, the pope sought advice on a number of salient points. Did the crisis at hand seem to warrant the appointment of a legate or nuncio, or perhaps multiple legates and nuncios? If so, whom should the pope appoint to the task? The cardinals offered verbal rather than written *consilia*; if a cardinal was unable to attend the consistory due to illness, two cardinals would be sent to him to solicit his opinion and report back to the pope. The pope would

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that the legate was received in Florence "as if he were the pope himself" (*come quasi papa*), and that he was presented with 1,000 florins in a cup upon entering the city; X.cccliii (pp. 627–628). Orsini clearly did wear papal garb for his entry into Siena (March 1327), where he received a tribute of 400 florins («Cronaca Senese dell'Agnolo Tura del Grasso», p. 454, l.1–5; «Cronaca Senese dell'Autore Anonimo», ed. A. Lisini and A. Iacometti, *RIS*^{2} 15 VI-A, p. 133, l.9–14). Orsini received 300 florins upon his splendid entry into Orvieto later that month («Estratti dalla "Historia" di L. di Domenico Manenti», *Ephemerides Urbevetanae II*, p. 384, l.1–3; «Estratti dalla "Historia" di Cipriano Manenti», *Ephemerides Urbevetanae II*, p. 419, l.4–7). Upon his arrival in Perugia in May 1327, he was awarded a silver cup and 500 florins (F. Bonaini *et al., Cronache e storie inedite della città di Perugia dal MCL al MDLXIII seguite da documenti, parte 1^a [1150–1491]*. Archivio Storico Italiano, ser. 1, 16–^{1} [1850], «Annali di Perugia», p. 64, «Cronaca del Graziani», p. 93). For later medieval representational symbolism, see Robert Figueira, "Legatus apostolice sedis: The Pope's 'Alter Ego' According to Thirteenth-Century Canon Law," *Studi Medievali* Ser. 3, 27 (1986), pp. 527–547. For apostolic envoys and the reception of gifts, see Kyer, *The Papal Legate*, pp. 174–175.

[36] See Blake Beattie, "The Sermon as *Speculum Principis*: A Curial Sermon by Luca Mannelli, O.P.," *Medieval Sermon Studies* 42 (1998), p. 26, n. 3.

[37] Barbiche, "Les «diplomates» pontificaux," p. 358.

then inform the candidate (or candidates) of his (or their) selection, making it clear that the appointment came with the consent of all or at least a majority of cardinals (*omnes uel maior pars fratrum nostrorum concordant*). At this point, according to Stefaneschi, the candidate would offer up a formal protest of his unworthiness to the task at hand; the pope and cardinals would refuse to excuse him, and after the senior cardinal deacon removed the pope's shoe, the candidate would then kiss the pope on the foot and the mouth. The pope would then retire to his chambers. Later that day, the newly appointed legate would join the pope for a private dinner, without the other cardinals.[38]

The pope could also nominate cardinal legates or nuncios *in camera*, in the presence of the assembled cardinals. Stefaneschi does not specify the circumstances under which such nominations took place, though he does indicate that they were neither customary nor common. Nor is it entirely clear whether the cardinals offered up *consilia* at cameral nominations, or simply witnessed the event. In any case, cameral nominations were a good deal less formal than those which took place in consistory. The pope might not even don formal regalia in such circumstances, though he would put on a cope and consistorial miter before announcing the appointment publicly.[39]

After the general mandate of the legation was published, the legate would generally be given a month to prepare for his mission (though the date of departure was always left to the discretion of the pope, and in particularly urgent matters, a legate might be expected to depart within as little as a fortnight).[40] Much of the departure time was given over to social activities with the other cardinals. These social activities seem to recognize the harsh reality that medieval legations were arduous and dangerous missions from which the legate might very well fail to return. Thus, the legate would go to visit each of the cardinals in their private domiciles (as he would upon his return). Close friends might visit the legate in his own home—one would expect, for instance, that Cardinal Napoleone Orsini spent an evening with his cousin and protégé before the latter departed for Italy—but otherwise, it was not customary for the cardinals to visit the legate. On the day of his departure, the legate would meet

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[38] See Marc Dykmans, *Le cérémonial de Jacques Stefaneschi*, pp. 496–497, #1–6.
[39] Ibid., pp. 497–498, #9.
[40] Ibid., p. 501, #24.

with the cardinals in a designated place outside of the city. (In the case of multiple legates or nuncios, the meeting would generally take place in the major church of the city.) The cardinals would remove their hats and birettas and kiss their confrere before he bid them a formal farewell and set off.[41]

Once he had left the territory of the city where the pope resided, the legate assumed a variety of privileges associated with the office of legation. These were different from the general and special powers of legation, which the legate could exercise only within his legatine territories. He could, for example, put aside his ordinary cap and don the scarlet cap and biretta which he would wear throughout his legation. He would also acquire the right to make the sign of the cross (though he could not have a cross carried before him).[42] Thus, even before he entered the territories assigned to him in the general mandate of his legation, he was able to conduct himself in a manner that made clear his special legatine status. These special privileges ended when the legate returned to the territory where the pope resided.

Upon his return, the legate had to endure another round of ritual activities. Before entering the curia, he would meet his confreres in an appointed location outside of the city. From there, the cardinals would return to the papal palace, with the legate attended by two junior cardinal deacons. The legate would greet the pope with a kiss on the foot and a kiss on the mouth, and a formal consistory would then take place. Beginning with the pontificate of Benedict XII, the pope would begin by delivering a brief *collatio* in praise of the legate (in which case Bertrand du Poujet and Giovanni Orsini would have been the first legates to be so honored); the legate would sit and listen with his head uncovered and his biretta set aside, as a gesture of humility. When the consistory had ended, the legate would join the pope and cardinals for a celebratory dinner. Soon afterward (most likely within a day or two), another consistory would be held; here, the legate would deliver a *collatio* in which he reported on his legation.[43] Finally, the legate would customarily present the other cardinals with a gift of jewels (though Stefaneschi is careful to

[41] Ibid., p. 498, #10–12.
[42] Ibid., p. 500, #19.
[43] Ibid., pp. 498–500, #13–18.

add, *prout placet*; indeed, it is difficult to imagine that a legate newly returned from a long, difficult and expensive legation would have many too jewels to give).[44] At this point the curial rituals surrounding a legatine appointment came to an end at last, and the legate once again took his accustomed place among the other cardinals.

Such elaborate rituals, no less than the remarkable powers which legates bore, underscore the truly exceptional character of a legatine appointment. Legates were not dispatched lightly; their activities were of necessity highly disruptive to the ecclesiastical and temporal administrations of the territories in which the legations took place.[45] By the fourteenth century, legates were sent out only when dire necessity seemed to dictate the application of their vast and sometimes controversial powers; even then, the popes were careful to emphasize that the appointment came with the deliberation and consent of the cardinals.[46] Ecclesiastical authorities were as likely as temporal ones to resent and resist the intrusion of a *legatus a latere*, especially in jurisdictions with strong, effective and well-developed administrative infrastructures. When legates were sent out, the pope took care to notify all secular and ecclesiastical authorities whose jurisdictions would be affected by the legation.[47] To minimize provocation the Avignon popes began to rely less and less on the *legatus a latere* as an envoy, turning instead to the less intimidating "solemn" nuncio, who exercised no office or jurisdiction. Two important exceptions to the rule are the Iberian Peninsula, where *legati a latere* continued to be used both as peacemakers amongst the competing Spanish kingdoms and as crusaders in the *Reconquista*, and, of course, Italy, whose fragmented states could not provide the same resistance as the great national monarchies, and whose extensive problems seemed soluble through nothing less than the application of legatine power.[48]

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[44] Ibid., p. 501, #25.

[45] Kyer, *The Papal Legate*, p. 119.

[46] The formula *de fratrum nostrorum consilio* always appears in the general mandate (Appendix A, l.17–18, 39–40). See also *Ordo Romanus XIV*, «De creatione cardinalium legatorum, vel nuntiorum», (*PL* 78, 1270 D).

[47] See the long list of recipients *in eundem modum* at the end of the mandate of Arnaud de Pellagrue (*Regestum Clementis papae V*, #5024).

[48] See Kyer, *The Papal Legate*, especially pp. 21–31, 93–130, 136–137; compare Kyer's figures of legatine destinations in Table 2 (p. 34) and Appendix IV (pp. 218–233). A general treatment of Avignonese cardinal-legates is found in Guillaume

In light of the enormous and controversial powers of the later medieval legate, it would be difficult to imagine that the fourteenth-century papacy could have added anything significant to the highly exalted legal and theoretical definition of the *legatus a latere*. Indeed, the contribution of the Avignonese popes to the development of the legate was not conceptual, but practical. The popes of the fourteenth century applied the accumulated centuries of legatine power to the most ambitious and extensive legations of the Middle Ages. The scope and complexity of Italian legations during the Avignonese period is perhaps best illustrated by a simple comparison. Between 1100 and 1218, twenty *legati missi* to England spent a total of some twenty-five years in the exercise of their legations;[49] between 1319 and 1367, three legates—Cardinals Bertrand du Poujet, Giovanni Gaetano Orsini and Gil de Albornoz—spent almost thirty-five years campaigning in Italy.

Of course, all legations were challenging. Bishop Hugues of Die, for example, was sent by Gregory VII in 1075 to eradicate simony and investiture from the French church, in the face of overwhelming opposition from both Philip I and his bishops. Cardinal Petrus Iterius was sent to France by Alexander III a century later to reform the schools of Paris, protect monasteries from lay interference, effect peace between Philip Augustus and Henry II of England, and crush the rising Cathar heresy near Albi.[50] Innocent III dispatched Cardinal Guala Bicchieri to England in 1216, both to safeguard the regime of John against his rebel barons and to expel the invading French dauphin Louis from English shores.[51] In 1225, Honorius III sent Cardinal Romano of Sant'Angelo to conclude the papacy's war against the Cathars and their protector, the count of Toulouse.[52] Each mission was enormous and extensive, and each legate was forced to overcome substantial obstacles to achieve success. Yet each

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Mollat, "Contribution à l'histoire du sacré collège de Clément V à Eugène IV," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 46 (1951), pp. 566–574.

[49] See the list in Helene Tillmann, *Die päpstlichen Legaten in England bis zur Beendigung der Legation Gualas (1218)* (Bonn, 1926), pp. 155–156. William of Canterbury, Henry of Winchester, Theobald of Canterbury, Roger of York, Thomas, Richard and Baldwin of Canterbury, William of Ely and Hubert Walter of Canterbury were *legati nati* and are not included in my reckonings.

[50] For Hugues, see Blet, pp. 101–114. For Petrus and Henry of Albano, who continued Petrus' legation in 1180, ibid., pp. 118–119.

[51] Tillmann, pp. 107–120.

[52] Blet, pp. 137–140.

of these earlier legates pursued a goal that was specific, limited and clearly defined. By and large, a crusading legate was just that, able to focus his attentions fully on his crusade; likewise, a reforming legate was sent to convoke synods and councils, not to conduct a crusade. Poujet, Orsini and Albornoz, sent only with the directive, at once vague and vastly challenging, to "pacify and reform" Italy, were obliged to apply the full range of legatine powers, combining all of the various legatine roles in the prosecution of their missions.[53]

Moreover, these earlier legates had relied largely on the support of powerful secular and ecclesiastical lords sympathetic to their causes. Hugues, for example, whose drastic reform of the bishoprics of France struck even Gregory VII as rather draconian, was able to thwart the resistance of the excommunicate Philip I through the support of the powerful and reform-minded Duke Guillem VI of Aquitaine; he also counteracted episcopal opposition with aid of the bishop of Langres and Abbot Hugues of Cluny.[54] Likewise, Guala could count on the support of the English bishops, some of whom were his own appointments, and he won over the rebel barons through a combination of harsh ecclesiastical penalties and support for mitigated redactions of Magna Carta. Later, as regent for the young Henry III, he relied on the support of the mighty William Marshall, earl of Pembroke.[55] Romano, too, succeeded in large part because of his ability to rely on established powers within his legatine territories; his crusade preaching eventually mobilized the forces of the French crown against the Cathars and Raymond VII of Toulouse, who submitted in 1229.[56]

The legates of fourteenth-century Italy had no such structures upon which to rely. The Neapolitan contribution to papal policy was often compromised by Angevin preoccupations with their Aragonese rivals in Sicily and by the resistance of states like Florence, which came to perceive Angevin involvement in central Italy as a threat to communal liberty. The other supra-Italian power of the peninsula, Venice, remained aloof from peninsular affairs through much of the fourteenth century. In the absence of powerful, centralized political supports, Avignonese legates were forced to address key issues on a

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[53] See the mandates of Poujet (Riezler, pp. 73–74, #121; calendared in *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #12112; cf. *Annales ecclesiastici Caesaris Baronii*, 24, pp. 120–121); Orsini (Appendix A) and Albornoz (Pope Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes et curiales*, #353).

[54] Blet, pp. 104, 106.

[55] Tillmann, p. 110.

[56] Blet, p. 139.

regional or even local basis, with no assurances that success in a given area could be maintained while the legate campaigned in another.[57] Albornoz's campaigns against Bernabò Visconti in Lombardy, for example, were conducted during simultaneous actions against Giovanni di Vico in the Patrimony, the Malatesta of Rimini, Francesco Ordelaffi of Forlì and the Manfredi family in Faenza—each of whom, if subsidized at times by Bernabò, pursued quite independent objectives.[58] Giovanni Orsini would find that his actions in Tuscany had little bearing on conditions in the Papal States or Rome, whose conflicts and upheaval were largely unrelated to those in Tuscany. Order, particularly in later legations, was often maintained only by expensive and unreliable mercenaries whose contracts could be bought out by enemies more solvent than the Church. Albornoz, for example, was often frustrated by the defection of mercenary companies swung over by massive Visconti war chests.[59] Where earlier legates had had to depend upon strong, centralized political support, Avignonese legates to Italy more often found themselves constrained to provide it.

Ecclesiastical structures in Italy also differed from those of ultramontane churches and their advanced, efficient administrative machineries. Northern bishops looked out into extensive dioceses used to vigorous diocesan rule. Like secular *contadi*, Italian dioceses looked inward to the vitality of the cities and towns. Italian bishops were local figures, born of local families and elected by local canons. In many respects, the Italian diocese was less an administrative unit than the religious arm of the city.[60] The growth of the chancery had

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[57] For this dilemma as it confronted Poujet in 1328, see Partner, *The Lands of St. Peter*, p. 320. For the fragmented political geography of Italy, see Dupré Theseider, *Problemi*, pp. 149–152. It is noteworthy that in Italy there did not even exist a central cultural and political issue, such as the *Reconquista*, which helped to provide the Spanish kingdoms with a common point of reference (ibid., p. 101).

[58] Norman Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades*, p. 76. For the problem of the Romagnol tyrants in later legations, see Augusto Vasina, *I Romagnoli fra autonomie cittadine e accentramento papale nell'età di Dante* (Florence, 1965), pp. 337–349.

[59] See Augusto Vasina, "Il papato avignonese," p. 145. For the general problems of the mercenary companies, see Norman Housley, "The Mercenary Companies, the Papacy and the Crusades, 1356–1378," *Traditio* 38 (1982), pp. 253–280; for the specific problem of Visconti bribes, see pp. 259–261.

[60] For a fresh discussion of the relationship between the local Italian churches (and religious expression generally) and the communes, see Augustine Thompson, *Cities of God. The Religion of the Italian Communes, 1125–1325* (University Park, PA, 2005).

been eclipsed by vigorous communal government and the vitality of the cathedral. Like the local aristocracies from whose ranks they so often came, Italian bishops had been slowly excluded from active political power by the communes; their role instead was the cultivation of the local saint and the preservation, as guardians of the cathedral, of local interests and traditions which helped to provide stability for the community. Founded in antiquity and predominantly urban in character, the small Italian dioceses did not need the centralized administration of the larger, rural dioceses of the north. There are exceptions—Milan, the patriarchate of Aquileia and, oddly, Città di Castello—but in general the Italian bishoprics, especially in central and southern Italy, simply never developed a diocesan system like that of France or, in particular, England.[61] Thus, the policy of widespread papal provision which John XXII introduced to Italy provoked suspicion and animosity in Italian churches that had always reflected local interests and powers.[62] Small, indifferent to strong administrative structures, and resistant to outside interference, Italian dioceses could not provide Avignonese legates with the kind of support that Hugues of Die had obtained from the abbot of Cluny or that Guala had secured from Stephen Langton; with few exceptions, the contribution of the Italian bishops to Orsini's legation was minimal, especially in the western Papal States, where diocesan development had long been stunted by the papacy.

The popes of Avignon were not the first to send legates to Italy. Despite the proximity of Rome, a great many legates were sent to various parts of Italy throughout the thirteenth century. Indeed, between 1198 and 1241, Popes Innocent III, Honorius III and Gregory IX sent more legates to Italy—fifty-two—than all of their successors between 1243 and 1378, who sent a total of forty-nine.[63] Most of these legations were associated with crusade preaching, either against the Muslims or against rebels in Italy itself. The future Gregory IX, Cardinal Ugolino, drew large numbers of recruits for the Fifth

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[61] The distinctive character of the Italian church with respect to its northern counterparts, especially in England, is treated in Robert Brentano, *Two Churches. England and Italy in the Thirteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1988), especially pp. 174–237. For the Italian bishop and his centrality to local identities, see Giulio Silano, "The Apostolic See and the Elections of the Bishops of Perugia in the Duecento and Trecento," *Mediaeval Studies* 50 (1988), pp. 495–497, and Beattie, "Local Reality and Papal Policy," *passim*.

[62] See below, pp. 170–174.

[63] See Kyer, *The Papal Legate*, Table 2, p. 34.

Crusade from northern and central Italy in 1221.[64] Crusading against lay powers in Italy dates back to Innocent III's crusade against the overly ambitious regent in Sicily, Markward of Anweiler, in 1198, but became increasingly common as the Hohenstaufen menace grew in the 1240s.[65] It was not restricted to the imperial threat, however; the popes also preached crusades against the tyrants Ezzelino da Romano and Oberto Pallavicino in the 1250s and 1260s and against the Colonna family in 1297.[66] Most thirteenth-century legates to Italy, then, were essentially sent out to preach crusades and grant crusading indulgences. Still, a few took on more ambitious missions. The great Florentine cardinal, Ottaviano degli Ubaldini, for example, personally led his crusaders (albeit to defeat) against Manfred's Muslim mercenaries at Lucera in 1255,[67] and Cardinal Gherardo Bianchi, legate during the crusade against the Aragonese rebels in Sicily in 1283, ruled the Kingdom of Naples during the four-year incarceration of Charles II by the Aragonese.[68] Certainly, these legations—relatively exceptional for thirteenth-century Italy—anticipate the distinctly martial expeditions of Poujet, Orsini and Albornoz of a century later. Even the less ambitious legations of the period helped to establish an essential role for crusading legates in the Italian peninsula.

Clement V's Italian legations, and in particular the mission of Arnaud de Pellagrue,[69] established important precedents for subsequent Avignonese legations to Italy, though it is really with the mission of Bertrand du Poujet that the distinctive Italian legations of the fourteenth century were born.[70] Poujet's legation provided the model for the missions of Giovanni Orsini and Albornoz, though

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[64] Cole, pp. 144–145. Ugolino's mission is partially documented in Levi, «Registri dei cardinali Ugolino d'Ostia e Ottaviano degli Ubaldini».

[65] See Joseph Strayer, "The Political Crusades of the Thirteenth Century," in K. Setton, gen. ed., *A History of the Crusades*, vol. 2, ed. R.L. Wolff and H.W. Hazard (Madison, WI, 1969), pp. 343–375, especially 348–367.

[66] Ibid., pp. 362–363, 374.

[67] Housley, *Italian Crusades*, pp. 16–17.

[68] For Gherardo's legatine regency see Peter Herde, "Die Legation des Kardinalbischofs Gerhard von Sabina während des Krieges der Sizilischen Vesper und die Synode von Melfi (28. März 1284)," *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia* 20 (1967), pp. 1–53.

[69] See above, pp. 8–11.

[70] For the extent to which Poujet's legation proved paradigmatic for the popes of Avignon, see Gardi, pp. 376–378.

not for all Avignonese legations to Italy. With Poujet's defeat and the death of John XXII, the papacy entered a period of some two decades in which the early stages of the Hundred Years War took precedence over the affairs of Italy. Neither Benedict XII, whose policy of appeasement was easily exploited by the expansionist Visconti, nor Clement VI authorized legations comparable in scale or scope to those of Poujet or Orsini.[71] Innocent VI and Urban V made Rome a papal priority once again and resurrected John's policy with the legation of Albornoz.[72] If the legates of Gregory XI, most notably Cardinal Robert of Geneva (the future antipope Clement VII), labored to bring Albornoz's work to fruition, they did not have to labor nearly as hard, operating, as they did, in papal territories whose reconstruction Albornoz had already initiated and to which, after 1375, the pope had already returned.[73]

It is useful at last to say a few words about the military aspect of fourteenth-century legations to Italy. No feature of the Avignon papacy's Italian policy was more expensive or controversial than legatine warfare. By the same token, none was more indispensable. The entire success of a legation was contingent on the legate's ability to attain military victory; meaningful reform was impossible in territories that remained subject to the papacy's opponents or were ravaged by internecine strife. Avignon's warrior-legates in Italy were more than crusading legates. Orsini, for example, preached the cross

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[71] For the Italian policy of Benedict XII see Guillaume Mollat, "Benoît XII et l'Italie," at the end of Vidal's edition of Benedict's *Lettres closes, patentes et curiales interessant les pays autres que la France*, 2, pp. v–xxii; also, Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 192–204. For Clement VI see Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 204–212, 279–290; for the ideological underpinnings of Clement's decision to remain in Avignon, and the tension between the "New" and "Old" Rome, see Diana Wood, *Clement VI: The Pontificate and Ideals of an Avignon Pope* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 43–95. For papal policy in Italy after John XXII under various envoys—Benedict XII's legate Bertrand de Déaulx, Clement VI's rector Astorge du Durfort and his legate Annibaldo di Ceccano—and for the return of an aggressive Italian policy under Albornoz and Cardinal Anglic Grimoard after Albornoz's death) see Partner, *The Lands of St. Peter*, pp. 327–365; virtually all of the sources cited by Partner in his section on Albornoz (pp. 339–360) present more sympathetic accounts than Partner does.

[72] For the Roman objective of Albornoz's mission see Paolo Colliva, *Il cardinale Albornoz, lo Stato della Chiesa, le "Constitutiones Aegidianae" (1353–1357)*. Studia Albornotiana 32 (Bologna, 1977), pp. 105–113.

[73] For the legation of Robert of Geneva see Roger Logoz, *Clément VII (Robert de Genève). Sa chancellerie et le clergé romand au début du Grand Schisme (1378–1394)* (Lausanne, 1974), pp. 14–21. For a concise overview of the Italian legations of the Avignonese period, see Gardi, pp. 374–395.

against Ludwig IV throughout 1328 and led a crusade against Castruccio in the summer of the same year, but he conducted many other actions—his assault on Rome in September 1327, his war with Viterbo in 1329—which were clearly not crusades. Legatine armies were thus comprised of a variety of forces—local militias, Angevin soldiers, mercenaries, crusaders—all of whom had different motivations and little sense of unitary polity. It is unclear, for example, whether mercenaries enjoyed crusading indulgences as well as financial remuneration for their services,[74] but it is certain that they took part in Orsini's failed crusade against Castruccio in July 1328. Thus, Avignonese legates in Italy functioned as campaign coordinators, crusade preachers and paymasters. They did not have to be great strategists or tacticians; they did have to be masterful logisticians and organizers.

Essential or otherwise, the martial aspect of Avignonese legations to Italy was highly controversial. Even if crusades against the papacy's Christian enemies were likely less scandalous than has long been believed,[75] they were subject to criticism throughout the thirteenth century, in particular for diverting resources and manpower from the defense of the Holy Land.[76] Certainly the fourteenth-century papacy's Italian wars had more than their fair share of eloquent and influential critics, many of whom could hardly be described as enemies of the papacy.[77] The English Dominican John Bromyard, for

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[74] Housley, *Italian Crusades*, pp. 147–151. Orsini seems to have relied more on indigenous Italian forces than Poujet, whose Bolognese army was shored up considerably with Lombard and Provençal mercenaries, although Orsini did at times employ mercenaries supplied by Poujet (see below, pp. 100, 107). He was accompanied to Italy by 400 Provençal horsemen who landed at Talamone, but who subsequently vanish from the record of Orsini's mission; Villani, X.cccliii (p. 627). Albornoz's campaigns, occurring after the advent of the great companies in the 1340s and requiring more manpower than the papacy and its allies could provide, could not ignore the might of the companies, and made extensive use of them (Housley, "Mercenary Companies," pp. 255–256). But mercenaries were dangerous allies: at other times, they proved so destructive that Albornoz actually preached crusades against them (ibid., pp. 258–262).

[75] See Elizabeth Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading, 1095–1274* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 175–176, and Housley, *Italian Crusades*, pp. 252–254.

[76] See Norman Housley, "Crusades against Christians: Their Origins and Early Development, c. 1000–1216," in *Crusade and Settlement*, ed. Peter W. Edbury (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 17–21. For a treatment of these criticisms, especially at the time of the Hohenstaufen, see Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading*, pp. 176–189.

[77] The list includes such diverse figures as Matthew Paris, Ramón Muntaner, Dante, Pierre Dubois, Marino Sanudo de Torsellis, John Wyclif, Marsilio of Padua,

example, called for an end to crusades against Christians in the 1320s to allow for a united Christian offensive against the Saracen.[78] The rebuttal—that it was scandalous to talk of expeditions to Palestine while Christendom itself was rent by rebellion and schism—seems to have carried little weight outside of the curia.[79]

The huge expense of the papacy's Italian wars was no less a contentious subject. Crusading subsidies helped to defray some of the cost, but these had been subject to criticism from the early thirteenth century and remained unpopular in the time of John XXII.[80] There is no denying that the costs of John's Italian wars were staggering, consuming nearly two-thirds of papal revenues during his pontificate.[81] Poujet received payments from Avignon totalling 2,480,000 florins between 1320 and 1334.[82] Unfortunately, the records of payments to Orsini do not survive,[83] but those payments were apparently considerable. Heinrich von Dissenhoven remarked that both Poujet and Orsini spent "an infinite treasure" in pursuit of their ultimately unsuccessful legations.[84] Still, Orsini's campaigns would have cost far less than Poujet's did; the cost of campaigning in Lombardy was considerably higher than anywhere else in Italy,[85] and Orsini did not rely on mercenary forces to nearly the extent that Poujet did.

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and Edward I of England. Philip V and Charles IV of France refused to support the papacy's wars against the Visconti because they diverted attention from the *crux transmarina* (and the windfalls which expeditions *outre-mer* engendered when they were abandoned after crusading taxes had already been levied and collected); see C.J. Tyerman, "The Holy Land and the Crusades of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth "Centuries," in *Crusade and Settlement*, pp. 106–107.

[78] Elizabeth Siberry, "Criticism of the Crusade in Fourteenth-Century England, in *Crusade and Settlement*, p. 131.

[79] Housley, *Italian Crusades*, pp. 75–97.

[80] Siberry, *Criticism of Crusading*, pp. 126–149, 179.

[81] Yves Renouard, *Les relations des papes d'Avignon et des compagnies commerciales et bancaires de 1316 à 1378*. Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome 151 (Paris, 1941), pp. 125–126.

[82] Ibid., p. 170. Renouard's figures are found pp. 169–180.

[83] Housley, *Italian Crusades*, p. 247. John XXII's cameral records are published in Emil Göller, *Die Einnahmen der apostolischen Kammer unter Johann XXII*. Vatikanische Quellen zur Geschichte der päpstlichen Hof- und Finanzverwaltung, 1316–1378, herausgegeben von der Görres-Geschellschaft 1 (Paderborn, 1910), and Karl H. Schäfer, *Die Ausgaben der apostolischen Kammer unter Johann XXII*. Vatikanische Quellen zur Geschichte der päpstlichen Hof- und Finanzverwaltung, 1316–1378, herausgegeben von der Görres-Geschellschaft 2 (Paderborn, 1911).

[84] *Quinta vita Joannis XXII*, Baluze-Mollat 1, p. 176: *Sed ambo infinitum thesaurum expenderunt, et vacui recesserunt.*

[85] Housley, *Italian Crusades*, p. 247.

Whereas Poujet was forced to lead huge armies against great cities like Milan, the Church's actions in the Patrimony were localized operations, relying on much smaller forces and directed at much smaller towns. Orsini's campaign against Amelia in 1330, for instance, cost just 1,575 florins—including the damages to the *castrum* of Focis, a Church possession which forces from Amelia had captured and destroyed.[86] Still, it would be a mistake to assume that campaigning in the Papal States did not incur considerable expenditures: between 1353 and 1360 Innocent VI spent more than 1,504,000 florins on the missions of Albornoz and Androin de la Roche.[87] Orsini's expenses were certainly a good deal less than Poujet's; then again, they would not have been negligible.

Almost all of the money expended on the papacy's Italian campaigns came directly from Avignon. Of the 1,888,987 florins which Poujet spent on mercenaries alone between 8 July 1324 and 1 February 1331, only 93,716 florins (less than five percent) came from Italian sources; the rest was sent from Avignon.[88] Between August 1353 and May 1362 Albornoz received over 832,534 florins for his campaigns in the Papal States; more than ninety-five percent of the money came from Avignon.[89] When added to revenues raised locally by the Italian collectories, to fines imposed on penitent rebels, and to the *procurationes* and *evectiones* which legates levied to maintain their entourages,[90] these figures point to the enormous cost of protracted legations involving military actions in the Italian peninsula. Indeed, it has been argued that the fiscalism that came to distinguish

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[86] See Mercurio Antonelli, ed. "Notizie umbre tratte dai registri del patrimonio di s. Pietro in Tuscia," *BSUSP* 9 (1903)," p. 475, #9.

[87] Germano Gualdo, "I libri delle spese di guerra del cardinale Albornoz in Italia conservati Vaticano," in *El Cardenal Albornoz y el Colegio de España* 1. Studia Albornotiana dirigidos por Evelio Verdera y Tuells 11 (Bologna, 1972), p. 604. The total comes from figures contained in the extant books of expenses; while it essentially covers the first seven years of the mission of Albornoz, it also includes sums from the last eight months of the first legation of Androin de la Roche (May-December 1353). See also Emilio Cristiani, "Note su alcuni rapporti tra le compagnie bancarie fiorentine e le legazioni in Italia del cardinale Albornoz," in *El Cardenal* 1, pp. 569–595. I. Studia Albornotiana dirigidos por Evelio Verdera y Tuells 11 (Bologna, 1972), pp. 569–575.

[88] Housley, *Italian Crusades*, p. 247.

[89] See Renouard, *Les relations*, pp. 257–271. The total suffers from the loss of the *Introitus et exitus* registers of 1359 (pp. 266, 268).

[90] See below, pp. 86–87. For fines as a source of indigenous revenue see Antonelli, "I registri," pp. 379–380.

Avignonese administration arose in the first instance to provide for the staggering cost of John XXII's Italian wars.[91]

The different ways in which revenues were raised at Avignon—extraordinary tithes, caritative subsidies (nominally voluntary donations by the clergy), and annates (revenues garnered by the curia from the first year of a papally provided cleric's appointment to a benefice)[92]—were often deemed excessive by the parties from whom these revenues came, particularly when sums raised in one region were diverted to another. Both the French crown and the French clergy opposed the new round of taxes and tithes which followed Orsini's commission in 1326.[93] Even in Italy, where the crisis was immediate and locally raised subsidies accounted for only a small percentage of the total cost of legation, legatine expenses often met with resistance: in August 1329 John XXII authorized Orsini to proceed against the abbots of the Benedictine monasteries of San Paolo fuori le Mura and San Saba, and the Cistercian house of Sant'Anastasio alle Acque Salvie, all in Rome, for their refusal to contribute to the legate's campaign against the rebellious city of Viterbo.[94]

Operational expenses aside, legates also had to provide for lodging, feeding and otherwise maintaining themselves and their attendants. These expenses could be onerous, and a cardinal legate often had few private resources on which to draw: cardinals absent from

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[91] Housley, *Italian Crusades*, pp. 250–251. See also Mollat, "Jean XXII, fut-il un avare?," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 5 (1904), pp. 522–534; 6 (1905), pp. 34–45, and John E. Weakland, "Administrative and Fiscal Centralization under Pope John XXII, 1316–1334," *Catholic Historical Review* 54 (1968), pp. 39–45, 285–310.

[92] For a treatment of these sources of income generally see Housley, *Italian Crusades*, pp. 174–190. For annates see William Lunt, *Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (New York, 1934), 1, pp. 93–99, and the collection of texts in 2, pp. 315–372; see also Guillaume Mollat, "Annats," *Dictionnaire du droit canonique* 1 (1935), col. 533–537, and Dupré Theseider, *Problemi*, pp. 127–128. For tithes and caritative subsidies, ibid., pp. 126–127, 129.

[93] For the opposition of Charles IV, and the concessions the pope was forced to make to overcome that opposition, see Housley, *Italian Crusades*, pp. 200–201. The archbishops and bishops of France were exhorted to provide subsidies for the Italian wars in July 1326 (*Lettres secrètes et curiales de Jean XXII*, #2904–2918), a request which the pope had to repeat in February 1317 and again in May (ibid., #3154–3168). Rheims proved a particularly difficult diocese for the papal nuncios, Arnaud Regis and Olric Saumate, sent to collect the subsidy there in December 1328 (ibid., #3733). In March 1329 Olric was granted the *facultas compellendi* all those who had not yet paid the subsidy (ibid., #3815), and was again directed to induce delinquents there to pay their debt in February 1331 (ibid., #4438).

[94] RV 115, f. 33rb (23 August 1329).

the curia as legates (but not as nuncios) were excluded from collecting their portion of the *census*.[95] To sustain themselves and their entourages, legates were permitted to levy imposts, in goods or in coin, from the communities to which they travelled. These imposts—*procurationes*, which provided for the legate's expenses while residing in a particular locale, and *evectiones*, "stable fees," which might be best understood as transportation subsidies—were often controversial and generally met with considerable resistance. The popes tried to minimize their potentially deleterious effect on local economies by imposing canonical restrictions on their use. A constitution of Lateran IV prevented even apostolic legates or nuncios from demanding procurations unless they were necessary, and legates staying in a specific geographical area could receive moderate levies from churches or persons of that area only if they had not demanded them already. The number of procurations levied, moreover, could not exceed the number of days the legate stayed in the area. Innocent III, it would seem, was acutely aware of just how quickly a locale might find itself overwhelmed by the burden of costly procurations.[96]

Even with these canonical restrictions, however, procurations were surrounded by uncertainties which could quickly give rise to problems. For one thing, who but the legate could determine whether or not a procuration was necessary, and on what basis did he do so? More significantly, perhaps, what exactly did "moderate levies" mean? Before Benedict XII standardized procuration fees in 1336, there was no clear answer to the question. William Durantis, for example, observed in his *Speculum Iuris* that moderate sums, if not explicitly defined in the letters accompanying a legate's dispatch, were to be determined by the legate's social status; it seemed improper, after all, that a rich man should have to eat like a pauper.[97] Presumably Orsini, a *dives*, could legitimately demand greater sums than envoys of less distinguished birth—and almost certainly did. In any case, it is all but assured that the legates levying the procurations and the communities that paid them had very different ideas about what "moderate" meant.

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[95] Kyer, *The Papal Legate*, pp. 167–173. Stefaneschi made explicit mention of the fact in his ceremonial; see Dykmans, *Le cérémonial de Jacques Stefaneschi*, p. 500, #22.

[96] Lateran IV, cons. 33; Alberigo, p. 250.

[97] *Intelligo autem moderatas expensas, si fiat iuxta modum in suis literis statutum: vel si non statutum, iuxta decentiam sui status: non enim coguntur divites pauperum cibis vesci*; *Speculum iuris*, «De legato» 4, 24, p. 36.

There were, moreover, practical limitations to the exaction of procurations and evections, particularly when hardship rendered payment overly burdensome or even impossible for individual churches. On 23 October 1330, for example, John XXII ordered Orsini to desist from demanding procurations from Bishop Guglielmo of Lucca, whose revenue-generating properties remained in the hands of rebels against the Church.[98] How a legate was supposed to underwrite his stay in a locale when the community could not sustain him remains a mystery, though Orsini at least could reasonably expect to draw on his family's considerable resources. When all is said and done, procurations remained an unpopular and probably somewhat ineffective means of subsidizing a legate's personal expenditures during the course of his legation—a necessary evil, perhaps, engendered by the tremendous difficulties associated with funding such costly missions.[99]

Papal envoy; agent of sweeping reform; crusader and director of the Church's military affairs: these are the parameters of the legatine office which Cardinal Giovanni Orsini was to exercise in the lands of central Italy. The enormous powers with which he was invested were necessary to the monumental task before him; he had, in a sense, to represent not just the pope, but the papacy, whose absence from Rome contributed directly and substantially to the problems which plagued the region. Whether those exalted powers were sufficient to remedy the extensive problems of central Italy remained to be seen—as did the extent to which Orsini would be willing to abuse and exceed such powers when his own personal objectives came into conflict with those of his mission.

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[98] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #51311.

[99] For procurations, see Ursmer Berlière, "Le droit de procuration ou de gîte. Papes et légats," *Bulletins de la classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques* (Brussels, 1919), pp. 509–538; Lunt 1, pp. 107–111; and Dupré Theseider, *Problemi*, p. 128.


Legation of Cardinal Giovanni Orsini
Bologna
Ravenna
Rimini
Pesaro
Fano
Poujet
Orsini
Urbino
Ancona
Osimo
Pistoia
Prato
Lucca
Florence
Altopascio
Pisa
Arezzo
Citta di Castello
Fabriano
Fermo
Siena
Perugia
Assisi
Ascoli Piceno
Spoleto
Orvieto
Todi
Viterbo
Rome
Terracina
0 12.5 25 50 75 100
Kilometers

CHAPTER FIVE

LEGATUS TUSCIE

On Monday, 23 June 1326, five galleys sailed up the Arno River from the Mediterranean Sea and put in at the harbor of Pisa. Curiosity-seekers crowded into the port and watched as Cardinal Giovanni Orsini disembarked with his retinue and entered the city. The mood of the crowd was at once festive and apprehensive: the formal entry of a cardinal-legate was a grand and solemn event, to be sure, and a novelty worth seeing; but it was hard to say exactly what the legate's arrival portended for a city like Pisa, with its strong Ghibelline associations and increasingly troubled circumstances. Certainly, there was no reason to assume that the legate's presence would do anything to slow the alarming growth of Angevin power in Tuscany. Worse still, it could only bolster the flagging fortunes of the upstart enemy, Florence, whose recent calamities had at the very least provided the Pisans with a welcome source of *Schadenfreude*. On the other hand, the legate might well keep Pisa from passing under the lengthening shadow of Castruccio, whose insatiable ambition extended no special consideration to cities with a history of Ghibelline attachments. For the moment, it seemed, the Pisans were willing to let hope prevail over fear. They extended the legate so cordial a greeting that the pope wrote to the Angevin *signore* of Florence, Duke Charles of Calabria, urging him to act favorably in his dealings with the Pisans.[1]

Orsini immediately sent notice of his arrival to Bertrand du Poujet, Charles of Calabria and, somewhat surprisingly, Can Grande della Scala;[2] the pope may yet have held out hope that Can Grande could still be won over again to the cause of the Church. It is not clear whether Can Grande bothered to respond, but his ally Castruccio, of all people, made contact the legate at once, sending greetings and informing Orsini that he welcomed this latest opportunity to engage

[1] See RV 113, f. 355ra (10 July 1326).
[2] See RV 113, f. 355rb (21 August 1326).

in peaceful negotiations with the Florentines. It was, needless to say, a ploy. Castruccio was still convalescing from a serious illness that had laid him up for much of the summer, and Orsini's arrival could hardly have come at a less opportune time for him; Castruccio was eager to buy time until his recovery was complete. Orsini, for his part, did not deign to reply.[3]

After a few days in Pisa, Orsini departed for Florence,[4] where he received an altogether more unequivocally enthusiastic welcome. Jubilant throngs lined the streets and cheered as the leaders of the commune presented the legate with a lavish gift of 1,000 florins in a golden cup. After the festive celebration, Orsini took up residence in the Franciscan church of Santa Croce, which would serve as his official headquarters during the first two years or so of his legation.[5] Here, on 3 July, he read out the formal announcement of Castruccio's excommunication and deposition, to the exultation of the assembled Florentines; on the following day he published the mandate of his legation.[6]

Orsini was anxious to start planning his campaign against Castruccio but discovered, to his considerable irritation, that his partner, Duke Charles of Calabria, was absent from the city. At the time of Orsini's arrival Charles was in Siena, where he had spent several weeks negotiating the conclusion of a long-standing feud between the powerful Tolomei and Salimbeni families. Charles was a dilatory and rather unenergetic man under the best of circumstances, but in this case at least there may have been a genuine cause for the long delay. He was at odds with the commune of Florence over the terms of the *signoria* to which the Florentines had appointed him the previous December.[7] Within months of the appointment, Charles began

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[3] «Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium II», p. 371, l.10–20.

[4] Villani, X.cccliii (pp. 627–628); cf. «Cronaca di Pisa di Rinieri Sardo», ed. O. Banti, *Fonti per la Storia d'Italia* 99. Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo (Rome, 1963), p. 78, l.11 – 79, l.8.

[5] Unaware that Orsini had already done so, John XXII wrote to him on 13 February 1327, ordering him to establish his residence at Florence (or elsewhere) as a base of operations for his legation (RV 114, f. 61ra).

[6] Villani, *loc. cit.*; «Cronaca Fiorentina di Marchionne di Coppo Stefani», ed. N. Rodolico, *RIS*[2] 30 I, p. 149, l.2–5. For the earlier condemnations, see RV 113, ff. 352vb–355ra. Castruccio had already been excommunicated in 1317, 1318 and 1325 (Green, *Castruccio Castracani*, pp. 195–196).

[7] Villani, XI.ii (p. 632). For Charles' *signoria* and the reforms associated with it, see Becker 1, pp. 84–89.

to hint at the prospect of having his term extended indefinitely. In this he had the support of the exiled *grandi*, who hoped that Charles would abolish the *Ordinamenti di Giustizia* which had effected their banishment more than a generation earlier. The *popolo*, for its part, was adamantly opposed to any extension; it had already invested Charles with greater power than any foreign lord had ever exercised in Florence, and refused to countenance any proposal that even hinted at the possibility of a permanent *signoria* and the restoration of the exiles. It is telling, perhaps, that the Florentines themselves had urged Charles to remain in Siena until the Tolomei and Salimbeni were reconciled. Charles' ultimate success in effecting a five-year truce helped him to obtain the *signoria* there prior to his departure on 28 July.[8]

When Charles finally returned to Florence, fully a month after Orsini's arrival, the Florentines were still smoldering with resentment, and the exasperated legate found himself constrained to postpone his preparations once again and to mediate between the two sides. On 29 August he proposed a compromise, assuring a ten-year term for Charles' *signoria* while guaranteeing that the *Ordinamenti* would remain in effect. Charles would retain executive authority in military affairs, but could not levy new taxes or borrow from the commune without the expressed consent of the Florentine *consigli.* Florence, for its part, was obliged to provide five hundred horsemen and six thousand infantrymen to Charles for his military activities in the region. The parties agreed, though not without some reservations. Tensions between Charles and the Florentines continued into the summer of 1327, but the legate's compromise averted the threat of civil war and permitted military cooperation at a crucial time in the Church's war against its enemies in Tuscany.[9]

Unfortunately, the lengthy negotiations cost the legate any chance he might have had of exploiting Castruccio's illness. By the time

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[8] Villani, X.ccclvi (p. 629); «Historiarum Florentini populi libri XII Leonardi Aretini Bruni», p. 130, l.13–18. For the irritation of the pope and legate at Charles' delay, see RV 113, f. 355rb–va (21 August 1326).

[9] See Davidsohn 4, pp. 1054–1056. When the Florentines protested Charles' attempts to recruit new horsemen later in 1326, Robert of Naples declared that he would not permit his son to remain in Tuscany without adequate protection. Already pushed to the brink of bankruptcy but wholly dependent on Angevin protection from Castruccio, the Florentines grudgingly agreed (July 1327) to pay Charles another 30,000 florins annually to cover the costs of new recruits.

Orsini managed to reconcile the Florentines and their Angevin *signore*, Castruccio had made a full recovery. Abandoning his conciliatory stance, he prepared to take the field against the forces now marshalling against him.[10] Earlier in the summer Orsini had requested the services of a Neapolitan fleet; by late August or early September the ships were standing ready off the coast of Tuscany.[11] On 30 August, in the piazza of Santa Croce, Orsini published the most recent papal proceedings against Castruccio, as well as the formal excommunication (25 May) of Guido Tarlati.[12]

The legate's activities acquired a greater urgency in the final days of 1326, when Ludwig IV crossed the Alps and began his long-promised descent into Italy. In January 1327, before a great assembly of his Ghibelline vassals at Trent, the emperor declared his intention to be crowned at Rome. The pope exhorted Charles and the legate to do everything in their power to keep the emperor from entering Rome.[13] With Guido Tarlati assuming *de facto* leadership of the emperor's clerical faction in Italy, the pope ordered Orsini to intensify his efforts to have Boso degli Ubertini installed as bishop of Arezzo.[14] Then, hoping to win over as many former enemies as possible, he authorized Orsini to absolve any penitent rebels from Lucca, Pistoia, Arezzo and Città di Castello, who approached the legate for absolution.[15]

Perhaps the most surprising of the opponents courted by the pope were the counts of Faggiuola, Nieri and Paoluzio, the son and nephew, respectively, of the illustrious Uguccione della Faggiuola. For years, Nieri and Paoluzio had dreamed of taking Uguccione's place at the head of the Ghibelline alliance, though their initiatives had yet to meet with much success. Much of Uguccione's power and influence in western Tuscany had passed to Castruccio, against whom

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[10] Davidsohn 4, pp. 1080–1081.

[11] RV 114, f. 58va (5 September 1326).

[12] Villani, XI.iii (p. 633). For Guido's excommunication, see RV 113, ff. 348vb–350va, and Riezler, p. 287, #694. Guido had been previously excommunicated (1324) for the seizure of Città di Castello («Annales Arretinorum», p. 18, n. 3).

[13] See RV 114, f. 61vb (21 March 1327), where Orsini is ordered to coordinate with Charles of Calabria in preparing for the emperor's advance; see also Riezler, pp. 323–324, #830, and p. 324, #831, for the letter sent to Charles.

[14] RV 114, f. 56rb (5 January 1327).

[15] RV 114, ff. 55vb–56ra (5 January 1327). Castruccio and Guido are referred to simply as "heretics and tyrants" in the text.

Uguccione's heirs had no hope of mounting an effective challenge. In eastern Tuscany their territorial ambitions set them in opposition to Guido Tarlati, who defeated them in September of 1323 and forced them to hand over Borgo San Sepolcro.[16] Thereafter the Faggiuola entered into an alliance of sorts with their one-time rival; less than a month later, Nieri assisted Guido in the capture of Città di Castello.[17] But the old enmity was never wholly forgotten, and the Faggiuola soon fell out with Guido. In 1326 they approached Orsini and expressed their desire to make peace with the Church; the legate was sufficiently convinced of their sincerity that he was willing to vouch for them to John XXII at the end of 1326.[18] The pope was rather more skeptical but instructed Orsini to absolve them, if a thorough investigation seemed to warrant it.[19] The pope's reservations would be vindicated soon enough—before the year was out the Faggiuola would throw in their lot with the emperor and return to their rebellion[20]—but in his eagerness to cultivate a possible counterweight to Guido he remained open at least to the possibility of a reconciliation with the heirs of Uguccione della Faggiuola.

While the pope's allies prepared for the great struggle with the Bavarian, Orsini made the curious and, under the circumstances, untimely decision to initiate a reform of the Tuscan churches. On 22 February 1327, the legate held a synod of sorts in Santa Croce. Among the assembled prelates were the *electus* of Arezzo, Boso degli Ubertini, and the vicar of the bishop of Florence; also present were the bishops of Amelia, Anagni, and Città di Castello, all three of

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[16] «Historiarum Florentini populi libri XII Leonardi Aretini Bruni», p. 118, l.15–26; Pasqui 2, pp. 551–552, #722.

[17] «Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium II», pp. 356, l.38–357, l.4; «Annales Arretinorum», p. 17, l.24–25. The city fell to Guido and his allies on 2 October 1323.

[18] RV 114, f. 59va (5 January 1327).

[19] RV 114, f. 55va–vb (5 January 1327).

[20] In late 1327 and early 1328 the Faggiuola were still refusing to restore the *castra* of Sant'Agata and Marcatelli to the Church; see RV 114, f. 226rb–va (21 November 1327), RV 114, f. 234vb (25 January 1328). On 31 January John XXII informed Orsini that the Faggiuola were rumored to have allied with Ludwig IV; if this were true, Orsini was to proceed against them (RV 114, f. 234va–vb). Nieri later served as Ludwig's vicar in Rome when the emperor withdrew to Tivoli in May 1328 (Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, p. 480), and was with the emperor and antipope in August 1328, when, at Nieri's request, Nicholas V provided the *pieve* of San Paolo, Arezzo, to one Feo Beyzoli of Arezzo (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #42710).

whom were closely associated with the legate.[21] Here Orsini published ten constitutions (22 February 1327), aimed in the main at certain abusive practices which had become customary within the Tuscan church.[22] *De vita et honestate clericorum* imposed harsh penalties on clerics who donned secular garb or participated in inappropriate activities such as gambling or soldiery,[23] and *De cohabitatione clericorum et mulierum* forbad the keeping of clerical concubines.[24] *De institutionibus* sought to curb both lay and clerical seizures of benefices without title and canonical institution.[25] *De clericis non residentibus* required cathedral or collegial canons to attend divine services, especially if they hoped to receive daily distributions in choir.[26] *De testamentis*

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[21] See below, pp. 164–165.

[22] Davidsohn 4, p. 1120. The texts are found in Cesare Guasti, ed. *I capitoli del comune di Firenze. Inventario e regesto*, 2 vols. (Florence, 1880–1893), 2, pp. 50–56.

[23] Clerics were to wear garb and tonsures according to their status and order. Transgressors would be suspended from collection of their revenues until they complied, and then for one month after; anyone receiving these revenues while suspended would be ineligible to obtain benefices for six months. The same penalties applied to clerics bearing arms without license from their ordinaries or the legate. Clergy were expected to celebrate the divine office and reside with other clerics, under pain of excommunication, and were banned from a wide range of activities, from holding secular offices and from pursuing commercial enterprises. Violators arraigned before a secular court could not expect the aid of the legate or their diocesans; they would be subject to the penalties above, and would also lose the fruits of their benefices for three months, with the revenues converted to the use of their churches (Guasti 2, pp. 51–52).

[24] All clerics having concubines were obliged to dismiss them within eight days of the promulgation of the constitution; transgressors would, after two months, be deprived of all benefices, which would be conferred to others by the rightful authorities (ibid., p. 17). The constitution was originally issued by Cardinal Latino Malabranca, a cousin of Giovanni Orsini, dispatched as legate to Tuscany in 1278.

[25] Those who had done so were held, within one month of the publication of the constitution, to resign the benefices, with all goods and rights, and not to impede the collation or provision of them by the rightful authorities. Clerics who failed to comply would be stripped of all benefices held within the legate's territories, and deemed unable to hold others henceforth. Laymen would be removed from secular offices, and likewise deemed unable to hold others, but would also be excommunicated, and unable to receive absolution except from the pope or a *legatus a latere*. Communion and absolution were not to be denied to those who repented, *in mortis articulo*, of an unlawful seizure, but they would be denied ecclesiastical burial until the benefice, with all goods and rights, was released and its revenues redeemed in full to the ordinary or his vicar. Clerics and religious who knowingly provided burial under these circumstances would be suspended from office and benefices for a year. Prelates to whom the collation and provision of benefices pertained were obliged to provide them with suitable persons, unmoved by threats, with the aid of the secular arm, if necessary, using the threat of ecclesiastical censure to obtain this aid if so required (ibid., pp. 52–53).

[26] Canons leaving before the end of the final psalm would be regarded as absent

demanded prompt execution of wills and testaments,[27] and *De iure patronatus* took aim at the abusive exercise of advowson over proprietary churches.[28] The custom whereby parishioners, at certain times of year, demanded and received raucous, wine-fuelled feasts at the expense of their churches, was banned in *De censibus et potationibus*.[29] *De excessibus prelatorum* imposed grave penalties on clergy who in any way acknowledged the authority of rebels against the church.[30] *De etate et qualitate ordinandorum* sought to end the all-too-common practice whereby young men assumed ecclesiastical dignities with cure of souls and then abandoned them to pursue military

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and suspended from receiving daily distributions for eight days; those who failed to attend and did receive distributions, unless excused by illness or other just cause, were to be excommunicated (as were those who assisted them or consented), and would not be absolved until they rendered twice what they received. In civic or princely collegiate churches, which did not make daily distributions, absentees were obliged to render six *denarii* of the customary money to the prelates of these churches for each day of absence, under pain of suspension from collection of prebendary revenues for one month. Confiscated distributions or fines were to be converted to the use of the church in question (ibid., p. 53).

[27] Executors were required to undertake their commission within one year of the testator's death; failure to comply would result in the transfer of the execution to the local diocesan (ibid., p. 54).

[28] Patrons who occupied the property or seized the precious goods of their churches, or laid violent hands on the religious personnel of these churches, would be deprived, at the next vacancy, of the right of presentation, which would then pass to whomever it would otherwise pertain by right or local custom. In collegiate churches, *iuspatronatus* would be forfeited for ten years. These penalties also applied to patrons who used threats to keep the clergy of these churches from the exercise of their spiritual and temporal administration, or from personal residence in their benefice. Prelates and rectors were forbidden, under pain of privation, from allowing patrons to exercise more rights or to hold more property from their churches than allowed by law or ancient custom (ibid., p. 54).

[29] The practice, which was blamed for innumerable brawls and homicides, was forbidden under pain of excommunication; rectors were banned from providing excessive feasts and drinking-parties, unless parishioners first swore faith to the diocesan and demonstrated that their church was obliged to provide them by legitimate custom. Lay violators would be excommunicated; clerics, deprived of all benefices (ibid., pp. 54–55).

[30] Clergy who knowingly celebrated the divine office in lands under interdict for submission to rebels against the Church, or who assisted these rebels in any way, received titles from them, or benefices, confirmations and promotions, treated with these rebels or their agents, induced others to follow them in rebellion, or impeded the jurisdiction of apostolic nuncios or legates, would not only be excommunicated *ipso facto*, but would be stripped of all benefices and deemed perpetually ineligible to hold others. If the transgressors were members of religious orders, they were subject to harsh and perpetual incarceration by their superiors (ibid., p. 55).

or other secular careers.[31] Finally, abuses and corruption in the legal profession were to be corrected according to *De postulando*.[32]

At first glance the legate's constitutions seem fairly unremarkable. They sought to remedy what had become common problems in Tuscan clerical life,[33] and nearly all of them had precedents in canon law.[34] The constitutions that endeavored to separate clerics from inappropriate activities or professions, for example, had extensive antecedents in the ecclesiastical legislation.[35] Compared to the often explosively controversial legatine reform packages of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Orsini's constitutions appear positively bland.[36] Their timing, however, was disastrous. Virtually all legatine reforms were bound to provoke at least some controversy and resistance, and

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[31] Those holding dignities *cum cura animarum* were obliged, within one year of taking peaceful possession of the benefice (or, in the case of current holders, one year from the publication of the constitution) to be promoted to the subdiaconate. Failure to comply would result in privation from these dignities or parsonages, unless the holder was dispensed on reasonable grounds by his diocesan (ibid., pp. 55–56).

[32] Advocates and proctors who acted improperly, or those who impeded the work of honest advocates and proctors by threats or violence, were excommunicated pending the rendering of due satisfaction (ibid., p. 56). Though the forum is not specified in the text, one may assume that Orsini is referring to the operation of ecclesiastical courts.

[33] See Richard C. Trexler, *Church and Community, 1200–1600. Studies in the History of Florence and New Spain.* Storia e letteratura, raccolta di studi e testi 168 (Rome, 1987), pp. 245–246 n. 2.

[34] Every constitution except *De censibus et potationibus* had a correspondent in the *Corpus iuris canonici*, and the series as a whole resembles legislation commonly issued at reform synods throughout the dioceses of thirteenth-century Latin Christendom. *De vita* drew heavily from the *Decretales* of Gregory IX (III, iii, especially c. 4–7, 9, 12, 15 and 16), as well as the Clementines (III, i, caps. 2, 3). *De cohabitatione* restated, in a condensed form, principles elaborated in *Decretales Gregorii IX*, III, ii, c. 1–4, 6. The anti-lay measures of *De institutionibus* derived from *Decretales Gregorii IX*, III, vii, c. 2, and *De clericis non residentibus* was based on *Liber Sextus* III, 3. *De testamentis* derived from *Decretales Gregorii IX*, III, xxvi, c. 3. General legal principles served as the bases for the more specific legislation of *De iure patronatus* (cf. *Decretales Gregorii IX*, III, xxxviii; *Liber Sextus* III, xix; *Clementini* III, xii), *De excessibus* (cf. *Decretales Gregorii IX*, V, xxxi; *Liber Sextus* V, vi; *Clementini* V, vi), and *De etate et qualitate ordinandorum* (cf. *Decretales Gregorii IX*, I, xiv; *Liber Sextus* I, x; *Clementini* I, vi). Gregory IX's *De postulando* limited clerical involvement in secular *fora* (*Decretales Gregorii IX*, I, xxxvii).

[35] Thompson, p. 49.

[36] See the accounts of the synods and councils held by Amatus d'Oloron and Hugues of Die during their legations to France on behalf of Gregory VII (Blet, pp. 99–111; Schieffer, pp. 88–139); the decisions issued at these synods often met with violent opposition. At the Council of Poitiers (June 1074), for example, Bishop Isambert of Poitiers actually took up arms against Amatus in response to the legate's vigorous decrees against Isambert's excesses (Blet, pp. 90–91; Schieffer, pp. 99–100).

several of Orsini's constitutions clearly challenged the peculiar relationship that had grown up between the Tuscan communes and their churches in the previous two or three generations. Since the late thirteenth century a number of communal governments—Florence, Pisa, Arezzo, Volterra and Pistoia, to name but a few—had issued legislation which limited traditional clerical immunities *vis-à-vis* secular courts and, in some cases, encroached on ecclesiastical jurisdictions. The result was an effective subordination of local churches to communal authority, or at the very least a convergence of communal and ecclesiastical interests which too often failed, in the eyes of the curia, to give ecclesiastical autonomy sufficient due.[37]

Orsini's constitutions sought to restore the old balance between secular and ecclesiastical institutions. The general emphasis on diocesan authority over disobedient clergy removed clerical cases from municipal *fora* and restored them to ecclesiastical tribunals, and *De testamentis* returned to episcopal oversight a matter more recently reserved to communal jurisdiction. Most provocative, however, were those constitutions that circumscribed rights of lay patronage over proprietary churches. Lay patronage remained widespread in Tuscany;[38] any serious challenge to traditional *iuspatronatus* there would inevitably draw the ire of some very powerful interests. Orsini's constitutions, however, showed little sensitivity to patrons' concerns. *De institutionibus* imposed much more severe penalties on laymen who seized ecclesiastical benefices than on clerics who did the same; lay violators, moreover, could only be absolved by the pope or his *legatus a latere*. By the terms of *De iure patronatus*, laymen who abused their rights of patronage over collegiate churches would forfeit them for a full ten years. So strongly did the constitutions consolidate clerical privileges at the expense of communal jurisdiction that when the bishop of Florence, Francesco da Cingoli, issued a revised version in August 1327, the commune petitioned the legate to strike it down. Eventually, under considerable pressure from the commune, Francesco excised the most overtly anti-lay provisions of the constitutions (1 August 1330), but by then the damage was done. At the very moment

[37] See Roberto Bizzocchi, *Chiesa e potere nella Toscana del Quattrocento* (Bologna, 1986), pp. 64–66.

[38] By about 1450 the Aretine aristocracy, for example, exercised *iuspatronatus* over a quarter of the parish churches of Arezzo (Bizzocchi, p. 49).

when the looming imperial threat demanded the closest of cooperation, the legate had driven a wedge between himself and the Florentine commune.[39]

At the end of February, in no small part as a result of the furor he had provoked with his constitutions, Orsini left Florence to prepare for the defense of Rome, stopping at various cities and towns along the way. On 1 March 1327 he entered Siena in full papal regalia.[40] Three weeks later he visited Orvieto, a city to which he had special attachments, before stopping in the war-torn town of Narni, where he helped to restore the Guelfs to power.[41] But the legate's leisurely progress proved costly to his objectives in Rome: in April, as he continued to wend his way slowly south,[42] a popular uprising against the papal senator in Rome, Robert of Naples, drove Robert's vicars from the city. Sciarra Colonna, an ardent supporter of the emperor and fierce opponent of the Orsini, assumed executive power as *capitaneo del popolo*. In this capacity Sciarra instituted an executive communal council of fifty-two *Boni Homines*, though real power rested with Sciarra and his chief lieutenants, Jacopo Savelli and Tebaldo de' Sant'Eustachio, who hoped to exploit this latest spasm of anti-Angevin sentiment and deliver Rome to the emperor. When Robert's envoys implored the Romans to join him in opposing the advancing emperor, the Romans refused. They declared that they would pledge their allegiance only to the pope, and then, only if he returned to Rome; otherwise, they had no intention of resisting the emperor.[43] When Orsini finally reached Rome he hoped to convince the Romans otherwise, but was never given the chance: Sciarra and his associates refused to grant him entry to the city. His

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[39] See Davidsohn 4, pp. 1119–1120; Trexler, pp. 251–253. The text of Francesco's first revision (7 August 1327) can be found in Guasti 2, pp. 1–47; the mitigated text (1 August 1330) is found ibid., pp. 47–49.

[40] «Cronaca Senese dell'Agnolo Tura del Grasso», p. 454, l.1–5; cf. «Cronaca Senese dell'Autore Anonimo», p. 133, l.9–14. Upon his arrival, Orsini was given a gift of 400 florins.

[41] «Estratti dalla "Historia" di Cipriano Manenti», p. 419, l.4–7 (entered erroneously under 1326); cf. «Estratti dalla "Historia" di L. di Domenico Manenti», ibid., p. 384, l.1–3 (entered erroneously under 1325). Orsini held Orvieto in fief from the pope (see above, p. 46); on 9 November 1326, he was made protector of the pauper's hospital of Santa Maria, Orvieto, at the request of the rector of Orvieto and brothers of the hospital (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #26982).

[42] A letter of the Aragonese royal proctor at Avignon, Bernat Lulli, asserts that Orsini had not reached Rome by 30 April (Finke, *Acta Aragonensia* 2, #282, p. 427).

[43] Ibid.

six-week journey to Rome having come to nothing, the legate grudgingly departed for Florence.

On the return Orsini visited Perugia, one of the Church's most dependable allies in central Italy. News of his coming sparked considerable excitement in Perugia: the commune went so far as to sponsor a contest in which fifty gamblers wagered on the date of the legate's arrival. Upon entering the city (7 May) Orsini was presented with a silver cup and five hundred florins, then took up lodgings in the episcopal palace. On 17 May, in the piazza of the *palazzo del podestà*, he published the most recent excommunications of Ludwig IV and Guido Tarlati and declared that Arezzo and Città di Castello had been placed under interdict;[44] otherwise, he seems to have accomplished little of significance during his twelve-day stay.

By about 21 May Orsini was back in Florence. Here he found that Charles of Calabria, in an exhibition of unaccustomed initiative, had assembled an impressive army from the Guelf cities of northern and central Italy. The army was in fact comprised of three distinct forces: a collection of mercenary forces led by the marshal of the Church, Bertrand des Baux; an Angevin force under the Neapolitan captain Filippo di Sangineto; and an agglomeration of Guelf militias led by Guido Riccio di Fogliano, a Sienese commander of considerable skill and experience.[45] Ten days after Orsini's return to Florence, on 31 May, the emperor received the Iron Crown of Lombardy from Guido Tarlati in the cathedral of Milan and prepared to move south to Tuscany.[46] Poujet, still waging his desperate war against the Visconti, could do nothing to stop him. Orsini published the latest round of papal proceedings against the Bavarian on 12 June;[47] to the surprise of no one, the announcement did nothing to slow the emperor's advance. By July Ludwig was nearing the northern edge of Tuscany and preparing to lay siege to Pisa. For Orsini, war with the emperor had become both inevitable and imminent.

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[44] See «Annali di Perugia», p. 64; «Cronaca del Graziani», pp. 93–94.

[45] Davidsohn 4, pp. 1096–1099. Davidsohn's claim that Orsini attended Charles' assembly on 5 April is at odds with what the contemporary sources suggest about the legate's itinerary, which would place him in Narni or in the vicinity of Rome at the time.

[46] Villani, XI.xix (p. 629).

[47] Ibid., XI.xxvii (p. 646).

This meant open war with Castruccio, who held the key to Ludwig's success or failure in central Italy. With only a small force of his own, the emperor was now wholly dependent on Castruccio's extraordinary military skill. In the event of Castruccio's decisive defeat, the emperor's position would be all but untenable. The question, of course, was how to do it. Neither Orsini nor Charles of Calabria came close to Castruccio's martial ability, and the Florentines had long since lost all confidence in their ability to stand against him on the battlefield. Hoping to forego out-and-out war, Charles had entered into a conspiracy against Castruccio with the powerful Quartigiani family of Lucca earlier that summer. The plot, however, was revealed to Castruccio by one of the conspirators, and Castruccio struck his enemies down with a swift and terrible vengeance. He seized more than twenty members of the family; Guerruccio Quartigiani and his three sons were hanged; the rest of the captives were buried alive, headfirst; and the remaining members of the family were driven into exile.[48] The failure of the conspiracy left Charles and the legate with no choice; if they had any hoping of turning back the emperor, they would have to fight Castruccio. When Castruccio joined up with Ludwig at Pisa, Orsini sent his army out against Lucca.

On 25 July the army left Florence, swelled to 2,900 cavalry and 20,000 footmen by reinforcements from Bologna, where Poujet's position was now secure. Hoping to draw Castruccio away from Pisa, the Guelf force assaulted the minor Lucchese fortresses of Santa Maria a Monte and Arminio. The strategy had worked once before for Ramón de Cardona; perhaps it could work again. Unbeknownst to either the legate or the emperor, however, Castruccio's objectives at Pisa had nothing to do with the emperor. Fate had given him a perfect opportunity to take the city for himself, and he was determined to let nothing stand in his way. Even after the Guelfs captured the Lucchese fortresses in August, Castruccio remained unmoved. When the emperor laid siege to Pisa on 27 August, with Castruccio at his side, the Guelfs were left with a stark and simple choice: they could move against Lucca itself; or they could abandon their fruitless campaign and withdraw to the defense of Florence. It is telling that they chose the latter.[49]

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[48] Ibid., XI.xxvi (pp. 645–646); see Green, *Castruccio Castracani*, pp. 93–98.
[49] Davidsohn 4, pp. 1096–1100.

While the Florentines prepared for the worst in Tuscany, the legate moved south to address the latest crisis in Rome. Sciarra Colonna, now at the height of his power, had expelled the emperor's opponents, including virtually all of the Orsini as well as Sciarra's own brother, Stefano, whose longstanding support for the Empire could not override the contempt in which he held this particular emperor.[50] With Rome now firmly in the imperial camp and preparing to receive the emperor, the Angevins had fortified the northern frontier of the *Regno*, building up their garrisons at Norcia and Rieti; as well, they had sent five Genoese galleys to blockade the rebellious Romans at Ostia. But even after the Genoese besieged the port and burned it on 5 August, the Romans remained defiant. Orsini attempted to enter the city on 30 August, again without success.[51] Outside the walls, he could only issue futile proclamations of papal prohibitions against contact with or support of the emperor.[52] In disgust, Orsini withdrew to Narni, where he joined forces with Prince John of Morea, the brother of King Robert. Here, too, he met with the Roman exiles, among them Stefano Colonna, with whom John XXII urged his legate to act, despite the long antipathy between their respective houses.[53] Stefano, however, refused to take part in any assault on Rome;[54] he remained, in the end, a Colonna, and could not bring himself to march with an Orsini legate against his own brother. From Narni the legate and Prince John led seven hundred horses and several thousand foot-soldiers to Rome. Here, the force split into two columns. The first column, under the legate and Prince John, took up a position to the northwest of the city, while a second, smaller force moved off to the southeast.[55] If Rome would not surrender peacefully, it would be taken by force.

Sciarra was ready for them. He had fortified Castel Sant'Angelo and raised the Roman militia into standing companies. When the legate's forces broke through the wall of the Leonine City on the night of 28 September,[56] Sciarra raced to the Campidoglio and

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[50] RV 114, f. 12rb–va (20 July 1327); cf. Riezler, p. 335, #879.
[51] Villani, XI.xxi (pp. 643–644).
[52] RV 114, f. 15ra (1 August 1327). A copy was sent to Bertrand du Poujet.
[53] RV 114, f. 234rb–va (24 September 1327); cf. Riezler, p. 347, #911.
[54] Villani X, xxi (V, p. 31).
[55] *Cronica dell'Anonimo Romano*, cap. iii, pp. 12–13.
[56] Villani, XI.xxii (p. 644). What follows is taken principally from the *Cronica*

sounded the storm bell. The horns and drums of the legate's forces threw the Romans into a panic, but Sciarra roused the frightened citizenry to action with the fearful claim that the legate and his men had come "to hack the breasts from the women of Rome."[57] Realizing that the legate's force had divided into two columns, he had sent a company under Jacopo Savelli to defend the Porta Maggiore while he himself moved to secure the Leonine City. The legate's second column, however, had misinterpreted the commands and was waiting at some distance from the walls to attack on the following day. The miscommunication would cost the legate dearly. By the time Jacopo and his men found the Porta Maggiore safe and undisturbed, Sciarra had already moved to meet the invaders.

The armies met at dawn at the Ponte Sant'Angelo. As the cavalries skirmished, young Andrea Orsini and Sciarra—now in his mid-sixties—exchanged insults and duelled to a draw with swords and poles before returning unharmed to their respective companies. In the furious fighting that followed, the legate's forces managed to surround the Romans in the piazza of Castel Sant'Angelo. The Roman standard-bearer, Ianni (Giovanni) Manno de Colonna, panicked and threw the standard of the *popolo* into the well in the piazza, but Sciarra managed to rally his forces by tearing his own cloak into a makeshift banner. The Romans began to gain ground, and when it became apparent that the remnants of the Orsini faction in the city would not be coming to the legate's aid, Orsini ordered his forces to retreat.[58] The Romans swept after them, swarming to the banks of the Tiber before the hospital of Santo Spirito; five Romans drowned in the disorderly crossing.

In the chaos a popular young Roman nobleman, Cola de Madonna Martomea degli Annibaldi, rode into the bodyguard of Prince John of Morea and attempted to seize the weary prince. In desperation, John lashed back with an iron cudgel; in the face of the blows, Cola's frightened horse reared and tumbled into the ditch at the gate of the hospital, crushing Cola beneath it. It was nothing more

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dell'Anonimo Romano (cap. iii, pp. 12–19), whose account is preferable to that of Villani and his copiers (such as Tura del Grasso).

[57] *Lo buono capitanio parlao e disse ca venuti erano per entrare in Roma, per mozzare le zinne delli pietti delle donne de Roma* (p. 15).

[58] Villani, XI.xxii (p. 644). The hour is given by the Anonimo (*Ora se aiza la terza*, p. 18).

than a clumsy accident, brought on by Cola's own recklessness, but the Romans transformed it immediately into the martyrdom of a brave young hero. Roused now to fury, they fell upon the attackers. The legate's forces attempted to retreat, but the Romans slaughtered them as they fled. Many Orsini captains were captured, including Bertoldo, the cardinal's nephew, and would have been slain had not Sciarra taken them under his protection. The legate lost twenty horsemen, a great many infantry and the Neapolitan captain, Geoffroi de Janville.[59]

The battle in the Leonine City was a troubling portent of what would become a serious problem for the legate when the focus of his legation moved south to Rome and the Patrimony in 1328 and 1329. The powerful Orsini name, which carried with it a wealth of resources and connections that the pope hoped to rally to his cause, was anything but an unqualified asset in Rome and the vicinity. For many Romans, and above all the Colonna, it was simply not possible to see Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini as an impartial agent of the distant pope. It was not the Church, but the Orsini, who stood to gain the most from an Angevin restoration in the City. Angevin rule meant Orsini vicars[60] and the exclusion of the Colonna from power painstakingly regained in the generation following the Colonna defeat by Boniface VIII. Stefano Colonna's refusal to join the legate's assault derived from the same recognition. The presence of Annibaldi and Savelli barons among Sciarra's defenders reflects not an ideological commitment to the Empire, but the blood ties between Sciarra and the Savelli as well as an Annibaldi/Orsini enmity that dated back to the pontificate of Nicholas III.[61] Even the location of the battle was significant: nearly twenty years earlier, John of Morea and the Orsini occupied the very same site and held it against Henry VII—and Sciarra—when the emperor entered Rome in May 1312.[62] The moment Giovanni Orsini stepped through the

[59] Villani, *loc. cit.* The «Cronaca del Graziani» gives the casualties as about 500 «Annali di Perugia», pp. 95–96).

[60] See above, p. 60.

[61] For the Savelli, see Bock, "Roma al tempo di Roberto d'Angiò," pp. 170, 173–174; for the Annibaldi, Brentano, *Rome before Avignon*, p. 100. For the Orsini/Annibaldi hostility, see Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, p. 221; Waley, *The Papal State*, pp. 200–201; Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, pp. 43–44.

[62] Bock, "Roma al tempo di Roberto d'Angiò," pp. 165–166.

shattered walls of the Leonine City, what began as a contest between the forces of the Church and the supporters of the Empire became, immediately and almost automatically, a clash between the Orsini and Colonna factions in Rome.

Sciarra's actions after the battle leave no doubt as to how he, at least, understood the significance of the event. In a grand public ceremony, Sciarra celebrated his triumph by sending a *pallium* and a fine chalice to be displayed in the church of Sant'Angelo in Pescheria. On the surface, the symbolism might seem obvious; after all, Sciarra's victory took place on the eve of the feast of St Michael the Archangel. In Rome, however, the church's significance ran deeper. Sant'Angelo was an important church, a bustling community center whose portico housed (as the name of the church indicates) Rome's biggest fish market.[63] Between 1312 and 1326 it was the titular church of Sciarra's brother, Cardinal Pietro Colonna.[64] During that time, Pietro established a strong, if unofficial, Colonna claim to Sant'Angelo and its various benefices. When he died at the beginning of 1326, the church was left without a cardinal until December 1327, when John XXII raised Pietro's nephew, Giovanni di Stefano Colonna, to the purple as cardinal deacon of Sant'Angelo. Between Pietro's death and Giovanni's elevation, however, Sant'Angelo was administered *in commendam* by none other than Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini.[65] At the time of the battle, then, this "Colonna" church lay in the hands of the same Orsini cardinal who now came to wrest control of the city from Sciarra and his partisans. In an age when public spaces were latent with symbolic meaning and significance,[66] the message of Sciarra's celebration was clear enough: the Colonna had reclaimed Sant'Angelo—and Rome itself—from their hated Orsini rivals.[67]

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[63] See Brentano, *Rome before Avignon*, pp. 40–46.

[64] Pietro was cardinal deacon of Sant'Eustachio from his elevation in 1288 to his deposition from the cardinalate by Boniface VIII in May 1297. At the time of Pietro's restoration to the cardinalate in 1306, Sant'Eustachio had been reassigned to Cardinal Riccardo Petroni. Pietro thus remained a cardinal *sine titulo* until Sant'Angelo was left vacant by the death of Cardinal Landolfo Brancacci in October 1312.

[65] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #26885 (1 November 1326).

[66] For this phenomenon as it pertained to Avignon, see Rollo-Koster, Joëlle, "The Politics of Body Parts: Contested Topographies in Late Medieval Avignon," *Speculum* 78 (2003), pp. 66–98.

[67] For Sant'Angelo in Pescheria as a "Colonna" church, see Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, pp. 215–216, 282.

After the defeat the legate remained in Roman territory for several months,[68] moving from one locale to the next and hoping perhaps to challenge Ludwig IV, who had taken Pisa and advanced on Rome without the threatened assault on Florence. But when the emperor entered Rome unopposed on 7 January 1328,[69] Orsini returned to Florence to prepare for the next stage in the war. The mood in Florence had been improved somewhat by the sudden and wholly unexpected death of Guido Tarlati. Guido had been with Castruccio and the emperor at Pisa, where he had tried, without success, to convince the Pisans to admit the emperor. Castruccio was furious and insisted that the Pisan ambassadors be seized. Guido protested that they had come in good faith and should be released unharmed.[70] The disagreement led to an increasingly vehement exchange of recriminations. Castruccio rebuked Guido for failing to take part in the campaign against Florence after Altopascio, complaining that Florence might have been his, had Guido come to his aid. Guido angrily replied that Castruccio could never have enjoyed success without Aretine assistance. He then upbraided Castruccio for his treacherous overthrow of Uguccione della Faggiuola more than twenty years earlier.[71] The former allies brought their dispute to the emperor, though Ludwig's judgment was a foregone conclusion: Castruccio was the emperor's most gifted commander and the key to his success in Tuscany. When Ludwig took Castruccio's side, Guido departed for Arezzo. As he passed through the Maremma he fell ill, most likely with the malaria that thrived in the unwholesome marshes of the region. As his condition worsened, Guido repented, recognizing John XXII as true pope and promising tearfully to support the Church forever, if only God would make him well.

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[68] Orsini was still in the vicinity of Rome on Epiphany 1328, when he ordered a three-day procession in Florence to pray for the delivery of the Church and the conversion of "the Bavarian"; Villani, XI.liv (p. 662).

[69] Ibid., XI.lv (pp. 662–663).

[70] «Historiarum Florentini populi libri XII Leonardi Aretini Bruni», pp. 132, l.25–133, l.4.

[71] Guido had long been associated with Castruccio: in 1323 he named Castruccio's brother Francesco as *podestà* of Arezzo («Historiarum Florentini populi libri XII Leonardi Aretini Bruni», p. 112, l.44–47; «Annales Arretinorum», p. 17, l.24–25). Since Altopascio, however, Guido had been distancing himself from Castruccio, and did not provide the promised assistance in Castruccio's campaign («Historiarum Florentini populi libri XII Leonardi Aretini Bruni», pp. 127, l.24–37, 128, l.4–14).

He received the sacraments and died at Montenero on 21 October 1327.[72]

Guido's death brought considerable relief to the Florentines and the pope. His virulent and thoroughly Aretine hatred for all things Florentine had made him a constant menace, and his machinations were responsible for much of the unrest that plagued the eastern Papal States. Much more than the pathetic antipope that Ludwig would raise up the following April, he had been the unofficial "chaplain" of the Ghibelline cause; when the archbishop of Milan refused to place the Iron Crown on the emperor's brow, it was Guido who performed the coronation ceremony.[73] Though he was never as powerful or as dangerous as Castruccio, the episcopal foundation on which he had erected his *signoria* gave his regime a domestic stability unmatched by any of his Ghibelline allies. Had he lived for another twenty or thirty years—he was only about forty-five at the time of his death—Arezzo might well have emerged as the principal Ghibelline center in Tuscany. Without him, however, the Tarlati *signoria* could not retain its vigor; after his death the *signoria* passed to his brothers, Dolfo and Pier "Saccone,"[74] who was eventually forced to sell the rights to the city to the hated Florentines in 1337.[75] With Guido's passing, the Aretine threat to Florence soon dissipated. Guido was mourned in Arezzo—the solemnity with which the Aretine clergy conducted his remains from Montenero to Arezzo resembled nothing so much as the translation of a saint's relics[76]—but his death brought no tears in Florence and Avignon.

The emperor, however, remained very much alive. At the beginning of the new year Orsini preached a crusade against him, denouncing him as a heretic for his association with the rebellious *fraticelli* and the authors of the *Defensor pacis*; any of the faithful who took up arms against the emperor would receive the same indulgences and graces accorded to crusaders in the Holy Land.[77] The legate

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[72] See Villani's account of Guido's death, XI.xxxvi (p. 654).

[73] «Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium II», pp. 377, l.10 – 378, l.21; Villani, XI.xix (p. 642); «Annales Arretinorum», p. 21, l.12.

[74] Villani, XI.xxxvi (p. 654).

[75] «Annales Arretinorum», *Documento II*, pp. 51–60.

[76] Ibid., p. 22, l.6–8.

[77] See the two letters of 21 January 1328 (RV 114, ff. 226va–228vb and f. 229ra–va), directed to both Orsini and Poujet; cf. Riezler, p. 363, #965). On 5 February the indulgences were extended to all those fighting under the banner of King Robert of Naples (RV 114, f. 229va–vb; cf. Riezler, p. 365, #973).

published notices calling for the arrest of Marsilio of Padua and Jean of Jandun and promising absolution to all who renounced their support for the Bavarian or his agents.[78] On 27 February 1328 the pope ordered Orsini to publish the papal pronouncement of major excommunication against the emperor, with the faithful forbidden to communicate with or assist him in any way.[79]

Though the legate's rhetoric was directed at the emperor, the more immediate problem was still Castruccio, now firmly established as Ludwig's chief lieutenant and, more than any of the Lombard *signori*, the real source of his power in Italy. He had been the emperor's vicar in Pisa since early 1328, but by April he found it impossible to conceal his ambitions any longer and proclaimed himself *signore* in his own right. Castruccio now turned his ambitions toward Pistoia, which he had been forced to abandon during the Altopascio campaign. He laid siege to the town in June; the Florentine garrison there held out valiantly while a second force, stationed in Prato, harassed Lucchese operations in the field. As in previous campaigns, the Florentines hoped to distract Castruccio with attacks on some of his minor holdings, but they had no more success than before; Castruccio refused to break his siege even after a Florentine army destroyed the *castrum* of Santa Maria a Monte on 15 June.[80]

Early in July Orsini preached the cross against Castruccio as an adherent to the heretic emperor.[81] Recruits poured in from Bologna, Siena and the lesser Tuscan cities, swelling the ranks of the cavalry to nearly 2,700; before long another eight hundred arrived from Naples under Filippo di Sangineto. From Bologna Poujet sent five hundred mounted mercenaries, at a cost of 10,000 florins.[82] The Florentines added nearly five hundred conscripts under the command of Jean de Beauville and the Lombard Guelf captain Vergiù

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[78] RV 114, f. 232ra–rb (13 February; reiterated 15 April; Riezler, pp. 373–374, #999), and f. 230ra (14 February); cf. Riezler, pp. 365–366, #975. The previous September Orsini had been authorized to absolve Lucchesi citizens who willingly returned to the obedience of the Church (RV 114, f.57va–vb).

[79] RV 114, ff. 230rb–231vb; cf. Riezler, p. 367, #980. Copies of the letter were sent to Poujet, the patriarch of Grado, and the archbishops and suffragans of Genoa, Milan, Pisa and Capua.

[80] See Green, *Castruccio Castracani*, pp. 233–251.

[81] Julius Ficker, *Urkunden zur Geschichte des Römerzuges Kaiser Ludwig des Baiern und der italienischen Verhältnisse seiner Zeit* (Innsbruck, 1865; repr. 1966), pp. 75–76, #127.

[82] For the military arrangement between Poujet and Florence, see Ciaccio, pp. 95–96, 179–180 (#XXX).

di Lando of Piacenza. On Tuesday, 13 July 1328, the army assembled in the piazza of Santa Croce, where Orsini distributed the crusaders' crosses. A week later the army was in Campanelle, within sight of Castruccio's siege camp. But Castruccio had fortified the rear with pickets and trenches, forcing the Guelf army to confront him where his forces were strongest. Castruccio, though faced with superior numbers, was able to maintain the siege while holding his ground against the Guelfs. The Guelfs, frustrated by their inability to breach Castruccio's defenses, issued a call to battle on 28 July. When Castruccio declined, the Guelf forces moved against Pisa. They entered the Borgo San Marco virtually unopposed the following evening while the Pisans, by now inured to the effects of occupation, sat calmly at their supper. Even then, Castruccio continued the siege. Sickness began to creep through the Lucchese camp, and Castruccio himself fell ill; still, he did not relent. With the fall of the city now imminent, the Pistolese captain, Simone della Tosa, struck a bargain with Castruccio: Pistoia would submit in exchange for amnesty to those who had taken up arms against him. A feverish and exhausted Castruccio agreed, and on 3 August he entered Pistoia in triumph. The Florentines and their allies had no choice but to abandon Pisa and return to Florence to defend against what now appeared an imminent attack.[83] The emperor was in Rome. Castruccio was in Pistoia. Orsini's crusade—indeed, his entire initiative in Tuscany—appeared to have ended in failure.

[83] The account is taken from Villani, XI.lxxxvi (pp. 682–684).


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Todi
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San Gemini
Terni
Bagnorea
Amelia
Narni
Montefiascone
Orte
Rieti
Viterbo
SABINA
Toscanella
Montealto
PATRIMONY OF ST. PETER
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CHAPTER SIX

FROM TUSCANY TO THE PATRIMONY, 1328/1329

With the capture of Pistoia in August 1328, Castruccio was closer to realizing his dream of uncontested mastery in Tuscany than at any other point in his remarkable career. The emperor had moved on to Rome, leaving Castruccio free to pursue his ambitions in Tuscany; with Pistoia in his grip once again and the legate's forces driven from the field, Castruccio was ready at last to strike at Florence. But he would not have long to savor this latest and sweetest victory. Within days of taking Pisa, Castruccio learned that the emperor had been expelled from Rome and was marching north to confront his insubordinate and over-ambitious lieutenant.[1] At any other time, Castruccio might have found the emperor's advent at worst a minor inconvenience, but Castruccio had yet to consolidate his hold on his newest conquests, and he was now desperately ill. Burning with fever, Castruccio sent his eldest son, Arrigo, to hold Pisa against the emperor while he himself undertook the defense of Pistoia and Lucca. Continued exertion exacerbated the illness, and before long Castruccio began to prophesy his own death. He confessed his sins and received the sacraments, but never repented of his aggressive defiance of the Church. On Saturday, 3 September 1328, the scourge of Tuscany died in Lucca at the age of forty-seven, leaving behind a Tuscan empire that included Lucca, Luni, the Lunigiana, Pisa, Pistoia, and portions of the Genoese *riviera*.[2]

The flamboyant conqueror who had loomed over the affairs of Tuscany for more than two decades left a surprisingly fragile legacy. The integrity of his holdings had been entirely dependent on Castruccio's exceptional military prowess and the force of his own remarkable personality; indeed, not even the Florentine Villani could

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[1] See below, p. 119.

[2] See the account of Castruccio's death in Villani, XI.lxxxvii (pp. 684–686), in which the prophecies of Castruccio and Dionigi di Borgo San Sepolcro depict Castruccio's demise as divine retribution against an arrogant tyrant.

resist portraying him as a heroic, larger-than-life figure. But Lucca was not Milan or Florence. Its comparatively small population and limited material resources were insufficient to sustain Castruccio's over-extended dominions; neither his inexperienced sons nor his brother Francesco could long preserve the state he had forged. The Lucchese threat to Tuscan liberty perished with Castruccio. Within three years of Castruccio's death, the Florentines were looking to acquire control of Lucca, with the full support of the pope.[3] By the 1340s Lucca would find itself little more than a pawn in the contest between Pisa—a city it had once ruled, however briefly—and Florence.[4]

Castruccio, it turns out, was not the only tyrant to fall. In what the pope and his allies could not help but see as a singular act of Old Testament justice, an epidemic of fever and death by the sword claimed most of Italy's leading Ghibellines between 1328 and 1329. The exiled Galeazzo Visconti, reduced to a *condottiere* in Castruccio's employ after falling out with the emperor the previous July, died of fever at the walls of Pescia in August 1328.[5] Passerino Bonacolsi and his heirs were assassinated on 3 August during an insurrection led by Luigi Gonzaga and sponsored in secret by Passerino's one-time ally, Can Grande della Scala.[6] By March 1329 Sciarra Colonna would lie dying of fever, lamenting his prosaic death in a miserable sickbed.[7] Bussa dal Monte Vitozo, an otherwise insignificant local bully of the Maremma, fell prey to the same sickness that claimed Guido Tarlati.[8] On 22 July Can Grande expired during the Dionysian victory feast with which he celebrated the conquest of Treviso that had taken place three weeks earlier.[9] Nor were the Guelfs left entirely untouched: Duke Charles of Calabria, the beloved son whom King

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[3] See the pope's letter to Giovanni Orsini (10 November 1330): *Ne dilecti filii commune Florentinum spe concepta de ciuitate Lucana habenda in proximo, Domino concedente, frustrentur, volumus et tue fraternitati mandamus quatinus nullum eiusdem ciuitatis tyranno tractatum admittas per quem posset ipsorum Florentinorum intencio quomodolibet impediri* (RV 116, f. 161rb).

[4] For Castruccio's impressive but ephemeral Lucchese state, see Green, *Castruccio Castracani*, pp. 255–259.

[5] Villani, XI.lxxxvii (pp. 684–685).

[6] «Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium II», pp. 401, l.30—402, l.20 (*Cron. B*); Villani, XI.xcviii (pp. 693–694).

[7] *Vat. Lat.* 1927, f. 15.

[8] «Cronaca Senese dell'Agnolo Tura del Grasso», p. 486.

[9] Villani, XI.cxxxviii (p. 719).

Robert had taken such pains to protect from the dangers of the battlefield, succumbed to fever in November.[10] The Florentines, freed at almost the same moment from the menace of Castruccio and the threat of a permanent Angevin *signoria*, immediately set themselves to restoring a traditional communal government, wholly unfettered by the fear of conquest or the dictates of a foreign *signore*.[11]

As for the emperor, his *Romzug* ended dismally. Crowned King of the Romans by Sciarra Colonna in a spectacular ceremony on 17 January 1328, Ludwig took great pains to exploit the democratic foundations of his "popular" election. The fifty-two *Boni Homines* of the Roman commune were prominently displayed in Ludwig's early pageantry, and he publicly proclaimed that his power derived, as it should, *de senatu populoque Romano*. But all the lofty republican rhetoric in the world could not alter the essential facts of Ludwig's Roman *imperium*. His support-base was in fact restricted to a relatively small group of ardently pro-imperial nobles, led by Sciarra Colonna. Once the thrill of the emperor's coronation had faded, the Romans quickly lost interest in Ludwig's grand imperial experiment and grew weary of his heavy hand. Nor could extravagant public spectacles conceal the inherent weakness of his position. The chronically insolvent emperor levied one extraordinary tax after another and extorted monies, first from the Jews, then from the general citizenry, and at last from his own allies: Silvestro Gatti of Viterbo was put to torture for a "loan" of 30,000 florins. Unpaid imperial troops ran wild and looted the markets of Rome. With the city under interdict, the emperor forced the clergy, under pain of torture, to celebrate Mass and the Office. Within three months of his entry into Rome, Ludwig IV's ostensibly populist regime had degenerated into little more than naked tyranny.[12]

Of all the emperor's misfortunes and missteps, nothing did him more damage than a catastrophe entirely of his own making: the creation of the antipope Nicholas V. Taking his cue from Otto I more than three and a half centuries earlier, Ludwig held an assembly

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[10] Ibid., XI.cviii (pp. 700–701); the importance of his passing is related in Tabacco, *La casa di Francia*, p. 297.

[11] Villani, XI.cix (pp. 701–702).

[12] For Ludwig's regime, see Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 451–481, and Boüard, pp. 124–125; cf. the more sympathetic account of Gregorovius, 11,3.3 (2, pp. 643–654).

of the Roman people at St Peter's on April 14, where he solemnly pronounced the deposition of "the heretic Jacques Duèse." A month later, again at St Peter's, Ludwig presented a Franciscan friar of the Aracoeli, Pietro da Corbaro, to thirteen representatives of the Roman clergy and people as candidate for pope. The electors, led by Marsilio of Padua and Giovanni di Sciarra Colonna, gave their unanimous assent to the emperor's candidate, whom the emperor then crowned as Nicholas V. For the first time since the days of Frederick Barbarossa, the Western Church was in schism.[13]

But Nicholas V was no Victor IV. Among the last and least of medieval antipopes, he enjoyed the recognition of the *fraticelli* and, at least for a little while, of Frederick III of Sicily, but virtually no one else. In fact, by the fourteenth century, there were very few outside of imperial circles who believed any longer that emperors had the power to depose and elect popes. Most of the emperor's Ghibelline allies were discreetly silent on the subject of the antipope. The Romans had enjoyed the festivities surrounding Nicholas' public "election," but quickly found they had little use for him. Even the leaders of the imperial faction in Rome seem to have despised him: in their formal submissions to the Church, Jacopo Savelli, Tebaldo di Sant'Eustachio, and even Giovanni di Sciarra Colonna—one of Nicholas' "electors"—confessed to a wide range of crimes against the Church, but denied ever having recognized Nicholas as pope or following him in heresy and schism.[14]

It was Ludwig's schism, more than anything else, which ensured the defection of Stefano Colonna from the imperial cause. The Colonna were by far the most powerful and important of Rome's pro-imperial clans. The two leaders of the Colonna faction in the early fourteenth century, Stefano and Sciarra, were figures of almost mythic stature in Rome, their names forever linked to their feud

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[13] Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 478–481; Gregorovius, 11,3.4 (2, pp. 648–651). Nicholas immediately issued sentences confirming the deposition of John XXII; see K. Eubel, "Der Gegenpapst Nikolas V. und seine Hierarchie," *Historisches Jahrbuch* 12 (1891), pp. 281–282.

[14] For Jacopo and Tebaldo, see RV 114, ff. 209ra, 209vb (13 October 1329); for Giovanni, RV 116, f. 314rb (16 December 1331). See Blake Beattie, "The Antipope Who Wasn't There. Three Formal Submissions to Pope John XXII," in *La Vie Culturelle, Intellectuelle et Scientifique à la Cour des Papes d'Avignon*, pp. 197–236. For the "pontificate" of Nicholas V, see Eubel, "Der Gegenpapst," pp. 278–285.

with Boniface VIII.[15] When Romans looked upon the aging Stefano Colonna, they still saw the dashing and fearless youth who had dared to rob a papal convoy in May 1297; Sciarra would forever be the firebrand who returned from wretched exile to stand before the pope in the throne room at Anagni, with murderous intent, in the fall of 1303. After Boniface's demise, Stefano and Sciarra had managed, by a Herculean effort and with astonishing speed, to restore their ruined house to glorious prominence from almost total ruin at Boniface's hands;[16] whatever else they might have been, Stefano and Sciarra Colonna were undeniably men of enormous ability. The bitterness with which they fell out over the emperor's *Romzug* ended a lifetime of remarkable fraternal solidarity; the two brothers, who had endured so much together, never spoke again.

Stefano's estrangement from the imperial cause was in fact neither abrupt nor entirely unexpected. Its roots are complex and, in the final analysis, not easy to discern. For all his famed audacity, Stefano was also a thoughtful man with a keen eye to the vicissitudes of political fortune. At some point after the restoration of his family in the early fourteenth century, he seems to have concluded that the long-standing Colonna attachment to the Empire—or, more accurately, perhaps, his family's famously tumultuous relationship with the papacy—had outlived its usefulness. To some extent, Stefano's warming relations with the papacy were informed by his entirely pragmatic belief that the imperial cause was, in the early fourteenth century, lost.[17] The enthusiasm with which he initially supported Henry VII had spent itself by the time the emperor's Italian adventure collapsed into chaos; as the Angevins and the Orsini closed in on the emperor at Tivoli in the summer of 1313 and Henry's allies began to abandon him, it was the hot-headed Sciarra, predictably enough, not Stefano, who remained steadfast by the emperor's side.[18] Certainly, John XXII regarded Stefano as a potential ally and made

[15] For this conflict, and its complex roots in the territorial rivalries of the Colonna and Gaetani families, see Boase, *Boniface VIII*, pp. 159–185; Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, pp. 42–56.

[16] For a concise history of the family's shifting fortunes from the time of Boniface VIII to the death of Cardinal Pietro Colonna in 1326, see Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, pp. 50–68.

[17] For Stefano's gradual estrangement from the imperial cause see Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 421, 437–438.

[18] Ibid., p. 419.

a determined effort to court him. In December 1327 he raised Stefano's second son, Giovanni, to the cardinalate, as part of a deliberate strategy aimed at securing the goodwill of the leading Roman clans;[19] throughout his pontificate, he provided Stefano's three youngest sons, Agapito, Giordano and Jacopo, to a number of lucrative benefices in Italy, France, Languedoc and the Low Countries.[20]

Still, Stefano's enmity to Ludwig IV was anything but assured until the emperor initiated his schism in the spring of 1328; only then did Stefano declare himself for John XXII. On 22 April—one week after Ludwig announced the "deposition" of John XXII—Stefano's youngest son, Jacopo, a canon of the Lateran basilica,[21] rode into Rome with four companions. He made his way to the church of San Marcello, pushed his way through the crowded piazza, marched up the stairs and produced a copy of the latest papal proceedings against Ludwig IV. There, before an astonished throng of perhaps a thousand people, he read the entire text aloud and then nailed it to the doors of the church before rejoining his companions and riding to the safety of his father's great stronghold at Palestrina.[22] The pope, needless to say, was delighted by this latest display of Colonna audacity and promptly rewarded Jacopo by providing him to the bishopric of Lombez, in Garonne, where Jacopo and his brothers had inherited extensive properties from their mother, Gaucerande de l'Isle-Jourdain.[23]

For the emperor, it was an ominous sign that the formidable Stefano Colonna now numbered himself among the enemies of the Empire. With his grand reputation and extensive connections, Stefano commanded the loyalties of a great many lesser (but still quite significant) families in and around Rome; their allegiance was effectively

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[19] See Guillemain, pp. 190–191, 202.

[20] See *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #453–455, 3777, 7147, 7150, 11966, 11967, 14968, 14969, 15100, 16472, 16473, 21941, 25426, 28751, 28969, 29222, 41288, 41726, 45756, 46107, 55488, 55611, 55612, 56473, 56475, 57319, 61418, 61419.

[21] Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, p. 415 C12.; *Die Kanoniker*, pp. 736–737, L26.

[22] Villani, XI.lxxi (pp. 674–675).

[23] 28 May 1328 (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #41397; Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, p. 415 C12.). The see was administered by Jacopo's elder brother, Cardinal Giovanni Colonna, until Jacopo finally reached Avignon for his ordination more than a year later; #41726 (28 June 1328), #41765 (30 June 1328), #43131 (14 October 1328). For the Colonna interests in and around Lombez, see E. Martin-Chabot, "Contribution à l'histoire de la France de la famille Colonna de Rome dans ses rapports avec la France," *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de France* 17 (1920), pp. 178–180.

in his gift. His *castra* and fortresses dominated the hills to the east and southeast of Rome; he could quite easily close the region off to the emperor, if he chose to do so. He was, moreover, a statesman-like man, clearer-headed and altogether less reckless than Sciarra; Petrarch, a Colonna protégé (and a close friend of Jacopo's), compared Stefano famously, if not quite impartially, to the great Roman general Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus—and found the latter wanting.[24] If anyone had the experience and *gravitas* to lead the emperor safely through the perilous straits of fourteenth-century Roman politics, it was Stefano. As it was, Ludwig's position in Rome was almost entirely dependent on Sciarra, a man who seldom if ever allowed better judgment to override the dictates of his ferocious passions. Ludwig could scarcely hope to maintain a meaningful imperial presence in Rome without the unqualified and undivided support of the Colonna; and Stefano had made it abundantly clear that the emperor would not have it.

By the time the scorching Roman summer began, the emperor was in serious trouble. What little support he retained in Rome evaporated when the devout Robert of Naples, incensed at the emperor's schism, sent a fleet to blockade the Roman port of Ostia. In the *contado* the great clans grew restless. As the Angevins and their allies gathered at Anagni, the emperor moved to fortify Tivoli and sent imperial troops to assault the fortresses of the declining Frangipani and Annibaldi; it was a testimony to Ludwig's weakness that his forces left the mighty Colonna and Orsini unmolested. Upon his return to the city on 20 July the emperor found the populace angry and menacing. As unpaid imperial troops began to slip away, Ludwig made a desperate appeal for aid to Frederick of Sicily; Frederick declined to respond. Stefano Colonna kept up his stony vigil in the Roman *contado*; beyond the walls, the legate and the Angevins were massing their forces.

With Rome now hovering on the brink of war and rebellion, Ludwig panicked. He sent his marshal and 800 horsemen ahead to secure Viterbo, and withdrew from Rome on 4 August, his feeble antipope in tow. The Romans filled the streets, jeering and baring their buttocks in a crude mock salute as the emperor and his retinue made their ignominious retreat from the city. That night Bertoldo

[24] *Fam.* VIII, 1:29.

Orsini led his family back into Rome; Stefano Colonna made his triumphant return the following morning. In a ghastly but venerable Roman tradition dating back to the time of the Caesars, urchins dug up the bodies of Ludwig's mercenaries and dragged them through the streets, leaving dogs to tear at the rotting clothes and flesh before hurling the corpses unceremoniously into the Tiber. The Romans burned the emperor's edicts and the antipope's constitutions in celebratory bonfires on the Campidoglio, then turned their fury on the palaces of Jacopo Savelli and Sciarra Colonna—so the pope reported, with breezy satisfaction, in a letter to King Philip VI of France.[25] On Sunday, 8 August 1328, Giovanni Orsini, twice barred from the city of his birth, entered Rome to the exuberant cries of his *concittadini*: "Long live Holy Mother Church, the Most Holy Father Pope John, and the Cardinal Legate! Death to the Bavarian and Pietro da Corbaro, heretics and Patarines, and all other traitors!"[26] Ten days later an Angevin army under Guillaume d'Eboli entered the city on behalf of Rome's duly appointed papal senator, King Robert of Naples.[27]

In the meantime, the emperor discovered that even his Ghibelline allies had abandoned him; when he reached Viterbo, he had 2,500 German knights in his service, but no Italian contingents.[28] For this Ludwig had only himself to blame: he had insulted Can Grande at Trent in January 1327, all but insuring the indifference of Can Grande's successors,[29] and his brutal treatment of Silvestro Gatti earned him a chilly reception in Viterbo.[30] Most critically, the mighty Visconti had turned on him: on 5 July 1327 Ludwig had deposed and arrested Galeazzo Visconti and his son Azzo, apparently after learning that Galeazzo had entered into secret negotiations with Poujet. Galeazzo died in exile the following year, but the cool and dangerous Azzo remained at large, plotting his restoration and long-

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[25] A. Fayen, ed. *Lettres de Jean XXII*, 2 vols. (Rome/Brussels/Paris, 1908), Analecta Vaticano-Belgica Publiés par l'Institut Historique Belge de Rome, 2, pp. 217–218, #2238 (4 October 1328); Riezler, pp. 399–400, #1086.

[26] So the pope reported to Philip VI of France in a letter of 28 August 1328 (Riezler, pp. 396–397).

[27] The account of Ludwig's expulsion is taken from Villani, X.xcv (pp. 690–691).

[28] Villani, XI.xcvi (pp. 691–692).

[29] Dupré Theseider, *Problemi*, p. 178.

[30] Pinzi 3, pp. 157–158; cf. the warmth with which Gatti received the emperor on his first visit (January 1328), pp. 149–154.

ing to exact his revenge on the architect of his father's ruin.[31] Those allies who had not themselves felt the sting of the emperor's wrath and ingratitude had regarded his treatment of the Visconti with alarm;[32] now that his cause was in ruins, they could hardly wait to cut their losses with him. Even Castruccio had betrayed him in the service of his own ambitions, and now lay dying of fever in Lucca. By the fall of 1328, Ludwig was very much alone.

The emperor's own force was small and comprised principally of mercenaries who were disinclined to remain long in the service of an indigent master; without the active support of his Italian vassals, he had no hope of success, though he still possessed the means to do some mischief. From Viterbo he ravaged the *contado* of Orvieto and laid siege to Bolsena, without great effect, then moved on to Todi in the middle of August 1328; here, his impoverished antipope stooped to despoiling the storied church of San Fortunato while the emperor's troops ran amok in Romagna and the Duchy of Benevento.[33] When Ludwig wore out his welcome in Todi, he moved on to Pisa, forgoing once again his long-promised assault on Florence.[34] He captured Pisa with the aid of a Sicilian fleet in September, then established Tarlatino Tarlati as imperial vicar in the city.[35] In November the emperor advanced on Lucca, where he drove out the sons of Castruccio Castracani.[36] Upon his return to Pisa, he resumed his dire but idle threats against Florence; here, too, the antipope conducted a series of farcical "proceedings" against John XXII, Robert of Naples and the commune of Florence early in 1329.[37] The restoration of Azzo Visconti in January 1329 forced Ludwig to abandon Tuscany at last; he surrendered his pathetic antipope into the custody of Count Bonifacio di Donoratico in Pisa and moved north against Milan in April. By August Nicholas was prostrate before John XXII, who kept him in close but comfortable confinement at Avignon until his death in October 1333.[38] John, for his part, was delighted.

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[31] See Francesco Cognasso *et al.*, *Storia di Milano V. La signoria dei Visconti*. Fondazione Treccani degli Alfieri per la storia di Milano (Milan, 1955), pp. 197–199.
[32] See «Cronaca Senese dell'Agnolo Tura del Grasso», p. 459, l.22–26.
[33] Villani, XI.xcvi (pp. 691–692).
[34] Ibid., XI.xcvii (pp. 692–693).
[35] Ibid., XI.ci (pp. 694–696).
[36] Ibid., XI.cv (pp. 698–699).
[37] Ibid., XI.cxx (pp. 708–709).
[38] For the formal confession he made to John XXII see *Prima vita Joannis XXII*

In a letter to Queen Jeanne of France, the pope exulted that Lucca and Pistoia were in open rebellion against their imperial vicars; now Azzo Visconti had taken the field against Ludwig in Lombardy. The antipope's *synagoga malignantium* was dissolved; the renegade Franciscans Michael of Cesena and Bonagratia of Bergamo (*seu verius Malagratia*, as the pope acidly remarked) were put to flight.[39] After a final, desperate, and utterly ineffectual demonstration of strength before the walls of Milan in April 1329, Ludwig IV wandered aimlessly for a while in the Po valley before vanishing forever across the Alps early in 1330.[40]

The failure of the emperor's *Romzug* issued from a critical misunderstanding of the political forces at play in fourteenth-century Italy. Ludwig tended, like John XXII, to overestimate both the importance and the cohesion of the Guelf and Ghibelline alliance-schemes, but possessed none of the perceptiveness and keen attention to detail that informed the pope's Italian policy. He failed miserably to appreciate the motivations of his Ghibelline allies, their view of the emperor's place in Italy, or even, in the final instance, their characters and ambitions; he might be forgiven for allowing himself to believe that the Ghibelline *signori* had a genuine and abiding respect for imperial rights in Italy, but it was sheer folly to assume that men like Castruccio Castracani or Azzo Visconti would meekly accede to the emperor's every demand.[41] In Rome, where he ruled with a curious combination of tactlessness and indecision, he attempted with dismal results to hide the harsh reality of his regime behind bombastic spectacles and the empty rhetoric of a democratic *imperium*. For the financial problems that plagued his expedition he could find no more effective remedy than extortion. In a world which had long since ceased to believe that emperors could create popes, he chose, with disastrous consequences, to revive the divisive schisms that had rent twelfth-century Christendom. In the end, perhaps, Ludwig was something of an anachronism, a twelfth-century emperor adrift in a fourteenth-century Italy whose essential character he quite simply failed

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(excerpted from Bernard Gui's *Cathalogo brevi Romanorum pontificum*), Baluze-Mollat 1, pp. 146–151 (6 September 1330).

[39] 5 May 1329; Riezler, pp. 418–419, #1166.

[40] For Ludwig's sabre-rattling outside of Milan, see Villani XI.cxxvii (p. 712); for his departure, Gregorovius, 11,4.2 (2, pp. 656–657). For the failure of the emperor's *Romzug*, see Dupré Theseider, *Problemi*, pp. 177–184.

[41] Dupré Theseider, *Problemi*, pp. 177–178.

to comprehend. When he returned to Germany in the winter of 1330, he took the ghosts of Henry IV and Frederick Barbarossa with him. The fundamental conflict in fourteenth-century Italy could now be revealed for what it was—indeed, what it always had been: not a contest between papacy and Empire, but a struggle for power in the peninsula.

With the realization of the pope's principal objectives in the Tuscan theater, the first phase of Orsini's legation came to an end. The Lucchese and Aretine threats had been neutralized. Florence had survived the challenge of Castruccio and the emperor's unfulfilled promise of a great assault. The emperor had been ejected from Rome and now found his position in Italy untenable. Nevertheless, the legate's contribution to the victory had been minimal. Untimely death removed Castruccio and Guido Tarlati from the scene; the emperor's political ruin was largely a debacle of his own making. Orsini's campaigns had been largely ineffective; at no point did they pose a significant threat to Castruccio's ambitions in Tuscany or to the emperor's objectives in Rome. It is true that the legate had found an exceptionally able opponent in Castruccio and a no less exceptionally feckless ally in Charles of Calabria, but Orsini himself must bear a considerable part of the blame. Almost from the outset his concern for Roman affairs had distracted him from the crises in Tuscany, where he proved far more adept at antagonizing his Florentine allies than he did at working with them. In the end it was good fortune, far more than anything the legate did, that secured victory for the papacy and its allies in Tuscany.

As the focus of his legation now shifted southward to the western Papal States, and in particular, to the Patrimony of St Peter, Orsini would find himself facing, not a coalition of powerful opponents, but a series of at best loosely related problems. These problems were engendered by the emperor's advent and departure, but they manifested themselves in quite different ways from one locale to the next. The towns of the Patrimony were generally much smaller and less prosperous than those of Tuscany—many had received the emperor quite simply because they had no chance whatsoever of resisting him. The connections between the towns, moreover, were more ephemeral than those between the towns of Tuscany. The partisan networks that linked the Guelfs and Ghibellines of one Tuscan city to their counterparts in another were less developed in, or altogether absent from, the towns of the Patrimony. Disputes there tended to

be acutely local affairs: one small town vying with another for control of an even smaller one on the border between them. The proliferation of separate, local conflicts would make the Patrimony in many respects a more difficult theater of operation than Tuscany; it was also, however, an arena with which Orsini was much more familiar, and in which his own connections and family resources afforded the means for more effective and decisive action. These same connections and resources, however, ensured that Orsini would find it difficult to maintain the disinterest—indeed, one might go so far as to say indifference—with which he had approached his duties in Tuscany. For better and for worse, the second phase of his legation would be very different from the first.

Between 1328 and 1329 the political situation in Italy underwent a momentous change. The collapse of the emperor's *Romzug* inaugurated a period of some three decades in which the Empire played at most a minimal role in Italian affairs. With the passing of one generation of Ghibelline *signori*, another came to power, less enamored of imperial vassalage and more willing in the long run to make peace with the pope in the interest of preserving their regimes. Formerly dangerous states such as Lucca, Arezzo and Mantua ceased to pose a significant threat to the Church's interests in Italy. Moreover, with the death of his only son, the disconsolate Robert of Naples began to withdraw from affairs beyond the *Regno*, turning increasingly toward securing the succession of his young granddaughter, Joanna.[42] As a result, Poujet and Orsini would find themselves freed from what had been an often rather listless Angevin leadership during their legations. They would also find it harder—not impossible, but harder—to rely on the considerable military and material resources that Robert had provided.

With the emperor now gone from the scene, interaction between the legates diminished. Poujet and Orsini had remained in close contact throughout the emperor's *Romzug*, coordinating actions to such an extent that Poujet often supplied Orsini with mercenary forces while the emperor was at large in Tuscany and the Patrimony. After the emperor's expulsion from Rome, the legates returned to the prosecution of their respective objectives in what had become, once again, two largely unrelated theaters of operation. From this point, Orsini's

[42] Léonard, pp. 315–316.

legation became essentially a series of isolated, local initiatives, conducted principally in the western Papal States and Rome. If these initiatives had little to do with Poujet's activities in Bologna, they did require extensive cooperation with papal officers in the Papal States, and in particular with the rectors of the Patrimony; they also, inevitably, touched on the legate's family interests in the region.

The first order of business for the legate was the rehabilitation of erstwhile rebels, both collective and individual, throughout his legatine territories. After 1328 a veritable horde of penitents presented petitions to the pope, begging for absolution.[43] Some of these came directly to John XXII at Avignon, but most were left to Orsini's discretion, as was the implementation of the terms of absolution and reconciliation. In June 1328, even before the emperor's fall, Narni had submitted to the Church; under its new rector, the legate's nephew Bertoldo, the commune offered the *signoria* to John XXII, not as pope, but rather as the private citizen, Jacques Duèse. The pope accepted the offer and instructed Orsini and Robert d'Albarupe, rector of the Patrimony, to appoint suitable officials to govern the city on the pope's behalf.[44] Orsini made the most of the opportunity and installed a kinsman, Andrea d'Orso Orsini, as *podestà*.[45] In September 1329 the Pisans sent envoys to Avignon, assuring the pope that they had intended to resist the emperor but, after the imperial occupation of Pisa, had had no choice but to collaborate with him; even the Milanese sought absolution from the pope, at the request of none other than Azzo Visconti.[46]

In both cases, John XXII proved more than willing to embrace his prodigal sons; indeed, the benevolence with which the pope responded to most petitions inspired a steady influx of submissions

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[43] For the development of the formal submission, and its use in the papacy's struggle with Ludwig IV, see Herman Otto Schwöbel, *Der diplomatische Kampf zwischen Ludwig dem Bayern und der römischen Kurie im Rahmen des kanonischen Absolutionsprozesses, 1330–1346*. Quellen und Studien zur Verfassungsgeschichte des deutschen Reiches in Mittelalter und Neuzeit 10 (Weimar, 1968).

[44] See RV 114, ff. 232va–233ra (10 June 1328); cf. Theiner 1, pp. 558–559, #DCCXXX, and RV 114; ff. 233rb–234ra (the commune's formal submission, 13 June 1328).

[45] Theiner 1, pp. 543–544, #DCCXXI. For the often turbulent relationship between Narni, which was subjected to the papacy in December 1236, and papal Rome, see Brezzi, pp. 104–105.

[46] Villani, XI.cxliii (pp. 722); for the text of the Pisa petition, see Riezler, pp. 441–447, #1267.

over the next three or four years. In July 1329 Orsini was authorized to absolve the penitent brothers Francesco, Vanni, Gerio and Ugolino di Tano degli Ubaldini, scions of a notoriously radical family of Tuscan Ghibellines and one-time allies of Guido Tarlati.[47] Jacopo Savelli and Tebaldo dei Sant'Eustachio, junior partners in Sciarra Colonna's radical triumvirate, submitted to the Church through their proctor, Ildebrandino Conti, bishop of Padua, on 13 October 1329.[48] Rome, its interdict suspended for eighteen months after the legate's entry, made its formal submission in February 1330.[49] Even Amelia, a hotbed of heresy and insurrection, yielded to the Church under pressure from the inquisition and the rector of the Patrimony in the autumn of 1332.[50]

Still, significant pockets of resistance remained, the most immediately threatening of which was Viterbo. For two centuries, wealthy and populous Viterbo had vied with Orvieto for "second-city" status in the western Patrimony. But where Orvieto distinguished itself with a long tradition of loyalty to the papacy, Viterbo had been at odds with Rome almost constantly since the middle of the twelfth century, when Viterbo frequently took the imperial part in the bitter struggles between the papacy and the Hohenstaufen emperors. Subjugated by the Roman commune in 1233, and again in 1291, Viterbo came to define itself above all as the principal center of anti-Roman resistance in the western Patrimony. The Romans, for

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[47] For the Ubaldini see Gene Brucker, *Florentine Politics and Society, 1343–1378* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 111–112. For their role in the conquest of Città di Castello (2 October 1323), in which Nieri della Faggiuola also took part, see «Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium II», pp. 356, l.38—357, l.4. For their activity in Arezzo and association with Uguccione della Faggiuola see «Annales Arretinorum», p. 12, l.16–26.

[48] RV 115, ff.207rb–210va; Theiner 1, pp. 576–582, #DCCLIV. Duplicate letters concerning their absolution were sent to Orsini on 31 January 1331 (RV 116, f. 173vb); see also RV 116, f. 317va (15 November 1331), for the delays which complicated Jacopo's absolution. For the 600 florin indemnity imposed on Tebaldo see Antonelli, "I registri," p. 380.

[49] RV 115, ff.205ra–207ra (16 February 1330). On 22 September Orsini was instructed to induce the Romans to send out letters of recantation to the princes of Christendom, as was customary when the Roman commune repented of rebellions against the pope (RV 116, ff.173ra). See also the text in Theiner 1, pp. 570–573, #DCCXLVII.

[50] RV 117, f. 7va (October 29, 1332); Antonelli, "Notizie umbre," pp. 475, #9; 480, #29, #29; 481, #33, #34. For Amelia's rebellions, associated with those of Todi, see Fumi, "Eretici e ribelli nell'Umbria dal 1320 al 1330," *BSUSP* 5 (1899), pp. 1–46, 205–425.

their part, acquired such a virulent hatred of the tough, defiant city that Gregorovius could rightly describe it as "the Veii of the Middle Ages."[51] During the thirteenth century, as both the popes and the Roman commune extended their dominion over the lesser cities and towns of the region, the fertile countryside between Lake Bolsena and Lake Bracciano made Viterbo an irresistible target of Roman expansion. More recently, Viterbo had suffered further territorial loss to Guitto Farnese, bishop of Orvieto (1302–28) and, from 1320 to 1323, rector of the Patrimony. Guitto, a rare Italian among the papal officials of early fourteenth-century Italy, had used his position to advance his own clan quite considerably in the Viterbese *contado*.[52] Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Viterbo had little love for Rome, the Orsini or the officials of the Roman Church. Cardinal Giovanni Orsini was emblematic of all three.

From the legate's perspective, the immediate source of the problem was Silvestro Gatti. *Signore* from 1325, Silvestro had been among Ludwig IV's most energetic supporters in the Patrimony. He had thrown his support behind the antipope and welcomed the imperial "bishop" of Viterbo, Pandolfuccio Capocci, in August 1328.[53] After his mistreatment at the emperor's hands, Silvestro lost some of his ardor for the imperial cause, though not so much that he was unwilling to accept an imperial vicariate in 1329.[54] In the end, his relationship with the emperor meant less than his commitment to restoring Viterbo's complete and unequivocal independence from Rome, and so he fomented and subsidized rebellions among Rome's lesser dependencies throughout the region.[55] So long as Silvestro Gatti remained in power, he threatened the stability of the western Patrimony.

At the end of 1328 the legate left Florence and established his headquarters at Montefiascone, where he was received with enthusiasm. Like many of the smaller, weaker towns of the region,

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[51] Gregorovius, 9,5.3 (2, p. 363). For the Roman domination of the communes of the western Papal States and the enmity it provoked, see Brezzi, pp. 50–60, 98–109.

[52] For Guitto and his relations with Viterbo see Antonelli, "Vicende della dominazione," pp. 373–378.

[53] Pinzi 3, pp. 161–162, n. 1; Roberto Cessi, *Saggi Romani* (Rome, 1956), p. 15.

[54] P. Egidi, "Le cronache di Viterbo scritte da frate Francesco d' Andrea," *ARSRSP* 24 (1901), p. 332, n. 2.

[55] See Pinzi 3, pp. 140–142.

Montefiascone had submitted to Ludwig IV out of necessity more than anything else; it could hardly have offered any resistance to the emperor. For this it had been laid under interdict, but was absolved by John XXII in May 1330.[56] The pope also authorized the citizens to rebuild the demolished walls—an important concession to a town long menaced by the aggressions of Viterbo, Corneto and Tolfa.[57] The legate's arrival was proof positive that the town had returned to the good graces of the Church. More importantly, perhaps, as the temporary headquarters of a papal legate, little Montefiascone suddenly found itself a very an important place.

From here the legate prepared for war with Viterbo and its troublesome *signore*.[58] Since the previous November, Orsini had maintained a company of 500 horsemen under the command of Andruccio di Buonanno di Ponte santa Susanna; with the arrival of contingents from Orvieto and Narni, he moved against Viterbo in February 1329.[59] At one point in the campaign the legate's forces managed to storm the gates and penetrate the city as far as the central piazza, but were forced to withdraw in the face of stiff resistance from Silvestro and his supporters.[60] During the campaign, however, Orsini's forces inflicted enormous damage on the fertile Viterbese *contado*. A drastically diminished summer harvest led to serious food shortages and the inevitable crisis of regime. By autumn the people were in revolt, and Silvestro's enemies closed in for the kill. On 10 September 1329, as the people rioted in the streets, Faziolo di Manfredi dei Prefetti di Vico, from a powerful rival clan of the Viterbese *contado*, assassinated Silvestro and assumed the *signoria* for himself.[61]

If Silvestro's death was welcome news to the legate, Faziolo's accession was not. The Prefetti di Vico and the Orsini were old enemies. Orsini expansion into Sabina, begun in the time of the Orsini pope, Nicholas III, put enormous pressure on the Prefetti di Vico and other families established in the region around Lake Bracciano; it

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[56] Theiner 1, pp. 574–575, #DCCXLIX.
[57] Ibid., p. 575, #DCCLI.
[58] RV 115, ff. 33vb–34ra (20 December 1328).
[59] See «Annali di Perugia», p. 101.
[60] Egidi, p. 332; Villani, XI.cxxxi (p. 715). See also Pinzi 3, pp. 164–165.
[61] «Estratti dalla "Historia" di Cipriano Manenti», pp. 427, l.1—428, l.4; Villani, XI.cxliv (p. 723). According to Manenti, an insult by Gatti precipitated the assassination. For early fourteenth-century Viterbo and the role of the Gatteschi-Prefetti di Vico rivalry in its political affairs see Pinzi 3, pp. 116–145.

was during the pontificate of Nicholas that Viterbo lost Soriano to the Orsini.[62] Moreover, the two families invariably found themselves on opposite sides of the papal/imperial divide: the Orsini were affiliated with the Conti dell'Anguillara, a powerful "Guelf" clan from the region that found itself frequently at odds with the Prefetti di Vico, who had extensive ties with the pro-imperial Colonna; Faziolo's brother, Teballuccio, was married to a daughter of Stefano Colonna.[63] Faziolo's grandfather, Pietro, had led the partisans of Manfred of Hohenstaufen (for whom Faziolo's father was named) in the Patrimony until he was brought to heel in July 1265 by none other than the rector of Rome, Matteo Rosso II Orsini—the legate's father.[64] In 1286 Honorius IV was forced to intervene in a destructive territorial feud between Orso Orsini and Pietro di Vico.[65] Between 1317 and 1320 the Prefetti di Vico and the Colonna had led Viterbo in arms against the Gaetani and Orsini barons of the Viterbese *contado*, before pressure from the Roman senate and the threat of invasion from Orvieto put an end to the uprising.[66]

At the time of Faziolo's coup, the legate was in Orvieto, where he was trying to heal a rift in the ranks of the city's leading family, the Monaldeschi.[67] Upon receiving the news of Faziolo's accession, Orsini hurried to Montefiascone with Bonuccio di Pietro Monaldeschi, who was able to negotiate a truce between the legate and Faziolo. Indeed, Faziolo proved surprisingly congenial. He offered no resistance when the legate entered Viterbo with two hundred Neapolitan horsemen in November.[68] He listened contritely as Orsini denounced Viterbo for receiving the schismatic Pandolfuccio Capocci, and acceded to the restoration of diocesan control to the rightful bishop, Angelo Tignosi. He then repented solemnly, on behalf of the commune, before the legate.[69] Faziolo's good behavior was entirely

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[62] Brezzi, pp. 100–101; Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 218–220; Brentano, *Rome before Avignon*, p. 188; Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, pp. 132–139.

[63] See Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, pp. 125–128. The marriage helped to seal an alliance of 1293, occasioned by a conflict between the Prefetti di Vico and the Conti dell'Anguillara.

[64] Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, p. 124.

[65] Theiner 1, pp. 292–293, #CCCLIV.

[66] Pinzi 3, pp. 116–120.

[67] «Estratti dalla "Historia" di Cipriano Manenti», p. 426, l.21–24.

[68] Ibid., pp. 427, l.1–428, l.4; cf. Villani X, cxliii (V, p. 188) and «Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium II», p. 417, l.20–31.

[69] Pinzi 3, pp. 173–174.

contingent on the exigencies of the moment. He had yet to consolidate his hold on Viterbo, the Gatteschi faction was far from broken, and Silvestro's son, Lando, was at large in the *contado*, eagerly awaiting an opportunity to strike at his father's assassin. The last thing Faziolo could afford was an open conflict with the papal legate. So long as Faziolo remained compliant, John XXII was willing to help him keep the Gatteschi at bay. On 22 December 1330 he ordered Orsini to do whatever he could to keep Lando from the city. A month later he forbade the legate from treating with Lando at all until the Gatteschi handed over the *castrum* of Orele and other properties that they had wrested from the Church;[70] in February Orsini seized all of Lando's properties.[71] For the moment, Faziolo had every reason to remain on good terms with the legate. As his position grew stronger, he would begin to show his true colors. For the time being, however, Viterbo was at peace.[72]

Without the leadership and support of Viterbo, lesser centers of rebellion were quickly and easily pacified. The legate's nephew and chief lieutenant, Giordano di Poncello Orsini, led a company of Orvietan bowmen against Corneto in November 1329.[73] The action was swift and successful: in December the legate suspended the interdict which overlay the town and informed the pope that Corneto had petitioned for absolution. The pope approved,[74] and in February 1330 Rolandus Rogerii, a canon of Corneto, appeared at Avignon to render formal submission to the pope.[75] Orsini's victory and the pope's leniency made an impression on the other communities of the region: the following summer a host of towns in the Patrimony, Sabina, and Campagna-Marittima would petition the pope for forgiveness and relief from the interdicts under which they lay for hav-

[70] RV 116, f. 173va; f. 173va–vb (31 January 1331).

[71] See the letter of 25 February 1330, ordering the legate to investigate the relative benefits of retaining these properties or exchanging them and using the revenues to construct a papal fortress over Viterbo (RV 115, f. 222ra).

[72] See Pinzi 3, pp. 171–173.

[73] «Estratti dalla "Historia" di Cipriano Manenti», p. 425, l.16–18. For the legate's base at Montefiascone, and Giordano's direction of the campaign's finances, see Antonelli, "I registri," p. 379.

[74] See RV 115, f. 218vb. Corneto had already been absolved for a previous rebellion early in 1329, but was condemned again for supporting Silvestro Gatti in October 1329 (see Antonelli, "Vicende della dominazione," pp. 267–275).

[75] RV 115, f. 219rb–220va (20 February 1330).

ing received the emperor; John XXII ordered Orsini to look into the matter on a case-by-case basis and to act accordingly.[76]

With a fragile peace established in the western Papal States,[77] the legate turned to the reduction of Todi.[78] Here he encountered a different sort of rebellion. Viterbo was a proud and ancient city, desperate to extricate itself from Roman domination; like so many other rebellious towns of the western Papal States, it was driven primarily by a desire for communal independence. Todi was made of more combustive stuff. It was ardently Ghibelline from the time of the Hohenstaufen and torn from within by the schism of the Spiritual and Conventual Franciscans. By the fourteenth century, Todi had emerged as one of the principal centers of *fraticelli* activity in the West. Todi, much more than the Rome of Nicholas V, was the real spiritual epicenter of Ludwig's schism; the bonfires to which its citizens consigned effigies of John XXII were a fitting symbol of its fiery heterodoxy. Virtually alone among the rebellious towns of central Italy, Todi showed no signs of remorse, real or feigned, for its defiance, but remained devoted to the emperor and antipope even as their cause stood in ruins. There was no room in Todi for the calculated manoeuvrings of Faziolo di Vico. In frustrated Viterbo, John XXII was an impediment to communal liberty; in Minorite Todi, he was the antichrist.[79]

The legate's difficulties in Todi were exacerbated by the identity of the town's *signore*, Giovanni di Sciarra Colonna. Like Faziolo in Viterbo, Giovanni Colonna added hereditary enmities to Orsini's already troubled relations with a rebellious city. But Giovanni Colonna was an altogether wilder character than Faziolo. Born of his father's adulterous tryst with a married woman,[80] Giovanni was intended

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[76] RV 115, f. 32vb (7 June 1329). Only the towns of Cori and Montefortini are mentioned by name.

[77] See Cessi, pp. 7–29.

[78] See RV 115, f. 221vb (5 December 1329), where the legate recommended diverting Angevin forces from Viterbo to Todi; the pope left the matter to Orsini's discretion.

[79] For the fierce character of Todi's rebellion, and Umbria's generally bad reputation for heresy during the period, see Fumi, "Eretici e ribelli nell'Umbria dal 1320 al 1330," especially *BSUSP* 5 (1899), pp. 1–46. See also Bock, "Processi di Giovanni XXII contro i Ghibellini nelle Marche," p. 19.

[80] Giovanni was thrice dispensed *super defectu natalium* (*de soluto et coniugata genitus*) to hold ecclesiastical benefices (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #18037, #26319, #26323).

from an early age for a career in the Church.[81] In his volcanic temperament and fierce commitment to the imperial cause, however, he was very much his father's son. He was foremost among the clerical electors of Nicholas V in May 1328 and was soon afterward named vice-chancellor of the antipope's curia.[82] For this, not surprisingly, he was deprived of his ecclesiastical benefices, bearing insult on top of injury when John XXII re-assigned five of his benefices to young Orsini clerics.[83] In September 1328 the retreating Ludwig IV left Giovanni as his vicar in Todi, where Giovanni's aggressive policies threatened stability throughout a region only recently delivered from the restless machinations of Guido Tarlati. The royal vicar in Rome, Guillaume d'Eboli, complained to the king in November 1328 that Giovanni was supplying arms and goods to Civitavecchia, then in a state of rebellion against the Church and the Angevin authorities in Rome.[84] More immediately troubling to John XXII was Giovanni's conquest of San Gemini, a possession of the Church, in the fall of 1329.[85] As far as the legate was concerned, the rehabilitation of Todi was wholly contingent on the defeat of Giovanni Colonna. In November 1329, Orsini began preparing his Angevin cavalry for a campaign against Todi. As it turned out, the assault never took place: the citizens of Todi rose up in December and drove Colonna from the city.[86] However, any hope that Colonna's

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[81] See Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, pp. 417–418 C16.; *Die Kanoniker*, p. 110. At various times he held benefices in Thérouanne (*Regestum Clementis papae V*, #7727), Brescia (ibid., #4373), Rheims (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #2865); the Lateran (ibid., #17953), Cambrai, Rouen, Evreux, Arras, St-Audomar, St-Martin of Tours, Brabant (ibid., #26320) and Lièges (#26323); the last two, granted in August 1326, were probably intended to win the support of Sciarra as Rome drifted closer to rebellion (Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, p. 451).

[82] See *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #42570, #42676, #46391, #52556. For Giovanni's role in the election of the antipope see Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, p. 478.

[83] See *Lettres communes de Jean XII*, #46525, #46710, #46713, #47521, #47614.

[84] Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, p. 488.

[85] RV 115, f.221ra (30 April 1330). By 28 November 1330 San Gemini had been restored to the control of the Church (see Antonelli, "Notizie umbre," p. 473, #29). The conquest of San Gemini was one reason for Todi's interdict on 1 July 1330, but other factors—a 20,000 florin subsidy to the emperor, the reception of the antipope and of two imperial vicars prior to Colonna—reveal the extent of Todi's rebellion (Riezler, p. 468, #1341).

[86] Dupré Theseider implies that Colonna was expelled in December 1328 (*Roma*, p. 486), but two papal letters, one to Philip VI of France (13 December 1329; Riezler, pp. 433–434, #1236) and the other to a certain Andrea di Todi (12 February 1330; ibid., p. 441, #1265), establish with certainty that the ouster took place in December 1329.

expulsion signalled a new spirit of repentance in Todi, would soon be dashed. The Tuderti were worn out by Colonna's heavy hand and unnerved at the prospect of an armed confrontation with the legate. As time would tell, they had yet to tire of rebellion.[87]

With the tenuous pacifications of Viterbo and Todi, the situation in the Papal States was probably better at the end of 1329 than it had been at any point in the previous two decades. Even the unquiet towns of the distant *Marche* had ceased their rebellions against the rectors of the Church, if only in the interest of self-preservation: the growing strength and ambitions of the Malatesta family in Rimini had begun to hint at the possibility of more unpleasant and thoroughgoing dominations than that of the Church.[88] With the Papal States at rest, at least for the moment, the legate now turned his attentions to Rome, where his family, triumphantly returned from its brief exile, was again in a position to assert its power.

[87] So the pope himself related in a letter to Philip VI (13 December 1329; Riezler, pp. 433–434, #1236).

[88] See Vasina, *I Romagnoli*, pp. 296–297.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CAPITANEUS URBIS

Some time toward the end of 1329 or the beginning of 1330, Orsini moved his headquarters from Montefiascone to Rome. The circumstances under which he did so, and in what capacity he intended to function in Rome, remain unclear. There is no doubt that John XXII meant for Orsini to address some or even all of the many problems which remained in the city in the aftermath of the emperor's expulsion,[1] but Rome itself was not among the territories placed under the legate's jurisdiction. This was perhaps an inevitable consequence of the pope's unique relationship to the City. John XXII was, in a canonical sense, "present" in Rome through his apostolic vicar *in spiritualibus et temporalibus*, Angelo Tignosi, the exiled bishop of Viterbo.[2] In a larger sense, perhaps, one might argue that the pope could never be absent from Rome, even when he was not actually there *in propria persona.* The ancient and sacred link between Rome and its bishops engendered the familiar (and, during the Avignonese period, extremely important) formula, *ubi papa, ibi Roma*; to a considerable extent, it also implied the converse, *ubi Roma, ibi papa*. Centuries of tradition precluded a *legatus a latere*, himself understood as a physical extension of the papal body, from exercising legatine authority in Rome. John XXII was an expert canonist; he was fully aware that Giovanni Orsini could not exercise legatine authority in a city that had not been committed to his jurisdiction. Indeed, without explicit instruction, he had no right to take action there at all.

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[1] As any number of papal letters attest; see RV 115, f. 32va (1 March 1329), 32va (7 May 1329), 33vb (7 July 1329), 33rb (23 August 1329), 68va (16 June 1329), 206vb (16 February 1330), 218r (7 October 1329), 219ra (8 January 1330), 221rb (5 September 1329), 221vb (3 January 1330), 222ra (26 March 1330), 222ra (30 March 1330), 222va (17 June 1330), 223vb (24 November 1329), 348va (8 February 1330); RV 116 f.170va (18 March 1331), 173ra (22 September 1330), 173rb (22 September 1330), 173vb (31 January 1331), 314ra (7 May 1332), 317va (16 December 1331), 317vb (29 January 1331), 317vb (5 February 1332); RV 117, f.4vb (20 August 1333), 7ra (25 September 1332), 233vb (8 March 1334).

[2] See Böuard, pp. 70–73; the pope's *vicarius in spiritualibus* exercised full ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Rome and the district.

The papal letters instructing him to act in Rome might best be seen as special mandates, authorizing him to function essentially as a nuncio or proctor within the walls of the city, without exceeding his own legatine mandate or superseding the vicarial authority of Angelo Tignosi. In any case, Orsini's status in Rome was problematic, and the uncertainties surrounding it ultimately opened the door to grave abuses. Whatever the pope's intentions may have been, it would not be long before the legate was routinely overriding much more than the authority of the pope's vicar. In the end, the Orsini family had far too much at stake in Rome for Orsini himself to remain an impartial agent of the papacy. Indeed, to a very considerable extent the final, definitive failure of Orsini's legation is attributable to his excesses in Rome.

From almost the moment of his arrival in Rome, Orsini's investment in the affairs of his family threatened the fragile peace there. The legate immediately and quite correctly identified Stefano Colonna as the most powerful and dangerous of his potential rivals in Rome, and was relentless in antagonizing him. Ironically, though, Stefano's enmity toward the legate was anything but assured. His defection from the imperial cause had given John XXII reason to hope for an accord with this most formidable of his Roman opponents, and Stefano himself was eager to improve the troubled relations between the Colonna and Orsini.[3] As early as June 1327 the pope urged Stefano and the legate to effect a marital alliance between the two houses.[4] Stefano was apparently willing to go along with the pope's request, but the legate was adamant in opposing the union. When his kinsman, Count Orso dell'Anguillara, contracted marriage with Stefano's daughter, Agnesa, Orsini did everything in his power to keep the marriage from taking place, citing one unspecified impediment after another.[5] On the eve of the legate's assault on Rome in September 1327, the pope exhorted Orsini and Stefano to join forces.[6]

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[3] Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, p. 423.

[4] RV 114, f. 62ra (13 Jun 1327).

[5] RV 115, f. 29vb (4 November 1328). The couple did eventually marry, and Petrarch remarked on the blissful state of their union; *Le familiari*, ed. V. Rossi, 4 vols. (Florence, 1933–1941), 1, *Fam.* III, 13, pp. 101–102. When war erupted between the Colonna and Orsini in 1333, Orso fought for his Colonna in-laws (see Mercati, p. 20, n. 52).

[6] RV 114 f. 234ra–vb (24 September 1327); see Riezler, p. 347, #911.

Stefano refused; a peacemaker he might have been, but he was above all a Colonna, and he would not stand with the Orsini and the Angevins in battle against his own brother. His refusal to fight almost certainly contributed to the legate's defeat and should perhaps have warned the pope of the dangers that lay ahead. It is noteworthy, too, that, after the emperor's expulsion, Stefano declined to enter the city with the Orsini, choosing instead to return one day after Bertoldo Orsini and three days before the legate entered the city.[7] By May 1329 relations between the Orsini and the Colonna had deteriorated to the point that the pope felt obliged once again to exhort Stefano and the legate to make peace, to no apparent avail.[8]

For a time the presence of King Robert's vicar in Rome, Guillaume d'Eboli, managed to hold the growing animosity between the Colonna and the Orsini in check. Guillaume's heavy hand, however, soon made him as unpopular as the emperor had been, and by the end of 1328, his misgovernment was the object of serious unrest in Rome. Early in the following year the pope instructed Orsini to investigate and rein in the "various excesses and multiple troubles" perpetrated by the royal vicar and his officials.[9] By the time serious food shortages struck at the end of the year, the proverbially fickle Romans had had enough. Chanting "Death to the senator!," they descended on the Campidoglio and demanded that Guillaume leave the city. Guillaume thought it prudent to comply; on 4 February 1330 he took his three hundred Neapolitan knights and beat a hasty retreat from Rome.[10] In his place the Romans raised up two *sindachi del popolo*, Poncello Orsini and Stefano Colonna, whom Robert of Naples had little choice but to recognize as his vicars in April. Poncello and Stefano ended the famine in a traditionally Roman manner, with a general distribution of grain levied in part from the other clans.[11] The success of the two *sindachi* derived in no small part from the

[7] Villani XI.xcv (p. 691).

[8] RV 115, f. 34ra–rb (21 May 1329).

[9] The text does not specify what these abuses were: *Non sine displicencia magna nuper accepimus quod per vicarium ac officiales et gentes regios existentes in Vrbe excessus committuntur uarii et grauamina multiplicia ciuibus inferuntur . . .*; RV 115, f. 33va–vb (2 January 1329).

[10] Villani, XI.cxviii (pp. 706–707); Guillaume retained the title "captain of the Roman militia," but without any significant political power (see Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 488–489).

[11] Villani, XI.cxviii (p. 707).

fact that their term gave equal representation to both of Rome's leading clans. When their term expired in June, however, Robert decided to appoint two Orsini, Bertoldo di Poncello and Count Bertoldo of Nola, to take their place. He justified his decision by claiming that Count Bertoldo was the preferred candidate of Stefano Colonna himself. The claim is not implausible—Bertoldo was Stefano's nephew, and Stefano was apparently quite fond of him[12]—though it is revealing that Robert found it necessary to explain his decision.

The installation of the two Orsini vicars coincides with a rapid transfer of power in Rome and the Patrimony from the Angevins to the Orsini. Robert, now preoccupied by the succession question in Naples, offered no resistance and may even have assisted the legate in effecting the transition, as his appointment of the two Orsini vicars seems to suggest. The legate, for his part, was eager to see the Angevins go. Already by the end of 1329 he was advising the pope against maintaining Angevin forces in the Patrimony.[13] Robert was inclined to agree: by October he was pressing the pope to release his two hundred knights from their service to the legate.[14] The pope, on the other hand, was so eager to keep the Angevins in the region for another three months that he authorized Orsini to exempt Robert from the annual census as payment for their continued service.[15]

If the momentary pacification of Viterbo and the expense of maintaining forces in the area help to explain the legate's recommendation to remove them, his own ambitions in the Patrimony were certainly part of the calculus. By 1329 the Orsini had taken the legate's presence as an opportunity to increase their power and holdings in the region at the expense of their rivals.[16] Early in 1330 Stefano Colonna complained to the pope that he and his supporters had been harassed by the legate and his entourage and excluded from offices in Rome. John XXII ordered Orsini to cease his provocations and work toward effecting the long-pending marital alliance between the two houses;[17] the legate, however, did nothing of the kind. Even after Robert's brother, Prince John of Morea, assumed

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[12] Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, p. 489.
[13] RV 115, f. 221vb (5 December 1329).
[14] RV 115, f. 221va (7 October 1329).
[15] RV 115, f. 218va (7 October 1329).
[16] Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, p. 491.
[17] RV 115, f. 348va–vb (8 February 1330).

the office of senator in 1330, real power in Rome continued to rest with the Orsini. Indeed, throughout the remainder of Orsini's legation, Angevin officers in Rome appear almost as tools of the Orsini family.[18] Not even Stefano Colonna was able to resist the conjunction of Orsini and Angevin arms. He withdrew from Roman affairs in the early 1330s, spending most of his time in the safer environs of Palestrina or his various other rural estates. The papal vicar, Angelo Tignosi, was likewise thrust aside; as early as 10 October 1329 the pope found it necessary to order the legate, without much apparent effect, to desist from encroaching on Angelo's jurisdiction.[19]

The dramatic growth of Orsini power in the Patrimony likewise created problems for papal officials in the region. After its pacification by the rector of the Patrimony, Pierre d'Artois, in the fall of 1332, Amelia was subjected to the rule first of Matteo Orsini and then, after Matteo was expelled by the citizens in September, the legate himself.[20] In 1330 Napoleone di Gentile Orsini and his son, Matteo, looking to consolidate their hold on the region around Soriano, boldly erected Orsini signorie in Toscanella, Nepi, Orte, Gallese and Vetralla, each of which they had wrested from the jurisdiction of the rector of the Patrimony.[21] John XXII demanded that Napoleone and Matteo return to the towns to the rule of the rector and ordered the legate, then staying at Rieti and certainly in a position to enforce the pope's demands, to ensure that they did.[22] His pleas fell on deaf ears. Napoleone and Matteo not only retained the towns in open defiance of the pope, but transformed Toscanella into a base for unchecked brigandage in the region.[23] In May 1332 another of the legate's kinsmen, the Count Palatine Guido Orsini, rode into the contado of Orvieto and sacked the town of Acquapendente.[24] Guido's aggression

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[18] See Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, p. 490.

[19] RV 115, f. 221va. For the events of the period, which saw the end of the Angevin senatorate in Rome, see Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 487–493.

[20] Antonelli, "Notizie umbre," p. 480, #27 (11 September 1332), #31 (6 October).

[21] Ibid., p. 137.

[22] See the text of the papal letter (30 August 1330) to Napoleone and Matteo, with reference to the letter to the legate, in Antonelli, "Vicende della dominazione," pp. 340–341, #16. Just three days earlier, the treasurer of the Patrimony had sent Ser Pepo *magistri* Bonaiuncte of Montefiascone to Rieti, at the request of Pierre d'Artois, to meet with Orsini to discuss the restoration of the *castra* of Perticaria and Carlei to Narni (Antonelli, "Notizie umbre," p. 472, #20).

[23] Antonelli, "I registri," p. 384.

[24] Waley, *Mediaeval Orvieto*, p. 128.

was likely connected to large, older struggle over the Orvietan *Terre Aldobrandeschine*, to which the Orsini had laid claim since the marriage of Orsello Orsini to Countess Margherita Aldobrandeschi in the 1290s. There was a short-lived peace in April 1334;[25] not coincidentally, the legate was in Orvieto at the time,[26] and may have been responsible for imposing a truce. Otherwise, however, the dispute continued well into the pontificate of Benedict XII,[27] and there is nothing to suggest that Cardinal Orsini made any serious attempt to resolve it.

The principal beneficiaries of the legate's indulgence were a collection of families with which the legate's family, the Orsini of Monterotondo, maintained close ties. These included the Orsini of Soriano and Nola (to the east of Naples), probably the Marino-Montegiordano branch of the family, as well two related clans, the Boboni and the Conti dell'Anguillara. Other branches of the Orsini family, however, were clearly excluded. In 1329 a dispute arose between the legate and Cardinal Matteo Orsini, from the more powerful Campo dei Fiore branch of the family. During the consistory in which the suspension of the Roman interdict had been discussed, Matteo had scornfully remarked that the legate had no authority to act in such affairs, or so it was reported to the legate. The source of Matteo's irritation was apparently the status of a certain *castrum* which belonged to Matteo's brother but was currently under the control of the legate, who refused to surrender rights to it. John XXII assured the legate, perhaps more in the interest of the peace than in the service of the truth, that the rumors about Matteo's angry speech were wholly unfounded; at the same time, he urged the legate to resolve the dispute over the *castrum* as quickly as possible.[28] By June 1330 the pope found it necessary to exhort the legate and his nephew, Bertoldo di Poncello, to work toward healing a rift within the Orsini family.[29] The source of the later dispute and its relationship to the earlier quarrel are not known, but the dissension between the two Orsini cardinals reveals the nature and parameters

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[25] Antonelli, "Notizie umbre," p. 483, #51.
[26] See below, pp. 150–151.
[27] Antonelli, "Nuove ricerche," pp. 123–124; see the texts in Theiner 1, p. 2, #III, #IV.
[28] RV 115, f. 34ra (23 March 1329); see also Forte, pp. 193, 219–220.
[29] RV 115, f. 222va; cf. Riezler, pp. 463–464, #1331.

of the Orsini aggrandizement over which the legate presided. Those branches of the Orsini family which associated themselves with the Monterotondo branch shared in the legate's gains; those that did not fared scarcely better than the Colonna.

As his power increased, Cardinal Orsini began integrating the expansion of Orsini power within a larger program for the aggrandizement of the Roman commune in the region.[30] Throughout late 1329 and early 1330 the Roman militia launched raids into the towns of Campagna-Marittima;[31] if at least some of this activity took place under Angevin leadership, as in the case of Velletri,[32] most seems to have come at the instigation of the legate. When the pope learned that Orsini had sent the Roman militia into the towns of Campagna-Marittima to exact unaccustomed taxes from the citizens, he responded with an angry letter, ordering the legate to cease this activity at once.[33] The raiding continued, however, and two months later the pope was again constrained to write, insisting this time that the legate not only put an end to the raids but provide compensation to the towns in question.[34] The letters leave no doubt that the legate had assumed a measure of civil power in Rome: in the first letter, Orsini is described as rector of the *popolo* (*populi rector*), and in the second, as holding the captaincy of the city (*capitaneatum Vrbis*), along with other titles (*alia tibi concessa ibidem officia*) not specified in the text.

The status of these offices—like so many things where the legate's status in Rome is concerned—is problematic. The popes exercised a formal *signoria* in Rome. When they left the city, as they did quite regularly in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the popes routinely left cardinals to assume *signorile* authority in their place;[35] the legate's uncle, Nicholas III, to give one example, did so when he went to Viterbo in 1278, leaving Rome in the care of Cardinals Latino

[30] For the often tense relations between the Roman commune and the neighboring towns in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see Boüard, pp. 226–231.
[31] RV 115, ff. 221vb–222ra (3 January 1330).
[32] RV 116, f. 170va and 170vb (both 18 March 1331).
[33] RV 116, f. 317va–vb (16 December 1331).
[34] RV 116, ff. 317vb–318ra (5 February 1332).
[35] See Agostino Paravicini-Bagliani, "La mobiltà della corte papale nel secolo XIII," in *Itineranza Pontificia. La mobiltà della curia papale nel Lazio (secoli XII–XIII)*, ed. Sandro Carocci, Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo. Nuovi studi storici 61 (Rome, 2003), pp. 3–78.

Malabranca and Jacopo Colonna.[36] Orsini's regime, however, was of a fundamentally different sort, and much harder to characterize than Poujet's *signoria* in Bologna. Three days after Poujet made his formal entry into Bologna at the beginning of 1327, he was given the *signoria* by a nearly unanimous vote of the *Consiglio del popolo*; he then used his authority to effect a significant (and not always well-received) transformation of the city's government in order to prepare for the war against Ludwig IV and his powerful Ghibelline allies.[37] In Orsini's case, the origins and purpose of his authority in Rome are much harder to discern. It is certainly possible that Orsini held his offices at the petition of the people—the titles have a decidedly communal ring to them—and with papal approval,[38] but the papal letters which mention them are by no means unequivocal. The language of the first letter would seem to suggest that John XXII had either appointed Orsini, or at least approved of Orsini's appointment, to the office of rector:

> Since it is not proper for you, who are known to be rector of the *popolo* constituted in these parts, to tolerate such things [i.e., the exaction of unaccustomed taxes], we submit to your discretion, by the tenor of the present letters, that you not delay in restraining the *popolo* and Romans from these and similar misdeeds, by the ways and means that should seem expedient to you.[39]

The second letter, too, with its reference to "offices conceded to you," supports the view that the pope had authorized Orsini to assume civil authority in Rome, though it does not state explicitly that the pope had done the conceding. A third letter (20 August 1333), however, would seem to suggest that the pope had done no such thing. Horrified by Orsini's assault on the Colonna after the murders of Orsini's nephews,[40] John XXII demanded that Orsini refrain at once from all further violence:

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[36] Theiner 1, pp. 215–216, #CCCLXX.

[37] See Guido Antonioli, *Conservator pacis et iustitie. La signoria di Taddeo Pepoli a Bologna (1337–1347)* (Bologna, 2004), pp. 39–41.

[38] See, e.g., Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 490–491.

[39] *Cum autem te, qui dicti populi rector esse dinoscitur et in eis partibus constitutus, talia non deceat tolerare, discretioni tue presentium tenore mandamus quatinus populum et Romanos eosdem ab hiis et similibus retrahere, uiis et modis quibus expedire uideris, non postponas* (RV 116, f. 317vb).

[40] See below, pp. 146–149.

> Consider whether such things befit the office of a cardinal legate of the Apostolic See in the lands of the Church, ***in which no civil jurisdiction has been committed to him***.[41]

Here again, the language is frustratingly evasive. In particular, it is hard to say exactly what the pope meant by "the lands of the Church." It is true that Orsini exercised no civil jurisdiction within the Patrimony of St Peter or the other Papal States. His actions against the Colonna, however, took place in Rome and its outlying *distretto*—where the legate would indeed have exercised civil jurisdiction, if the pope had in fact approved Orsini's assumption of the various offices to which he laid claim in Rome.

What is clear is that Cardinal Giovanni Orsini had assumed *signorile* power in Rome during the early 1330s, with or without the sanction of the pope. Unlike Poujet's *signoria* in Bologna, it was not intended, first and foremost, to serve the interests of the Church, but rather those of the Orsini and the Roman commune.[42] It was, in fact, a very typically Roman—and in particular, perhaps, a very typically Orsini—*signoria*, with numerous thirteenth-century precedents. Both in its bold assertion of Orsini power and in its conflation of Orsini and Roman communal interests, it had antecedents in the senatorate of the legate's grandfather, Matteo Rosso I, in the 1240s, and in the pontificate of his uncle, Nicholas III, under whom the interests of the papacy, the commune of Rome, and the Orsini family were often difficult to distinguish from one another. In this respect at least, Giovanni Orsini's rule undoubtedly found far more favor in Rome than in Avignon. Other Avignonese legates in Italy too often crafted ecclesiastical *signorie* that failed to account for local sensibilities or the increasingly xenophobic character of fourteenth-century Italian society. The Gascon Pellagrue drove Ferrara to rebellion with his hated garrisons of Angevin knights and unruly Catalan mercenaries; Poujet's lack of sympathy for the social and political conventions of the Italian commune would precipitate his expulsion from Bologna in the last year of his legation. Cardinal Orsini's Roman *signoria* was, if nothing else, a home-grown product; even those, like the Colonna, who suffered from its partisan effects, would

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[41] Emphasis added: *Attende insuper si talia ad cardinalis apostolice sedis legati officium in terra ecclesie, in qua nulla sibi temporalis iurisdictio est commissa, ualeant pertinere . . .* (RV 117, f. 7vb).

[42] See Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 489–492.

have recognized its roots in entirely local political and social forces. After the harsh reign of the German emperor and the recurring interventions of the perennially unpopular Angevins, Orsini's regime was, at the very least, refreshingly Roman.

As the legate devoted more and more of his attentions to Rome and its outlying *distretto*, other territories began to slip from his grasp. In Viterbo, the vacillations of Faziolo di Vico continued to bedevil the agents of the pope. Faziolo's initial docility convinced the legate to lift the interdict from Viterbo on 24 November 1329; the pope formally absolved the city on 15 February 1330.[43] Before long, however, Faziolo had managed to consolidate his regime, and so the legate and Viterbo were once again at odds. Orsini, for reasons not entirely clear, put off receiving oaths of obedience from Faziolo and the commune until August 1330.[44] When Faziolo requested that the legate provide Viterbo with a *podestà*,[45] Orsini selected a close associate, the vigorously pro-papal Bonuccio Monaldeschi.[46] He cannot have intended the appointment of an Orvietan as anything but a rather punitive show of strength; in any case, when the term of Bonuccio's successor, Gentile of Narni, expired in May 1331, the discontent in Viterbo was so high that even Orsini felt it prudent to acquiesce to the establishment of an eight-member citizen council to govern in the place of the *podestà*. The council's tenure, however, was brief. When its term expired in July, Orsini appointed another Orvietan *podestà*, Ceo della Rocca, who already exercised considerable power as the Church's *sindaco e custode della città e del distretto*.[47] At the end of 1331 Faziolo unearthed a conspiracy, possibly supported in secret by the legate and almost certainly by the rector of the Patrimony, Pierre d'Artois, to restore the Gatteschi.[48] Recognizing his continuing vulnerability, Faziolo had little choice but to request that Orsini once again provide a *podestà*. The legate's demands, however, which included Faziolo's expulsion, were so dra-

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[43] For the lifting of the interdict, see Pinzi 3, p. 174; for the absolution, Cessi, p. 11. The absolution was contingent upon Viterbo's ratification of papal terms within fifteen days of receiving notice of the absolution (Pinzi 3, pp. 176–177).

[44] Pinzi 3, pp. 177–178.

[45] RV 116, f.169vb (31 January 1331).

[46] Pinzi 3, pp. 174–175; see RV 116, f.169vb (31 January 1331).

[47] Ibid., p. 178.

[48] For the legate's warming relations with the Gatteschi see Cessi, pp. 11–12; for Pierre's open support of the Gatteschi, ibid., p. 13, n. 22.

conian that he found the gates of Viterbo closed to him when he attempted to enter the city with Pierre d'Artois early in the new year.[49]

Significantly, this episode marked the end of all cooperation between the legate and the rector of the Patrimony. Orsini had worked well with Pierre's easy-going predecessor, Robert d'Albarupe, in large part because the imperial occupation of Rome had necessitated close cooperation. Pierre d'Artois was less agreeable and altogether less tolerant of the legate's heavy hand. As treasurer and vice-rector of the Patrimony from 1325 until Robert's death in the spring of 1330,[50] Pierre had witnessed Orsini's mounting aggression in the Patrimony; by the time he succeeded Robert in the fall of 1330,[51] he was determined to do whatever was necessary to defend the integrity of his authority and jurisdiction in the Patrimony. The legate's disdain for the authority of the rector, and his almost constant opposition to it, eventually led Pierre to throw in his lot with the Colonna, whose support he sought in defending his own authority over Viterbo against that of the legate.[52] Orsini, for his part, continued to parcel important offices in Viterbo to personal associates, to the frustration of both Pierre d'Artois and Faziolo di Vico; in the summer of 1332, he named the flexible Jacopo Savelli—the former ally of Sciarra Colonna and now an Orsini protégé—to serve as captain of Viterbo.[53] In October 1332 Pierre d'Artois wrote to the pope, complaining that the legate had made the rector's position with respect to Viterbo all but hopeless.[54] The animosity between the two men, and between both of them and Faziolo, became so intense that the pope effectively removed both the legate and the rector from all involvement in the city's affairs toward the end of 1332. In September he ordered his

[49] Pinzi 3, pp. 178–182.

[50] Antonelli's claim that Robert died on 15 October ("Vicende della dominazione," p. 281) would appear to be incorrect. A papal letter of 30 April 1330 (RV 115, ff.220vb–221ra) makes reference to Robert's death, which probably occurred in March: when the pope notified his officials on 30 March that Orsini and King Robert were to receive the ambassadors of Viterbo, he sent a copy not to Robert d'Albarupe, but to the vice-rector, Pierre d'Artois (RV 115, f. 222rb–va).

[51] Pierre took office sometime before 8 November 1330 (RV 116, f. 173ra). On 27 January 1331 Orsini was ordered to receive, in the name of the pope, an oath of obedience from Pierre, now officially installed as rector (RV 116, f. 144vb).

[52] Antonelli, "Nuove ricerche," pp. 137–138.

[53] Antonelli, "Di Angiolo Tignosi," p. 11.

[54] Cessi, pp. 22–29, esp. 22–24.

latest nuncio in the region, Philippe de Cambarlhac, to receive Viterbo's absolution on behalf of the Church.[55] When the leaders of Viterbo's commune met on 14 December 1332 to pledge themselves to the obedience of the Church, Cambarlhac presided as *rector et gubernator ciuitatis*; neither Orsini nor Pierre d'Artois (whom Cambarlhac would eventually succeed as rector of the Patrimony) was present. Faziolo was strangely silent during the proceedings,[56] but was apparently instrumental in effecting the commune's submission: to reward him for his cooperation the pope ordered Cambarlhac to restore the *castrum* of Sippiciano to Faziolo in February 1333.[57]

By summer Faziolo was sufficiently confident of his position in Viterbo and the goodwill of the pope that he decided to attempt a real and lasting peace with the pope. On 2 August 1333, the Franciscan prior Francesco da Viterbo and Matteo di Biagio,[58] prior of the secular church of Sant'Angelo in Viterbo, appeared as proctors and nuncios of Viterbo before the pope at Avignon. There they confessed to a wide variety of grave offenses. The citizens of Viterbo had received Ludwig of Bavaria and given him the keys to the city. After Ludwig's coronation they had acknowledged Pandolfuccio Capocci, Ludwig's "bishop" of Viterbo and Toscanella, and recognized the imperial vicariate of Silvestro Gatti. They had received Castruccio Castracani and the antipope, along with his curia (though the two proctors were careful to note that many in the city never regarded Pietro da Corbaro as the true pope, or Ludwig as the true emperor), and they had even received a certain Franciscan, Giovanni Fiorentino, as *inquisitor heretice pravitatis*, at the behest of Michael of Cesena. They had sought and received privileges from the emperor, committed numerous transgressions against the pope and his officials, and adhered to the *fraticelli* and the heretical Augustinian friar, Niccolò da Fabriano. The proctors acknowledged that Faziolo di Vico, having returned Viterbo to the devotion of the Church, then repeatedly ignored the mandates of the legate and rector of the Patrimony and barred both of them from entering the city. To all these sins the

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[55] Theiner 1, pp. 601–602, #DCCLXX.

[56] Ibid., pp. 603–605, #DCCLXXIII.

[57] The citizens of Viterbo had previously given Sippiciano over to Faziolo, but Philippe de Cambarlhac took control of the *castrum* not long afterward (ibid., p. 605, #DCCLXXV).

[58] For Matteo, see Rehberg, *Die Kanoniker*, pp. 425–426, M150.

proctors frankly and humbly confessed; then they sought the forgiveness of the Church and relief from the many spiritual penalties under which the city lay. The pope magnanimously granted their request.[59] Finally, Viterbo's rebellion was at an end—no thanks to either the legate or Pierre d'Artois.

Todi, on the other hand, remained tenacious in its defiance. After the emperor's departure, the papal inquisitor of Tuscany had conducted extensive proceedings, in concert with the legate, against numerous Tuderti accused of schism and heresy.[60] In the summer of 1330 the pope instructed Orsini to act against those who remained unrepentant, in accordance with papal proceedings at Avignon and the findings of the inquisitors.[61] But as of December 1330, a full year after the overthrow of Giovanni Colonna, the legate had not yet taken action, and Todi remained in a state of open rebellion. By this point John XXII was giving serious consideration to the campaign which Orsini had proposed a year earlier. He asked Robert of Naples to send two hundred horsemen to Orsini for a period of three months and authorized the legate to exempt Robert from the census, as payment.[62] Todi, intimidated by the renewed threat of Angevin arms in the summer of 1331, promptly yielded to the legate, who accepted the city's submission even before the inquisitors had completed their investigation there. John XXII, however, acting on information that suggested that Todi's submission was less than sincere, bluntly refused to ratify the legate's decision and ordered him to lay interdict to the city until it rendered a more genuine submission to the Church.[63] Whether Orsini did so remains uncertain; there is no evidence that he did. The legate appears to have lost all interest in Todi after Giovanni di Sciarra Colonna made his formal submission to the pope late in 1331.[64] By June 1332 the Tuderti were attacking the *castrum* of Mossena, in the *Terra Arnulphorum*, and John XXII ordered Orsini and Pierre d'Artois to take action at once;

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[59] Riezler, p. 552, #1621.
[60] RV 115, f. 221ra–rb (12 July 1330).
[61] RV 115, f. 222va–vb (14 July 1330).
[62] RV 116, f. 169vb (17 December); Orsini was authorized to exempt Robert from the *census* that year, so that the troops could be paid
[63] RV 116, f. 172ra–vb (19 July 1331). As of the previous February the inquisitors were still conducting proceedings against both Todi and Amelia (see RV 116, f. 173vb).
[64] RV 116, ff.314ra–317ra (16 December 1331); Riezler, pp. 519–524, #1505.

in view of the hatred which had grown up between the two men, even the pope may have recognized the futility of the order.[65]

While Viterbo and Todi slipped from the legate's grasp, his aggressions in Rome were pushing the city toward civil war. A letter of Angelo Tignosi to the pope describes a city on the verge of anarchy in the autumn of 1331. With the support of their Angevin officers, the Orsini exercised a sort of terror: the Colonna were cruelly harassed, civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions were trampled, and churches and churchmen were harried and stripped of their goods; the latter actions signalled a continuation, particularly bizarre in being fostered by the legate, of Ludwig IV's anticlericalism.[66] Using monies extorted from the Romans and the neighboring towns, the legate financed a private army of one hundred men under the count of Nola, Bertoldo di Romano Orsini, but did nothing to rein in the lawlessness of nobles who had attached themselves to the Orsini cause; the three sons of Giovanni Boboni and the wild Buccio di Giovanni Savelli terrorized the citizenry unchecked.[67] After a new outbreak of factional violence in the summer of 1332 the pope sent Philippe de Cambarlhac to Rome in the hope of restoring order. Orsini was instructed to assist him in his mission, but the very fact of Cambarlhac's dispatch indicates that the pope's confidence in his legate had all but evaporated.[68]

The dam finally broke in the spring of 1333. On 6 May Bertoldo di Poncello Orsini, the legate's nephew and head of the Monterotondo branch of the family, rode at the head of an armed company with Count Francesco dell'Anguillara, another Orsini nephew, to the Colonna castle of Cesano (or possibly San Cesareo—there is some discrepancy in the sources), where Stefano Colonna had taken refuge. Their intentions remain unclear: the Guelf Villani claimed that the Orsini barons were *en route* to conclude some kind of treaty with Stefano when they were treacherously attacked,[69] while Petrarch, a

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[65] RV 116, f. 313vb (23 June 1332).

[66] Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, p. 490; the emperor had found such policies a valuable tool in Rome, where popular indignation over the papacy's prolonged absence had unleashed a wave of anticlericalism.

[67] See the account of Angelo's letter in Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 489–491. This is the same Count Bertoldo of Nola who had held the Angevin vicariate in the summer of 1329.

[68] See the letters of 16 and 25 September 1332 (RV 117, f. 6vb and f. 7ra).

[69] See Villani, XI.ccxix (pp. 767–768).

Colonna client, intimated at an act Orsini aggression which backfired.[70] Given the situation in Rome, Petrarch's scenario may well be the more plausible of the two, though it is impossible to say for certain. In any case, before the party could reach the castle it was ambushed by Stefano's eldest son, Stefanuccio, who routed the Orsini; the two leaders, Bertoldo and Francesco, were slain in the attack. The fragile peace that had held, however tenuously, between the two houses in the previous months was now decisively and irreparably broken.

What followed was a study in the terrible potential of legatine power abused. The legate immediately summoned the vassals of the Orsini family throughout the Roman *contado* and moved against the Colonna. Orsini had recently (and, perhaps, rather ironically) been instrumental in ending the long feud between Siena's powerful Salimbeni and Tolomei families.[71] He now called upon the Sienese to repay their debt by sending him a company of one hundred knights to besiege the Colonna fortress of Giove. On 22 May the legate's forces captured the fortress and utterly destroyed it; Stefano Colonna was lucky to escape with his life. Orsini then turned his wrath against Rome, plundering his native city but reserving the cruelest destruction for the Colonna quarter, which he subjected to a pitiless sacking.[72] In a particularly senseless piece of retaliatory violence Orsini partisans murdered a Colonna schoolboy as he made his way through the streets with his tutor.[73] With the Colonna reeling from the legate's fury, Petrarch composed his famous sonnet, *Vinse Annibal*, exhorting Stefanuccio not to shrink from pursuing the victory which destiny had promised him:

> Hannibal conquered, and knew not then
> How to use his victorious venture well;
> Take care, my dear *signore*,
> Lest the same thing happen to you.

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[70] *Le familiari*, III, 3, in which Stefanuccio appears as the great Christian emperor Theodosius I, while the legate is portrayed as the Gallic usurper Eugenius, "a wolf from the pasture, a tyrant from a cleric," laying waste to the hapless churches of Italy (*. . . quod sic esse, novus Eugenius ex agro lupus, tyrannus ex clerico; et oppresse et nudate per Italiam testantur ecclesie*). For Petrarch's role as an unofficial Colonna propagandist see Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, pp. 209–210.

[71] Negotiations between the Salimbeni and Tolomei were conducted in the spring of 1333 under the auspices of the legate and King Robert («Cronaca Senese dell'Agnolo Tura del Grasso», p. 510, l.6–10).

[72] «Cronaca Senese dell'Agnolo Tura del Grasso», p. 510, l.11–28.

[73] Marchetti-Longhi, p. 84.

The bear, raging o'er its cubs,
Which found in May a bitter pasture,
Is gnawed from within, and hardens its fangs and claws
To take vengeance on us for its losses.

So long as the new-found grief thus rends its heart,
Lay not down the honored sword,
But follow whither your fortune calls,
Unswerving along the path
Which can give to you, after death yet
A thousand and a thousand years, honor and fame to the world.[74]

Stirring stuff, to be sure; but not enough to retrieve the situation for the Colonna. They were on the run; the legate was too strong. A full-scale blood feud had erupted in Rome, and with their cardinal-legate leading them, the Orsini had taken the upper hand.

The pope, it goes without saying, was horrified. Directly upon receiving word of the legate's actions, John XXII sent two letters, both dated 20 August but of wholly different tenors, to Orsini in Rome. The first offered a fatherly message of consolation to Orsini on the loss of his nephews, enjoining him gently to keep from despair, to remember his dignity and to conduct himself in accordance with his station;[75] the second made no attempt to conceal the pope's horror and outrage:

> Attend, my son, and consider diligently just how greatly you give offense to God in this affair. It pertains to Him, in His own right or through His ministers, to avenge the injuries born against anyone; you, however, do not blush to usurp His office brazenly, when you have

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[74] Sonnet XI:
Vinse Annibal, e non seppe usar poi
Ben la vittoriosa sua ventura
Però, Signor mio caro, aggiate cura
Che similmente non avvegna a voi.

L'Orsa, rabbiosa per orsacchi suoi
Che trovaron di maggio aspra pastura,
Rode sè dentro, e i denti e l'unghie indura
Per vendicar suoi danni sopra noi.

Mentre 'l novo dolor dunque l'accora,
Non riponete l'onorata spada
Anzi seguite là dove vi chiama
Vestra fortuna dritto per la strada
Che vi può dar, dopo la morte ancora
Mille e mill'anni, al mondo onore e fama.

[75] RV 117, ff.3vb–4ra.

> not, in fact, been authorized, either by Him or by us, as His minister, to perpetrate the aforesaid offenses.[76]

The legate's actions, deplorable under any circumstance, were exacerbated by the possibility that Giove belonged, not to Stefano, but to his son, Giovanni Colonna—one of Orsini's confreres in the Sacred College. In any event, the pope dismissed the notion that Stefano himself had played any part in the murders, noting with bitterness that the legate had committed the very crimes from which he was enjoined to restrain others. Even then, however, the pope declined to recall Orsini, exhorting him instead to return to the proper execution of his legatine mandate.[77] On the same day he wrote to the legate, John XXII appealed to the leaders of Rome, and in particular to the heads of the great Roman families, to work with the nuncios, Philippe de Cambarlhac (the new rector of the Patrimony) and the papal auditor, Bertrand de Saint-Geniès, who had joined Cambarlhac in the desperate task of restoring peace to the City.[78] The pope was probably hoping against hope when he wrote to Orsini on 8 March 1334 and urged him to refrain from "his partisan actions" and to work instead for peace.[79] But by then the damage was done; the Colonna/Orsini vendetta would rage, with short-lived intermissions, for more than a decade, until the exhausted Roman populace acceded to the remarkable tribunate of the populist (and openly anti-noble) Cola di Rienzo in 1347.[80]

The factional bloodshed in Rome echoed across the region and gave rise to similar conflicts in the neighboring cities and towns. The

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[76] *Attende, fili, et diligenter considera quantum Deum offenderis in hac parte. Ad ipsum quidem pertinet per se uel suos ministros illatas iniurias alicui uel aliquibus uindicare; tu uero non erubuisti eius officium usurpare temere, cum nec per ipsum nec per nos, eius ministrum, deputatus ad predicta fueris perpetranda* (RV 117, f. 7vb).

[77] RV 117, ff. 7va–8ra.

[78] RV 117, ff. 4vb–5rb. For the mission of Philippe and Bertrand, see Antonelli, "Nuove ricerche," p. 138. For papal letters to the Roman nobles, which acquired an almost generic form during the Avignonese period, see Jean Coste, "Les lettres collectives des papes d'Avignon à la noblesse Romaine," in *Le fonctionnement administratif de la papauté d'Avignon*, pp. 151–170.

[79] RV 117, f. 233va–vb.

[80] Gregorovius, 11,5.3 (2, pp. 683–685). See Mercati's *Nell'Urbe dalla fine di Settembre 1337 al Gennaio 1338*, a study, with texts of the truces, of an abortive peace initiative of Benedict XII; the introduction provides a concise narrative of the conflict. For Cola's anti-noble (and occasionally anti-papal) propaganda see Miglio, pp. 327–330. For Cola and the Orsini see Partner, *Lands of St. Peter*, pp. 333–334; see also Dupré Theseider, *Roma*, pp. 593–611, and, for Cola's hatred of the nobles, Brezzi, pp. 126–130.

most serious instance came in Orvieto, where the Colonna/Orsini clan war helped to accelerate a growing divide within the Monaldeschi family. All but immune to any challenge from Orvieto's distant second family, the Filippeschi, the Monaldeschi had dominated Orvieto without significant or effective opposition for more than a century. Now, they found themselves threatened internally through the formation of two antagonistic factions within the family itself. At stake were the Monaldeschi's traditionally close ties to the Orsini. One faction—inspired, no doubt, by the increasingly aggressive assertion of Orsini power throughout the region—had come to the conclusion that the Orsini influence in Orvieto had grown too great and needed to be curtailed. The other faction continued to view the family's relationship with the Orsini as advantageous and looked to preserve it at any cost. The schism had widened when Orvieto went to war with Perugia in 1332 over the town of Chiusi and the *castrum* of Pieve, to both of which Perugia and Orvieto had been advancing competing claims for the better part of twenty years.[81] The leader of the pro-Orsini faction, Napoleone "Napuluccio" di Pietro Novello Monaldeschi, had undertaken the defense of Chiusi without municipal sanction or even the consent of his family; the faction of his uncle, Ermanno, saw Napuluccio's unilateral action as an attempt to exclude Ermanno and his supporters from the city's affairs. Orsini was in Orvieto for a few days in the fall of 1332.[82] It is not clear whether he made any attempt to resolve the discord between the two factions during his brief stay in the city, though if he did, he was unsuccessful. The discord intensified throughout 1333 and finally erupted into violence in the spring of 1334. On 20 April Ermanno's son, Corrado, and a band of his supporters accosted Napuluccio in the street; a fight broke out and Napuluccio was killed.[83]

As the two factions hastened to arms, Orsini withdrew from Rome and journeyed to Orvieto in a desperate attempt to mediate the feud; the gross irony of the situation says much about the surreal character which his legation had by then assumed. Orsini's efforts

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[81] RV 117, f. 7ra–vb (17 December 1332). The conflict remained unresolved a year later (RV 117, f. 283rb–va; 20 December 1333). For this dispute, which dated to at least 1313, see Waley, *Mediaeval Orvieto*, pp. 129–130.

[82] See Antonelli, "Notizie umbre," p. 480, #28 (16 September); by 21 September Orsini was in Bagnorea (ibid., #29).

[83] See Waley, *Mediaeval Orvieto*, pp. 126–139.

to reconcile the warring factions were utterly without effect. His own family, after all, was the object of the original dispute, and at this point, any reputation he may once have had as a peacemaker had been thoroughly discredited. The conflict only came to an end when Napuluccio's followers were driven from the city and Corrado, to his credit, went into voluntary exile at Onano.[84] With the victory of Ermanno's faction, peace returned to Orvieto, but at a most troubling cost for the Church: with the aid of his brother, Beltramo—who happened to be bishop of Orvieto—Ermanno seized power and erected the first true *signoria* in the history of a city distinguished from the twelfth century for its devotion to the Church and to communal ideals.[85]

Orsini's failure to mediate the Monaldeschi feud was another emblem of the disintegration of his legation, and doubly disturbing to the pope in light of the simultaneous collapse of Poujet's mission in the north. Poujet had managed, by a heroic effort, to recover from the disasters of 1325. In February of 1327 he regained Bologna, which he ruled with an iron hand for the remainder of his legation.[86] The exile, restoration and tentative rehabilitation of Azzo Visconti in the wake of the emperor's *Romzug* put an entirely unexpected but most welcome end to Poujet's grueling war with Milan. Though Poujet continued to struggle with the lesser tyrants of Romagna—the Malatesta in Rimini, the Ordelaffi in Forlì, the Manfredi in Imola and Faenza, and the Polenta in Ravenna[87]—he so skillfully managed to regain the upper hand that by 1330 victory for the Church in Lombardy seemed not only possible, but likely.[88]

It was at this moment that Poujet's labors were to be undone with the astonishing campaign of King John of Bohemia, son of the late Emperor Henry VII. When King John entered Italy in 1330, ostensibly as an agent of Ludwig IV, the pope understandably regarded

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[84] «Estratti dalla "Historia" di Cipriano Manenti», pp. 432, l.1–433, l.6.

[85] Antonelli, "Nuove ricerche," pp. 125–126. For Orvieto's long history of communal liberty and loyalty to the Church see Waley, *Mediaeval Orvieto*, pp. xiii–xxv.

[86] For Poujet's legation to the capture of Bologna see Ciaccio, pp. 12–39; Marcus, pp. 40–63; for his rule in Bologna, Ciaccio, pp. 39–76. For the extent to which his "foreignness" did him harm see Mollat, *Les papes*, p. 179.

[87] For Poujet's difficulties with the Romagnol petty despots see Vasina, *l'Romagnoli*, pp. 323–337.

[88] See Ciaccio, pp. 78–116. A more concise overview of Poujet's legation to 1330 is found in Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 178–183.

his actions with suspicion and alarm. In fact, the Bohemian was very much his own man, playing the pope, the emperor and the French king against one another in pursuit of his own ambitions. At first, he enjoyed considerable success: one war-weary city after another submitted bloodlessly to this strangely charismatic knight-errant as he wended his way through northern Italy. By March 1331 John's ambitions placed him in direct opposition to Ludwig IV, and the pope, perhaps hoping to cultivate an agreeable candidate for the imperial throne, decided to come to terms with him, though not without reservations. In April Poujet reached a secret agreement with King John whereby the latter would retain his Italian acquisitions, at least nominally on behalf of the Church, in exchange for guarantees of fealty to the pope and an oath to keep clear of the Angevin *Regno*.[89]

To the Italians, the arrangement smacked of a Gallic conspiracy, with the Gallic pope and his Gallic legate now ceding Italian territory to this culturally Gallic adventurer from the wrong side of the Alps. The reaction was swift and decisive. Old enmities were cast aside as Lombard *signori* joined forces with the Guelf communes of Tuscany to form the League of Ferrara (1332); even Robert of Naples aligned himself with the enemies of John of Bohemia. The creation of the League sounded the death-knell of the Guelf alliance and resulted in the complete undoing of fourteen years of exhausting campaigns by Poujet in northern Italy.[90] Before long the League's forces, under the command of Azzo Visconti, had Poujet on the run; on 18 June 1333 the Estensi inflicted a crushing defeat on Poujet and the Bolognese at Argenta, forcing John of Bohemia to withdraw from Italy.[91] Even after the Bohemian's departure, Poujet, now branded irreversibly as an agent of foreign intervention in Italy, was forced to battle foes and former friends alike. His forces lost ground consistently to the League, led by Florence and the Visconti, until at last, in August 1334, he was expelled from Bologna in a rebel-

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[89] Villani, XI.clxxvii (pp. 744–745). For John of Bohemia in Italy see Tabacco, *La casa di Francia*, pp. 299–311; Ciaccio, pp. 117–142.

[90] Housley, *Italian Crusades*, p. 29. For a brief assessment of John of Bohemia see Dupré Theseider, *Problemi*, pp. 195–196; for the growing "Italicization" of the central issues of the peninsula in the fourteenth century, ibid., p. 101.

[91] Ciaccio, pp. 117–151; Dupré Theseider, *Problemi*, pp. 194–198; Tabacco, *La casa di Francia*, pp. 293–311.

lion that ended with the razing of *La Galliera*, the fortified palace that Poujet had prepared in anticipation of the pope's promised return.[92]

Thus did the two great Italian legations of John XXII fail, almost simultaneously, in the summer of 1334. From the brink of ruin, Poujet had staged a spectacular recovery, only to find his cause now utterly and irretrievably lost. Rome and the Patrimony had exploded into factional warfare, not in spite of Orsini's initiatives, but as a direct result of them. Nearing ninety, not even the indefatigable Pope John XXII could believe any longer that he would live to see his labors in Italy brought to fruition. On 27 August 1334—ten days after Poujet's expulsion from Bologna—John XXII issued Orsini's recall, at the legate's own request. John's final letter to his *legatus Tuscie* betrays the pope's deep sorrow at the failure of the mission, the veiled promise of a serious dressing down for the legate, and more than anything else, perhaps, the resignation of a man who seemed too weary to care much what Cardinal Giovanni Orsini did next:

> Your most recent series of letters to us have made it apparent that you judge it time to return to him who sent you, for which reason you have humbly requested of us through your letters that we should grant you a license to return. Considering attentively that your presence could be consolatory be for us, and ours for you, and that some of the things that have happened to you and to us could better be treated in person rather than through nuncios or letters, we grant to you the requested license; and so that it might remain secret until that time of its publication, we have sent the present letters to be sealed, not with a bull, but with our own secret seal. Therefore, my son, do prudently whatever you see fit.[93]

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[92] Ciaccio, pp. 143–151. See also Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 184–192. For Bologna's importance as an intended "first-stop" for the papacy's return to Italy, see Vasina, "Il papato avignonese," p. 144.

[93] *Series litterarum tuarum nobis nouissima directarum nobis aperuit euidenter iuxta tuum arbitrium tempus esse ad eum qui te miserat redeundi, quare nobis humiliter per easdem litteras supplicastis ut super hoc nostram tibi deberemus licentiam impartiri. Nos autem considerantes attente quod nostra tibi tuaque nobis presentia consolatoria esse multipliciter poterit, quodque nonnulla que te ac nos contingunt melius inter presentes quam per inter nuncios uel litteras poterunt pertractari, postulatam tibi licentiam impartimur, et ut hoc possit teneri secretius quousque publicandi sit tempus, presentes litteras non bulla sed sigillo nostro decreto duximus sigillandus. Fac ergo fili prudenter que circa premissa uideris oportuna* (RV 117, f. 253rb).

CHAPTER EIGHT

LEGATINE ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM

On 19 September 1329 John XXII instructed Orsini, in his capacity as papal judge-delegate, to deprive a certain Francesco Calixti of his benefices in the Lateran basilica and to reassign them to Giovanni de Turre, a Roman cleric in the legate's *familia*.[1] On the surface, the case seemed straightforward enough. Francesco was a known supporter of Ludwig IV and a member of the antipope's curia; his guilt was not in doubt.[2] Yet the case quickly spiralled into a maelstrom of appeals and countersuits that dragged on for at least three years. Orsini, who was in Viterbo at the time, left the case to his auditors, Bishop Ugolino of Città di Castello and Bishop Alamanno of Anagni. When the auditors summoned Francesco to appear before them at the legate's hospice in Rome, he refused, citing threats from Giovanni de Turre and his brother Lello, who had extensive connections in the neighborhood. The legate guaranteed that Francesco would be given safe conduct, but Francesco nevertheless insisted that his case be heard in a safer location. When the legate's auditors refused to change the venue, Francesco appealed the decision to the Holy See.

Ugolino and Alamanno went ahead with the case. They convicted Francesco *in absentia* and deprived him of his Lateran benefices. With his first appeal still pending at Avignon, Francesco now launched a second appeal. The pope sent letters to his vicar *in spiritualibus* in Rome, Angelo Tignosi, as well as to Pietro Colonna (provost of Marseilles) and Giordano Orsini (archdeacon of Coutances), authorizing them to handle the appeal. They, in turn, appointed a panel of three *iurisperiti* to hear it: Angelo commissioned Nicolaus de Fuscis

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[1] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #46656; see also Fayen, #2507. For Francesco—a Colonna client—see Rehberg, *Die Kanoniker*, pp. 294–295 L109. For Giovanni, ibid., pp. 278–279.

[2] See *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #42515, #42532, #42537, #42552, #42554, #42558, #42569, #42578, #42583, #42587, #42596, #42619, #42623, #42628, #42656.

de Berta, to act on his behalf; Giordano and Pietro named Thomasius de Cervenucta (canon of Dublin) and Raynaldus de Sanctaperta, a doctor of laws, respectively. With Thomasius absent, Nicolaus and Raynaldus determined that Francesco's second appeal had been just. They announced that he had been improperly convicted by the legate's auditors and that jurisdiction in the case had devolved to them; they then overturned the proceedings held in Orsini's hospice and sentenced Giovanni de Turre to pay all expenses in the suits. Now it was Giovanni's turn to appeal. John XXII was inclined to agree with him; he believed that Nicolaus and Raynaldus had acted improperly, perhaps because the third judge-delegate, Thomasius de Cervenucta, had been absent from the hearings, and complained that the long delay had left a known schismatic unpunished for his many crimes against the Church. Thus, on 25 July 1332 John XXII ordered his vicar in Rome, Angelo Tignosi, to conduct an inquest and to provide him with all the pertinent evidence against Francesco.[3]

The case provides a vivid example of the kind of business which came before the legate on a daily basis. It can hardly be described as a major event, and Francesco Calixti was anything but a major figure in the imperial schism of 1328. In and of itself, the outcome of the case—which remains unknown—had little or no bearing on the ultimate success or failure of Orsini's mission. At the same time, however, the case was but one small part of the much larger reform initiative to which the legation was ultimately devoted. Medieval legates were pastoral agents as much as they were papal diplomats and military commanders.[4] If Orsini's military campaigns dominate the sources, and thus, inevitably, any narrative account of the legation, one cannot forget that these campaigns were but means to an end. Their goal was a revival of the beleaguered churches of central Italy and the restoration of effective ecclesiastical government to the Papal States. As Francesco's case makes all too clear, these seemingly minor cases could easily become enormously protracted and complicated affairs which eventually found their way to the papal Rota. A similar case pitted the abbots of San Pietro di Montemartano and San Pietro di Bovara against Bishop Bartolo of Spoleto, over Bartolo's right to demand horses from the two monasteries while

[3] Fayen, #3255. The case is related in Rehberg, *Die Kanoniker*, pp. 278–279.
[4] See Barbiche, "Les «diplomates» pontificaux," pp. 366–367.

conducting pastoral visitations. Late in 1331 the case came to Orsini's auditor, Ugolino of Città di Castello, who decided in Bartolo's favor. The abbots appealed to the pope, requesting that the case be heard by an *auditor sacri palatii*.[5] Even without the larger military and diplomatic initiatives which preoccupied the legate throughout his mission, cases like this went far beyond the ability of any one man to give them proper attention. Much of the legate's activity in this regard thus fell to a large staff of administrative and judicial officials, leaving the legate free to address the major military and diplomatic initiatives of his legation.

In order to carry out his assignment, Orsini brought with him a substantial entourage. Unfortunately, the composition and structure of this entourage remain somewhat elusive. It took five galleys to conduct Orsini and his retinue from Avignon to Pisa,[6] though it is difficult to say just how many people this included. Villani notes that the legate's armada was followed by a fleet of ten galleys, carrying four-hundred Provençal knights.[7] Each ship, then, could carry forty men and forty horses, though it is not clear that the same formula applies to the legate's fleet; one is inclined to doubt, for example, that every man on Orsini's staff brought a horse along with him. If the numbers are hard to determine, the precise identities of the passengers are harder still. With the survival of supplication rolls from the time of Clement VI on, it becomes much easier to identify the personnel in legatine entourages,[8] and easier still with the preservation of legatine registers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Albornoz, for example, submitted supplication rolls to Urban V soon after that pope's election, including a complete list of the men who accompanied and assisted him during his legation.[9] Similarly, when Cardinal Flavio Orsini journeyed to France in 1572, he brought with

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[5] The appeal was dated 11 December 1331; see Franco Bartoloni, "Suppliche pontificie dei secoli XIII e XIV," *BIST* 67 (1955), pp. 164–166.

[6] For the transport of Orsini's entourage, see above, p. 89.

[7] Villani, X.ccccliii (p. 627).

[8] Supplication registers were by no means limited to legates; prelates and princes from all over Christendom submitted supplications to the Holy See. The contents of these registers thus provide a wealth of information about ecclesiastical personnel, beneficial policies, financial strategies, political relationships, etc. See for example Javier Serra Estellés, "Un registro especial de súplicas dirigidos a Clemente VII (1378–1394) en el códice Barb. Lat. 2101 de la Biblioteca Apostólica Vaticana," *AHP* 33 (1995), pp. 7–39.

[9] Guillemain, p. 256, n. 384.

him a very large and quite well documented entourage, structured in imitation of the papal chancery; it included discrete groups of referendaries, abbreviators, scribes, and a registrar, all under the supervision of an administrative regent. It was also quite ostentatiously impressive, comprised of prelates and curial dignitaries whose ability to inspire awe was at least as important as their ability to provide administrative assistance.[10]

The legatine retinue of Flavio's fourteenth-century kinsman was almost certainly a less formally structured—and far less self-consciously magnificent—affair. Its personnel were probably drawn, as Albornoz's were, principally from the cardinal's own *familia*, itself a difficult entity to define with any great precision. All cardinals relied on the services of a large group of dependents who looked after their masters' material and spiritual needs, and who received in return various forms of recompense, such as salaries, gifts, room and board, ecclesiastical advancement, or any conceivable combination thereof. Exactly who among them should be considered as part of a cardinal's *familia*, and what exactly the term *familiaris* meant in the fourteenth century, remain the subjects of scholarly debate: some scholars would apply the term to all of a cardinal's resident dependents, clerical or secular, from chaplains and administrators to cooks and stable-boys; others would restrict it to the small number of clerical protégés designated as *familiares commensales* or *familiares commensales continui*. In the end, the former approach is probably preferable to the latter, though the fourteenth-century cardinalatial *familia* remains something of a moving target.[11]

As the private court of a cardinal, the *familia* would generally, but not always, accompany him on long journeys away from the curia, even if some of its members inevitably remained in Avignon to look after the cardinal's domestic affairs there.[12] On the eve of his departure in May 1326 and on his return to Avignon in January 1335

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[10] See Barbiche, "Les registres du cardinal Flavio Orsini," pp. 266–267.

[11] For the debate, and for some considerable insight into the composition of fourteenth-century cardinalatial *familiae*, see Pierre Jugie, "Les *familiae* cardinalices et leur organisation interne au temps de la papauté d'Avignon: Esquisse d'un bilan," in *Le fonctionnement administratif de la papauté d'Avignon*, pp. 41–59.

[12] Ibid., p. 54; Guillemain, pp. 252–258. It is noteworthy that Albornoz's supplication rolls to Urban V included one roll for *familiares* and one for the agents of his legation—making it clear that the cardinalatial and legatine *familiae* were not necessarily identical. For cardinals' *familiae*, see Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, *Cardinali di curia*; Norman Zacour, "Papal Regulation of Cardinals' Households in the Fourteenth

Orsini petitioned the pope to provide benefices for various *familiares* and associates;[13] the collected petitions clearly anticipate the supplication registers of the next generation. It is possible that, on his departure, Orsini was simply making a last attempt to exercise his influence on behalf of his *familia* before leaving the curia (in which case, one might expect a longer list), and that, upon his return, he was following the custom of petitioning the new pope to shower largesse on his household. Yet it may also be that he wished to secure incomes for men who, in the first case, would have needed money to maintain themselves during the mission, or, in the second, would have been financially exhausted after it.

Orsini's *familia* was made up in the main of central Italians, perhaps half of whom were Romans.[14] Their intimate knowledge of central Italian affairs would have made them particularly valuable agents, and several of them clearly did accompany the legate to Italy. Giovanni and Lello de Turre of Rome, for example, were on hand

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Century," *Speculum* 50 (1975), pp. 434–455; Jacques Verger, "L'entourage du cardinal Pierre de Monteruc (1356–1385)," *Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome: moyen âge, temps modernes* 85 (1973), pp. 515–546; Mollat, "Contribution," pp. 50–57. Wills are among the best sources for cardinals' households; see, e.g., Forte, pp. 228–262, and Maurice Prou, "Inventaire de meubles du cardinal Geoffroi d'Alatri (1287)," *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire* 5 (1885), pp. 382–411.

[13] Between 23 May and 1 June 1326 Ligo of Orvieto, Thomas Fastolf, Romano Jacobi and Jean Anglici received benefices (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #25455, #25457, #25461, #25467), as did two nephews, Jacopo di Francesco Bonaventura and Giovanni Orsini (ibid., #25456, #25538). On 10 and 11 January 1335 a larger list of *familiares*, some of whom were relatives, also received benefices: Napoleone di Poncello Orsini (*Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #309), Baldo Jacobini of Livorno (ibid., #405), Guillaume de Montmorin (#429), Gentile di Francesco Orsini (#435), Matteo di Giovanni Boboni (#464), Cecco Angelitti (#478), Giovanni Petri Angeli (#487), Lino of Trevi (#496), Scolario of Bagnorea (#507), Thomas Frederici of Clermont (#1087), Francesco Petri Ranucceti (#530), Paolo Geminelli (#537).

[14] The Romans in Orsini's clerical *familia* were Gregorio Fatii, Niccolò Palinerii Tartari de Turre, Paolo Stefani dei Patrizi, Giovanni and Lello de Turre, Napoleone di Poncello Orsini, Gentile di Francesco Orsini, Matteo Boboni, Giovanni Petri Angeli, Giovanotto de Insula and (probably) Cecco Angelitti. Of the remaining twelve Italians in Orsini's household in 1326, all but one (Giovanni dei Stabili of Pontecorvo, in the southern diocese of Aquino) were from central Italy (Francesco Pauli, Francesco Petri Ranucceti and Ligo of Orvieto; Francesco Hugolini de Castroleonis of Bologna; Lippo Vanni of Carmignano; Romano Jacobi of Rossano; Pietro Petri dei Stabili of Rieti; Baldo Jacobini of Livorno; Lino of Trevi; Scolario of Bagnorea; and Paolo Geminelli of San Gemini). Non-Italians (the Flemings Mathieu de Neuville-sur-Méhargne, Conrad Nicholai de Budevois and Jean Alemanni of Bapaume, the Englishman Thomas Fastolf, and the Gallic Guillaume de Montmorin) accounted for only about one-sixth of the legate's household. The provenance of the *famulus* Thorus is unknown. See Appendix C.

to frighten Francesco Calixti in 1329;[15] Giovanni dei Stabili of Pontecorvo, Orsini's abbreviator and one of his chaplains, assisted the legate in the case of Perticaria and Carlei, as did Giovanotto de Insula, a Roman servant in the legate's household.[16] The legate's *familia* also included men, like the English lawyer Thomas Fastolf, whose legal background would have been particularly useful but whose presence in the legate's entourage is not attested in any of the surviving sources.

One *familiaris* who almost certainly travelled with the legate was his chamberlain, *magister* Ligo of Orvieto, a papal chaplain, curial careerist and Orsini family protégé who ended his days as bishop of the Orsini town of Nola (1340–48).[17] Ligo had at least some training in civil law and had considerable administrative experience at the curia.[18] Between 1326 and 1334 he is found serving as executor in a great many beneficial appointments in central Italy; his physical presence there, while not absolutely essential, would certainly have made him a much more effective executor. At a time when the turbulent affairs of Italy rendered collection of revenues from Italian benefices difficult (forcing great numbers of Italian curialists at Avignon to "invade" benefices in the churches of France and Languedoc),[19] Ligo received several benefices in central Italy, including two in rebellious Todi.[20] The collection of revenues from these benefices would have been virtually impossible at Avignon, but rather more feasible in Italy, where Ligo would have had the support of

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[15] For the de Turre brothers, see above, pp. 155–156.

[16] For the case, see below, pp. 188–190. For Giovanni's involvement, see Antonelli, "Notizie umbre," p. 477, #6, where he is seen serving as proctor of the rector of the Patrimony; for Giovanotto, ibid., p. 477, #8, p. 481, #38.

[17] For Ligo's provision to the see (6 September 1340), see *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #7660. Ligo first appears as papal chaplain on 17 September 1326 (ibid., #26544). For his death somewhere between 13 June and 25 August 1348 see Daniel Williman, *The Right of Spoil of the Popes of Avignon, 1316–1345*. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 78 (Philadelphia, 1988), pp. 178–179, #760.

[18] In October 1319 Ligo was described as a student of civil law (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #10511). The common letters of John XXII contain far many too instances in which Ligo appears as clerical executor to give adequate citation here.

[19] For the rise in Italian holders of Gallic benefices in the 1320s see Louis Caillet, *La papauté d'Avignon et l'église de France. La politique bénéficiale du Pape Jean XXII en France (1316–1334)* (Paris, 1975), pp. 298–299.

[20] He was provided to the priory of the secular church of Sant'Illuminata, Todi, in May 1328; the executors included the bishop of Padua, Ildebrandino Conti, a Roman noble who continued to play a part in the complicated affairs of Rome in this period (see above, p. 124), and the young *electus* of Naples, Giovanni Orsini (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #41113). By December Ligo was complaining that he was unable to take possession of the priory *propter quorundam tyramnidem* (*sic*) (ibid.,

legatine arms. Similar, if far less numerous, references suggest that Guillaume de Montmorin, Francesco Petri Ranucceti, Pietro Petri dei Stabili (a kinsman, perhaps, of Giovanni dei Stabili) and Francesco Pauli, all *familiares* of Orsini, also followed him to Italy.[21]

A number of relatives either accompanied Orsini to Italy or were already there and joined up with him once he arrived. Not all of these were members of the cardinal's household, though they clearly functioned, at the very least unofficially, as his agents during the legation. Three sons of Giovanni Boboni—Bobo, Lorenzo and Matteo (who was also a member of Cardinal Orsini's *familia*)—worked closely with the legate from the outset. The Boboni were prominent among the Roman nobility in their support for John XXII and their hatred for the emperor and his antipope; during the emperor's retreat from Rome a canon of Santa Maria Maggiore, Giordano di Bertoldo Boboni, cornered the "anti-cardinal" of Ostia-Velletri, Jacopo Alberti of Prato, and abused him at sword-point.[22] Of the three brothers, it was Bobo, not Matteo, who seems to have worked most closely with the legate. He was not a member of Orsini's *familia* but he did have blood ties to Cardinals Giovanni Orsini and Jacopo Stefaneschi, both of whom helped to advance his ecclesiastical career.[23] Like Ligo, he served as executor in many central Italian benefice appointments

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#43671). In October 1330 Ligo was provided to the priory of the secular church of Santa Maria *de Vepribus*, Todi—with Ildebrandino Conti, the archbishop of Naples, and the bishop of Marsi serving as executors (#51398). In June 1331 the executors were ordered to compel Leone Violantis of Tusculum and other *detentores* to restore Santa Maria and its revenues to Ligo's rightful possession (#53886).

[21] For Guillaume, appointed to benefices in San Gemini, Massa and either Todi or Volterra, see *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #44701. For Francesco, provided with a canonry in Orsini's title church, San Teodoro, see *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #530. For Pietro Petri, given a canonry in Rieti, see *Lettres communes de Jean*, #61766, #61773 (10 October 1333); the executor was *magister* Giovanni dei Stabili de Pontecorvo, Orsini's *capellanus et abbreviator*, who was with him in Italy. For Francesco Pauli, also a recipient of several central Italian benefices (including one in his native Orvieto), ibid., #56462, #57858.

[22] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #46329; the letter comes from the register of Nicholas V, who, at Viterbo, impotently deprived Giordano of his benefices and reassigned them to the ruffled Alberti. For Giordano see Rehberg, *Die Kanoniker*, pp. 355–356.

[23] At Jacopo's instigation he was made archdeacon and prebendary canon of Sabugali (Cividale); he owed his prebendary canonry in Cordova, and probably the one in Lièges, to the influence of Cardinal Giovanni Orsini (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #6853, #11582, #13797), and held canonries in St Peter's, Nola, St-Léofard (Meung-sur-Loire) and San Bartolomeo (Zamora, Spain). Bobo is often seen working as an executor with other Orsini curialists, or in indulgences or benefice appointments to Orsini clerics or *familiares*; see ibid., #7484, #18329, #18335–18337, #22035, #23862, #23865, #23867, #42222, #48364–48366, #53968.

during Orsini's legation and helped to reassign a number of benefices, stripped from their schismatic holders, to clerics loyal to John XXII.[24] In late 1329 and early 1330 Bobo was at Avignon as one of the proctors in Rome's submission to the Holy See, but he was back in Italy in August 1330 to assist in the rehabilitation of Viterbo.[25] By the time of his death at Rome late in 1332, he had emerged as one of the legate's most important clerical agents.[26]

Even more prominent among the kinsmen who stood in the legate's service were Giovanni and Giordano Orsini, sons of the legate's brother, Poncello, and brothers of one of the legate's chaplains, Napoleone.[27] Giovanni, who was probably the elder, had been resident at Avignon since the age of fourteen; he enjoyed the favor of both Cardinal Napoleone Orsini and Cardinal Giovanni Orsini, through whose patronage he obtained numerous benefices.[28] The names of Cardinal Giovanni's *familiares* and associates abound in the many assignments of the younger Giovanni's administrative career: Bobo Boboni, Ligo of Orvieto, Jacopo di Francesco Bonaventura (another of the cardinal's nephews), Jean Anglici and Rinaldo Orsini were among those with whom or on whose behalf he acted as executor of graces or benefice appointments.[29] On 23 December 1327 the pope provided the twenty-five year-old Giovanni to the archdiocese

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[24] Ibid., #48365, #48366, #53968.

[25] Bobo is described as proctor of Rome in RV 115, ff. 206vb–207rb (16 February 1330); the three proctors are also described as papal ambassadors and nuncios (f. 205ra).

[26] See above, p. 146, for the license accorded him in Rome by Orsini. For Bobo's death see *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #59159.

[27] See Appendix C, #22.

[28] By 7 September 1316 he held canonries in Toledo, Coutances, Padua and Rouen, which he owed to Napoleone's patronage (see *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #821, #822). In August 1320 he was permitted to continue receiving the revenues of his Toledo canonry *in absentia* for studies or while resident at the curia (ibid., #14011). Cardinal Giovanni helped to obtain canonries for his nephew in Cambrai (#14906), Beauvais and Chartres, both of which were benefices of the cardinal's deceased brother, Jacopo (#16940, #16941). Upon the provision of Napoleone da Romangia to the archdiocese of Monreale in 1326, Giovanni di Poncello was collated to the archdeaconry of Rheims, with a canonry and prebend there, soon to be vacant through Napoleone's consecration (#25538). Cardinal Giovanni also obtained for Giovanni a three-year indulgence to receive revenues of all benefices while absent for study (#17567).

[29] See *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #22034, #23862–23865, #23867, #25455, #25456, #25467, #25538.

of Naples.[30] The fact that he was not at Avignon at the time of his election—somewhat irregular for a papal chaplain—and the similarities between his own work and that of Ligo of Orvieto and Bobo Boboni during Orsini's legation strongly suggest that he was with his uncle in Italy at the time.[31]

After Giovanni's provision to the see of Naples, his brother, Giordano, emerged as the legate's chief lieutenant. Giordano too was a cleric, though he never advanced beyond minor orders; his early curial career was similar to his brother's, and during the legation Giordano served as executor in numerous provisions to central Italian benefices.[32] He was also involved in some decidedly less clerical duties; at Montefiascone, he not only directed the legate's finances but coordinated the campaigns against Viterbo and Corneto in 1328–29.[33] Upon the murder of his eldest brother, Bertoldo, in May 1333, Giordano resigned his benefices, married, and became *paterfamilias* of

[30] Ibid., #30829. He has often been confused with another Giovanni di Poncello Orsini, nephew of Cardinal Matteo Orsini; Dupré Theseider identified the latter as archbishop of Naples (*Roma*, Tavola IV). But in his will (1340) Matteo named his nephew simply "Johannes Poncelli de filiis Ursi" or "Johannes Ursinus" (Forte, pp. 247, 250, 257); there is no mention of the archbishopric of Naples, though Matteo took pains to indicate that another nephew, Tebaldo, was archbishop of Palermo (p. 257). In a letter of August 1338 Benedict XII clearly identified Archbishop Giovanni as the brother of Giordano and Napoleone di Poncello Orsini (Theiner 2, p. 34, #LX). It is noteworthy that, after Giovanni's election, many of his benefices were distributed to his own close relatives or associates of the legate: his benefices in Baptisey and Coutances went to his brother Giordano (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #43245; Ildebrandino Conti and Ligo of Orvieto were the executors); another brother, Napoleone, chaplain of the legate, received his canonry in Toledo (ibid., #45644). A cousin, Gentile di Francesco, also a chaplain of the legate, received his canonry in Chartres (#45643); Ligo received his benefices in Beauvais (#43671).

[31] He was not granted a *licentia recedendi ex curia* after his election, and when he finally received the *pallium* in February 1330 (more than two years after his election), he received it not from the delegation of cardinal deacons which customarily bestowed it *apud sedem apostolicam*, but from the bishops of Marsi and Nepi (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #48346, #48347).

[32] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #16939. When Cardinal Orsini obtained for him the indulgence to receive fruits of all benefices *absque residencia* for studies (March 1323), Giordano held benefices in Padua, Toledo, Chartres, Beauvais and Cambrai (ibid., #17549, #17550). See also #23866, #43245, #47521,#45482, #51591–51593, #53933, #53968, #54592, #56458.

[33] See above, p. 128. John XXII recognized clerical combat as a necessary evil in such a mission when he granted the legate and his followers the faculty of being absolved from irregularities incurred through the prosecution of warlike acts; see RV, ff. 170vb–171ra (12 June 1331); *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #53885.

the Monterotondo Orsini,[34] leading the furious Orsini vendetta against the Colonna which followed Bertoldo's death.[35]

Auditors were also an essential part of Cardinal Orsini's legatine support staff. As legate and papal judge-delegate,[36] Orsini was competent to adjudicate a large number of suits, both civil and criminal, the majority of which he delegated to a corps of auditors. Unlike the various kinsmen and *familiares* who followed in the legate's train, these seem to have been indigenous officials, usually bishops of minor Italian sees, who possessed the institutional resources necessary to the effective oversight of such affairs. Orsini's auditor-general, for example, was the bishop of Città di Castello, Ugolino della Branca, one of the two auditors before whom Francesco Calixti refused to appear. A Benedictine monk by profession, Ugolino was apparently a man of precocious administrative ability: he was made abbot of San Donato di Polpiano by Clement V in March 1311 at the age of twenty-four and bishop of Città di Castello (16 March 1320) at just thirty-three.[37] When that city fell to Guido Tarlati in October 1323, Ugolino fled to Florence.[38] He entered the legate's service soon after Orsini's arrival there in the summer of 1326 and quickly became one of Orsini's most important agents in Tuscany; indeed, during Orsini's long Tuscan visitation and first Roman campaign in the summer and fall of 1327 Ugolino served as his *de facto* vicar in Florence.[39]

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[34] His marriage was impending by November 1333 (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #61169).

[35] Mercati, pp. 11, 13, 16, 20, and 25 (n. 69). Following the truces between the families, arranged by Benedict XII in 1337, Giordano was rector of Rome with Stefano Colonna (1339), and senator in 1341 and 1344.

[36] Although the two clearly entailed different types of authority, to stress the difference too strongly would create an artificial distinction. Most of the litigation assigned to Orsini was assigned to him in his capacity as apostolic judge-delegate, yet bore directly, for the most part, on issues matters relevant to his legatine mandate (e.g., the cases of Seclegaita Pandona, Offreduccio Minalducii and Francesco Calixti), although some (the marriage dispute between Giordano Catanzarii and Odolina Riccardi, for example), did not. As a rule, cases which began during Orsini's legation but continued past its termination (as with Seclegaita, Offreduccio and Francesco Calixti) due to appeals indicate that Orsini heard such cases as a judge-delegate, for his sentences as legate could not have been appealed during his legation (see above, p. 70).

[37] *Regestum Clementis papae V*, #6642, #6643; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #11139.

[38] Davidsohn 4, p. 961.

[39] Ibid., n. 3, and pp. 1120–1123.

Another of the legate's auditors (who was also involved in the case of Francesco Calixti) was Alamanno Galgano, bishop of Amelia and, later (20 March 1327), Anagni.[40] He was among the three prelates assigned as conservator-judges to the papal notary Pandolfo Savelli, administrator of Ostia and Velletri, in April 1327,[41] but is otherwise rather shadowy. More prominent was the legate's chancellor, Pietro Ferri of Piperno.[42] Bishop of Anagni (1320–27), Marsi (1327–36) and Chieti (1336), Pietro was a seasoned administrator and jurist who served at various times as a conservator-judge to the vicar of Rome (Angelo Tignosi), three Italian monasteries, Boso degli Ubertini (papal *electus* of Arezzo), and the legate himself.[43] As chancellor Pietro was more an administrator than a judicial officer, although he did at times adjudicate litigation. On 8 June 1329, for example, he was one of the three judges ordered to hear the case between Orso dell'Anguillara and Agnesa Colonna, who had contracted marriage through Orso's proctor; Orso then claimed to have revoked the proctor's mandate before the marriage was contracted.[44] Most of Pietro's work, however, was of an executory nature, and the names of Ligo of Orvieto, Giordano and Giovanni di Poncello Orsini, Bobo Boboni, Rinaldo Orsini, various Orsini *familiares*, and the bishop of Padua, Ildebrandino Conti, appear frequently with his own in a number of assignments.[45]

To this large and varied collection of legatine agents fell the principal responsibility for the administrative and legal execution of Orsini's reform initiatives. These initiatives were of various types. Many aimed at restoring rights and prerogatives wrested from the

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[40] Alamanno was made bishop of Amelia on 8 January 1322 (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #14913).

[41] For Alamanno's appointment as conservator-judge, *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #28344. He was dead by November 1330, when Giovanni Pagnotta succeeded him as bishop of Anagni (ibid., #51493).

[42] See *Annales Camaldulensis ordinis sancti Benedicti*, ed. J.B. Mittarelli, Anselmo Costadoni, 9 vols. (Venice, 1755–1773; repr. 1970), 5, Appendix, col. 503–505.

[43] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #11480, #12921, #1655, #23034, #50621, #53889, #59725.

[44] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #45330. Orso ultimately lost the case, and was apparently quite happy that he did: the couple eventually entered into a very happy union (see above, p. 134, n. 5).

[45] See *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #47132, #47521, #51398, #53367, #53968, #54592, #60203, #61766, #61773. It was Pietro who, with the bishop of Nepi, presented the *pallium* to Giovanni di Poncello Orsini, *electus* of Naples, early in 1330 (ibid., #48346).

Holy See during the papacy's absence from Italy. After the Roman commune seized Toscanella in 1329 against the protestations of the pope, John XXII ordered Orsini to vindicate the Holy See's claim to the town.[46] In September 1330 the legate was instructed to work with Jean d'Amiel, rector of Spoleto, in overturning "certain innovations prejudicial to the Roman Church" in Rieti.[47] When Orsini and Count Bertoldo Orsini recovered the woolworkers' guild of Rome on behalf of the pope in January 1332, they were warmly commended by John XXII.[48] The pope might as well have congratulated Orsini's administrative staff; these are in fact the sorts of initiatives that the legate almost certainly delegated to his agents, while he himself ranged back and forth in his campaigns against Viterbo and Todi.

After 1328 the legate, or perhaps more accurately, the legate's staff, devoted considerable effort to repairing the schism which had rent the Italian churches in the time of Nicholas V. The schism's effect was probably minimal outside of cities such as Arezzo and Todi, where Ludwig had genuine support, or those centers (Corneto, Pisa, Rome, Viterbo) where he had established a real presence; but the number of schismatic benefice-holders in these cities was considerable.[49] Thus, as Orsini proceeded against the Augustinian hermit Donato, Ludwig's "bishop" of Pistoia, he also purged local churches and chapters of imperial appointments.[50] Similarly, Orsini

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[46] RV 115, f. 68va (16 June 1329). Sometime before December 1331 the pope united the sees of Toscanella and Viterbo (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #56049).

[47] RV 116, f. 172vb (11 September 1330).

[48] RV 116, f. 317vb (29 January 1332). The relationship between the guild and the Holy See is uncertain, though the text makes clear that the guild was subject in some form or another to the pope: *Grata nuper insinuatione percepto qualiter super recuperatione artis lanarii* [sic] *ad nos et romanam ecclesiam pertinentis te gerere studuisti, tuam exinde prudentiam cum gratiarum actionibus multipliciter in domino commendamus*). It may be that the papacy, with its great demand for liturgical garments, enjoyed privileged status *vis-à-vis* the guild, but beyond this, the exact meaning of *pertinentis* is uncertain. For the *lanaiuoli*, see Lori Sanfilippo, *La Roma dei romani*, pp. 149–164; she notes that the Roman *lanaiuoli* are not well-documented (p. 148).

[49] See the registers of Nicholas V in *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, VIII, pp. 385–402.

[50] For Donato, see RV 114, ff. 231vb–232ra (5 March 1328). For local churches and chapters, see, for example, *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #45231, #46434 (from the registers of Nicholas V), #46656 (cf. Fayen, #2507), #52624, #60634; RV 114, f. 55rb–va. Other examples of proceedings against heretics and rebels are found in *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #44662, #46255; #51507; RV 114, f. 56rb (cf. Riezler, pp. 311–312, #787); ff. 231vb–232ra; RV 115, f. 31rb–va.

published proceedings condemning such prominent intellectual dissidents and leaders of the schism as Michael of Cesena, William of Ockham, Marsilio of Padua and Jean of Jandun. He also published exhortatory letters calling for the extirpation of the *fraticelli* and prosecuted the unnamed Roman clergy who had violated the interdict of 1328.[51] As well, he repaired a number of deteriorating churches and united impoverished religious houses,[52] for indeed the physical and financial effects of the schism were a problem in need of redress. Thus, he directed his attention not only to the rebellions of prominent figures like Giovanni di Sciarra Colonna, but to comparatively minor uprisings, such as the abortive coup attempt by the Minalducii brothers in the little Umbrian city of Spello.

The revolt of the Minalducii brothers is probably typical of the minor rebellions that plagued the lesser Italian towns throughout the 1320s and 1330s. The stakes were small but the problem was real, and the actors contributed to the widespread unrest that troubled Italy in a turbulent time. The leaders, Offreduccio and Matzone, were prominent in the local church: Matzone was prior of Santa Maria di Spello, and Offreduccio was prior of the cathedral. In 1323 the brothers attempted to seize power in the town and "to lead it in rebellion against the Holy See." Their motivation remains unclear, though, like many of the minor troublemakers in the region, they may have taken their inspiration from Guido Tarlati. In any case, the uprising failed and rector of Spoleto, Jean d'Amiel, initiated proceedings against the two.[53] The case was prosecuted jointly by d'Amiel,

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[51] On 24 November 1329 Orsini was ordered to publish responses and refutations of the heretical opinions of Michael of Cesena, throughout his legation (RV 115, ff. 223vb–224ra; a great many prelates throughout Christendom were likewise instructed). Orsini issued orders for the arrest of Marsilio and Jean of Jandun in February 1329 (see above, pp. 106–107). John XXII ordered the extirpation of the *fraticelli* on 5 December 1329 (RV 115, f. 218va–vb). On 20 September 1328 the pope ordered Orsini to proceed against all clerics who violated the interdict by celebrating *divina* in Rome, or, worse still, in the presence of the emperor and antipope (RV 115, f. 31rb–va). One of these violators, Niccolò Jacobi de Galgano of Rome, was to be prosecuted as one of the twelve electors of Nicholas V (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #51507).

[52] For the repair of churches see Villani, XI.clxxv (p. 744), where Orsini ordered the construction of a new campanile for the Badìa in Florence; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #50439; *Annales Camaldulensis ordinis sancti Benedicti* 5, p. 327 (curiously dated 11 October 1324). For the union of foundations, see *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #46312; RV 115, f. 219ra (cf. Riezler, p. 436, #1245); *Annales Camaldulensis ordinis sancti Benedicti* 5, pp. 342–343, 353–354.

[53] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #20355.

the papal vicar of Spoleto (Santoro d'Escolo), and d'Amiel's judge-delegate (Conato Samaroni of Narni). It came first to the apostolic *auditor causarum*, Bertrand de Saint-Geniès, but was then forwarded to Orsini on 8 March 1329; also charged were Offreduccio's other brothers, Pietro and Vagnolo, canons of Spello.[54] The case, like so many others, endured long after the end of Orsini's mission: in January 1335 Benedict XII, in accordance with letters of John XXII, ordered Pierre de Castanet, d'Amiel's successor, to cite Offreduccio, then languishing in prison for his crimes, to appear at the Holy See to answer to the charges.[55] Remarkably, Offreduccio was a curialist and papal scribe at Avignon who evidently continued to work in that capacity, even as his case was pending.[56] The outcome remains uncertain, though Offreduccio was still working in the curia as of May 1338.[57] His ultimate disposition is perhaps less important than the rampant spirit of rebellion that he embodied. Offreduccio and his brothers are a reminder that, for every grand despot—for every Matteo Visconti or Castruccio Castracani—there were a dozen Offreduccios, making mischief of their own (albeit on a much smaller scale) and doing damage that the legates had to repair.

Orsini's work the monasteries reflects a desire to reform the quality of monastic life, personnel and activity, all of which had experienced significant disruption amidst the widespread disorder of the day.[58] In other cases, Orsini proceeded against corrupt or heretical abbots and monks who had exploited the upheavals of the day to their own advantage. Giustino, abbot of the Benedictine monastery of Santi Gorgonio e Vito, in Pisa, had been convicted of various crimes by the papal nuncios Bertrand Cariti and Pierre Raymundi; the pope instructed Orsini to administer a suitable punishment, including deposition, as he saw fit. Giustino spent two years in a Florentine prison, condemned for plundering his own abbey, until John XXII

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[54] Ibid., #44662, #46255.

[55] *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #2424.

[56] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #28668; ibid., #49095.

[57] *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #5379.

[58] For Avignonese policy toward Italian monasteries, especially with respect to the Camaldolese and *Olivetani*, see Cecile Caby, "La papauté d'Avignon et la monachisme italien: camaldules et olivétains," in *Il monachesimo italiano nel secolo della grande crisi. Atti del 5º Convegno di studi storici sull'Italia benedettina: Abbazia di Monte Oliveto Maggiore, 2–5 settembre 1998*, ed. Giorgio Picasso and Mauro Tagliabue (Cesena, 2004), pp. 23–41.

ordered the legate to release him in December 1329.[59] More commonly, Orsini provided and translated abbots and confirmed their elections, in accordance with John XXII's policy of papal provision and reservation of Italian benefices. On 1 November 1326 the pope instructed Orsini to provide a suitable person to the Vallombrosan abbey of Pactiana, near Pistoia, after the death of its abbot.[60] In 1328 he left the election of a new abbot of San Paolo fuori le Mura, Rome, entirely to the legate's discretion.[61] That same year, the pope enjoined the legate to install Giovanni Nelli as abbot of the Vallombrosan house of San Paolo de Bazzolo in Florence, vacant through the transfer of Jacopo to Santa Trinità, another Florentine convent. The process had been confirmed by the abbot-general, Giovanni, but the pope was careful to stress that all appointments to Tuscan convents pertained to the Holy See. To emphasize the point, John XXII ordered Orsini to nullify the election of a certain Benedetto, prior of Bino di Cesare, Florence, which the abbot-general had also confirmed. [62]

Orsini directed considerable attention to the problem of monastic violence. As owners of often substantial properties, central Italian monasteries had always been vulnerable to the aggressions of powerful and avaricious neighbors; the absence of the papacy and the protection it provided only worsened the situation. In October 1326 Orsini transferred Abbot Pietro from San Donato di Polpiano to San Bartolomeo di Careggi, whose previous abbot, Niccolò, had been unable to reform the spiritually and physically deteriorating monastery due to threats from the local aristocracy.[63] In May 1327 the legate absolved Tomasso di Ceccano, lord of Arnara, who had been excommunicated for abducting the abbot, three monks and a *conversus* of the Cistercian convent of Casamare; one assumes that Tomasso had

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[59] RV 114, f. 62va–vb; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #47605. The suppliants for Giustino's release were Robert of Naples and the Pisan commune; John XXII left it to Orsini's discretion whether Giustino should be stripped of his office for his crimes. For similar cases, see *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #26006, #46927, #47605; RV 114, ff. 61vb–62ra; RV 115, f. 33rb, f. 33rb–va.

[60] RV 114, f. 58rb.

[61] Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, p. 231 n. 22.

[62] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #41212. For other instances of Orsini's involvement in provisions and transfers of abbots, see ibid., #26854, #29227 (see also RV 114, f. 57rb–va), #40882, #41212, #42119, #43682, #45460, #50681, #51226, #52725, #54839; f. 60ra–rb

[63] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #26854.

already made amends for his transgressions.[64] Disputes often spilled over into the monasteries themselves, where members of local families competed for the offices which would allow them some control over these properties. In a surprise election, seven of the thirteen Benedictine nuns of Santa Maria, Capua, had elected Seclegaita Pandona, a nun of San Giovanni, Capua, as abbess, after the death of Abbess Finitia. The other six, opponents of Seclegaita, were prevented from participating in the election and expelled by Seclegaita's faction and her kinsmen. Francesca d'Eboli, *procuratrix* of the six, appealed for aid to the pope, who instructed Orsini to intervene.[65] A year later the pope instructed him to provide the convent with an abbess, if he determined that Seclegaita's election had indeed been illicit.[66]

Orsini's interventions in diocesan affairs were more limited. He provided much-needed assistance to bishops threatened or exiled by lay enemies. Boso degli Ubertini, Aretine *electus* and rival of Guido Tarlati, was the chief recipient of such support,[67] but Orsini also secured benefices for Simone, archbishop of Pisa, exiled by the Pisan Ghibellines he had prosecuted,[68] and he helped to install papal *provisi* in sees rent by rebellion, such as the March of Ancona.[69] Otherwise, the legate left the bishops of central Italy largely to their own devices, though he was vigorous in enforcing the principles of papal provision and general reservation which had become central to beneficial policy in Italy under John XXII.[70] John XXII had authorized Orsini

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[64] Ibid., #28814.

[65] Ibid., #44181 (31 January 1329).

[66] Ibid., #48509 (17 February 1330). The case dragged on for years after the end of Orsini's legation: on 20 December 1336 Benedict XII ordered the bishop of Rapolla to end the case, for, although Orsini's auditor-general had decided against Seclegaita, Seclegaita had appealed to the Holy See (*Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #3956). For other cases of monastic factional violence, conflicts within individual orders or election disputes, brought to Orsini's arbitration, see *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #43978, #50047; *Annales Camaldulensis ordinis sancti Benedicti* 5, pp. 311–312.

[67] See *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #29001 (cf. RV 114, ff. 56vb–57rb); RV 113, f. 352ra–vb; RV 114, f. 56rb; RV 117, f. 6vb.

[68] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #40640.

[69] RV 113, f. 355rb–va (21 August 1326).

[70] Papal provision, which had become common in the thirteenth century, allowed the pope to provide bishops to vacant sees; under John XXII, the principle was extended to all regular and collegiate foundations. General reservation allowed the pope to reserve a benefice or class of benefices to his own provision during the lifetime or tenure of the present incumbent. For the various forms of papal interference in local elections, see Silano, pp. 489–494; for the general history of papal

to confer benefices but was careful to note that legatine provision was, strictly speaking, an irregularity. The intent was not to undermine a privilege that the pope himself had granted, but to stress that papal provision and general reservation were to be taken seriously.[71] Orsini was often called upon to install papal *electi*, even if it required overriding capitular elections.[72] On 23 November 1331 John XXII conferred a canonry, prebend and treasury in Florence to the Florentine Fredo de Ranuciis, even though the chapter had earlier nullified Fredo's appointment to the treasury—a decision to which Giovanni Orsini himself had assented.[73] Six months later, on 7 June 1332, the pope instructed Orsini to provide Niccolò Branca de Clausura to the archpriesthood of Ostia, proclaiming that the chapter's election of its own candidate was null.[74] Resistance to such intrusions could be vehement, especially in communities where premier benefices had traditionally passed to clerics from the local aristocracy, or when the provisions in question seemed a bit too favorable to foreign influences. The Florentines apparently accepted the provision of Fredo without incident, notwithstanding the chapter's earlier opposition to his candidacy. The people of Ostia, however, found Niccolò's provision harder to swallow—not because they considered a Roman "foreign," but because Niccolò's exceptional youth (twenty)

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provision, see Mollat, "Bénéfices ecclésiastiques en Occident," *Dictionnaire du droit canonique* 2, col. 406–449, esp. col. 418–419, and Geoffrey Barraclough, *Papal Provisions. Aspects of Church History Constitutional, Legal and Administrative in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1935). For general reservation, see Guillaume Mollat, *La collation des bénéfices ecclésiastiques à l'époque des papes d'Avignon* (Paris, 1921), pp. 9–16, and, for documents illustrating the evolution of the principle, Lunt 2, pp. 217–233. Clement IV was the first pope to attempt a systematic general reservation throughout Christendom, in 1265 (Mollat, *La collation*, p. 16). John XXII reserved all ecclesiastical foundations in the Papal States to papal provision on 13 September 1319 (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #12007); on 30 July 1322 he reserved those in Aquileia, Milan, Ravenna, Genoa and Pisa (ibid., #16165).

[71] E.g., *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #29766. For Orsini's right to confer benefices, see above, p. 70. On the basis of this right he provided candidates to at least twenty-eight benefices during his legation (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #28967, #29591, #29766, #30547, #40597, #40665, #40847, #41678, #42193, #42939, #43341, #43358, #43969, #44125, #40972, #45451, #48396, #50011, #50890, #51375, #51858, #52672, #53577, #53793, #54132). Many papal appointments of the period make emphatic reference to the principles of papal provision and reservation (e.g., #54132).

[72] See *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #28213, #29648, #41746, #42229, #45231, #56462 (cf. Fayen, #3187), #57393, #57858.

[73] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #55772.

[74] Ibid., #57393.

and blood ties to the legate suggested a provision motivated almost entirely by nepotistic concerns. Indeed, at times the intrusion of overtly "foreign" or otherwise inappropriate *provisi* could be used to punish rebellious local churches; certainly this was true of John XXII's beneficial policy in Arezzo.[75] So long as the various types of papal intervention assured that local candidates would continue to hold the benefices of their cities, they did not spark controversy;[76] when they did not, they often led to conflict and protracted litigation.

Orsini learned firsthand just how volatile beneficial provisions could be in two bitter disputes involving benefices in Florence. On 17 September 1327 John XXII granted to Orsini, *in commendam*, the three-hundred-fifty-year-old Benedictine monastery of Santa Maria, the "Badìa", one of Florence's most distinguished convent houses.[77] The grant was intended to provide for the legate's sustenance,[78] and Orsini wasted little time in making the most of it: he immediately laid claim to three-quarters of the monastery's revenues, leaving just 500 florins for the maintenance of the house and its small community of ten monks. For their part, the monks were unwilling to part with any of the Badìa's revenues, least of all to the advantage of a foreigner.[79] Orsini had a new bell-tower built in 1330,[80] but relations remained strained at best between him and the monks, who eventually seized the legate's goods and revenues in the house. The controversy outlived the legate.[81] The distaste with which Villani

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[75] Beattie, "Local Reality and Papal Policy," *passim*.

[76] Silano, pp. 498–499. There are far too many examples to give a comprehensive list, but a few examples illustrate the point. Rinieri Francisci of Orvieto was provided without controversy to the Orvietan church in September 1327 (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #29766); so too the Perugian Martino Andrucii Ceccoli, provided to a *sinecure* in Perugia (#40847, 9 April 1328), and Feo Benevenuti, also of Perugia, provided to the priory of the church of San Benedetto di Perugia (#47844, 20 December 1329). Likewise, the provision of the Florentine Fredo de Ranuciis to a prebendary canonry and the *thesauraria* of Florence (23 November 1331; #55772) did not provoke resistance.

[77] *Lettres communes de Jean XII*, #29886.

[78] See Villani, XI.liv (p. 662).

[79] Ibid., *loc. cit.*

[80] Ibid., XI.clxxv (p. 744).

[81] On 7 May 1336 Benedict XII ordered the papal nuncio to Tuscany, Ponce d'Étienne, to resolve the ongoing conflict between the monks of the Badìa and Cardinal Napoleone Orsini, executor of Giovanni Orsini's will. Napoleone complained that the monks had seized and divided amongst themselves, during Giovanni's lifetime, certain properties and revenues which pertained to Giovanni, and demanded justice in the matter (*Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #3840).

referred to the episode may be representative of the general opinion in Florence, where the reform package of February 1327 had already driven a wedge between Orsini and the commune,[82] and the incident served further to undermine relations between Orsini and the Florentines at a crucial period in the war against the emperor and his allies.

Two years later, another important Florentine benefice stood at the eye of a controversy between Florence and the legate. On 27 October 1329, John XXII provided Orsini to the rural baptismal church, or *pieve*, of Santa Maria Impruneta. The pope justified the provision by citing papal rights of general reservation in Tuscany.[83] The recent history of the *pieve* had been turbulent: disputed claims of patronage led to war between the Bardi and Buondelmonti families in the early 1320s. The Buondelmonti eventually triumphed, but the acrimonious suit between the two families, which dragged on at Avignon for five years, was most likely the inspiration for John XXII's decision to reserve all collegiate churches in Tuscany to papal provision.[84] Inevitably, the provision of the legate drew the ire of the Buondelmonti, who saw the provision as a continuation of the anti-patronage policies unveiled in the constitutions of February 1327. The *popolo*, fearing that the legate was conspiring to seize all of the city's most prestigious benefices, rallied behind the Buondelmonti. Popular resistance grew so intense that Orsini soon found himself unable to collect the revenues and fruits of the benefice.[85] Moreover, the chapter's *electus*, Serbene dei Neri, a Buondelmonti *protégé*, refused to relinquish the *pieve* and actually took up arms against the legate's agents when they attempted to take control of the Church on his behalf.[86] The legate, whose patience—a limited resource under the best of circumstances—had spent itself in the affair of the Badìa, responded by laying an interdict on the city on 10 May 1331. Nineteen months would pass before the interdict was finally lifted, and the legate and Buondelmonti came to an agreement whereby

[82] Davidsohn (7, p. 41) notes that the incident of the Badìa did in fact provoke unrest amongst the citizenry of Florence.

[83] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #47132.

[84] Davidsohn 7, pp. 39–42. Orsini most likely had the feud between the Bardi and Buondelmonti in mind when he issued his constitution *De iure patronatus*.

[85] Villani, XI.clxxix (p. 745).

[86] See Davidsohn 7, p. 41. Serbene was still in possession of the benefice in September 1331 (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #54958).

Orsini retained the *pieve* but guaranteed the Buondelmonti a portion of the revenues.[87] By then it was too late to salvage the legate's "relations with Florence, though the highly contentious nature of papal provisions in Italy was as much to blame as the legate's heavy-handedness.

Orsini devoted considerable effort to resolving disputes between various polities or individuals—that is, of course, when he himself was not embroiled in them. In September 1329, for example, he worked with the rector of Campagna-Marittima, Raymond Gramat, to end the long and destructive feud between Stefano Colonna and Paolo Conti;[88] the outcome is unknown, but in light of the legate's relationship with Stefano Colonna and the long enmity between the Conti and Orsini families, one is not optimistic. The legate was also enjoined to resolve a long-standing dispute between the Hospitallers of Pisa and Giovanni Pini Rossi and his sons, Florentine citizens, over properties in Florence.[89] As well, he heard property suits between the Hospitallers—an apparently litigious order, at least in Italy—and, in one case, the bishop of Viterbo and, in another, the town of Pianocarpe.[90] In yet another case, he arbitrated between the Pisan Dominicans and the lord of Pisa, Count Bonifacio Novello di Donoratico, over the *usus* of some Dominican houses in the city.[91] In other actions, Orsini approved transactions involving Church property, and defended those whose property rights had been violated.[92]

Marital disputes, too, came before the legate's court. These could be lengthy and complex cases, like the suit that arose between Odolina Riccardi, countess of Caserta, and her estranged husband, Giordano di Pietro Ruffi Catanzarii, count of Montalto. The couple had verbally contracted marriage sometime before 1329. They were fully aware that an impediment existed within the fourth degree of consanguinity, but did not seek a dispensation. As a consequence,

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[87] Davidsohn (*loc. cit.*) claims that the ineffectiveness of the interdict forced the pope and legate to withdraw it, but Villani suggests that popular unrest forced the Buondelmonte to acquiesce to the legate's superior position.

[88] RV 115, f. 221rb. For the hostility between the Orsini and the Conti see Brentano, *Rome before Avignon*, pp. 102–105; Waley, *The Papal State*, pp. 44–45.

[89] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #52178, #52179; RV 114, f. 61rb.

[90] Ibid., #52177, #52626.

[91] RV 114, f. 56va–vb (18 February 1327). For other property disputes brought to the legate's arbitration, see *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #28526, #46064 (cf. Fayen, #2497), #56049.

[92] See, for example, *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #44938, #48513, #52732, #57810; RV 115, f. 32ra–va (7 February 1329), f. 220vb (30 April 1330).

they were excommunicated *de jure*. They subsequently sought dispensation, but failed to mention the excommunication. Believing they had done all that was necessary, the couple then took up residence together and produced a daughter. Soon afterward, the marriage was declared illicit, for reasons which the papal letters do not make entirely clear. It would seem that Odolina was unhappy with the union and suggested to the archbishops of Naples and Salerno that an impediment existed within the third degree of affinity, from which the couple had neither sought nor received dispensation. Odolina left her husband, and the pope instructed the two archbishops to determine whether this impediment in fact existed. Giordano, meanwhile, appealed to the legate, but neglected to mention either the excommunication or the latest determination regarded the validity of the marriage. On the basis of Giordano's fraudulent appeal, Orsini decided against Odolina and ordered her to return to Giordano; in 1331 she appealed to the pope, who appointed three judges-delegate to get to the bottom of the whole sordid mess.[93]

More significantly, perhaps, the legate's court interposed its jurisdiction in matters traditionally reserved to the Sacred Penitentiary and the Papal Chancery. Laymen excommunicated for attacking clerics, for example, though normally required to seek absolution from the Holy See, could receive it from the legate while he was in Italy.[94] Thus, in one case, Orsini absolved Paolo Conti, lord of Vallemonte, who, as *podestà* and rector of Segni, had executed three clerics convicted of homicide;[95] in another he absolved Sinduccio Nelli, *domicellus* of San Severino, Camerino, who had killed a Dominican friar while storming the castle of Staffoli on behalf of the rector of the *Marche*.[96] The legate likewise absolved any number of penitent adherents of the emperor, such as Jacopo, archdeacon of Tivoli, Egidio de Tosettis de Scandrilia, notary of the antipope, and Tomasso Petri Ambe de Pomerio, who had served as a chaplain of Nicholas V.[97] He also granted dispensations to petitioners seeking marriages blocked by impediments, and to clerics suffering defects of age, birth or order.[98]

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[93] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #26090, #47725, #53391, #55674.
[94] Ibid., #28814, #28979, #61530.
[95] Ibid., #28979 (17 June 1327).
[96] Ibid., #61530 (24 September 1333).
[97] Ibid., #46248, #52189, #54059.
[98] For marriage dispensations, see *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #28456, #29586, #46676, #50910, #56274, #56686, #57308, #59193. For clerical dispensations, see ibid., #41702, #41822, #50280.

The legate's presence in a particular locale provided John XXII with an opportunity to take care of business that in some cases had little enough to do with the legation but was of interest to the pope all the same. In one such case, the pope instructed Orsini to act on behalf of Raymond de Guillaume des Farges, cardinal-deacon of Santa Maria Nuova, against the Florentine banking house of the Scali, one of Florence's oldest and most distinguished commercial companies.[99] Prior to the house's collapse, the Scali maintained what was to all intents and purposes a branch office at Avignon. They had proctors there,[100] assisted in the collection and transfer of papal revenues in Italy,[101] helped transfer papal monies to Poujet during his legation,[102] and provided banking services for the pope and curia.[103] Cardinal des Farges had made, through his proctors, a deposit of 2,135 gold florins with the Scali, which was unable to remit payment after the bank failed in August 1326. The pope immediately wrote to Orsini, who was in Florence at the time, instructing him to recover the debt from the goods of individual merchants within the boundaries of his legatine territories, upon request by Cardinal des Farges' proctors.[104] A month later Cardinal des Farges complained that the money, now reported as 2,030 florins and 160 silver marks, had not yet been returned, and the pope reiterated his desire to have Orsini collect the sum from individual members of the defunct society.[105] The papal letters in this case might best be seen as special mandates, authorizing Orsini to act essentially as a special nuncio. Certainly, the assignment had little if anything to do with his mission; it was a favor to Cardinal Raymond des Farges. Giovanni Orsini was asked to do it simply because his presence in Florence put him in the best position to recover Cardinal des Farges' investment.

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[99] For the Scali, see Yves Renouard, *Recherches sur les compagnies commerciales et bancaires utilisées par les papes d'Avignon avant le Grand Schism* (Paris, 1942), pp. 8–10.

[100] See, e.g., *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #18151.

[101] Ibid., #12271; Paul M. Baumgarten, ed. *Untersuchungen und Urkunden über die Camera Collegii Cardinalium für die Zeit von 1295 bis 1437* (Leipzig, 1898), pp. 163–164, #249, #250.

[102] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #18157.

[103] Ibid., #5393.

[104] RV 113, f. 355ra–rb (13 August 1326).

[105] RV 114, f. 58ra–58rb (21 September 1326).

The volume and variety of matters brought forward for Orsini's adjudication and execution leave little doubt but that the legate and his entourage were expected, at least to some to degree, to compensate for the absence of the curia, on whose physical presence in the region much of the normal administration of the Papal States had come to depend. The legate's judges took on what were essentially the responsibilities of the Rota; in other matters, his agents carried out duties traditionally associated with the chancery or the apostolic penitentiary; in still others, the legate performed tasks unrelated to his legatine mandate. But the legate's relatively small retinue could not, in any truly meaningful way, provide a genuinely effective substitute for so vast and sophisticated an administrative machinery as that of the papal curia. This fact helps to underscore the profound difficulties with which Avignonese legates had to contend in the central Italian theater, and may go far in accounting for Orsini's ultimate failure in the region.

CHAPTER NINE

THE FAILURE OF A LEGATION

Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini took his time getting back to Avignon after his recall in August 1334; it is hard to imagine that he was looking forward to the pope's promised face-to-face discussion. He was still in Siena as of 14 October 1334—almost two months after his formal recall—when he absolved the impoverished Claresses of Assisi from their debt of one-twenty-fifth of their revenues to him;[1] he had not yet reached Avignon by 31 January 1335.[2] The earliest date at which one can say for certain that Orsini was back in Avignon is 15 May 1335, when he sat with Cardinals Pedro Gomez and Guillaume de Pierre Godin on the panel which examined and overturned the election of Gobert de Sarens as abbot of the Benedictine monastery of St-Waleric, Amiens.[3] By then John XXII had been in his grave for five months, his final days darkened by the controversy surrounding his remarks on the Beatific Vision and by the ruin of his great plan for the restoration of Italy. His successor, Benedict XII, had decidedly more pacific (and frugal) ideas as to how the Church's crises in Italy should be handled; nearly a generation would pass before Innocent VI and Urban V would revive and ultimately vindicate John's costly and bellicose approach to Italian affairs. Orsini, however, would not live to see such vindication; worn out, perhaps, by the rigors of his legation, or afflicted by one of the innumerable illnesses that thrived in the unwholesome air of his native city, he died at the age of about fifty on 27 August 1335—one year to the day after the issue of his recall—and was buried in the Franciscan church at Avignon.[4]

Scholars have tended to treat the failure of John XXII's Italian legations as a part of the collapse of his Franco-Angevin vision for

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[1] Cesare Cenci, OFM, *Documentazione di vita assisana 1300–1530*, 3 vols. (Grottaferrata, 1974–1976), 1, p. 72.

[2] See Riezler, p. 580, #1700.

[3] *Lettres communes de Benoît XIII*, #11.

[4] Heinrich von Dieffenhoven, *Tertia vita Benedicti XII* (Baluze-Mollat 1, p. 219).

the reordering of Western Christendom.[5] To a considerable extent, their conclusion is warranted. Certainly, Poujet failed in large part because both he and John XXII never fully appreciated the real meaning of the struggle in Italy.[6] The pope's extensive use of Gallic agents and his untimely accord with John of Bohemia transformed Italian suspicions of the pope's objectives into open opposition; his assumptions about the character and integrity of the Guelf and Ghibelline alliances left him wholly unprepared to respond to the formation of the League of Ferrara. John's two successors, Benedict XII and Clement VI, abandoned his expensive and martial approach to the Italian problem, but did no better in appreciating the fundamental concerns of the various Italian peoples; in their more modest Italian initiatives, they too relied overwhelmingly on Gallic agents. Indeed, the popes of Avignon never really understood the process of alienation and competing objectives that helped to transform Florence, for example, from a stalwart of the papal cause into one of the chief opponents of the papacy's return in the 1370s. The Florentines, in all fairness, contributed mightily to the deterioration of relations between Florence and Avignon: they were always ready to sacrifice old alliances on the altar of political and economic advantage, and their desire to create an expanded Florentine state in central Italy after about 1350 required the continued weakness of a Rome deprived of the papacy.[7] Even so, the popes could be surprisingly insensitive to Florentine concerns and tended to take Florentine support for granted. In spite of its grand objectives and the considerable experience that informed it, John XXII's Italian policy played a vital part in keeping the popes at Avignon until the time of Gregory XI.

But the reasons for Orsini's failure lie elsewhere; after all, *il cardinale* Giovanni Gaetano del fu Matteo Rosso II degli Orsini da Monterotondo can hardly be considered emblematic of John's Franco-Angevin vision, and Gallic agents and Angevin arms played, in the final analysis, only a small part in his legation. Nor can Orsini's failure be attributed principally to his personal failings. He was, to be

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[5] See Dupré Theseider, *Problemi*, pp. 194–198; Tabacco, *La casa di Francia*, pp. 293–311.

[6] See Tabacco, "Programmi di politica italiana," pp. 66–67.

[7] For the often rocky relations between Florence and Avignon, and the breakdown of the "Guelf" ideology to the time of the *Otto Santi*, see Partner, "Florence and the Papacy," and, for the breakdown in papal-Florentine relations in the 1370s, Brucker, *Florentine Politics and Society*, pp. 244–355.

sure, a bad legate; time and time again, his actions betrayed an impatient, tactless and ferociously partisan temperament, ill-suited to impartial diplomacy or disinterested campaigning. His rashness was an instrumental cause of the terrible clan war of 1333, which likely contributed to a modest deterioration of relations between the popes and the Orsini during the 1330s and 1340s.[8] Ultimately, however, the failure of Orsini's legation, like its distinctiveness, was predicable on other factors: its geographical parameters, the institutional complexities of the legatine office, especially in the Papal States—an unusually difficult theater in which to conduct legations[9]—and the implications of the legate's own roots in the medieval Roman aristocracy.

Orsini's legation covered about 50,000 square kilometers, or just over one-sixth of modern Italy. It was a large territory, though not exceptionally so by the standards of medieval papal legations. The territory granted to Poujet in his original mandate of 1319, for example, was nearly twice that size, and Pellagrue had exercised jurisdiction over an area perhaps three times greater; earlier legates to England covered four times Orsini's territory, and those to France, ten. But in Italy, geography meant much more than distance. Orsini's legatine territories encompassed a wide range of distinct cultural, political, social and linguistic traditions. Each region within his legation presented its own problems, often with little or no reference to those of adjoining regions. Even more than Poujet, who could at least identify a loose affiliation of Lombard despots as the central obstacle to his mission, Orsini had to act in a theater distinguished in the main by the absence of a single, central challenge or threat on which all other problems were somehow contingent. The physical presence of the papacy had in previous centuries provided a principle of unity to central Italy. In the papacy's absence, however, this ephemeral unity quickly gave way to the fragmentation which seemed the most natural expression of central Italy's diverse traditions.

In such an environment Orsini, like Albornoz after him, often found it very difficult to coordinate actions. Early in his legation, he had to contend simultaneously with the essentially unrelated problems of Castruccio's ambitions in Tuscany and the pro-imperial

[8] See Allegrezza, p. 85.
[9] Vasina, "Il papato avignonese," pp. 145–146.

revolution in Rome. As he scurried back and forth to confront one or the other, Orsini found himself unable to respond adequately to either, let alone both. After 1329 he grappled with the rebellions of Viterbo and Todi, rebellions motivated by very different factors and manifested in very different ways. Indeed, the circumstances of Orsini's legation meant that to address one problem was essentially to ignore another; the effort he expended on the pacification of one community gave others the opportunity to rebel. The legate's apparent strength at the end of 1329 and the beginning of 1330, when the Papal States were momentarily pacified, had come largely as a result of a series of fortuitous circumstances—epidemic, assassination, domestic unrest—which purged an entire generation of talented and dangerous Ghibelline leaders. By 1331/2 the enemies of the Church had recovered, or entirely new ones had emerged, and rebellion and conflict again afflicted Orsini's legatine territories.

Orsini's mission underscores a problem which, of all medieval papal legates, perhaps only he, Poujet and Albornoz had to face. Representational theory allowed popes, through *legati a latere*, to conduct what were in effect visitations without leaving Rome. Whether in England, France, the Empire or the Holy Land, legates bore the "presence" of a pope to lands which were not dependent, either historically or politically, on the immediate presence of the papacy. The reforms these legates enacted, however sweeping, ultimately depended on the inspiration or impetus of distant Rome; once implemented successfully, the reforms were fostered and maintained by secular and ecclesiastical authorities who had been brought on side, and whose prerogative it had always been to govern in the region.

In central Italy, by contrast, the papacy was more than a supreme spiritual authority; it was a social and political necessity. The precarious balance of power which had evolved over three centuries could not be maintained without the immediate presence of the papacy; the effective government of the Papal States was dependent on a bureaucratic network of officials radiating outward from Rome. Poujet, Orsini and Albornoz may have stood at the pinnacle of a thousand years of representational theory, but nothing in canon law equipped them to compensate for the papacy's physical presence in Italy. Invested with the full weight of papal *plenitudo potestatis*, they entered their territories as tiara-crowned appendages sprung from the very body of the pope. At other times and places in Christendom, this had been sufficient to spark and effect reforms, but in Italy, it

was not. A legatine entourage was no substitute for the curia and all it entailed in the region. Poujet, Orsini and Albornoz could, in one sense, bring the presence of the pope to central Italy; what they could not bring was the presence of the papacy.

On another level, the failure of Orsini's legation can be attributed in part to problems inherent in the very office of *legatus a latere.* Throughout the centuries the Catholic hierarchy had developed mechanisms and procedures by which unfit personnel could be removed from office and replaced without irreparable damage to the normal patterns of religious life. The case of Guido Tarlati shows how hard it could be to enforce the depositions of powerful prelates, but the system did, in theory, allow it. The institutional continuity and stability of the bishopric, and the coexistence of other structures—the archdiocese; the chapter; the archdeacon's court; the parish; pastoral alternatives such as the religious orders—enabled religious communities to survive during vacancies after a bishop's death, or during comparable interruptions in the legal, administrative and spiritual duties of a bishop, such as those incurred by a bishop's infirmity or deposition. Legation, by contrast, had no such safeguards. It was not a stable or static institution with a clearly defined place in the hierarchy, but an irregular, provisional and kinetic one. The legate functioned outside of and above the ordinary workings of the hierarchy. Legations necessarily and inevitably disrupted the normal exercise of ecclesiastical administration. More significantly, there were no effective, institutionalized means by which a legate who exceeded his authority could be kept in check. Legatine power was controversial at the best of times; when misused, its effects could be devastating. The very qualities that made a *legatus a latere* so powerful—his transcendent jurisdiction and immunity from the censure of other authorities—could also make him very difficult to control, as Giovanni Orsini so frequently demonstrated.

Aside from often unheeded rebukes and exhortations, recall was the only real option available to the Holy See in cases of abuse. Yet the recall of a legate for incompetence or abuse was an extreme measure. It was an admission of failure on the part of the pope; it left unresolved those crises which had precipitated the legation in the first place; it weakened the credibility of the office and of legates dispatched subsequently. Certainly, a pontiff seeking to re-establish and consolidate his authority in Italy could ill-afford the suggestion that he was unable to control his own officials. Recall was almost

never issued unless a mission had been completed or the health of the legate required it. The recall of one legate and dispatch of another shattered a legation's frail continuity, often with unfortunate results. When cardinals bought by Visconti bribes secured the recall of Albornoz in early 1357, for example, he was replaced by the abbot of Cluny, Androin de la Roche. The contrast between the two legates could hardly have been more striking. It took the bland, incompetent de la Roche just eighteen months to squander the hard-fought gains of three years of campaigning.[10] When Albornoz was sent to retrieve the situation in September 1358, he had to start from scratch in his war against the Visconti and the petty tyrants of the Papal States, who had all but recovered the territories he had taken from them prior to his recall. The effects of del la Roche's failure were not lost on Albornoz or the pope: hurt by the slander of the Visconti faction in the Sacred College, Albornoz astutely demanded to be recalled in 1364—after which an anxious Urban V vigorously rebuffed Albornoz's detractors and urged him to continue in his work.[11]

There could scarcely be a better example of legatine power abused than Orsini's vendetta against the Colonna in the spring of 1333. John XXII's dilemma was clear enough: there was no question that the legate had utterly violated his mandate, yet the nature of the crisis was such that only a legate (and in this particular case, *this* legate) seemed able to remedy the disaster; no legate could have controlled the Orsini faction as Giovanni Orsini could. John XXII could only gamble, exhorting his legate to end the war while desperately sending nuncios to negotiate peace. Though the gamble did not pay off, still the pope declined to recall the legate for over a year—and even then he only did so at the legate's request. However disastrous Orsini's conduct may have been, John XXII seems not to have considered recall an option.

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[10] For Androin's mission see Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 227–230. Dupré Theseider dismissed him as "an absolutely mediocre man, wholly favorable to (Bernabò) Visconti and having come especially to tend to his interests" (*. . . un uomo assolutamente mediocre, del tutto favorevole al Visconti e venuto apposta per farne gli interessi*); "Egidio dell'Albornoz e la riconquista dello Stato della Chiesa," in *El Cardenal Albornoz* 1, pp. 433–459, p. 452. Androin's legation is documented in Jean Glénisson and Guillaume Mollat, *L'administration des états de l'église au XIV^e^ siècle: correspondance des légats et vicaires-généraux*, 1: *Gil Albornoz et Androin de la Roche (1353–1367)*. Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome 203 (Paris, 1964).

[11] Mollat, *Les papes*, pp. 237–238.

The extraordinary nature of legatine authority also entailed a number of jurisdictional problems. The canonists of the thirteenth century exalted the authority of a legate above that of a bishop or archbishop; beyond this, however, the relationship between legatine and ordinary jurisdictions was anything but clearly defined. Legatine authority overrode but did not obliterate more permanent jurisdictions, leading at times to considerable confusion. The problem was particularly acute in Papal Italy, where there were not only the usual episcopal, abbatial, and other jurisdictions in place, but also a collection of idiosyncratic jurisdictions, wholly unique to the region. Orsini's legatine authority extended over four of the seven provinces of the Papal States (Campagna-Marittima, the Patrimony of St Peter, the March of Ancona, the Duchy of Spoleto). In each province there were not one, but two special jurisdictions: the essentially gubernatorial authority, both spiritual and temporal, of the rector; and the fiscal jurisdiction of the treasurer.[12] Moreover, in Rome, where the legate's authority was always problematic,[13] the pope already had a vicarial representative in the bishop of Viterbo, Angelo Tignosi, the pope's *vicarius in spiritualibus et temporalibus* since 1325.[14] Trying to determine where one jurisdiction left off and another began would have bedevilled the most erudite of canonists, let alone a legate who had to make quick decisions in the service of his mission. Confusion was all but inevitable.

Certainly, this was the case in Orsini's relationship with the Inquisition. Like Poujet, Orsini had been placed in charge of the inquisitions within his territories,[15] but the precise terms of this authority are unclear in light of the sometimes contradictory papal texts which laid out his responsibilities. On 5 January 1327, for example, Orsini was authorized to inquire and act against suspected heretics, regardless of status or previously granted immunities, "according to the form of the canons and the privileges granted by the Apostolic See to the office of Inquisition." Yet at the same time, the pope made it clear that the inquisitorial powers of local ordinaries and of

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[12] See Chantal Reydellet-Guttinger, *L'administration pontificale dans le duché de Spolète (1305–1352)*. Studi dell'Accademia Spoletina (Florence, 1975), pp. 24–26 (for the rector), pp. 59–63 (for the treasurer).

[13] See above, pp. 133–134.

[14] See Antonelli, "Di Angiolo Tignosi," pp. 6–7.

[15] Housley, *Italian Crusades*, pp. 58–59.

the Inquisition itself were not to be diminished as a result of the legate's authority.[16] A sort of partnership was likely intended, as when, in July 1330, John XXII ordered Orsini to review the proceedings of the Tuscan Inquisitor against suspected heretics in Todi so that he could then help the Inquisitor to proceed against them.[17] Still, the lack of clarity led to problems. In February 1331 John XXII angrily rebuked Orsini for impeding the work of the Tuscan Inquisition, especially in Todi and Amelia. The pope now expressed quite clearly that Orsini's authority was, in fact, wholly distinct from that of the Inquisition:

> . . . And so, since it is expedient that offices of affairs not be disturbed, but that, satisfied with his own office, one should permit another to use his office freely, you should not usurp [the office of the Inquisition], assisting it instead with mutually beneficial advice and useful aid.[18]

The nature of Orsini's interference is not specified, but in light of the uncertainties inherent in his relations with the Inquisition, this might well be one instance where it is hard to fault the legate for exceeding the parameters of his mandate.

The relationship between the legate and papal nuncios is no less problematic. Legatine authority exceeded that of all other papal representatives, including nuncios; but if a nuncio's special mandate so specified, he could be exempted from the authority of a legate. At several points during Orsini's legation, nuncios were dispatched to Rome and its environs—most notably Guigo de Saint-Germain and Guillaume de Veyrato in 1327, Philippe de Cambarlhac in 1332 and Bertrand de Saint-Geniès in 1333—yet Orsini had very little to do with them. Indeed, the mission of Cambarlhac in particular was occasioned in large part by the legate's own abuses. This was especially true after the outbreak of war between the Orsini and the Colonna in May 1333, when Cambarlhac and Bertrand de Saint-Geniès worked explicitly to undo the damage that the legate had helped to cause.

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[16] Orsini's powers of inquisition were granted *iuxta formam canonum et priuilegia officio inquisitionis ab apostolica sede concessa*, but the pope later added, *per hoc autem ordinariis uel inquisitoribus eiusdem criminis* (heresy), *quin possint secundum iuris formam et eadem priuilegia super hiis procedere, non intendimus derogare* (RV 114, f. 55va; 5 January 1327).

[17] RV 115, f. 221ra–rb (12 July 1330).

[18] *Cum itaque expediat quod rerum officia non turbentur, set quod suo contentus officio quilibet alium uti suo permittat <officio> libere, sibi assistens non usurparis mutuo consiliis et auxiliis oportunis eidem* . . . (RV 116, f. 173vb; 24 February 1331).

When John XXII wrote to the legate and the leading figures of Rome in August 1333, he urged them to heed the nuncios, to assist them in their mission and to accept their counsels.[19] The implication is that Orsini was now to some degree subject to the authority of the nuncio—a canonical aberration, to say the least, and one to which the legate remained heroically indifferent. Ideally, a nuncio dispatched to a legate's territories would aid and complement the legate in his work; in this case, the nuncios' commission merely injected yet another papal official into an arena already distinguished by a confusing proliferation of them.

There is no denying that Orsini was often high-handed and arbitrary in his dealing with other papal officers, or that he regarded the authority of men like Angelo Tignosi and Pierre d'Artois as an obstacle to Orsini aggrandizement in Rome and the Patrimony. In the case of Pierre d'Artois, at least, the problem was apparently compounded by an intense mutual dislike. Much of the difficulty between the two men, however, may be traced to uncertainties surrounding the precise nature of the relationship between the legate and the officials of the Papal States. John XXII typically instructed Orsini and the various rectors of the Papal States to work in concert, in a manner suggesting a more or less equal footing between the legate and the rectors. In June 1328 Orsini and the rector of the Patrimony, Robert d'Albarupe, jointly published the notice of Narni's absolution, and worked together in the appointment of suitable officials there.[20] At the same time, they granted the papal fiefs of Rusclo and Rocca dei Cesari to the nobleman Francesco de Camporegali, as a reward for services rendered to the Church.[21] At other times, however, circumstances indicate that the rectors were subject to Orsini's authority, precisely as they would have been to the pope. In September 1328, at the petition of Cardinal Napoleone Orsini, the legate ordered Robert d'Albarupe to relax his interdict over the town of Montalto, which had been forced to receive the emperor.[22] When the rector

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[19] . . . *fidem credulam adhibentes eis assistere suisque persuasionibus et exhortationibus in hac parte salubribus taliter acquiescere studeatis* . . . (RV 117, f. 4vb; 20 August 1330). The actual text was addressed to the Angevin lieutenants in Rome; the legate received a copy, *mutatis mutandis* (f. 5ra).

[20] *Lettres communes de Jean XXI*, #41534; RV 114, ff. 232va–233rb (10 June 1328).

[21] *Lettres communes de Jean*, #41668). For other commissions suggesting an equal partnership between the rectors and the legate see RV 116, ff. 147ra–rb, 170va, 170vb; RV 117, f. 7va; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #61281.

[22] *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #42313.

of Campagna-Marittima, Raymond Gramat, exchanged the *castrum* of Ariccia for the Conti fief of Monte San Giovanni in February 1329, the pope gave Orsini the authority to approve the transaction.[23] After the death of Robert d'Albarupe, the new rector of the Patrimony, Pierre d'Artois, was received by Orsini, before whom Pierre was obliged to swear the customary oath of obedience to the Church;[24] the new rector of Spoleto, Pierre de Castanet, was likewise received in September 1332.[25]

At still other times, the two jurisdictions appear as wholly separate from one another, or as more or less complementary. After Orsini had received Nieri and Paoluzio della Faggiuola into the embrace of the Church, the rector of the *Marche*, Jean Émil, complained that the Faggiuola continued to detain the *castrum* of Sant'Agata; John XXII ordered Orsini to see that Nieri and Paoluzio restored the *castrum* not to his authority, but to that of the rector.[26] In July 1330 Orsini was to investigate the potential benefits of providing papal officials to the *castra* of Perticaria, Carlei and Oriano, so that Pierre d'Artois could then act on the information.[27] At other times, it is the distinction between the two jurisdictions that is most apparent. When Faziolo di Vico led Viterbo into rebellion again early in 1331, Orsini was instructed to take steps ensuring that the city returned *either* to his obedience *or* to that of the rector, Pierre d'Artois.[28] The separation of jurisdictions was nowhere more clearly evinced than in a papal letter of 31 August 1331, ordering Orsini not to interfere in appeal cases forwarded to the Holy See by the rectors or their officials without special license from the pope, even if the rectors themselves forwarded them first to Orsini.[29]

One case in particular underscores the problems inherent in the legate's relationship with the rectors. It hinged on the disposition of two *castra*, Perticaria and Carlei, both of which apparently belonged to the commune of Narni. The legate had seized the *castra* at some point prior to Narni's submission in June 1328, at which time ambassadors of Narni asked the pope to restore the *castra* to Narni's control.

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[23] RV 115, f. 32rb–va (7 February 1329).
[24] RV 115, f. 221rb–va (26 November 1329); RV 116, f. 144vb (27 January 1331).
[25] RV 117, ff. 6vb–7ra (13 September 1332).
[26] RV 114, f. 226rb–va (21 November 1327).
[27] RV 115, f. 220vb (26 July 1330).
[28] RV 116, ff. 169vb–170va (3 February 1331).
[29] RV 116, f. 172vb.

Orsini, who had a long and favorable relationship with Narni,[30] was inclined to oblige. The citizens of Terni, however, protested that Narni had used the *castra* as staging grounds for incursions into Terni's territory and insisted that they be destroyed. The pope was eager to resolve the dispute as quickly as possible so that Narni and Terni could provide a united front against Ludwig IV,[31] and entrusted the matter to the legate and the rector of the Patrimony, Robert d'Albarupe.[32] As it turned out, resolution was anything but swift: at the time of Robert's death in early 1330 the matter was still under investigation, and the pope ordered Orsini to bring the case to a prompt conclusion.[33]

With the appointment of Pierre d'Artois the dispute between Narni and Terni quickly became a contest of wills between the legate and the new rector. Some time before 27 August 1330, Orsini finally decided in favor of Narni.[34] The outcome was hardly surprising: under the legate's nephews, Bertoldo di Poncello Orsini and Andrea d'Orso Orsini, Narni had been a veritable Orsini client-state since June 1328.[35] In November 1330 the pope wrote to his legate to inform him that Pierre d'Artois was to do essentially whatever the legate told him to do with respect to a territorial dispute between Narni and Terni:

> Having learned what your letters contained concerning the affair of our beloved sons, the citizens of Narni and of Terni, which was committed to you under a particular form in our letters, note that we have ordered our beloved son, Pierre d'Artois, canon of Poitiers and rector of the Patrimony of St Peter in Tuscany, that he should strive to follow and to fulfill, without any opposition or contrary actions, any arrangement that you might make with respect to this matter, insofar as it pertains to him . . .[36]

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[30] See Rehberg, *Kirche und Macht*, p. 354.

[31] RV 114, f. 234ra, f. 235ra–rb.

[32] See RV 114, f. 234ra (18 June 1328).

[33] RV 115, ff. 220vb–221ra (30 April 1330).

[34] Antonelli, "Notizie umbre," p. 472, #20.

[35] Bertoldo had been appointed rector of the town before 10 June 1328 (RV 114, f. 232va); a letter of 13 June describes Andrea as *podestà* (f. 233rb).

[36] *Intellectis que presentate nobis discretionis tue littere super negocio dilectorum filiorum Narniensium et Interampnensium tibi sub certa forma commisso per nostras litteras continebant, ecce quod dilecto filio Petro de Artisio canonico Pictauensi, patrimonii beati Petri in Tuscia rectori, mandamus ut ordinationem quam super eodem negocio feceris exequi absque impedimento quouis et diffugio, prout ad ipsum pertinuerit, studeat et complere, sicut in literis nostris quas eidem rectori super hoc dirigimus, tua circumspectio plenius poterit intueri*; RV 116, f. 173vb–174ra (8 November 1330).

In March 1331 Narni paid 1,500 florins to the treasurer of the Patrimony to cover the costs of maintaining the two *castra*, and the matter seemed to have come to an end.

Soon afterward, however, Pierre d'Artois sent an agent, one Jacobutius of Rieti, to appeal the legate's decision. Pierre seems to have changed his mind shortly thereafter: two months later, when Dominicus de Amandola, Pierre's proctor, requested information concerning the case, he was notified that Pierre and the treasurer had decided not to pursue the matter. Yet in March 1332, when Giordano Orsini was at Narni to formalize the restitution of Carlei and Perticaria, Pierre sent a *castaldus* named Passus to notify Giordano that the restitution should be halted because of the rector's ongoing appeal.[37] The legate ignored the injunction; on 7 July 1332 he received a stern letter from John XXII, in which the pope complained that Orsini had made his decision despite the protests of Terni and the rector's pending appeal, and ordered him to return the *castra* to the authority of the Church.[38] There is no denying that the antipathy between the legate and the rector exacerbated the dispute, but here again, it is hard to fault either party for failing to grasp the subtleties of what was clearly a confusing jurisdictional relationship.

On still another level the legate's estrangement from papal officials in central Italy reflected, not a jurisdictional problem, but a differing vision of the governance of the Papal States. Innocent III's resettlement of the Papal States in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries introduced a distinctive administrative scheme in which the rectors of the western provinces were typically Romans of aristocratic background with close ties to the Holy See. Thus one finds Cardinal Giovanni Colonna as rector of Campagna in 1217, and Cardinals Rinieri Capocci and Romano Bonaventura as rectors of Spoleto and Campagna-Marittima, respectively, in 1220.[39] In the 1260s, however, the Gallic popes Urban IV and Clement IV appointed Gallic clerics to the rectorates, excluding Roman noble families from their previous involvement in the government of the Papal States. The policy of Gregory X suggests an anti-Gallic backlash, with a return to the twelfth-century practice of a rectorate split between lay

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[37] See the texts in Antonelli, "Notizie umbre," p. 473, #26; p. 477, #6; p. 477, #8; p. 478, #14.

[38] RV 116, f. 318ra. For the dispute see Fumi, *BSUSP* 4 (1898), pp. 452–453.

[39] Theiner 1, pp. 47–48, #LXIV; p. 56, #LXXXII; p. 58, #LXXXVIII.

rectors *in temporalibus* and clerical rectors *in spiritualibus*. Virtually all of these rectors were Italians, and many were Romans. The nepotism for which Nicholas III, Nicholas IV and Boniface VIII were so strongly criticized by their contemporaries was in fact an important political device by which these popes ensured the loyalty and dedication of their appointees to the papal rectorates.[40] Even when popes did not appoint relatives to the rectorates, they tended to rely on the Roman aristocracy, who found rectorates a useful means of protecting and consolidating family interests in the Papal States and ensuring continued participation in papal government. The Orsini in particular enjoyed the benefits of aristocratic Roman rectorates in the second half of the thirteenth century: under Boniface VIII, Orso Orsini served as rector of the Patrimony and Bertoldo Orsini was rector of Spoleto; Cardinal Napoleone Orsini not only served as rector of Spoleto and the March of Ancona simultaneously, but exercised legatine power within the provinces.[41]

With the Avignonese papacy, however, the character of the rectorate changed again. The power of the rectors, often given virtually free reign in the previous century, was more strictly regulated as the rectors increasingly took on the character of genuine professional administrators.[42] The new rectors were not scions of powerful local houses, but trained bureaucrats with curial backgrounds. They were Languedocians and Frenchmen, often of bourgeois stock, who owed their posts to the fourteenth-century popes even more than the Roman aristocrats had to the thirteenth-century popes. Robert d'Albarupe, Pierre d'Artois, Raymond Gramat, Jean d'Amiel and Pierre de Castanet: these were the *novi homines* of the Avignonese curia who came to displace the grand old clans from their positions of privilege in the administration of papal Italy. Indifferent to the controversies provoked by Gallic rectors of the thirteenth century, the popes of Avignon remained committed to their unpopular Gallic appointments until the pontificate of Innocent VI, who restored Italians (if not always Romans) to their earlier prominence among

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[40] See Waley, *The Papal State*, pp. 102–104.

[41] Waley, *The Papal State*, p. 238. See Waley's list of thirteenth-century rectors, pp. 302–322 (Appendix II). For Napoleone's legatine authority, see Gardi, p. 374

[42] See Reydellet-Guttinger, pp. 24–26. One hundred and twenty-two texts illustrating the change are found in Paravicini Bagliani, "Eine Briefsammlung für Rektoren des Kirchenstaates (1250–1320)," *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 35 (1979), pp. 150–208; a partial list of officials during this period appears, pp. 145–147.

the rectors of the Papal States. Among Innocent's lay rectors, one finds Giovanni Fulgosi of Piacenza, rector of the March of Ancona,[43] the Roman Giordano Orsini, rector of the Patrimony,[44] and Giovanni d'Angelino Salimbeni of Siena, rector of the March of Ancona.[45] Innocent's clerical rectors include Petrocino Casalesco, bishop of Torcelli and rector of Romagna,[46] and the Sicilian Filippo d'Antillo, bishop of Ferrara and rector of Spoleto.[47] These were names which Italians found altogether more congenial than d'Albarupe, d'Artois, Gramat and Castanet. In this light, Orsini's hostility to a man like Pierre d'Artois becomes more comprehensible. To Orsini, Pierre embodied the new administrative regime in the Papal States—a regime which had deprived the Orsini and their baronial peers of access to an important source of power and prestige in the western Papal States.

In many respects the biggest problems of Orsini's legation were rooted in the legate's Roman background. If "Italy" meant little as a political concept in the fourteenth century, it did express an increasingly important cultural reality. The Italian peoples were long aware of their common cultural descent from ancient Rome, but that awareness was intensified during the long struggle between the houses of Hohenstaufen and Anjou, as Gallic and German armies vied with one another to determine the fate of the Italian peninsula. Dante, keenly aware of the cultural "Italy", proposed the creation of a national vernacular, drawn from the best elements of the various Italian dialects.[48] Petrarch extolled a cultural patriotism for the peoples of Italy, most strikingly in his *Africa*, which made a national epic of the Second Punic War; by the mid-fourteenth century, Boccaccio would stand at the fore of a growing number of authors who relied increasingly on the power of the Italian word to provide windows into a distinctively Italian daily life.[49]

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[43] Theiner 2, p. 245, #CCXXXV.
[44] Ibid., p. 250, #CCXLIV.
[45] Ibid., p. 253, #CCLI.
[46] Ibid., p. 255, #CCLVI.
[47] Ibid., pp. 316–317, #CCCXV.
[48] *De vulgari eloquentia*, Lib. I, cap. xvi–xix, ed. Pier Vincenzo Mengaldo (Padua, 1968), 1: Introduzione e Testo, pp. 26–31.
[49] For the development of the Italian vernacular in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, with reference to its cultural and political implications, see Bruno Migliorini and T. Gwynfor Griffith, *The Italian Language* (London, 1966), chapters 4–6 (pp. 78–154).

All the same, "Italian" remained, in Trecento Italy, an often dangerously broad and indifferent term. By far the most important and tangible of fourteenth-century Italian identities remained local ones, predicated on the tremendous range of social, political, economic and linguistic traditions scattered across the length of the Italian peninsula. The constitutive bases of local identities engendered of necessity an acute awareness of that which was not local. This awareness might manifest itself in a variety of ways, from diffidence to suspicion and outright antipathy; it rarely if ever took the form of fondness. The vicissitudes of history ensured that some enmities were always more virulent than others, though these were never exclusive. The Sienese, for example, might reserve for the Florentine a particularly poisonous hatred, which could incline him under certain circumstances and at certain times to align himself with enemies of Florence in, say, Pisa or Arezzo or Lucca; that does not mean he felt any great affinity for the Pisan, the Aretine or the Lucchese, to say nothing of the Roman, the Milanese or the Venetian.

The narrowness of local identities, and the problems attached to them, is demonstrable in the experience of another Italian legate who arrived in Italy on behalf of the distant pope in the fourteenth century. He was Cardinal Annibaldo di Ceccano, sent by Clement VI to prepare Rome for the Jubilee of 1350. It was not, on the surface, a particularly difficult mission, especially in comparison to the one that had defeated Giovanni Orsini fifteen years earlier. Even so, it took place in difficult political circumstances, and Annibaldo struggled from the outset. He almost immediately found himself at odds with Rome's self-proclaimed tribune and revolutionary leader, Cola di Rienzo. While riding through the streets after Mass one day, the cardinal was slightly injured in an unsuccessful assassination attempt. He was certain that Cola was behind the plot and promptly excommunicated him, ending any hope of an effective partnership with the tribune. Soon afterward, in July, while journeying through his native Campagna, Annibaldo died, quite possibly a victim of poison: the nearly simultaneous deaths of a nephew and a number of the cardinal's retainers invite suspicion, though there is no evidence to suggest that Cola was involved.[50]

[50] See *Cronica dell'Anonimo Romano*, cap. xxiii, pp. 157–162.

The failure of Annibaldo's mission was, to some extent, a personal one. Annibaldo was a snooty *bon vivant*, best known for the Lucullan fête he threw for Pope Clement VI in 1343;[51] the Romans found him and his imperious retinue insufferable. On the other hand, the Romans were almost predisposed to dislike and distrust him. As the anonymous Roman chronicler observed,

> This *missore* Anniballo had in himself four unlaudable characteristics: first, he came from Campagna; second, he had a squint; third, he was very pompous [and] full of vainglory; of the fourth I wish to keep silent.[52]

To the Roman chronicler, Annibaldo's birthplace was a matter of paramount importance. In his list of the cardinal's flaws, it precedes the cast of his eyes, his pomposity, even the apparently unspeakable vice to which the chronicler so cryptically alludes. To come from Campagna was, to a Roman, the mark of a profound and insuperable character defect. How could the pope have sent a *campagnese* to preside over so quintessentially Roman an affair as the Jubilee? Never mind that Campagna lay directly to the southwest of Latium, or that the Counts of Ceccano were so thoroughly immersed in the affairs of the Roman *distretto* as to warrant inclusion among the Roman baronial *casati*:[53] to a contemporary Roman observer, Annibaldo was still decidedly and irredeemably foreign. The pope might just as well have sent a Gascon or a Limousin—or a Mongol—as this squinting popinjay from the backwoods of Campagna.

The inverse lesson of Annibaldo's misadventure, of course, and the Anonimo's perspective on it, is that being a Roman was not necessarily an asset outside of Rome. Giovanni Orsini's "Romanness" undoubtedly contributed to his ineffectiveness in Florence. If only a little more than two hundred kilometers separated Florence from Rome, their political visions and social circumstances were worlds apart. There was little common ground between the com-

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[51] See G. Milanesi, ed. *I due sontuosissimi conviti fatti a papa Clemente quinto nel MCCCVIII descritti da anonimo fiorentino* (Florence, 1868); Milanesi erroneously identifies the cardinal of this account as Arnaud de Pellagrue. For the correct identification and dating of the banquets, see Zacour, p. 440, n. 22.

[52] *Cronica dell'Anonimo Romano*, cap. xxiii, p. 157: *Questo missore Anniballo abbe in sé quattro proprietati non laudabili: la prima, ca esso fu de Campagna; la secunna, che esso fu guercio; la terza, fu moito pomposo, pieno de vanagloria; la quarta voglio tacere.*

[53] See Carocci, *Baroni di Roma*, p. 70.

munal traditions of Florence, with her strong, commercial economy, and Rome's idiosyncratic blend of papal, Angevin and aristocratic government, perched atop the City's *sui generis* pilgrim economy. Giovanni Orsini was a Roman prince, no more sympathetic to Florentine communal conventions than Poujet was to those of Bologna. Indeed, he probably had far more in common with Florence's disenfranchised *grandi* than with her wealthy bourgeois leaders or commercially-minded *popolo*. To the Florentines Orsini's aristocratic *hauteur* seemed the very epitome of Roman crassness and arrogance; his *Romanesco* speech was, to Florentine ears, harsh and unrefined. Dante, in *De vulgari eloquentia*, spoke volumes about the social and cultural chasm that divided Florence and Rome:

> With so many varieties in Romance vernacular, let us seek the most comely and honorable speech of Italy; and that we should have a clear path for our hunting, let us first throw from the forest the entangled brambles and briars. Just as the Romans assume that they should be placed before all others, we place them, not without merit, before the rest in this weeding out process, proclaiming that they have no place in any account of vernacular eloquence. Therefore we say that the vernacular, or better yet, caterwauling, of the Romans is the foulest of all Italian vernaculars; nor is it surprising, since they also seem to exceed all others in the deformity of customs and habits. Indeed, they say, "what d'yer say, suh?"[54]

When John XXII sent Giovanni Orsini to Italy, he did so in the firm belief that an Italian legate could negotiate the perilous straits of Italian politics as no "Gaul" ever could. Therein lay a big part of the pope's problem: when the Cahorsin Jacques Duèse looked at Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini, he saw an Italian; what he should have seen, and what every inhabitant of the Italian peninsula saw, was a Roman.

In particular, perhaps, he should have seen a Roman prince of the *gente Ursina*. The proud and turbulent Giovanni Orsini was far

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[54] *Quam multis varietatibus latio dissonante vulgari, decentiorem atque illustrem Ytalie venemur loquelam; et ut nostre venationi pervium callem habere possimus, perplexos frutices atque sentes prius eiciamus de silva. Sicut ergo Romani se cunctis preponendos existimant, in hac eradicatione sive discerptione non inmerito eos aliis preponamus, protestantes eosdem in nulla vulgaris eloquentie ratione fore tangendos. Dicimus igitur Romanorum non vulgare, sed potius tristiloquium, ytalorum vulgarium omnium esse turpissimum; nec mirum, cum etiam morum habituumque deformitate pre cunctis videantur fetere. Dicunt enim* Messure, quinto dici?) (*De vulgari eloquentia* 1, Lib I, cap. xi, 1–2 [pp. 18–19]).

too deeply invested in the affairs of the western Papal States to function as a disinterested agent of the papacy. Since the time of Nicholas III, the Orsini had regarded the Angevin presence in Rome and the Patrimony as a potential impediment to Orsini primacy. Given a chance to rein that presence in, Nicholas' nephew and namesake did not hesitate to act. Given the ancient family enmities that he carried with him, the legate's antagonism toward Stefano Colonna and Faziolo dei Prefetti di Vico was all but a foregone conclusion.

Even the terrible vendetta of 1333 was less extraordinary than it might seem at first glance. Since at least the eighth century, violence had been a vital instrument of clannish advancement in Rome. Clan wars enabled powerful families to demonstrate their strength, to overwhelm declining houses, and to acquire territory; the peace initiatives, usually sponsored by the papacy, which clan wars invariably elicited, permitted the victors to consolidate their gains and prepare for the next conflict. During the thirteenth century, skilled pontiffs such as Innocent III or Nicholas III advanced their own families by playing rival houses against one another in limited conflicts; the more aggressive Boniface VIII provoked more extensive clan wars in the interest of familial aggrandizement. To a very considerable extent, Cardinal Giovanni Orsini did nothing more than continue in the tradition of his thirteenth-century papal antecedents. His presence gave the Orsini an opportunity to assert themselves against their rivals, and they wasted little time in doing it. The blood-feud which erupted in 1333 was not inevitable, and cannot be laid on the lap of John XXII. On the other hand, one is tempted to conclude that a Roman or Italian pope would have been much more attuned to the possibility of such a consequence.

With respect to the problems to which Orsini's wilful and excessive partiality gave rise, one final case warrants mention. In October 1335, two months after Orsini's death, Benedict XII enjoined the archbishop of Cagliari to resolve a complicated suit between two nuns of the Benedictine convent of Santa Maria de Nasta, in Massa Marittima. On the death of Abbess Anastasia, the nuns of the convent sought refuge from the conflicts of the region at the monastery San Pietro *in Silki*, in the Sardinian diocese of Torre. While there they elected one of their number, Paola, as their new abbess. Although the election was wholly canonical, and Paola had exercised her office effectively for some fifteen years, an objection was raised by Costanza Peruzzi de Calci, a nun of Sant'Agnesa in Pisa. Orsini, it seems,

had informed the abbot of San Savino, Pisa, that Santa Maria was vacant and instructed him to install Costanza as abbess. Upon taking possession of the convent, Costanza violently ejected Paola and another nun, Caterina de Valle, before subjecting the convent to her own ruinous misrule. Paola and Caterina implored the pope to do justice; it now fell to the archbishop of Cagliari to undo the damage that the legate had done. The reasons for the legate's intervention are not specified, though Benedict had reason to suspect the worst: in a remarkable passage, the pope accused the now deceased Orsini of deliberately lying about the status of the convent.[55] Why he would have done so is a mystery. Orsini was more than willing to bend or break the rules where his family was concerned, but Costanza had no blood connection to the legate. The circumstances—and, perhaps, the intensity of the pope's anger at the whole affair—do not discourage salacious speculation, though the legate, for all his faults, does not seem to have inclined toward sexual incontinence, and there is no evidence whatsoever of an inappropriate relationship between Orsini and Costanza. It is enough to say that Orsini's conduct in the matter does not reveal a temperament well suited to an impartial exercise of the legatine office.

Regardless of its failure, or the many causes thereof, Orsini's mission played a part in shaping subsequent papal policy in Italy. When the more pacific policies of Benedict XII and Clement VI failed to bring peace to the peninsula, the popes returned to the more belligerent and ambitious policy of John XXII, but with some significant modifications. Neither the "Gallic" legation of Bertrand du Poujet nor the "Italic" legation of Giovanni Orsini had obtained the desired results. Poujet, for all his considerable ability, never truly understood the social and cultural forces at work in northern Italy; he strove to apply the Gallo-centric policies of Avignon to a society grown bitterly intolerant of foreign—and above all Gallic—intervention. Poujet's governing strategies in Bologna drew their inspiration, not from centuries of Bolognese tradition, but from the administrative spirit of the fourteenth-century curia. It is telling that the two Bolognese

[55] *. . . suggerente mendaciter bone memorie Iohanni sancti Theodori, diacono cardinali tunc in illis partibus Apostolice Sedis legato, quod predictum monasterium Sancte Marie tanto tempore vacaret* . . . See José Trenchs and Regina Sáinz de la Maza, eds., *Documentos pontificios sobre Cerdeña de la época de Alfonso el Benigno (1327–1336)* (Barcelona, 1983), pp. 194–195, #278.

bishops whose successive provisions he secured were Languedocians; the first, Étienne Ugonet (1331–32), had been chancellor of Poujet's *familia*, and the second, Bertrand Tissandier (1332–34), was one of Poujet's own kinsmen. Such actions inevitably inflamed local sensibilities, which quickly came to perceive Poujet as an emblem and agent of heavy-handed foreign oppression.[56] Orsini, by contrast, was so deeply invested in the affairs of central Italy that he quickly subordinated the papacy's interests in the region to his own. When Innocent VI revived the martial policy of John XXII in Italy, he placed his hopes neither in a Gallic nor in an Italic legatine model, but rather in the great Castilian cardinal, Gil Álvarez de Albornoz.[57]

If Orsini's mission should be considered a response to the mission of Poujet, Albornoz's mission should perhaps be seen as a response to both. Albornoz brought with him to the Italian theater a measure of what one might call "cultural neutrality". It is true that Albornoz was a foreigner, but he was not a "Gaul"—and it is impossible to exaggerate how important that was in fourteenth-century Italy. As an Iberian, Albornoz was intimately familiar with the dynamics of a culturally particularized and politically fragmented Mediterranean society, but he brought to the table a personal detachment wholly absent from the mission of Giovanni Orsini. His exceptional military and administrative skills were honed during his service as Benedict XII's crusading legate against the Moors in Spain in the 1340s.[58] It is also important that Innocent VI was careful to burn off some of the jurisdictional fog that had hung over Orsini's mission. Albornoz was not only *legatus a latere*, but "Vicar-General of the Papal States," a title which gave him a clearly defined place in the administrative hierarchy.[59] Innocent also clarified his legate's position *vis-à-vis* the Inquisition; invested with the power to enquire and proceed against inquisitors, to remove them from office and replace

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[56] See Antonioli, *Conservator pacis et iustitie*, pp. 36–46.

[57] See Gardi, pp. 387–390.

[58] For Albornoz's skilled handling of the Algeciras campaign see J. Gautier Dalché, "A propos d'une mission en France de Gil de Albornoz: opérations navales et difficultés financières lors du siège d'Algésira (1341–1344)," in *El Cardenal Albornoz* 1, pp. 247–263.

[59] See the text, distinct from the general mandate, in Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes et curiales*, #353; for the administrative authority which this title conferred see Antonio Marongiu, "Albornoz, legislatore," in *El Cardenal Albornoz* 3 (Bologna, 1973) p. 29. Colliva (p. 160) claims that Orsini too had been vicar-general, but I have found no documentary evidence in support of the claim. See also Mollat, "Contribution," pp. 574–580.

them with men of his own choosing,[60] Albornoz was, beyond any doubt, in charge of the Inquisition within his territories.

More importantly, perhaps, Albornoz was able to develop new legatine policies, combining the more effective features of the Gallic and Italian models but transcending the limitations of both. He undertook the difficult task of reconciling strong, central papal government with local traditions, new political concepts and the enduring desire for autonomy;[61] in so doing, he enjoyed a success which had eluded Orsini and Poujet. Poujet's military and administrative leadership had been, for the most part, French or Provençal; Orsini depended on relatives or affiliates. Both approaches excluded, albeit in quite different ways, local powers and structures from the reestablishment of order in their legatine territories.

Albornoz, on the other hand, made local powers, even initially hostile ones, part of the new order in the Papal States. He did not simply draw his enemies into extended conflicts (as Poujet did) or force them into humiliating submissions (like Orsini), but tried to rehabilitate them. After Albornoz defeated Galeotto and Malatesta "Guastafamiglia" Malatesta of Rimini at Paderno (29 April 1355), he not only allowed the "scourges of the *Marche* and Romagna" to remain in power in Rimini, but named them Apostolic Vicars there and in three other towns, in exchange for a payment of 6,000 florins and the service of a hundred horsemen in Romagna and the March, annually. By 1358 Galeotto was captain-general of Albornoz's forces—a remarkable change for a man who had been excommunicated as an enemy of the Church just three years earlier.[62] Of course, not all of the Church's opponents benefited from Albornoz's generosity: the Visconti forfeited his trust forever by abusing the vicariates granted to them in the province of Bologna, and Albornoz never had much use for the treacherous Francesco Ordelaffi of Forlì. Even so, the creative flexibility with which Albornoz governed stands in stark

[60] Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes et curiales*, #360.

[61] Paolo Prodi, *Lo sviluppo dell'assolutismo nello Stato Pontificio (secoli xv–xvi)*, 1: *La monarchia papale e gli organi centrali di governo* (Bologna, 1968), p. 37; Marongiu, pp. 31–32.

[62] Partner, *Lands of St. Peter*, pp. 343–344. For Albornoz's policy with respect to the *signori* see Mollat, "Albornoz et l'institution des Vicaires dans les États de l'Église (1353–1367)," in *El Cardenal Albornoz* 1, pp. 345–354, especially pp. 347–349; see also Dupré Theseider, "Egidio dell'Albornoz," ibid., pp. 443–444, and Prodi, pp. 37–38.

contrast to both the rigidity of Poujet[63] and the almost calculated chaos with which Orsini too often played his hand. Albornoz allowed the cities of the Papal States to retain varying degrees of autonomy, including, in many cases, the rights to elect their own *podestà*, to exercise *merum et mixtum imperium*, and to determine their own financial policies. Through such concessions, and through clear demonstrations of his even-handedness (usually by requiring the readmission of exiles), Albornoz was able to exact oaths of fidelity from the citizens of conquered or willingly subjected polities—oaths which had, for the most part, real staying power.[64]

Albornoz was also a more ambitious and careful legislator than his predecessors had been. The constitutions he issued at Fano for the March of Ancona in 1357 marked the first real attempt to provide a systematic, legislative foundation for the Papal States.[65] This comprehensive code drew from a wide range of diverse sources, including the constitutions of earlier envoys to Italy; significantly, it did not make reference to the controversial legislation enacted by Orsini and Poujet. Where Orsini's constitutions in Florence and Poujet's statutes in Bologna trod on local sensibilities and customs, Albornoz was careful to enshrine local political realities in his law-code.[66] He also solicited the wisdom of the legislative tradition itself, making use of provisional constitutions issued in the Papal States by the nuncio Bertrand de Déaulx in 1335 and 1336. It seems too that he sought inspiration in the cohesive codes of Alfonso X in Castile and, on the advice of his collaborator, Niccolò Spinelli, in the constitutions of Frederick II in Sicily. He was thus able not only to establish a new order for papal Italy, but, through the creation of a grand legal framework, to preserve it.[67]

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[63] Colliva, pp. 137–138.

[64] Dupré Theseider, "Egidio dell'Albornoz," pp. 444–446. For Macerata see Emilia Saracco Previdi, "L'Albornoz e Macerata. Un esempio della politica albornoziana nelle Marche," in *El Cardenal Albornoz* 1, pp. 641–644.

[65] Prodi, p. 36, and Brando Brandi, "Le *Constitutiones S.M. Ecclesiae* del Card. Egidio Albornoz," *BIST* 6 (1888), pp. 37–38. They remained the basis for government in the Papal States into the nineteenth century. The text, containing 178 constitutions in six books, is found in Colliva, pp. 533–725.

[66] Colliva, p. 138. Poujet's statutes, issued in September 1332, survive only in fragments. See Ciaccio, pp. 53–54; for Poujet's financial reforms and decrees, ibid., pp. 49–53.

[67] Marongiu, pp. 31–32. For the influence of Bertrand de Déaulx, see Partner, *Lands of St. Peter*, p. 348; for the likely influence of Alfonso X and Frederick II, see Marongiu, p. 28.

If, in the end, it was the genius of Albornoz that finally enabled the papacy to go home in the time of Gregory XI, one cannot forget that the reconstruction of papal authority in central Italy thereafter took decades, and not simply because of the outbreak of the Great Schism in 1378. One must also acknowledge that Albornoz's success owed much to the legations of Bertrand du Poujet and his less familiar counterpart, Giovanni Gaetano Orsini. Orsini's mission demonstrated clearly that there were alternatives to the Avignon papacy's heavy dependence on French and Angevin agents, though these too entailed their own set of problems and risks. And if Orsini, like Poujet, failed in the end, his ephemeral successes were perhaps enough to show, in the long run, that the Avignon papacy's "Italian problem" was not insoluble—though its effective solution required greater temperance and detachment than Cardinal Giovanni Gaetano Orsini was able to bring into the turbulent arena of fourteenth-century Italy.

APPENDIX A

GENERAL MANDATE OF THE LEGATION[1]
RV 113, ff. 350vb–351va
18 April 1328

Dilecto filio Johanni sancti Theodori diacono cardinali, apostolice sedis legato

Quia nonnumquam, quod coniectura fore sufficiens persuasit, | contingit docente magistra rerum experientia insufficiens declarari, oportunum reputamus et congruum, ut talis insufficientia proinde suppleatur. Dudum siquidem Lombardie ac Tuscie ac aliarumque partium uicinarum statum miserabilem per tempestuosos guerrarum et commotionum flatus et turbines ab hoste pacis <ac> turbatore quietis deformatum, non absque mentis amaritudine ac dolorum inmensitate, intra nostra precordia sepius reuoluentes et cupientes more patris beneuoli que non pretereuntis incommoda filiorum eidem statui de salubri et oportuno remedio prouidere, dilectum filium nostrum Bertrandum tituli sancti Marcelli presbyterum cardinalem, apostolice sedis legatum, cuius profunditatem scientie, claritatem industrie aliarumque grandia uirtutum et probitatis merita, quibus ipsum decorauit altissimus, in magnis et arduis nouimus ab experto ad partes ipsas cum plene legationis officio, de fratrum nostrorum consilio, duxerimus destinandum, et licet ipse tanquam vir uirtuosus et prudens, iniuncte sibi legationis officium et fideliter exequendo, circa reformationem status eiusdem, non sine multis laboribus et solicitudinibus uariis laborauerit hactenus et adhuc continue laborare non cesset, tanquam hereticorum ac infidelium et rebellium partium Lombardie succrescente malicia et superbia semente, idem legatus in prouincia Tuscie ac certis aliis partibus adiacentibus nequit, ut

[1] The text has been edited elsewhere; see Edouard Winkelmann, ed. *Acta imperii inedita, saeculi xiii. et xiv. Urkunden und Briefe zur Geschichte des Kaiserreichs und des Königsreichs Sicilien in den Jahren 1198–1400* (Innsbruck, 1880–1885), 2, pp. 790–791, #1128; the edition has some minor problems (e.g., p. 790, l.28). See also Riezler (pp. 279–280, #666), who omits the opening formula (*Quia . . . suppleatur*). See Theiner 1, p. 542, #DCCXVII, an edition of the letter sent to the papal officials in the Papal States giving notice of Orsini's appointment.

exposcit partium ipsarum status miserabilis et expedit, sue partes solicitudinis exercere, sicut ad nostri appellatus auditum pertulit multorum partium earundem fidelium instantia sepius repetita. Nos autem, qui in agro dominico diuina prouidentia operari quamuis immeriti constituti sumus, uigilantie studiis quantum nobis ex alto permittitur, ad operam manus nostre possibilitatis libenter apponimus, quam eisdem partibus et egro illarum statu reddi speramus, Deo propicio, futuram, quid illarum partium ecclesie deuotis expediat mentalibus occulis intuentes, quid ne operis circa premissam | pendi debeat, profundis cogitationibus mediantes, multis quoque ad hoc requisitionibus et supplicationibus populorum partium earundem fidelium, per suos solemnes ambaxiatores ad nostram presentiam propter hoc destinatos frequentius, excitati quod ipsam Tuscie prouinciam et certas partes alias inferius designatas legatum alium, de fratrum ipsorum consilio, prouidimus destinandum, attendentes igitur quod gratiarum dator altissimus personam tuam nobilitate generis, scientie magnitudine, prouidentie dono, discretionis uirtute, industrie munere, circumspectionis gracia et aliarum uirtutum titulis insignauit humeros tuos fortitudinis robore muniendo, ut onera grauia facilius supportares, plenam quoque, immo plenissimam, de huiusmodi tuis laudabilibus meritis fiduciam obtinentes, licet apud sedem apostolicam ex tui maturitate consilii, tua non modicum oportuna presentia dinoscitur, nosque illa careamus inuiti, te tamen ob honorem et exaltationem ecclesie ad reformationem et directionem necessarias ac desideratam quietem prouincie ac partium predictarum, de fratrum nostrorum consilio, illuc tanquam pacis angelum duximus destinandum, discretioni tue in eadem prouincia Tuscie tam in imperio quam in terris Romane ecclesie constituta, necnon archiepiscopatu Pisano et Castelli ac Perusina ciuitatibus et diocesibus, Massa Trabaria, ciuitate Vrbini, diocesi et districtu ipsius, Marchie Anconitane, ducatus Spoletani prouinciis, Campanie, Maritime et Sabine comitatibus, patrimonio beati Petri in Tuscia, et Vrbeuetana, Viterbiensi, Thiburtina, Reatina, Tudertina, Interanensi et Narniensi ciuitatibus et diocesibus, omnibus aliis prouinciis et terris in litteris legationis dicti Bertrandi cardinalis legati expressis, necnon insulis et terris Sardinie et Scorsice, sub ipsius Bertrandi legatione libere remanentibus et inclusis, plene legationis officium committendo, | vt euellas et destruas, dissipes et desperdas, edificies et plantes ac facias, auctoritate nostra, quecumque ad honorem Dei, prosperum statum partium earundem ac reformationem pacis fidelium uideris expedire; concessa tibi auctoritate simili,

contradictores et rebelles quoslibet, preterquam nostros et eiusdem romane ecclesie officiales, quos nobis specialiter reseruamus, per excommunicationis uel interdicti uel amotionis aut depositionis sententias siue aliter per censuram ecclesiasticam, appellatione postposita, compescendi, quibuslibet indulgentiis, priuilegiis seu litteris, quibusuis personis, locis uel ordinibus, generaliter uel specialiter ab eadem sede concessis, de quibus quorumque totis tenoribus aut de ipsorum locorum, ordinum et personarum nominibus propriis in litteris specialis mentio sit habenda, per que nullumcumque in hac parte uolumus afferi suffragium, nequaquam obstantibus, libera facultate. Quocirca discretioni tue per apostolica scripta mandamus, quatinus iniunctum tibi ministerium laboris huiusmodi, pro diuina et eiusdem sedis ac nostra reuerencia, suscipiens sic illud uiriliter sicque solicite ac laudabiliter iuxta datam tibi a Deo prudentiam, exequaris quod de tuis studiosis laboribus, celesti fauente clementia, desiderati fructus adueniant, quos speramus, tuque proinde diuine retributionis premium merearis. Nos enim sententias quas tuleris et penas quas inflixeris in rebelles, ratas habebimus et faciemus auctore domino usque ad satisfactionem condignam inuiolabiliter obseruari. Ceterum partes predictas tibi decretas superius ab omni iurisdictione dicti Bertrandi cardinalis legati tenore presentium prorsus eximimus, volentes et decernentes ut huiusmodi tua legatione durante in eisdem tibi decretis partibus, nulli alii, nisi tibi postquam eas ingressus fueris, super hiis que ad commisse legationis officium pertinent, pareantur. Datum Auenioni, xv kalendas maii anno X^{o}.

APPENDIX B

SUBSIDIARY POWERS[1]

1. All ecclesiastical persons in the lands of Orsini's legation are ordered to receive the legate with honor, to heed him as apostolic legate, and to fulfill his commands and ad-monitions faithfully and devoutly (#26399)

2. *Item* dukes, princes, *marchesi*, counts, barons, knights, communities, corporate entities (*universitates*), *populi* (#26400)

3. Faculty to proceed against promoters of scandal and discord, and enemies of the peace (#26401)

4. All prelates, ecclesiastics both secular and regular, of whatever order; *marchesi*, counts, etc.; communities, corporate entities, and individuals of Tuscany and other parts of Orsini's legation, are ordered to heed and obey Orsini and his deputies, in matters (*negotiis*) committed to him (#26402)

5. Faculty of exercising ecclesiastical censure against all those bearing harm to him or his *familia* without rendering satisfaction after having been warned (#26403)

6. Faculty to punish and deprive any ordained cleric of all indulgences and privileges granted from the Holy See, for disobedience to him, unless satisfaction be rendered after suitable warning is given (#26404)

7. Faculty of conscripting and retaining anyone from the Dominican, Franciscan, and other orders within his legation, as often as and wherever needed, for business necessary to his legation; those so employed may be granted licence to ride horses and to eat meat (#26405)

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[1] Taken from *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*; dated 17 April 1327 (unless otherwise noted).

8. Faculty of depriving any secular cleric of all graces granted by the Holy See, and of halting the execution of the letters of these graces, for disobedience to him (#26406)

9. Power to levy evections according to the needs of his legation, notwithstanding the constitution of Lateran IV[2] (#26407)

10. Faculty to force prelates and ecclesiastics, through ecclesiastical censure, to provide whatever is needed for his nuncios (#26408)

11. Concession to leave his legatine territories, should the need arise, and to delay in neighboring parts, without the cessation of legatine authority (#26409)

12. Faculty of compelling all prelates or ecclesiastics, regardless of previously granted exemption, to pay all procurations owed to him (#26410)

13. Faculty to demand whatever is necessary for his legation from Dominicans, Franciscans and other orders, even outside the boundaries of legation (#26411)

14. Concession to meet and treat with the ambassadors and nuncios of communes and private individuals, even during the celebration of Mass, and to receive and respond to letters of all ambassadors and nuncios of towns, fiefs and individuals, even those who have been excommunicated by their ordinaries for heresy (#26412)

15. Faculty of exercising ecclesiastical censure over all prelates and regular or secular religious, of any order, dignity or status (#26413)

16. Orsini is notified that, by papal design, the powers of his legation are in no way to be diminished (#26414)

17. Faculty of providing suitable persons to canonries expecting prebends in 24 cathedrals or collegial churches, within the boundaries of his legation (#26415)

18. Faculty to suspend and relax sentences of interdict and suspension incurred by cities of his legation through papal letters, legates, nuncios, or judges delegate (#26416)

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[2] John XXII is dispensing Orsini from the restrictions placed on levies by Innocent III, allowing for, conceivably, unrestricted procurations and evections (see above, pp. 86–87).

19. Faculty of dispensing 20 clerics within his legation from defects of order or age so that they can receive and retain single benefices *cum cura* (#26417)

20. Faculty of dispensing priests within his legation from irregularities they may have incurred, even suspension from office, for blessing a second marriage (#26418)

21. Faculty of dispensing prelates and ecclesiastics from irregularities they may have incurred during his legation by pronouncing sentences of excommunication upon others contrary to the requirements of the constitution of Innocent IV and then not abstaining from divine office[3] (#26419)

22. Faculty of dispensing 40 ecclesiastics of his legation from irregularities they may have incurred, during his legation, by receiving orders while excommunicated and ministering in them, or by celebrating or attending the divine office or Mass while excommunicated, suspended or under interdict (#26420)

23. Concession to grant indulgences of 1 year and 100 days to all persons coming to him or present with him during the divine office or at public assemblies (#26421)

24. Faculty of absolving all ecclesiastics who have incurred excommunication by contravening synodal statutes (#26422)

25. Concession to grant indulgences of 40 days to all true penitents obliged to construct or repair 100 churches, hospitals and bridges, or to offer support to the sick and the poor (#26423)

26. Power to dispense 10 ecclesiastics from defects of birth (if born to priests or out of wedlock), so that they can hold all orders and a benefice, even one *cum cura* (#26424)

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[3] I Lyons, cons. 19 (v. *Sext* I, xi, c.1) required judges to give sentences of excommunication, suspension or interdict in writing, noting the cause of the sentence and, upon request of the excommunicate, presenting a copy to him within one month's time of the request; the process must be recorded in a public instrument or in testimonial letters corroborated by authentic seals. Judges failing to do so would be barred from the Church and from divine offices for one month (cf. Alberigo, p. 291).

27. Faculty to absolve clerics and laymen in his legation from excommunication incurred for damaging or burning churches or ecclesiastical possessions (#26425)

28. Faculty to grant licenses to retain the revenues of benefices while absent for the study of theology, to 20 persons within the bounds of his legation (#26426)

29. Faculty to grant notariates (*tabellionatus*) to 30 unwed persons of his legation, so long as they are not in holy orders (#26427)

30. Indulgence of having Mass (even sung) celebrated before daybreak or after the proper hour (though not after nones) during his legation (#26428)

31. Indulgence of having Mass (aloud one time only) and the divine office celebrated in places under interdict both within and without his legation (#26429)

32. Indulgence to have his confessor absolve him of all sins *in articulo mortis*, once only (#26430)

33. Faculty to dispense ten men and ten women within the fourth grade of consanguinity or affinity so that they can marry (#26431)

34. Faculty to dispense from defects of birth any person of his legation who was born to an unmarried man, a deacon or subdeacon, and to an unmarried woman, who wishes to be or is a practicing cleric or priest, provided he was not born of incest or adultery or to a priest (#26432)

35. Faculty to reserve to his own collation six dignities, parsonages, or offices, *cum* or *sine cura*, to six appropriate persons, in six cathedrals or collegiate churches, whether secular or regular, within the boundaries of his legation (#26433)

36. Faculty to absolve from excommunication all those excommunicated by judges-delegate of the Apostolic See who are now unable to be absolved because the judges have died or their jurisdictions have expired (#26434)

37. Power to have cognizance of all cases and disputes amongst residents of his legatine territories, which have been or are to be forwarded to the Apostolic See (#26435)

38. Faculty to receive all resignations of benefices and to confer these benefices, *ex causa permutationis* (#26436)

39. Indulgence that all clerics with him during his legation may receive all revenues from their benefices without residence (#25437)

40. All ecclesiastical persons, secular and regular, who receive these papal letters, are ordered to receive hospitably and to treat honestly with the legate, providing whatever is necessary to him and his entourage (#26438)

41. Indulgence to have the divine office and Mass celebrated in places under interdict (#26440; 4 June 1326)

APPENDIX C

FAMILIARES OF CARDINAL GIOVANNI GAETANO Orsini (date = first mention as *familiaris*)

1. Gregorio Fatii of Rome, *capellanus* (13 June 1318; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #7484)

2. Ligo of Orvieto, *capellanus, familiaris, camerarius*; papal chaplain (20 October 1319; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII* #10511); bishop of Nola, 1340–1348

3. Mathieu de Neuville-sur-Méhargne (Flanders), *clericus, familiaris* (10 January 1321; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #12833); died *apud SA* before 23 February 1323 (ibid., #16985)

4. Pinus Francisci of Carmignano (Tuscany), *capellanus* (died *apud SA* before 13 April 1323; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #17192)

5. Lippo Vanni of Carmignano, *clericus* (17 April 1323; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #17207)

6. Niccolò Palinerii Tartari de Turre of Rome, *clericus, familiaris* (11 October 1324; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #20826)

7. Francesco Hugolini de Castroleonis of Bologna, *clericus, familiaris* (25 July 1325; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #22886)

8. Gerio Guidocti of Città di Castello, *familiaris; scriptor poenitentiariae apostolicae* (retired from clerical orders to marry before 1 March 1326; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #24528)

9. Francesco Pauli of Orvieto, notary, *clericus, familiaris; scriptor poenitentiariae apostolicae* (1 March 1326; ibid., #24528); at the time of his death *apud SA* (before 16 May 1334) he was notary and *capellanus* of Matteo Orsini, OP, cardinal priest of Santi Giovanni e Paolo (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #63153)

10. *Magister* Thomas Fastolf, *jurisperitus*, of Yarmouth (diocese of Norwich), *clericus, familiaris domesticus, commensalis* (24 May 1326; *Lettres*

communes de Jean XXII, #25457); papal chaplain and *palatii apostolici auditor causarum* under Benedict XII (*Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #7731)

11. Romano Jacobi of Rossano, *clericus, familiaris, commensalis* (24 May 1326; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #25461)

12. Jean Anglici of Rouen, *clericus, familiaris* (24 May 1326; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #25467)

13. Conrad Nicholai de Budevois, *clericus, familiaris* (2 November 1326; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #26908)

14. Jean Alemanni of Bapaume, *clericus, familiaris* (10 March 1329; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #44700)

15. Giovanotto de Insula, *familiaris* (22 July 1331; Antonelli, "Notizie umbre," p. 477, #8)

16. Paolo Stefani de Patriciis of Rome, *familiaris* (21 November 1331; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #55732)

17. Giovanni de Turre of Rome, *familiaris* (25 July 1332; Fayen, #3255)

18. Lello de Turre of Rome, *familiaris* (25 July 1332; Fayen, #3255)

19. Thorus, *famulus* (12 June 1333; Antonelli, "Notizie umbre," p. 481, #38)

20. Pietro Petri dei Stabili, *familiaris* (8 October 1333; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #61766)

21. Giovanni dei Stabili of Pontecorvo (diocese of Aquino), *abbreviator, capellanus* (10 October 1333; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #61773)

22. Napoleone di Poncello Orsini of Rome, nephew, *capellanus* (10 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #309)

23. Baldo Jacobini of Livorno, *capellanus domesticus* (10 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII* #405)

24. Guillaume de Montmorin, *clericus, commensalis* (10 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #429)

25. Gentile di Francesco Orsini, nephew, *capellanus* (10 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #435)

26. Matteo di Giovanni Boboni of Rome, kinsman, *capellanus* (10 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #464)

27. Cecco Angelitti, *clericus, familiaris* (10 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #478)

28. Giovanni Petri Angeli of Rome, *commensalis* (10 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #487)

29. Lino of Trevi (Campagna-Marittima), auditor, *capellanus* (10 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #496)

30. *Magister* Scolario of Bagnorea, *capellanus, commensalis* (10 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #507)

31. Francesco Petri Ranucceti of Orvieto, *clericus* (11 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #530; Rehberg, *Die Kanoniker*, pp. 325–326 L152)

32. *Magister* Paolo Geminelli of San Gemini, *capellanus, physicus* (11 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #537)

33. Thomas Frederici of Clermont, *clericus commensalis* (10 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #1087)

APPENDIX D

BENEFICES OF GIOVANNI GAETANO ORSINI

1. Canonry with prebend, Rheims (before 17 March 1308); exchanged for archdeaconry of Coventry (v. #14; *Regestum Clementis papae V*, #2653)

2. Canonry of Paris (before 7 September 1316; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #217)

3. Canonry awaiting prebend, dignity or parsonage, or office, *cum cura* or *sine cura*, in York (7 September1316; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #713); prebend eventually provided in Laughton (*Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #279)

4. Canonry with prebend, St Peter's Basilica, Rome (before 7 September 1316; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #713)

5. Canonry awaiting prebend, Beauvais (before 7 September 1316; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #713)

6. Sinecure in Sant'Angelo di Subripa, Portua (before 7 September 1316; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #713)

7. Archdeaconry of Bibiesca, Burgos (before 9 September 1316; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #881)

8. Canonry with prebend, Bibiesca (before 9 September 1316; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #881)

9. Church of San Lorenzo, Salerno; *in commendam* (25 January 1317; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #2611)

10. Church of San Niccolò, Lupica; *in commendam* (25 January 1317; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #2611)

11. Priory of Marestay, Saintes, OSB; *in commendam* (25 July 1317; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #4502)

12. Priory of the monastery of St-Jean d'Angeliac, Saintes, OSB (25 July 1317; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #4502)

13. San Marco, Rome; *in commendam* (16 September 1317; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #5539)

14. Archdeaconry of Coventry; *in commendam* (12 June 1320); received from Riccardo Annibaldi in exchange for canonry and prebend of Rheims (*Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #11594)

15. Papal fief of Orvieto; *in commendam* (2 November 1321; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #13317)

16. Church of San Pietro di Cagnano, Aversa; *in commendam* (3 December 1321; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #14815)

17. Papal fief of Bitteto (14 September 1323; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #18236)

18. Papal fief of Brindisi (14 September 1323; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #18236)

19. Church of Sant'Angelo di Nocera, Salerno (subject to monastery of Cava, OSB; 12 January 1325; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #21368)

20. Church of Wearmouth, Durham; *in commendam* (23 October1325; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #23622)

21. Sant'Angelo in Pescheria, Rome; *in commendam* (assigned to Cardinal Giovanni di Stefano Colonna, December 1327; 1 November 1326; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #26885)

22. Abbey of Santa Maria, OSB, Florence; *in commendam* (17 September 1327; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #29886)

23. *Pieve* of Santa Maria in Impruneta (or "in Pineta"), Florence; *in commendam* (27 October 1329; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #47132)

24. Archdeaconry of Vernet, Bourges (before 28 February 1333; *Lettres communes de Jean XXII*, #48652)

25. Canonry, prebend and office of chamberlain of St-Martin, Tours (16 February 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #80)

26. Reservation of canonry with prebend, Cambrai (28 July 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #211)

27. Reservation of archdeaconry, Brabant (28 July 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #211)

28. Canonry with prebend, Saintes (Date uncertain; *Lettres communes de Benoît XII*, #241)

29. Canonry awaiting prebend, York (obliged to resign sacristy of York granted *gratia Johannis XXII* [see #3]; 9 January 1335; *Lettres communes de Benoit XII*, #298)

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